R v Jailos Kambule (Criminal Review Case 50 of 1939) [1939] ZMHCNR 2 (31 December 1939)
Allowing another person to drive the lorry does not, by itself, constitute an act tending to serious risk to the lorry under section 75(1) of the Employment of Natives Ordinance; the facts do not disclose an offence under the section.
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [1939] ZMHCNR 2
- Parties
- Prosecutor: Republic; Defendant: Jailos Kambule
- Court
- High Court of Northern Rhodesia
- Jurisdiction
- Zambia
- Case Number
- Criminal Review Case 50 of 1939
- Procedural Posture
- Criminal Review / Judgment
- Outcome
- Conviction quashed
- Legal Topics
- Wilful Breach of Duty, Employment of Natives Ordinance, Liability for Acts of Employees
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Republic
Prosecutor
Jailos Kambule
Defendant
Procedural Posture
Criminal Review / Judgment
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether allowing a third person to drive a lorry constitutes a wilful breach of duty under section 75(1) of the Employment of Natives Ordinance
- 2 Whether the defendant's act amounted to an act tending to serious risk to the lorry
Ratio Decidendi
Allowing another person to drive the lorry does not, by itself, constitute an act tending to serious risk to the lorry under section 75(1) of the Employment of Natives Ordinance; the facts do not disclose an offence under the section.
Court Disposition
Conviction quashed
Orders
- Fine of £1 to be refunded to the defendant
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
46 Vol. II] R . v. JA IL O S K A M B U L E . Criminal R eview Case N o. 50 of 1939. Employment o f Natives Ordinance section 75 (1)— wilful breach o f duty— allowing third person to drive lorry. The facts appear in the judgment hereunder. The Employment o f Natives Ordinance is now Cap. 171 and the subsections o f section 74 referred to in the penultimate paragraph o f the judgm ent were repealed by Ordinance 27 o f 1940. R ob in son , A . C . J .: I think the Magistrate found the same difficulty as I do in this case. The defendant was charged in that being a servant, b y wilful breach o f duty, did do an act tending to serious risk to a motor lorry placed by his employer in his charge. The facts were that the defendant was employed as a lorry driver and he perm itted another native to drive the lorry and there was an accident. I know the defendant pleaded guilty but the form o f charge probably was: “ D id you allow Chaima to drive your m aster’s lorry o f which you were in charge and did you know you ought n ot to have done so and in the result do you adm it there was an accident ? ” All that was admitted, but do those facts show any offence contra section 75 o f Cap. 62 ? Defendant before he could be found guilty had to do an act tending to serious risk to the lorry. This section implies an overt act. I f an alternative word, e.g., “ deed ” is used instead o f “ act ” I think the It could never be said that meaning o f the section becomes clear. allowing someone else to drive the lorry was “ doing a deed ” . Another point is that even if allowing Chaima to drive was “ doing an act ” , there is nothing to suggest on the record that it must necessarily be an act "tending to serious risk ” to the lorry. Chaima m ay have been, fundamentally, a far more skilful driver than the defendant himself. Obviously the defendant com m itted a breach o f duty to his employer I f the but the facts must fit a penal provision before it is punishable. employer had given strict instructions that the defendant was to drive and no one else, then I think section 74 (4) or perhaps (7) would be applicable. As it is, I much regret, because the defendant needed a salutary lesson and the sentence was very appropriate, that the conviction must be quashed and the £1 fine be refunded.