Col. Paul Chikuswe Chilanga (Rtd) v The Attorney General (2016/HP/2148) [2025] ZMHC 135 (31 December 2025)

- ~ ') IN THE IDGH COURT FOR ZAMBIA AT THE PRINCIPAL REGISTRY HOLDEN AT LUSAKA (Civil Jurisdiction) 2016/HP/2148 BETWEEN COL. PAUL CHIKUSWE C TIFF AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DEFENDANT Before the Honourable Lady Justice C. M. Lombe. For the Plaintiff: Mr. MZ Mwandenga with M Mwandenga of Messrs MZ Mwandenga and Company For the Defendant: Ms. NNkazi - Acting Senior State Advocate -Attorney General's Chambers JUDGMENT CASES REFERRED TO: 1. Bank of Zambia v Jonas Tembo and Others (SCZ/24/2002) 2. Amber Louise Guest Milas Tubonic v Beatrice Mulako Mukinga, Attorney General (2011) ZR Vol. 1. 3. O'Reilly v Madan.an (1983) 2 AC 237 (HL). 4. North Western Energy Cooperation Ltd v Energy Regulation Board (2011) ZMHC 20. OTHER MATERIALS REFERRED TO: 1. G. Monahan Essential Contract Law Routledge-Cavendish 2001. 2. P. Richards Law of Contract Pearson Longman, 2007. JI INTRODUCTION 1.1 This is an action by the Plaintiff, a retired officer of the Zambia Army, against the Attorney General, sued in his capacity as the principal legal adviser to the Government and on behalf of the Commissioner of Lands. The Plaintiff seeks various declaratory and monetary reliefs arising from events connected to his occupation of Government housing during his service and subsequent dealings with the Commissioner of Lands following his retirement. 1.2 In essence, the Plaintiffs claim relates to three broad matters. First, he seeks reimbursement and damages arising from his stated entitlement to purchase a Government house in Kitwe which he formerly occupied as part of his conditions of service. Second, he claims damages for loss of opportunity to purchase alternative Government accommodation offered to him being House No. 15 Chilubula Road, Olympia Park after his transfer to Lusaka. Third, he seeks a declaration that he is entitled to be allocated a piece of land in a prime area of the city, or, in the alternative, compensation equivalent to the value of such land. 1.3 The factual background to the dispute is largely common cause. While in service, the Plaintiff was allocated a House No. 26 Choma Avenue Parklands in Kitwe. A dispute subsequently arose as to whether he was entitled to purchase that house under the Government Sale of Pool Houses Scheme introduced in 1996. J2 That dispute was litigated to finality and determined by the Supreme Court, which held that another officer was the lawful sitting tenant and therefore entitled to purchase the house. Following his transfer to Lusaka, the Plaintiff was offered alternative Government accommodation, which he declined. After his retirement, further engagements took place with the Commissioner of Lands, culminating in an offer of land in Kafue, which the Plaintiff also rejected. 1.4 The Plaintiff now contends that the foregoing events give rise to contractual, equitable, and compensatory rights enforceable against the State. The Defendant, on the other hand, denies any legal liability and maintains that the Plaintiff had no entitlement to the Kitwe house, that no contract or legitimate expectation arose in his favour, and that any offers made to him after the Supreme Court decision were purely ex gratia. PLEADINGS 2.0 STATEMENT OF CLAIM 2.1 By an Amended Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim filed on 21 st September 2017 the Plaintiff sought the following reliefs: i. ii. R eimbursement ofK650=00. A declaration that the Plaintiff is entitled to be given a piece of land in a prime area of Lusaka in lieu of a house. iii. An order that the Commissioner of Lands should offer the Plaintiff a piece of land in a pn'me area of Lusaka. J3 e • zv. Alternatively, compensation in the form of the Kwacha equivalent of the prime land that the Plaintiff is entitled to be given. v. Damages for breach of contract. vi. K98,878=60 being a refund of all legal expenses and costs incurred by the Plaintiff in defending the matter bearing cause No.2001IHPI1070 in the High Court. vii. KIO, 320,000=00 (now KJ0.320=00) being a refund of the money that was paid by the Plaintiff for the abortive purchase of House No. 26 Choma Avenue Park/ands Kitwe less consideration fees, registration fees and preparation fees for the lease of the land to be given to the Plaintiff in lieu of a house: vm. K123, 473=00 (now K123=00) being money paid for the consideration fees, registration fees and preparation fees for the lease in respect of House No. 26 Choma Avenue, Park/ands Kitwe; zx. Damages or compensation for the loss of an opportunity to purchase House No. 15 Chilubula Road, Olympia Park Lusaka; x. Interest on the sums and/ or damages in "a'~ "d". "e", ''f' ''g" "h" and ''!"from such dates and such rates as the Court may deem just and expedient: xz. Costs of and incidental to these proceedings. 2.2 It was stated that the Plaintiff in January 1992, while stationed in Kitwe, had been allocated House No. 26, Choma Avenue, J4 .. Parklands, Kitwe, by the Zambia Army as an incident of his employment. 2.3 At the time, the house was government-owned property. It was further stated that around March 1997, following the introduction of a government scheme for the sale of pool houses, he was advised by the Ministry of Works and Supply that he was eligible to apply for the purchase of the said house. It was stated that the Plaintiff proceeded to apply for the house and it was offered to him at a price of Kl0,320,000.00 (now Kl0,320.00). 2.4 The Plaintiff claimed that he paid the offer fees on 7th March 2001, namely: Annual rent: K22,473 .00 Consideration fees: K25,000.00 Registration fees: K46,000.00 Preparation fees: K30,000.00 Total: K123,473.00 2.5 He also stated that he paid the full purchase price ofKl0,320,000.00 in three instalments to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, as follows : a. 29/08/01 b. 24/09/01 C. 29/10/01 K3,000,000.00 KS,320,000.00 K2,000,000.00 Total: Kl0,320,000.00 2.6 The Plaintiff stated that upon completion of payment, Certificate of Title No. L10611 for House No. 26, Choma Avenue, Parklands, Kitwe was issued to him by the Commissioner of Lands. He further stated that under the belief that he was now the lawful owner of the property, he paid rates in the sum ofK650,000.00 (now K650.00) to K.itwe City Council on 13th December 2006. 2. 7 He further stated that upon being transferred to Lusaka, House No. 26 Choma Avenue, Parklands, Kitwe was reallocated by the Ministry of Works and Supply to one Lt. Colonel Progress N amenda Sianga. It was stated that the Plaintiff still under the belief that he was the owner of the property, he offered the house to the Zambia Army for lease. 2.8 The Plaintiff also stated that upon relocation to Lusaka, he had been allocated House No. 15, Chilubula Road, Olympia Park, on p t March 1999, as an incident of his employment. He stated that he, however, did not take occupation of the said house, as it appeared to have been allocated to another person. 2.9 He further stated that in October 2001, Lt. Colonel Sianga commenced proceedings under Cause No. 2001 / HP/ 1070 against him, one S. M. Sweta (Secretary to the Committee on the Sale of Government Pool Houses), and the State, challenging the sale of House No . 26 Choma Avenue, Parklands, Kitwe seeking cancellation of his Certificate of Title relating to the property. J6 • 2.10 According to the Plaintiff, on 30th July 2012, the High Court delivered judgment in favour of Lt. Colonel Sianga and ordered the cancellation of Certificate of Title No. L10611. It was stated that being dissatisfied with the Judgment of the High Court, the Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court under Cause No. 217 /2012. However, on 10th November 2015, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment and the cancellation of the title. 2.11 It was stated that following the judgment of the Supreme Court, the Plaintiff wrote to the Government on 11 th December 2015 requesting an alternative house in Lusaka. He stated that he was informed that none was available. He further stated that on 4th and 12th February 2016, he engaged the Ministry of Works and Supply on the matter, and the Ministry verbally proposed offering him land in a prime area of Lusaka as compensation. 2.12 The Plaintiff stated that he accepted the offer by letter dated 19th February 2016. He stated that, as a result, there came into existence a binding and enforceable contract between himself and the Government whereby the latter agreed to provide him with a piece of prime land in Lusaka in lieu of a house. 2.13 It was stated that by a letter dated 23rd February 2016 from the Ministry of Works and Supply to the Secretary to the Cabinet, a recommendation was made the Secretary to the Cabinet direct the Commissioner of Lands to identify suitable land for the Plaintiff. It J7 • was further stated that the Secretary to the Cabinet, by letter dated 24th February 2016, acted on this recommendation. 2.14 The Plaintiff stated that, in breach of the said contract and without lawful justification, the Commissioner of Lands issued an invitation to treat dated 15th July 2016, offering him land in Kafue namely Plot No. KAFUE/LN-24742/1040 instead of prime land in Lusaka. It was stated that the Plaintiff rejected the offer, asserting that the land offered was not prime and was not in Lusaka as contemplated under the agreement. 2.15 It was stated furthermore that by reason of that breach, the Plaintiff suffered loss and damage. It was stated that he was entitled to be given prime land in Lusaka in lieu of a house. 2.16 It was stated that in the alternative, that the Government had mishandled the sale of House No . 26 Choma Avenue, Parklands, Kitwe, resulting in litigation. It was stated that the State were sued by Colonel Sianga and, in defending himself, the Plaintiff incurred legal costs in the High Court and further costs in the Supreme Court where he appeared in person. It was stated that the Plaintiff suffered loss and damage as a result. It was further stated that, based on the judgments in the High Court and Supreme Court, the Plaintiff was entitled to be refunded: a. The purchase price of Kl0,320,000.00 (now KI0,320.00), less statutory fees for the lease relating to the prime land to be allocated to him in Lusaka; and J8 b. The sum of K123 ,473.00 (now K123.00) which he had paid as consideration, registration, and preparation fees in relation to House No. 26 Choma Avenue, Parklands, Kitwe. 2.17 The Plaintiff claimed that these sums had been wrongfully withheld from him. 2.18 Finally, the Plaintiff stated in the alternative that the Government had also mishandled the allocation of House No. 15, Chilubula Road, Olympia Park, Lusaka, and thereby deprived him of the opportunity to purchase it as a sitting or would-be sitting tenant under the government pool housing scheme. DEFENDANT'S DEFENCE 3.1 The Defendant did not dispute the Plaintiffs employment status or the fact that he had been allocated House No. 26, Choma Avenue, Kitwe. However, the Defendant stated that the said house was not a Zambia Army institutional house, but rather a government pool house under the Ministry of Works and Supply. 3.2 The Defendant denied the Plaintiffs claim that he had applied for the purchase of the house in March 1997 under a government sale scheme, stating instead that the scheme had only been implemented on I st October 1996. It was further stated that by the time of the J9 • sale's commencement, the Plaintiff had already been transferred to Lusaka and was therefore not a sitting tenant. 3.3 The Defendant also denied that the Plaintiff qualified as a sitting tenant or that he was eligible to purchase the house, and called for strict proof regarding the payments allegedly made under the scheme. 3.4 As to the Plaintiff's payments, acquisition of title, and subsequent offer of the house for lease, the Defendant stated that all transactions and the issuance of the title deed were done in error. The Defendant further stated that these matters were within the peculiar knowledge of the Plaintiff. 3.5 The Defendant made no comment on the Plaintiff's request for an alternative house following the court's decisions, stating those matters were also within the Plaintiff's personal knowledge. 3.6 The Defendant did, however, admit that the Plaintiff was offered alternative land and stated that this was done purely out of compassion and humanitarian consideration, not under any contractual obligation. It was further stated that the Plaintiff had declined to accept the land offered. 3. 7 The Defendant denied that there had been any contract between the Plaintiff and the Government for the provision of land, asserting that there was never any intention to create legal relations. The JIO Government, it was argued, had made a compassionate gesture that was not legally binding. 3.8 The Defendant denied the Plaintiff's assertions that he had suffeed loss and damage and claimed that the Plaintiff had refused to accept alternative land. The Defendant also denied any obligation to reimburse the Plaintiff for legal expenses incurred in defending the action brought by Col. Sianga, stating that the Plaintiff had been sued in his personal capacity and could not shift the burden of legal costs to a co-defendant. 3.9 Further, the Defendant denied that the Plaintiff was entitled to any refund of the purchase price or associated fees, and denied the Plaintiff's entitlement to damages. PLAINTIFF'S REPLY 4.1 In reply, the Plaintiff stated that, as a senior Zambia Army officer, he had always been entitled to be allocated a government house through the Ministry of Works and Supply. He stated that the Government, without lawful justification, had failed, refused, or neglected to provide him with such a house. 4.2 He stated that following discussions with vanous government officers and officials, it was agreed that he would be given a piece of prime land in Lusaka in lieu of a government house. J 11 These officers and officials, the Plaintiff maintained, were acting on behalf of the Government. 4.3 The Plaintiff denied the Defendant's claim that the offer ofland was made out of compassion or humanitarian concern, as instructions issued in or around March 2016 by the Secretary to the Cabinet to the Commissioner of Lands, directed that land be identified for the Plaintiff in a prime area of Lusaka. Contrary to those instructions, the Commissioner offered land in Kafue in July 2016, which the Plaintiff rejected. He argued that Kafue did not qualify as prime land in Lusaka. 4.4 The Plaintiff relied on an exchange of correspondence between himself, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Works and Supply, and the Secretary to the Cabinet between February and March 2016 to support his claim that a legally binding contract had been formed between him and the Government for the provision of land in Lusaka in lieu of a house. 4.5 He stated that the Government's failure to provide such land constituted a breach of that contract and reiterated that he had suffered loss and damage as a result. 5. TRIAL 5 .1 At trial, the Plaintiff was the sole witness in his own cause. He testified that before his retirement from the Zambia Army in 2008, J 12 • he was posted to Kitwe in 1992, where he occupied House No. 26, Choma Avenue, Parklands, Kitwe. He testified that on 20th May 1996, he vacated the house, having been transferred to Lusaka. He also testified that is deputy at the time, Colonel Progress Sianga, immediately occupied the house. 5 .2 The Plaintiff testified that he came to learn, that Government was selling houses and therefore wrote to the Ministry of Works and Supply enquiring about the same. The Plaintiff testified that he qualified to purchase House No. 26 Choma Avenue, Parklands, Kitwe, which he had previously occupied, as the date for eligibility to do so was pr January 1996. He further testified that he however had to make the requisite application to purchase the house. 5.2 The Plaintiff testified that on 3rd March 1997, he made the application internally and on 1st March 1999, the Army Commander informed him of a meeting at the Ministry of Works and Supply. He stated that upon attending the said meeting, he was informed by a Mr. Sweta that he had been allocated House Number 15, Chilubula Close, Olympia Park, Lusaka, which he needed to purchase. He stated that he was handed an allocation slip, which was exhibited at page 3 of the Plaintiff's Bundle of Documents. 5.3 The Plaintiff testified that he visited House Number 15, Chilubula Close, Olympia Park, Lusaka, and inspected the same. He further testified that, having applied for House No. 26, Choma Avenue, Parklands, Kitwe, he was also given an offer letter for the same and Jl 3 was asked to make several payments towards it. The Plaintiff referred the Court to a receipt at page 106 of the Plaintiff's Bundle of Documents regarding full payment for House No. 26, Choma Avenue, Parklands, Kitwe. Following this, the Plaintiff testified that he was issued with Certificate of Title Number L10611, as appearing at page 103 of the Plaintiff's Bundle of Documents. 5.4 According to the Plaintiff, House No. 26, Choma Avenue, Parklands, Kitwe was occupied by Colonel Progress Sianga so he offered the same be rented out by the Zambian Army. He testified that, however, Colonel Progress Sianga sued the Plaintiff, claiming to be a sitting tenant. A long legal battle thereafter ensued, culminating in a Supreme Court Judgment in Appeal Number 217 / 2012, as exhibited at pages 68- 89 of the Plaintiff's Bundle of Documents, in favour of Colonel Sianga. 5.5 The Plaintiff testified that he then sought a replacement house by letter dated 16th November 2015 to the Attorney General. He testified that he followed up by letters dated 11 th December 2015 and 4th January 2016, the same exhibited in the Plaintiff's Bundle of Documents at page 90 and the Plaintiff's Supplementary Bundle of Documents at pages 1- 3, respectively.) 5.6 The Plaintiff testified that he pursued the matter further and, by a letter in response from the Ministry of Works and Supply to a letter from the Attorney General regarding occupation of House Number 15, Chilubula Close, Olympia Park, Lusaka, it was stated that he J14 never took up occupation, and as a result, there was no alternative house that could be given to him. 5. 7 The Plaintiff testified that, with his efforts looking bleak, he tabulated his incurred expenses and requested a refund. The Plaintiff stated that he was subsequently offered land in a prime area of Lusaka, which was confirmed by letter dated 19th February 2016, appearing at page 93 of the Plaintiffs Bundle of Documents. 5.8 The Plaintiff testified that the Commissioner of Lands was directed to avail him land, as per the letters appearing at pages 94, 95, and 96 of the Plaintiff's Bundle of Documents from the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Works and Supply and the Secretary to the Cabinet. The Plaintiff further testified that he was instead given land in Kafue, being Kafue/ LN/24742/1040, as shown by the offer letter exhibited at page 98 of the Plaintiff's Bundle of Documents. 5.9 The Plaintiff testified that he felt cheated therefore he commenced these proceedings. He added that he was never refunded any of the money he had paid towards the houses. 5 .10 In cross-examination the Plaintiff stated that he was a sitting tenant of House No. 26, Choma Avenue, Parklands, Kitwe, which he vacated on 20th May 1996. He stated that, to the best of his knowledge, the Cabinet Office Handbook on the Sale of Pool Houses was published in 1996, after he had vacated the house. 5 .11 The Plaintiff confirmed that, according to the Supreme Court Judgment, he was unable to purchase House No. 26, Choma Avenue, Parklands, Kitwe. He stated that the Cabinet Circular of 1996 did not provide for an alternative house for him. The Plaintiff disagreed that the State offered him land out of compassion or good Defence witness ill, as he had correspondence showing that it was agreed he be given land. 5.12 The Plaintiff also confirmed that he sought a refund of his legal expenses, following the suit commenced against him by Colonel Progress Sianga, wherein he was subjected to legal costs. 5 .13 There was nothing asked in re-examination 6 DEFENDANT'S CASE 6.1 The Defendant called one witness, Abraham Banda (Defence witness), an inspector at the Ministry of Infrastructure, Housing and Development. 6.2 The Defence witness testified that the procedure for the sale of pool houses to sitting tenants was that an eligible civil servant, who was a sitting tenant, needed to make an application by filling in Form GPl , which was submitted to the Permanent Secretary of the Province or Ministry. Once submitted, the Permanent Secretary or Minister would forward the application forms to the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Works and Supply. J 16 • 6.3 The Defence witness further testified that the Permanent Secretary would check the forms and, if satisfied, would then submit them to the Government Valuation Department, which would indicate the purchase price, among other things. Once done, the forms would be sent back to the Permanent Secretary and, if found to be in order, would be submitted to the Committee for the Sale of Government Houses for consideration. 6.4 The Defence witness further stated that after the forms were submitted, the Committee would verify them and ensure that the accompanying documents were attached- being a copy of the national registration card, a copy of the allocation slip to the house being applied for, and the latest payslip of the eligible civil servant. 6.5 It was Defence witness's testimony that after the Committee had considered and approved the application, it would make a recommendation to the Commissioner of Lands for issuance of an offer letter. He stated that once the offer was generated, the eligible civil servant would be given 90 days in which to accept the offer and begin paying for the property through the Ministry of Finance. At the same time, the Commissioner of Lands would start the process of issuing a Certificate of Title. The Defence witness added that the Committee would not offer the purchase of a house to someone who was not a sitting tenant, and Jl 7 .. there was no recourse for someone who did not meet the requirements. 6.6 When cross-examined, the Defence witness confirmed being aware of the Plaintiff's case and that he had been informed that the Government could assist him in securing a piece of land. When referred to pages 90 to 98 of the Plaintiff's Bundle of Documents, the Defence witness confirmed that the Plaintiff engaged the Defendant regarding an alternative house, and all efforts resulted in him being offered land, but not in Lusaka, as no other house could be availed to him. Further, he stated that the Plaintiff did not take possession of House Number 15, Chilubula Close, Olympia Park, Lusaka. 6.7 The Defence witness confirmed that Kafue/ LN/ 24742/ 1040 was availed to the Plaintiff following protracted discussions with the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Works and Supply, and the Secretary to the Cabinet. 6.8 There was nothing asked in re-examination. SUBMISSIONS 7.1 At the close of the trial, the Plaintiff's Counsel filed submissions, however the Defendant's submissions if any have never graced the Court's record. Be that as it may I will not restate the submissions on record, suffice to state that they may be referred to as and when it becomes necessary in the analysis of this matter. Jl8 • 8 LAW 8.1 It is trite that public policy demands that there is an end to litigation. For this reason, once a matter has been conclusively adjudicated upon a party who participated in such concluded proceedings cannot reopen issues relating to that matter unless there is good cause shown why all issues pertaining to that matter could not be dealt with in that matter. This is a principle called res judicata. In the case of Bank of Zambia v Jonas Tembo and others (SCZ Judgment No. 24 of 2002.) the Supreme Court held inter alia in that: ii. A plea of res judicata must show either an actual merger or that the same point had been actually decided between the same parties. 8.2 Further, in the case of Amber Louise Guest Milan Trbonic v Beatrice Mulako Mukinga,Attomey-General (2011) ZR Voll Matibini S. C. J, as he then was, had the occasion to discuss the principle of resjudicata when he stated as follows: Further, by a plea of res judicata, a party may be prevented from pursuing a cause of action if it is demonstrated that party had an opportunity earlier on of recovering in the first action that which he seeks to recover in the second action. The underlying principle regarding the plea of res judicata is expressed in the maxim,· reipublicaes ut sit finis litium, J 19 meaning that it is in the public interest that there should be an end to litigation. 8.3 Now the Plaintiff labours under the belief that there was a binding contract between the parties. According to the Learned Author of Essential Contract Law Cl>, at page 27: "A valid contract is a contract that the law will enforce and creates legal rights and obligations .... and contains all the three essential elements of formation: agreement (offer and acceptance); intention (to be bound by the agreement),· and consideration ... " 8.4 In relation to what amounts to a breach of contract the Learned > states at page 113 that Author of Law of Contract < "Where a person fails to perform their side of the contract then subject to the mitigating factors, they will be in breach of contract. A breach of contract will always give rise to a claim in damages, no matter how minor or serious the nature of the breach. Whether an innocent party is entitled to treat the contract as at an end, so that they can treat the contract as discharged, depends on whether the breach is so serious that it goes to the root of the contract, that is there is a breach of a primary obligation. " 8.5 In the case of O'Reilly v Madon.an [1983] 2 AC 237 (HL) Lord Diplock expressed the following opinion: "Since all remedies for infringements of rights protected by public law can be obtained upon an application for judicial review, as can also J20 .. remedies for infringements of rights under private law if such infringements should also be involved, it would in my view as a general rule be contrary to public policy, and as such an abuse of the process of the court, to permit a person seeking to establish that a decision of a public authority infringed rights to which he was entitled to protection under public law to proceed by way of an ordinary action and by this means to evade the provisions of Order 53 [now given statutory effect under the SCA-see above]for the protection of such authorities." 8.6 In relation to legitimate expectation Matibini S. C. J. in the case of North-Western Energy Company Limited v Energy Regulations Board (2011) ZMHC 70 held inter alia as follows: 18. "Legitimate expectation" arises where a decision maker has led someone to believe that they will receive or retain a benefit, or advantage including that a hearing will be held before a decision is taken. 19. The protection of legitimate expectation is at the root of the constitutional principle of the rule of law, which requires regularity, predictability and certainty in government's dealings with the public. 20. The doctrine of legitimate expectation derives its justification from the principle of allowing the individual to rely on assurances given and to promote certainty, and consistent administration. 21. The doctrine of estoppel applies in any situation in which because of a party's previous behaviour, it would be unconscionable to permit him to deny a fact. J21 • 22. Fundamental to the legitimacy of public decision-making, is the principle that official decisions should not be infected with improper motives such as fraud, or dishonesty, malice or personal self-interest. ANALYSIS 9 .1 The Court has considered the pleadings, the evidence on record, and the submissions advanced by counsel. The central question for determination is whether, in law, the Plaintiff has established any enforceable right against the State capable of sustaining the reliefs sought. 9.2 The first issue for consideration relates to the Plaintiff's claim to any legal or contractual entitlement to the Kitwe house. It is not in dispute that the Plaintiff previously occupied a Government house in Kitwe as part of his conditions of service. It is also common cause that a dispute arose regarding the entitlement to purchase that house under the Government Sale of Pool Houses Scheme introduced in 1996. That dispute was litigated to finality and culminated in a judgment of the Supreme Court, which held that another officer, and not the Plaintiff, was the lawful sitting tenant and therefore entitled to purchase the house. The Certificate of Title that was issued in relation to the house was accordingly cancelled. 9.3 The effect of that judgment is decisive. The Supreme Court being the apex court, its findings are final and binding on this Court. The Plaintiff is precluded from reopening, either directly or indirectly, the question of entitlement to the Kitwe house. J22 • ... 9 .4 The doctrine of res judicata is well settled in Zambian law. In Bank of Zambia v Jonas Tembo the Supreme Court set out this principle where the same parties or their privies are barred from re-litigating the same issue, whether in the same or a different form. Even though the Defendant did not specifically refer to the principle in its defence, this court is well entitled to call on it especially that judgments of the High Court and Supreme Court were exhibited by the Plaintiff and were referred to by both parties. The doctrine is founded on public policy, which requires finality in litigation and prevents abuse of court process. 9.5 In the present matter, the Plaintiffs claims for reimbursement, damages, and loss of opportunity are all premised on a stated entitlement to the Kitwe house. 9.6 That entitlement having been conclusively negatived by the Supreme Court, there is no legal foundation upon which such claims can stand. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Plaintiff had no legal or contractual right to purchase the Kitwe house, and no compensable interest arose from its sale to the other officer. 9. 7 The next issue relates to whether there was a breach of ccontract or enforceable night uunder the government sale of houses scheme. The Plaintiff contends that by virtue of occupation and alleged payment, he acquired rights under the Government Sale of Pool Houses Scheme. This contention is untenable. • • 9.8 The Plaintiff contends that by reason of occupation and alleged payment, he acquired contractual rights to purchase the Kitwe house. This argument cannot be sustained in law. In Zambia, it is settled that a binding contract with Government must satisfy the ordinary requirements of contract formation and must be shown to have crystallised in accordance with applicable statutory and administrative rules. Government housing schemes are administrative in nature and do not, without more, confer contractual rights enforceable at private law. 9. 9 Eligibility under the Sale of Government Pool Houses Scheme depended on compliance with stipulated criteria, including being the lawful sitting tenant at the material time. The Supreme Court having determined that the Plaintiff did not meet that criterion, no contract could have arisen notwithstanding any alleged payment or expectation. 9. 10 This a pp roach accords with established Common wealth authority. In O'Reilly v MackmanCJ>, the House of Lords cautioned against challenging actions of public bodies under private law thereby circumventing the correct procedure of challenging such decisions. In this case the Plaintiff seeks to challenge the decision of the Government under the Sale of Government Pool Houses Scheme in assuming there was a contractual relationship yet the action is clearly one that was J24 • .. administrative in nature and ought to have been challenged at the very least in judicial review. 9 .11 This Court therefore finds that no enforceable contract existed between the Plaintiff and the State in relation to the Kitwe house, and there was consequently no breach capable · of grounding a claim for damages. 9 .12 The third issue relates to the Plaintiff's claim for damages for loss of opportunity to purchase the Lusaka House. The evidence shows that following his transfer to Lusaka, the Plaintiff was offered a Government house in Olympia, Lusaka. He declined the offer, having been informed that it was the only house available at the time. 9.13 The undisputed evidence was that he never took occupation of the house. He now seeks damages for loss of opportunity to purchase that same house. 9.14 The law is clear that a party cannot reject a lawful offer and thereafter claim damages for the consequences of that rejection. Loss which is self-inflicted or attributable to a claimant's own voluntary choice is not recoverable. Damages for loss of opportunity are only awardable where a real and substantial chance has been lost as a result of the defendant's wrongful conduct. J25 • .. 9.15 In the present matter, any loss suffered by the Plaintiff flowed directly from his refusal to accept the Lusaka house. There was no breach or wrongdoing on the part of the State. The claim for loss of opportunity is therefore speculative and legally unsustainable. 9 .16 The fourth issue related to the claim for a declaration that the Plaintiff is entitled to the allocation of prime land in the city or compensation equivalent to the value of such land. This claim clearly misconceives the nature of land allocation under Zambian law. 9 .17 Under the Lands Act, the allocation of State land is a statutory function vested in the Commissioner of Lands and exercised at his discretion. The courts have consistently held that they will not interfere with such discretion unless it is shown to have been exercised illegally, irrationally, or in bad faith. 9.18 There is no evidence before this Court that the Commissioner of Lands acted unlawfully or capriciously. On the contrary, the evidence shows that land in Kafue was offered to the Plaintiff as a gesture of good will following protracted engagements. Such an offer, being ex gratia, does not create enforceable legal rights, particularly where it is rejected. 9 .19 In the case of North-Western Energy Company Limited v Energy Regulations Board the rationale relating to legitimate expectation J26 was discussed. In the case in casu it can be seen from the evidence that no such representation was made to the Plaintiff that he would be allocated prime land in the city for him to place reliance. A request was made to the Commissioner of Lands and what was available was offered to the Plaintiff. He declined the offer. This Court therefore finds that the Plaintiff had no legal right to demand land in a specific location or monetary compensation in lieu thereof. 9.20 The other issue relates to whether the Plaintiff is entitled to recover costs incurred in the earlier litigation. The Plaintiff claims reimbursement of costs incurred in the earlier litigation over the Kitwe house. That claim is equally untenable. 9.21 Costs are awarded at the conclusion of proceedings and form part of the final disposition of a case. Once determined, they cannot be re-litigated in subsequent proceedings. The Plaintiff lost the earlier litigation, including on appeal to the Supreme Court. It has been found that the dispute is res judicata. He cannot recover those costs by recasting them as damages in a fresh action. 10 CONCLUSION 10.1 Upon a careful evaluation of the evidence and the applicable law, it is found that: J27 a) The Plaintiff had no legal or contractual entitlement to the Kitwe house. b) There was no breach of contract or legitimate expectation on the part of the State. c) Any loss suffered by the Plaintiff arose from his own voluntary decisions. d) The offer of land in Kafue was purely ex gratia and not legally enforceable. e) The claims for damages, alternative land, compensation, and reimbursement of costs are devoid of legal merit. 10.2 In view of the foregoing all the claims by the Plaintiff fail and are dismissed for lacking merit. 10.2 Costs are ordered for the Defendant, to be taxed in default of agreement. 10.3 Leave to appeal is granted. Dated at Lusaka this 3.1.. of December, 2025 SY C. M. LOMBE JUDGE J28