The People v Christopher Mombe (3D/47/24) [2024] ZMSUB 1 (4 October 2024)

IN THE SUBORDINATE COURT OF THE THIRD-CLASS 3D/47/24 FOR THE MBALA DISTRICT HOLDEN AT MBALA (Criminal Jurisdiction) BETWEEN: REPUBLI C O F ZAMB I A THE JUDICI A RY * C ·, OCT 2:2~ J;h - MAOISTRAT E CLASS E , P. O. BOX 420 101, MBA.c-"' THE PEOPLE AND CHRISTOPHER MOMBE Before: Hon. Deeleslie Mondoka For the State: Mr. W. Chavula, Public Prosecutor, National For the Accused: In person Prosecution Authority. JUDGMENT CASES REFERRED TO: i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. vii. MWEWA MURONO V. THE PEOPLE (2004) Z. R. 207 (S. C.); SALUWEMA V THE PEOPLE (1965) ZR 4 (CA); BENSON NGUILA V. THE QUEEN (1963-1964) Z. AND N. R. L. R. 14; LUCKY DUBE, RONNIE MAFULO AND FRANK MOLOSI V. THE PEOPLE CAZ APPEAL No. 48, 49 and 50 of 2017; ATTORNEY GENERAL V. KAKOMA (1975) ZR 21; MWANGO V THE PEOPLE SCZ APPEAL NO. 171 OF 2015; JEREMIAH MUKONDYA v THE PEOPLE SCZ APPEAL No. 8 of 2019; J1 viii. SIMUTENDA V THE PEOPLE (1975) ZR 294 AND TEMBO V THE PEOPLE (1976) Z. R. 332, and ix. DONALD FUMBELO V THE PEOPLE SCZ APPEAL NO.476/2013. STATUTE AND OTHER SOURCES: i. THE PENAL CODE ACT, CHAPTER 87 OF THE LAWS OF ZAMBIA. INTRODUCTION [1] [2] The accused is charged on a single count of Unlawful Wounding, contrary to Section 232(a) of the Penal Code, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia. The facts of the case indicate that on the 12th day of June, 2024, in the town of Senga, situated in Senga District in the Northern Province of the Republic of Zambia, the accused, Christopher Mombe, did unlawfully wound one Danny Chansa. [3] On the 22nd day of July, 2024, the accused was brought before this Honourable Court and arraigned on the said charge. Upon being duly informed of the particulars of the accusation, the accused entered a plea of Not Guilty, thus necessitating a trial to determine the veracity of the allegations and to adjudicate upon the issue of the accused's guilt or innocence. BACKGROUND FACTS PROSECUTION’S CASE [4] The grand machinery of the State, vast and formidable, stirred into action. In the courtroom, a charge of unlawful wounding had emerged—a crime that reverberated through the fragile fabric of society, threatening the balance of order. Now, the prosecution, ever watchful like a seasoned predator, assembled its witnesses with the meticulous care of a skilled naturalist gathering specimens. Each testimony, a fragment of the truth, lay shrouded in layers of violence and bitterness. Yet with steadfast determination, they ventured into this tangled wilderness of human conflict, seeking out the J2 elusive truth—hidden, but waiting to be uncovered, like a rare creature in the depths of a primordial forest. [5] And so, on the morning of June 25, 2024, the court convened, draped in solemnity, as the first witness for the prosecution took the stand. The complainant, a man by the name of Danny Chansa, aged 53, residing in Chilangwa Village, henceforth referred to as PW1, approached the witness box with an air of weary resolve. Sworn in, PW1 began his tale—one that carried the weight of injury and indignation, with the precision of a man recounting a singular moment in his life that had veered into chaos. [6] PW1 testified that on the day in question, at approximately one o’clock in the afternoon, he found himself in the company of the accused at the home of his in-laws. Having paid a modest sum of K10.00 in advance, PW1 had secured for himself the local brew known as “Kachasu,” ready and filtered for his consumption. [7] In what began as a seemingly ordinary afternoon, the accused joined PW1 in sharing the fruits of their modest labours, and the two commenced drinking together. But alas, as with many a tale involving spirits, events soon took a darker turn. PW1 recounted how the accused, without warning or provocation, drew near to him—too near, as fate would have it—and plunged a blade into PW1’s posterior. Incredibly, PW1 did not flinch, nor did he react immediately, so much so that the accused struck again with a second, more grievous blow. [8] It was then, PW1 said, that the true horror of the moment became clear. With his intestines now protruding from the wound, a grotesque spectacle unfolded before the assembled crowd. PW1, resolute in his pain, grasped hold of the accused, vowing in his agony that if he were to perish, the accused would not escape unscathed. His cry for help was heard, and a nearby bystander—his young brother, was summoned to disarm the accused and relieve PW1 of further violence. [9] In swift response to this grievous injury, PW1 deponed that he was rushed to Nondo Clinic. From there, the gravity of the situation demanded he be transferred to Senga Hill, and at 18:00hrs transferred to Senga Hill medical J3 centre; during which time the police officers arrived, eager to take his statement as he lay bandaged, weakened but unwavering. [10] In a scene of quiet tension, PW1, with a grave air of certainty, presented two artefacts of great significance to the court. The first, a medical report, cold and clinical in its details. The second, a knife—an object that now stood as a dark and ominous symbol of the violence that had unfolded. These items, marked meticulously as "ID1" and "ID2," were laid bare before the court. And then, with a slow, deliberate motion, PW1’s gaze turned toward the accused, sitting silently in the dock, and with a steady hand, pointed him out as the one responsible for the terrible act. It was a moment that would resonate throughout the courtroom. [11] In cross-examination, defence counsel scarcely mounted a challenge, leaving PW1’s account unscathed. The accused claimed PW1 had joined him for drinks, but PW1 flatly denied this assertion, casting it aside with precision. Re- examination yielded no further revelations. [12] On the 3rd of September 2024, the State called upon its second witness, Detective Constable Kasase Kabwe, service number 48741, henceforth referred to as PW2. His testimony, though lacking the theatrics of the first, was no less crucial, for it served as the missing link in the narrative, weaving together the strands of evidence already presented. [13] PW2, with meticulous recall, took us back to the 12th of June, 2024. He deponed that, on that day, stationed at the quiet, unassuming outpost of Senga Hill Police, a report was received—an urgent one—of unlawful wounding. The source of the report? None other than Nondo Health Centre. Without delay, PW2, along with another officer, set off, like predators stalking their prey, making haste to the scene of the incident, where the truth awaited to be uncovered. [14] Upon arriving at Nondo Health Centre, PW2 found both PW1 and the accused present, along with the weapon—a retractable okapi knife, now retracted, but unmistakable in its malevolence. PW1 was gravely wounded, a bandage concealing the violent work of the blade, while the accused appeared subdued. J4 [15] The inquiry carried PW2 to Chilangwa Village, a barren and nondescript locale where not a single witness could be unearthed. It emerged, however, that the keeper of the speakeasy was none other than the wife of the accused. The accused was promptly apprehended, and a medical report was duly procured, furnishing yet further documentary corroboration of the injuries sustained by PW1. Thus, a chain of evidence, tenuous yet compelling, was forged, implicating the accused in the act of violence. [16] In due course, the accused was formally charged with the offence of unlawful wounding, contrary to Section 232 of the Penal Code, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia. PW2, standing firm in his duty, identified the medical report and the weapon for the court, both of which were accepted into evidence as “P1” and “P2” respectively. [17] During cross-examination, the accused attempted to mount a defence of provocation, claiming that it was PW1 who had pushed the accused, provoking the altercation and that both parties had been under the influence of alcohol. This line of defence was met with scepticism by PW2, who refuted the accused’s assertions, holding firm to his belief that the accused was the clear aggressor in the matter. No further revelations came to light during re- examination. [18] The prosecution’s case, by all accounts, stood firmly on the bedrock of reliable witness testimony and incontrovertible evidence. With the facts marshalled before the court, and after careful, impartial consideration, it became evident that the threshold for a prima facie case had been met. The accused now faced the unyielding provisions of Section 207 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Chapter 88 of the Laws of Zambia. It was here, with the scales of justice delicately balanced, that the tide shifted, and the accused was rightly called upon to offer his defence—a crucial moment in which the allegations could either be refuted or remain, ominously unchallenged. THE DEFENCE’S CASE [19] As the court resumed its solemn proceedings, a palpable tension enveloped the chamber, thick as fog in the early morn. The accused, now standing J5 before the assembly as the first defence witness, was a figure cloaked in an air of ambiguity, each breath steeped in the weight of expectation. Choosing the path of unsworn testimony, he prepared to unveil his version of the events—a narrative woven from the intricate tapestry of his life, obscured by shadows and doubt. [20] The court, a vigilant audience reminiscent of a predator poised to pounce, leaned forward, ready to unravel the tangled threads of his tale. The scales of justice, poised precariously, mirrored the legendary sword of Damocles, suspended by a fragile thread—an emblem of the precarious balance between truth and deception. In this theatre of law, every whispered word and furtive glance held the promise of revelation or ruin, an unfolding drama set against the backdrop of humanity's eternal struggle for understanding and redemption. [21] On this particular day, September 30, 2024, the defence phase began, unveiling DW1's account of the fateful events of June 12, 2024. He recounted a scene of revelry, set against the backdrop of an agricultural show, where his in-laws were engaged in the ancient art of brewing alcohol. As the intoxicating aroma wafted through the air, DW1 deponed that he joined the festivities, sampling the fruits of their labour. However, amidst this atmosphere of celebration, an altercation broke out, prompting him to retreat and succumb to slumber. [22] Awakening to a disturbing revelation, DW1 was informed by his in-laws that he had inflicted injury upon another with a knife—a claim that he vehemently denied, attributing it to the haze of intoxication that had enveloped him. The urgency of the situation escalated; his in-laws swiftly contacted the Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Unit (CCPU), who arrived to apprehend the accused, still reeling from the effects of his drunken state. [23] When questioned by the police officers about the reason for his arrest, DW1 found himself engulfed in confusion, unaware of the gravity of his actions. It was only when the officers explained that he was accused of wounding another that he firmly denied the allegations, a bewildered expression marking his face. J6 [24] And so, as DW1’s testimony drew to a close, the defence case stood complete, lacking the reinforcement of additional witnesses. The echoes of his words lingered in the air, the truth obscured, leaving the court to ponder the intricate web of human experience and its often-unpredictable outcomes. FACTS IN DISPUTE [25] Following a meticulous examination of the entirety of the evidence adduced, the following pivotal factual issues remain contested: (i) Whether the defendant, DW1, unlawfully wounded PW1 with felonious intent, contrary to Section 232(a) of the Penal Code; (ii) Whether DW1 did, in fact, accost and physically assault PW1, as alleged by the plaintiff; and (iii) Whether DW1 was genuinely unaware of the events transpiring on June 12, 2024, and only became cognizant thereof upon being informed by PW2. [26] The disputed factual matters herein identified shall form the focal point of further deliberation, analysis, and evaluation, for the purpose of ascertaining the truth and delivering a verdict that upholds the principles of justice. THE LAW ESTABLISHING THE CHARGE IN CASU [27] Reference is made to the Penal Code Act, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia, specifically Section 232 thereof, which stipulates and provides in part as follows: Any person who- (a) unlawfully wounds another; or (b) unlawfully, and with intent to injure or annoy any person, causes any poison or other noxious thing to be administered to, or taken by, any person; is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for three years. (Emphasis supplied) [28] Incidentally, a “wound” is defined under section 4 of the Code in question as: “… any incision or puncture which divides or pierces any exterior membrane of the body, and any membrane is exterior for the purpose of this definition which can be touched without dividing or piercing any other membrane.” [emphasis supplied] [29] Further, in re LENGWE V THE PEOPLE (1976) ZR 127, it was held in the vicinity of: J7 “The terms “incision” and “puncture” clearly indicate that such a wound must be caused by an instrument with a cutting edge or a point. However, the cutting edge or point need not be limited to metal objects such as a knife, spear, or bullet; a wound may equally be inflicted by a sharpened object, such as a stone or stick.”[emphasis supplied] INGREDIENTS TO BE ESTABLISHED TO PROVE THE ACCUSED GUILTY [30] In advancing its case, the prosecution bears the burden of convincingly establishing each essential element of the offense, namely: (i) that the accused (DW1) caused the wounding of PW1; (ii) that there existed no legal justification for the wounding inflicted upon PW1 by DW1; (iii) that DW1 possessed the requisite intention to wound PW1; and (iv) that DW1's actions were the proximate cause of the wounding of PW1. [31] Only upon successfully proving each of these indispensable elements can the prosecution hope to secure a verdict of guilt, a daunting challenge indeed. ANALYSIS OF THE LAW; FACTS AND DETERMINATION [32] In accordance with the well-established jurisprudential framework, it is imperative to acknowledge at the outset that the burden of proof in criminal proceedings unequivocally resides with the prosecution. This principle has been authoritatively enunciated by the apex court, namely, the Supreme Court, which has decreed that the prosecution bears the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. This aligns with the sacrosanct legal maxim ‘actus probandi incumbit actori’, signifying that the burden of proof lies upon the party who asserts the claim. [33] in re MWEWA MURONO V. THE PEOPLE (2004) Z. R. 207 (S. C.), it was held inter alia that: … “in criminal cases, the rule is that the legal burden of proving every element of the offence charged, and consequently the guilt of the accused lies from beginning to end on the prosecution… The J8 standard of proof must be beyond all reasonable doubt”. (Emphasis mine) [34] Thus, if the accused's narrative presents a plausible scenario, albeit not the most likely, a reasonable doubt emerges, and the prosecution's burden of proof remains unfulfilled, for a scintilla of uncertainty suffices to undermine the requisite degree of certainty. [35] Consequently, whereupon consideration of the evidence presented, a reasonable doubt persists in the mind of the court regarding the accused's culpability, the court shall, in accordance with the principles of justice and the presumption of innocence, render a verdict of NOT GUILTY, for it is axiomatic that doubt begets acquittal. SALUWEMA V THE PEOPLE (1965) ZR 4 (CA). [36] It is crucial to observe that DW1's choice to offer unsworn testimony triggers a long-standing principle rooted in the wisdom of Conroy, faithfully adhered to by our courts. Under this doctrine, when an accused opts to present evidence without taking the oath, three key consequences arise: i. First, by forgoing the oath, DW1 consciously surrenders the protections that come with the solemnity of swearing to tell the truth. The absence of this ritual signals a waiver of the moral and legal safeguards associated with the oath. ii. Second, DW1’s unsworn testimony opens the door to heightened judicial scrutiny. Without the cloak of an oath, the court is entitled—indeed, obligated—to subject this evidence to a more exacting review, probing the credibility and reliability of every word uttered. iii. Third, and most critically, the court must weigh the probative value of DW1's unsworn statements against the backdrop of established legal standards. The unsworn nature of the testimony does not make it inadmissible, but it does lower its standing, so to speak, in the hierarchy of evidence. This court, mindful of the jurisprudence, will give such testimony the diminished weight it deserves. J9 [37] In short: DW1 chose to speak, but without the shield of an oath, the court listens with sharpened ears and a sceptical eye. [38] For context—Conroy, C. J, in re BENSON NGUILA V. THE QUEEN (1963-1964) Z. AND N. R. L. R. 14, referred to unsworn testimony in the following terms: … “The court may attach what weight it chooses to the contents of such statement. The balance of opinion seems to be that an unsworn statement is evidence in the case, but is of less weight than sworn testimony, which can be tested by cross-examination”. (Emphasis mine) [39] In this intricate web of truth and falsehood, I find myself ensnared in a tempest of clashing narratives, where the prosecution and defence unveil their starkly divergent tales of the events in question. Like phantoms gliding through the twilight, PW1 and PW2 navigate their course of conviction, asserting with fervent certainty that on the twelfth day of June 2024, DW1, with malevolent intent, did wound PW1 with a retractable knife. They insist, with unwavering confidence, that at no moment did PW1 extend an invitation for DW1 to partake in the local brew known as “kachasu.” [40] Conversely, DW1, with an equal measure of ardour, propounds a counter- narrative steeped in innocence, claiming that he had been revelling in the company of others, engaged in the festivities of an agricultural show. Not once does DW1 acknowledge the presence of PW1 nor does he concede to having shared drink with him. He recounts that a ruckus had erupted earlier in the day, prompting him to seek refuge in slumber. In essence, DW1 maintains ignorance of PW1's injury, asserting that he was merely roused by his in-law, who brought word that he had inflicted a wound upon PW1, a claim he vehemently denies. Furthermore, he suggests that PW2 informed him he was to be taken to the police, accused of unlawfully wounding PW1— a charge he disputes, attributing it to his intoxication and the fog of the previous revelries. [41] The stage is set, the drama unfolds, and I, the reluctant arbiter of justice, must traverse this perilous terrain of contradictory testimonies, striving to unearth the elusive truth and render a verdict that can withstand the storm of human frailty and misjudgement. In such instances as in the fog of war, truth is the first victim. J10 [42] It is the sacred duty and solemn obligation of the trial court, as the ultimate arbiter of fact, to meticulously dissect and scrutinize the conflicting evidence laid before it. It must thereafter articulate definitive findings grounded in a thorough examination of the probative value and credibility of the testimony and evidence adduced. This careful endeavor seeks to resolve the tangled disputes that lie at the heart of the matter, establishing a foundation for a verdict that aspires not merely to justice but to an equilibrium that reflects the complex nature of human affairs1. [43] And so, I declare with unshakeable conviction, that I shall not be swayed by the siren's song of extraneous evidence, nor shall I be bound by an obligation to lend credence to testimony that wanders, like a lost traveller, far from the beaten path of relevance. My duty, my honour, my unwavering commitment, is to seek justice, unencumbered by the weight of unnecessary distraction. [44] Further, I lend countenance to the notion that, “a person accused of an offence and on trial begins to build his or her defence right from the time of apprehension and from the first prosecution witness by asking questions in cross examination. Where an issue or defence is only raised when the accused is on the stand, the court cannot be faulted for treating it as an afterthought and an explanation which cannot reasonably be true. In this case, DW1 had the opportunity regarding his defence from his apprehension or at the earliest time during trial2..." [45] And touching the issues of intoxication, section 13(4) of the Penal Code, chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia, enacts as follows: … “(4) Intoxication shall be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether the person charged had formed any intention, specific or otherwise, in the absence of which he would not be guilty of the offence.” (Emphasis mine) [46] The Supreme Court in re LUBENDAE v THE PEOPLE (1983) Z. R. 54 (S. C.), held inter alia that: heavy drinking, even to the extent affecting the co-ordination 1 See LUCKY DUBE, RONNIE MAFULO AND FRANK MOLOSI V. THE PEOPLE CAZ APPEAL No. 48, 49 and 50 of 2017. Which position the Supreme court earlier espoused in re ATTORNEY GENERAL V. KAKOMA (1975) ZR 21. 2 Mwango v The People SCZ Appeal No. 171 of 2015 J11 of reflexes is insufficient in itself to raise question of intent unless the accused person's capacities were affected to the extent that he may not have been able to form the necessary intent. (Emphasis mine) [47] Further, the supreme court has in a legion of cases, i.e., in re JEREMIAH MUKONDYA v THE PEOPLE SCZ APPEAL No. 8 of 2019; SIMUTENDA V THE PEOPLE (1975) ZR 294 AND TEMBO V THE PEOPLE (1976) Z. R. 332 maintained that: … “It is not enough that the accused person was drinking beer for him to benefit from the defence of intoxication under section 13(4) of the Penal Code; there must be evidence showing that as a result of such drinking, the accused person’s capabilities were so affected that he may not have been able to form the intent to kill or cause grievous harm.” (Emphasis mine) [48] Upon careful contemplation of DW1's testimony, I cannot help but see his account as profoundly dubious. He constructs a tale with an air of casual indifference, where memory lapses and trivialities swirl together, reducing the charge to nothing more than a fleeting disturbance, a mere ripple in the calm sea of his slumber. And yet, in the smooth contours of this story, there lies a striking void—a silence where one would expect the presence of PW1 to be acknowledged. Instead, with an almost mechanical precision, he assigns a timeline that conveniently erases PW1 from the scene, as if time itself conspired with his own self-interest. But this delicate fiction, crafted for his own benefit, is undone by the weight of its own contradictions. The inconsistencies within it, woven so artfully, betray the truth that lies beneath, a truth that cannot be ignored. It is, at its heart, an illusion, built on shifting sands, collapsing under the very scrutiny it seeks to evade. [49] DW1's audacious accusation against PW1—that he was the aggressor, having supposedly pushed him—stands in stark contrast to his professed ignorance of the specific events surrounding the incident until he was coached by PW2. Furthermore, his denial of any unlawful wounding of PW1, which he attributes to the fog of intoxication, demands rigorous scrutiny. One must ask: how does one both claim ignorance and simultaneously articulate a defence rooted in a clear understanding of intoxication? J12 [50] To reiterate and expand, in re SIMUTENDA V THE PEOPLE [1975] Z. R. 294 it was held that: (i) Evidence of drinking, even heavy drinking is not sufficient for intoxication to provide a defence under section 13 (4) of the Penal Code; the evidence as a whole, including that of intoxication, must be such as to leave the court in doubt as to whether the accused actually had the necessary intent, namely in this case the intent to kill or to do grievous harm. (ii) A court is not required to deal with every possible defence that may be open to an accused person unless there is some evidence to support the defence in question, i.e. 'evidence fit to be left to a jury" (iii) Provocation consists mainly of three elements - the act of provocation, the loss of self-control both actual and reasonable, and the retaliation proportionate to the provocation. These elements are not detached. Evidence of a provocative incident is not by itself evidence of provocation "fit to be left to a jury". [emphasis supplied] [51] From the evidence presented by the defence witness, what remains conspicuously absent is any indication that DW1, in his inebriated state, was incapable of forming the requisite intention to perpetrate the act of violence. Furthermore, there exists a stark lack of testimony suggesting that he was driven to a state of uncontrolled fury by provocation. Both of these considerations pertain intrinsically to the inner workings of the defendant’s mind, that opaque and tumultuous realm where intent and emotion collide. [52] Yet, DW1 in denying the very act of assaulting PW1, it is my reasoned conclusion that there lies no foundation upon which to examine the defence of intoxication and provocation that DW1 has alluded to. How can one ascertain the depths of his emotional tumult when he has categorically rejected the possibility of his involvement in the act of stabbing? The defence’s mere assertion of intoxication could not suffice to illuminate the murky waters of memory or culpability. It is conceivable that the haze of J13 alcohol might have clouded his recollection of the incident, yet no evidence has been brought forth to detail the degree of his intoxication or the state of his consciousness at that fateful moment. [53] Thus, we are left in the realm of speculation, where the absence of clarity and certainty renders judgment a most fragile endeavour. [54] Thus, I am compelled to conclude that DW1’s testimony lacks the requisite credibility to withstand the unforgiving scrutiny of this court. To entertain his narrative would imply that PW1 indeed provoked him, which would logically suggest some measure of agitation on DW1’s part. Yet, his subsequent claim—that he withdrew from the fray, all the while ensnared in a state of drunken stupor—betrays an inherent contradiction that cannot be reconciled with his earlier assertions. [55] Moreover, DW1’s professed lack of awareness regarding the reason and circumstances surrounding his arrest, coupled with his emphatic denial of any encounter with PW1 on that fateful day, pushes the bounds of credulity to their breaking point. The law demands rationality and coherence in testimony; one cannot simply wish away the facts of one's own conduct and interactions. Such claims do not merely lack credence; they stand in defiant opposition to reason and logic—principles that must guide our solemn pursuit of justice. [56] Furthermore, the accused's own contradictory assertions render his claim of an inability to form the requisite intent to unlawfully wound PW1 not just implausible, but laughable. DW1 clings to his purported lack of recollection regarding the events in question while simultaneously maintaining that his intoxication muddled his intent. Such a paradox cannot hold water in the court of reason. [57] In re HAONGA AND OTHERS V THE PEOPLE (1976) ZR, 200, the Supreme Court stated, among other things, that: "Where a witness has been found to be untruthful on a material point, the weight to be attached to the remainder of the evidence is reduced." [emphasis supplied] [58] Further, in re DICKSON SEMBAUKE CHANGWE AND IFELLOW HAMUCHANJE V THE PEOPLE (1989) ZR, 144 where the Supreme Court stated as follows: J14 "For discrepancies and inconsistencies to reduce or obliterate the weight to be attached to the evidence of a witness, they must be such as to lead the court to entertain doubts on his reliability or veracity either generally or on particular points." [emphasis supplied] [59] In the solemn theatre of justice, where witnesses stand as sentinels of truth, the court is burdened with the grave responsibility of discerning credibility. It must wield its discretion with a judicious hand, scrutinizing the totality of circumstances and the occasional discrepancies that emerge like shadows in the light of scrutiny. The court may adopt various strategies in this delicate endeavour: it may choose to cast aside the tainted testimony as one discards an overripe fruit, or it may accept such accounts, but with an air of circumspection, as one might approach a treacherous path. It might demand corroborative evidence to bolster the claims, much like a weary traveller seeking solid ground. Alternatively, it may draw adverse inferences when the situation demands it, like an artist who perceives the subtle strokes of a portrait that reveal more than the surface suggests. [60] In steadfast adherence to these principles, the court endeavours to uphold the sanctity of justice, ensuring that the integrity of the fact-finding process remains untarnished, much like a pristine stream reflecting the heavens. For in the realm of truth, a lie on a material point is a poison, seeping into the very fabric of testimony and rendering it suspect, much like a once-vibrant flower wilting under a relentless sun. [61] Furthermore, when the accused opts for silence, a taciturn acceptance of the prosecution's narrative during cross-examination, the consequences are profound. Their own narrative, which emerges only during their defence, risks being shrouded in scepticism, viewed through the lens of disbelief. The silence, that eloquent void, transforms into a silent admission, undermining the credibility of their later assertions, much as a delicate bloom wilts without the nourishment of sunlight. Thus, the courtroom, a stage for truth and deceit, becomes a mirror reflecting the complexities of human nature and the inexorable pursuit of justice. See the legal case of DONALD FUMBELO V THE PEOPLE SCZ APPEAL NO.476/2013. J15 [62] The record's stark silence regarding DW1's obliviousness to the events recounted by PW1 and PW2 during their examination-in-chief is damning. Moreover, DW1's failure to challenge the credibility of these two witnesses is a glaring omission, a tacit concession that their testimony lies beyond reproach. DW1's credibility, already shattered by PW1 and PW2's unyielding testimony, lies beyond repair. His narrative, a house of cards, collapses under its own weight, vulnerable to the slightest doubt. The defendant's case is not weakened - it is eviscerated by its own contradictions and improbabilities. [63] Thus, after scrupulous examination of the evidence, I arrive at the ineluctable conclusion: the accused, DW1, stands guilty of the alleged transgression. [64] This determination is not reached in haste, but rather emerges as the inevitable culmination of a deliberate and exhaustive analysis of the record. The evidence, considered in its entirety, weaves a rich tapestry of guilt, each strand intricately intertwined to dispel any residual doubts regarding DW1's culpability. [65] The testimony of PW1 and PW2 constitutes the linchpin of the prosecution's case, demonstrating beyond peradventure: (i) DW1's infliction of wounds upon PW1, a factual nexus that anchors the accused's liability; (ii) The absence of any lawful justification for DW1's actions, stripping the accused of potential defences; (iii) DW1's formation of the requisite intent to wound PW1, a mental state that animates the accused's culpability; (iv) The direct causal link between DW1's conduct and PW1's injuries, foreclosing any claims of remoteness or intervening cause. [66] In short, the evidence adduced at trial constitutes an unbroken chain of proof, each link forged from the testimony of credible witnesses, documentary evidence, and the accused's own inculpatory statements. [67] The accused's guilt is not merely probable; it is palpable. The record rebuts any notion of reasonable doubt, leaving only the inexorable conclusion that DW1 committed the offense charged. J16 VERDICT [68] For the avoidance of doubt—I find the accused person GUILTY as charged for the offence of unlawful wounding contrary to section 232(a) of the Penal Code Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia; consequently, I CONVICT him accordingly. [69] IRA WITHIN 14 DAYS. JUDGEMENT DELIVERED AT MBALA IN OPEN COURT ON 4th OCTOBER, 2024 _____________________________________________ DEELESLIE MONDOKA HON. MAGISTRATE J17