COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/1013

28.6.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 170/38 ---|---|---|--- * * * COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2022/1013 of 27 June 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China and as extended to Vietnam and Lao People’s Democratic Republic following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 11(2) thereof, Whereas: 1\. PROCEDURE 1.1. Previous investigation and measures in force (1) | By Regulation (EC) No 119/97 (2), the Council imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty ranging from 32,5 % to 39,4 % on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms (‘RBM’) originating in the People’s Republic of China (the ‘PRC’ or ‘country concerned’) and a definitive anti-dumping duty of 10,5 % on imports originating in Malaysia. These duty rates were applicable to RBM other than those with 17 or 23 rings, while RBM with 17 and 23 rings were subject to a duty equal to the difference between the minimum import price (MIP of EUR 325 per 1 000 pieces) and the free-at-Community-frontier not cleared through customs price, whenever the latter was lower than the MIP. ---|--- (2) | By Regulation (EC) No 2100/2000 (3), the Council increased the above mentioned duties for Chinese RBM other than those with 17 or 23 rings, following an anti-absorption investigation pursuant to Article 12 of the basic Regulation. The amended duties applicable to such imports from the PRC ranged from 51,2 % to 78,8 %. ---|--- (3) | Following an anti-circumvention investigation pursuant to Article 13 of the basic Regulation, by Regulation (EC) No 1208/2004 (4), the Council extended the definitive anti-dumping measures to imports of certain RBM consigned from Vietnam, whether declared as originating in Vietnam or not. ---|--- (4) | By Regulation (EC) No 2074/2004 (5) the Council extended the definitive anti-dumping measures on imports of RBM originating in the PRC following an expiry review. No request for an expiry review had been received concerning the measures applicable to Malaysia, which consequently expired in January 2002. ---|--- (5) | Following an anti-circumvention investigation pursuant to Article 13 of the basic Regulation, by Regulation (EC) No 33/2006 (6), the Council extended the definitive anti-dumping measures to imports of certain RBM consigned from Lao People’s Democratic Republic (‘Laos’), whether declared as originating in Laos or not. ---|--- (6) | By Regulation (EC) No 818/2008 (7) and as a result of an anti-circumvention investigation, the Council extended the scope of the measures to certain slightly modified RBM. ---|--- (7) | Following an expiry review, the anti-dumping duties on imports of certain RBM were extended for five years in February 2010 by Implementing Regulation of the Council (EU) No 157/2010 (8), and following another expiry review, for another five years in May 2016 by Implementing Regulation of the Council (EU) 2016/703 (9) (the ‘measures in force’). ---|--- (8) | The anti-dumping duties currently in force are 51,2 % for one exporting producer and 78,8 % for all other exporting producers. ---|--- 1.2. Request for an expiry review (9) | Following the publication of a Notice of impending expiry of the measures in force (10), the Commission received a request for the initiation of an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (10) | The request for review was lodged on 12 February 2021 by the Union producer Ring Alliance Ringbuchtechnik GmbH (‘the applicant’) representing more than 25 % of the total Union production of RBM. The request for review was based on the grounds that the expiry of the measures would be likely to result in continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury to the Union industry. ---|--- 1.3. Initiation of an expiry review (11) | Having determined, after consulting the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation, that sufficient evidence existed for the initiation of an expiry review, on 11 May 2021 the Commission initiated an expiry review with regard to imports of RBM originating in the People’s Republic of China and extended to Vietnam and Lao People’s Democratic Republic on the basis of Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (11) (‘the Notice of Initiation’). ---|--- 1.4. Review investigation period and period considered (12) | The investigation of continuation or recurrence of dumping covered the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2020 (‘the review investigation period’ or ‘RIP’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury covered the period from 1 January 2017 to the end of the review investigation period (‘the period considered’). ---|--- 1.5. Interested parties (13) | In the Notice of Initiation, interested parties were invited to contact the Commission in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the applicant, other known Union producers, the known exporting producers and the PRC authorities, known importers, users, traders, as well as associations known to be concerned about the initiation of the expiry review and invited them to participate. ---|--- (14) | Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the expiry review and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. None of the interested parties requested a hearing. ---|--- 1.6. Sampling (15) | In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation. ---|--- 1.6.1. No sampling of Union producers (16) | In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that the three known Union producers, IML Industria Meccanica Lombarda SRL, Koloman Handler Fémárugyár Magyarország Kft and Ring Alliance Ringbuchtechnik GmbH., had to submit the completed questionnaire within 37 days of the date of publication of the Notice of Initiation. The Commission also invited other Union producers and representative associations, if any, to make themselves known and request a questionnaire. No other Union producer or representative association came forward. ---|--- 1.6.2. Sampling of importers (17) | To decide whether sampling was necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. No unrelated importers submitted the requested information. Consequently, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary. ---|--- 1.6.3. Sampling of exporting producers in the People’s Republic of China (18) | To decide whether sampling was necessary and if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in the PRC to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation. ---|--- (19) | No exporting producers from the PRC provided the requested information and/or agreed to be included in the sample. Therefore, there was no cooperation from the Chinese producers and the findings with regard to the imports from the PRC are made on the basis of the facts available pursuant to Article 18 of the basic Regulation. ---|--- 1.7. Replies to the questionnaire (20) | The Commission sent a questionnaire concerning the existence of significant distortions in the PRC within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation to the Government of the People’s Republic of China (‘GOC’). ---|--- (21) | The Commission sent the questionnaire to Union producers, unrelated importers and exporting producers. The same questionnaires were made available on DG Trade’s website (12) on the day of initiation. ---|--- (22) | Questionnaire replies were received from the Union producers Ring Alliance Ringbuchtechnik GmbH and Koloman Handler Kft., two parties belonging to the same group with one production facility and hereafter jointly referred to as ‘Ring Alliance Ringbuchtechnik GmbH’, and M.L. Industria Meccanica Lombarda S.r.l. ---|--- 1.8. Verification (23) | The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury and of the Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies: ---|--- Union producers: — | Ring Alliance Ringbuchtechnik GmbH, Oroszlany, Hungary, ---|--- — | I.M.L. Industria Meccanica Lombarda S.r.l., Offanengo, Italy. ---|--- 2\. PRODUCT UNDER REVIEW AND LIKE PRODUCT 2.1. Product under review (24) | The product under review is the same as in the previous expiry review, namely, certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the PRC, consisting of two steel sheets or wires with at least four half-rings made of steel wire fixed on them and which are kept together by a steel cover. They can be opened either by pulling the half rings or with a small steel trigger mechanism fixed to the ring binder mechanism (the product under review). RBM are falling at the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2016/703 under CN code ex 8305 10 00 (TARIC codes 8305100011, 8305100013, 8305100019, 8305100021, 8305100023, 8305100029, 8305100034 and 8305100035). ---|--- (25) | RBM are used in a wide range of applications, for example, in the production of software manuals, catalogues and brochures, technical manuals, office files, as well as presentation and other bound files and photo and stamp albums. ---|--- (26) | A large number of different types of RBM were sold in the Union during the review investigation period. The differences between these types were determined by the width of the base, the type of mechanism, the number of rings, the opening system, the nominal paper holding capacity, the ring diameter, the shape of the rings, the length and the ring spacing. Given the fact that all types have the same basic physical and technical characteristics and, within certain ranges, are interchangeable, it was established that all RBM constitute one single product for the purpose of the present proceeding. No comments were received in that regard. ---|--- 2.2. Like product (27) | As shown in the investigation leading to the imposition of the measures in force (13), the following products have the same basic physical and technical characteristics as well as the same basic uses: | — | the product under review; ---|--- — | the product produced and sold on the domestic market of the country concerned; and ---|--- — | the product produced and sold in the Union by the Union industry. ---|--- These products are therefore considered to be like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation. 3\. CONTINUATION OF DUMPING 3.1. Preliminary remarks (28) | During the review investigation period, imports of the product under review from the PRC continued albeit at a much lower level than in the previous expiry review (i.e. from January 2014 to December 2014). According to Comext (Eurostat) imports of ring binder mechanisms from the PRC accounted for about 0,7 % of the Union market in the review investigation period compared to 2,3 % market share during the previous expiry review. ---|--- (29) | As mentioned in recital (19), none of the exporters/producers from PRC cooperated in the investigation. Therefore, the Commission informed the GOC that due to the absence of cooperation, the Commission might apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation concerning the findings with regard to the People’s Republic of China. The Commission did not receive any comments or requests for an intervention of the Hearing Officer in this regard. ---|--- (30) | Consequently, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation, the findings in relation to the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping were based on facts available, in particular the information contained in the request for the expiry review, publicly available data for the two Turkish companies operating under NACE Rev2 code 2599, information provided by the applicant, information from the Turkish national statistics office, Eurostat’s Comext database, Global Trade Atlas, the OECD’s International Transport and Insurance Costs of Merchandise Trade (ITIC) website, the World Bank’s doing business website. ---|--- 3.2. Procedure for the determination of the normal value under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation for the imports of ring binder mechanisms originating in the PRC (31) | Given the sufficient evidence available at the initiation of the investigation tending to show, with regard to the PRC, the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, the Commission initiated the investigation on the basis of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (32) | In order to obtain information it deemed necessary for its investigation with regard to the alleged significant distortions, the Commission sent a questionnaire to the GOC. In addition, in point 5.3.2 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited all interested parties to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence regarding the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation within 37 days of the date of publication of the Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union. No questionnaire reply was received from the GOC and no submission on the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was received within the deadline. Subsequently, the Commission informed the GOC that it would use facts available within the meaning of Article 18 of the basic Regulation for the determination of the existence of the significant distortions in the PRC. ---|--- (33) | In point 5.3.2 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission also specified that, in view of the evidence available, it may need to select an appropriate representative country pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation for the purpose of determining the normal value based on undistorted prices or benchmarks. The Commission further stated that it would examine possible appropriate countries in accordance with the criteria set out in first indent of Article 2(6a) of the Basic regulation. ---|--- (34) | On 20 October 2021, the Commission informed by a note (‘the First Note’) interested parties on the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value. In that note, the Commission provided a list of all factors of production (‘FOPs’) such as raw materials, labour and energy used in the production of the product under review. In addition, based on the criteria guiding the choice of undistorted prices or benchmarks, the Commission identified possible representative countries, namely Turkey as an appropriate representative country. The Commission received one comment from the applicant on the First Note. ---|--- (35) | On 7 February 2022, the Commission informed by a second note (‘the Second Note’) interested parties on the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value, with Turkey as the representative country. It also informed interested parties of its intention to use the two Turkish companies, (D S C Otomotiv and Samet Kalip ve Madeni) who operate under NACE Rev2 code 2599 and produce products in the same general category as ring binder mechanisms as a basis to establish the SG&A and profit to construct normal value. ---|--- 3.3. Normal value (36) | According to Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, “the normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country”. ---|--- (37) | However, according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, “in case it is determined [….] that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country due to the existence in that country of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b), the normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks”, and “shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits” (“administrative, selling and general costs” is refereed hereinafter as ‘SG&A’). ---|--- (38) | As further explained below, the Commission concluded in the present investigation that, based on the evidence available and in view of the lack of cooperation of the GOC and the exporting producers, the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was appropriate. ---|--- 3.3.1. Existence of significant distortions (39) | In recent investigations concerning the steel sector in the PRC (14) – steel being the main factor of production for ring binder mechanisms – the Commission found that significant distortions in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation were present. The Commission concluded in this investigation that, based on the evidence available, the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was also appropriate. ---|--- (40) | In those investigations, the Commission found that there is substantial government intervention in the PRC resulting in a distortion of the effective allocation of resources in line with market principles (15). In particular, the Commission concluded that in the steel sector, which is the main raw material to produce the product under review, not only does a substantial degree of ownership by the GOC persist in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation (16), but the GOC is also in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation (17). The Commission further found that the State’s presence and intervention in the financial markets, as well as in the provision of raw materials and inputs have an additional distorting effect on the market. Indeed, overall, the system of planning in the PRC results in resources being concentrated in sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the GOC, rather than being allocated in line with market forces (18). Moreover, the Commission concluded that the Chinese bankruptcy and property laws do not work properly in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation, thus generating distortions in particular when maintaining insolvent firms afloat and when allocating land use rights in the PRC (19). In the same vein, the Commission found distortions of wage costs in the steel sector in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation (20), as well as distortions in the financial markets in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation, in particular concerning access to capital for corporate actors in the PRC (21). ---|--- (41) | The request contained information on the distortions in the steel sector, in particular it referred to the recent findings in the anti-dumping investigations lead by the European Commission which confirmed the existence of distortions in the steel sector. The request further contained information on distortions in the non-ferrous metal sector, in particular concerning nickel which is an important raw material for the manufacturing of the product under review. Moreover, the request referred to the Commission’s report on significant distortions in China (22) (‘Report’), emphasising in particular the distortions in the labour market and in access to finance. ---|--- (42) | In the present investigation, the Commission examined whether it was appropriate or not to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC, due to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. The Commission did so on the basis of the evidence available on the file, including the evidence contained in the Report, which relies on publicly available sources. That analysis covered the examination of the substantial government interventions in the PRC’s economy in general, but also the specific market situation in the relevant sector including the product under review. The Commission further supplemented these evidentiary elements with its own research on the various criteria relevant to confirm the existence of significant distortions in the PRC. ---|--- (43) | Specifically in the steel sector, which is the main raw material to produce the product under review, a substantial degree of ownership by the GOC persists. Many of the largest steel producers are owned by the State. Some are specifically referred to in the ‘Steel Industry Adjustment and Upgrading Plan for 2016-2020’. For instance, the Chinese State-owned Shanxi Taiyuan Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (‘Tisco’) mentions on its website that it is “a super iron and steel giant”, which “developed into an extraordinary large-scale iron and steel complex, which is integrated with business of iron mining, iron and steel production, processing, delivery and trading” (23). Baosteel is another major Chinese State-owned enterprise that engages in steel manufacturing and is part of the recently consolidated China Baowu Steel Group Co. Ltd. (formerly Baosteel Group and Wuhan Iron & Steel) (24) . While the nominal split between the number of SOEs and privately owned companies is estimated to be almost even, from the five Chinese steel producers ranked in the top 10 of the world’s largest steel producers, four are SOEs (25). At the same time, while the top ten producers only took up some 36 % of total industry output in 2016, the GOC set the target in the same year to consolidate 60 % to 70 % of steel production to around ten large-scale enterprises by 2025 (26). This intention has been repeated by the GOC in April 2019, announcing a release of guidelines on steel industry consolidation (27). Such consolidation may entail forced mergers of profitable private companies with underperforming SOEs (28). ---|--- (44) | In addition, in the steel sector, many of the largest producers are specifically referred to in the ‘Steel Industry Adjustment and Upgrading Plan for 2016-2020’. For instance, Tisco mentions on its website that it is “a super iron and steel giant”, which “developed into an extraordinary large-scale iron and steel complex, which is integrated with business of iron mining, iron and steel production, processing, delivery and trading” (29). ---|--- (45) | Since the RBM sector is very fragmented and most producers are SOEs, it was impossible to establish the exact ratio of state owned vs. privately owned RBM producers during the investigation. ---|--- (46) | With a high share of SOEs in the steel sector, the main raw material to produce ring binding mechanisms, even privately owned producers are prevented from operating under market conditions. Indeed, both public and privately owned enterprises in the RBM sector are also subject to policy supervision and guidance as set out in recitals (47) to (53) below. ---|--- (47) | As to the GOC being in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation, the investigation did not look into individual companies, since the RBM sector is very fragmented and mostly consists of SMEs. ---|--- (48) | Furthermore, policies discriminating in favour of domestic producers or otherwise influencing the market in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), third indent of the basic Regulation are in place in the RBM sector. ---|--- (49) | The steel industry, which is the main component for the production of RBMs, is regarded as a key industry by the GOC (30). This is confirmed in the numerous plans, directives and other documents focused on steel, which are issued at national, regional and municipal level such as the ‘Steel Industry Adjustment and Upgrading Plan for 2016-2020’. This Plan states that the steel industry is “an important, fundamental sector of the Chinese economy, a national cornerstone” (31). The main tasks and objectives set out in this Plan cover all aspects of the development of the industry (32). ---|--- (50) | The 13th Five-Year Plan on Economic and Social Development (33) envisages support to enterprises producing high-end steel product types (34). It also focuses on achieving product quality, durability and reliability by supporting companies using technologies related to clean steel production, precision rolling and quality improvement (35). ---|--- (51) | The ‘Catalogue for Guiding Industry Restructuring (2011 Version) (2013 Amendment)’ (36) (‘the Catalogue’) lists steel as encouraged industry. ---|--- (52) | The GOC further guides the development of the sector in accordance with a broad range of policy tools and directives related to, inter alia, market composition and restructuring, raw materials, investment, capacity elimination, product range, relocation, upgrading, etc. Through these and other means, the GOC directs and controls virtually every aspect in the development and functioning of the sector (37). The current problem of overcapacity is arguably the clearest illustration of the implications of the GOC’s policies and the resulting distortions. ---|--- (53) | In sum, the GOC has measures in place to induce operators to comply with the public policy objectives of supporting encouraged industries, including the production of steel as the main raw material used in the manufacturing of the ring binder mechanisms. Such measures impede market forces from operating freely. ---|--- (54) | The present investigation has not revealed any evidence that the discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy and property laws according to Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation in the steel sector referred to above in recital (40) would not affect the manufacturers of RBM. ---|--- (55) | The RBM sector is also affected by the distortions of wage costs in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation, as also referred to above in recital (40). Those distortion affect the sector both directly (when producing RBM or the main inputs), as well as indirectly (when having access to capital or inputs from companies subject to the same labour system in the PRC) (38). ---|--- (56) | Moreover, no evidence was submitted in the present investigation demonstrating that the RBM sector is not affected by the government intervention in the financial system in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation, as also referred to above in recital (40). Therefore, the substantial government intervention in the financial system leads to the market conditions being severely affected at all levels. ---|--- (57) | Finally, the Commission recalls that in order to produce RBM, a number of inputs are needed. The PRC is one of the major producers of steel – the key raw material in the RBM production process. When the producers of RBM purchase/contract these inputs, the prices they pay (and which are recorded as their costs) are clearly exposed to the same systemic distortions mentioned above. For instance, suppliers of inputs employ labour that is subject to the distortions. They may borrow money that is subject to the distortions on the financial sector/capital allocation. In addition, they are subject to the planning system that applies across all levels of government and sectors. ---|--- (58) | As a consequence, not only are the domestic sales prices of RBM not appropriate for use within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, but all the input costs (including raw materials, energy, land, financing, labour, etc.) are affected because their price formation is affected by substantial government intervention, as described in Parts I and II of the Report. Indeed, the government interventions described in relation to the allocation of capital, land, labour, energy and raw materials are present throughout the PRC. This means, for instance, that an input that in itself was produced in the PRC by combining a range of factors of production is exposed to significant distortions. The same applies for the input to the input and so forth. No evidence or argument to the contrary has been adduced by the GOC or the exporting producers in the present investigation. ---|--- (59) | As indicated in recital (29), the GOC did not comment or provide evidence supporting or rebutting the existing evidence on the case file, including the Report and the additional evidence provided by the complainant, on the existence of significant distortions and/or on the appropriateness of the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation in the case at hand. ---|--- (60) | In sum, the evidence available showed that prices or costs of the product under review, including the costs of raw materials, energy and labour, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government intervention within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation as shown by the actual or potential impact of one or more of the relevant elements listed therein. On that basis, and in the absence of any cooperation from the GOC, the Commission concluded that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs to establish normal value in this case. Consequently, the Commission proceeded to construct the normal value exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks, that is, in this case, on the basis of corresponding costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, as discussed in the following section. ---|--- 3.3.2. Representative country 3.3.2.1. General remarks (61) | The choice of the representative country was based on the following criteria pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation: | — | A level of economic development similar to the PRC. For this purpose, the Commission used countries with a gross national income per capita similar to the PRC on the basis of the database of the World Bank (39); ---|--- — | Production of the product under review in that country (40); ---|--- — | Availability of relevant public data in the representative country. ---|--- — | Where there is more than one possible representative country, preference should be given, where appropriate, to the country with an adequate level of social and environmental protection. ---|--- (62) | As explained in recitals (34) and (35), the Commission issued two notes for the file on the sources for the determination of the normal value: the first note on production factors of 20 October 2021 (the “First Note”) and the second note on production factors of 7 February 2022 (the “Second Note”). These notes described the facts and evidence underlying the relevant criteria, and addressed the comments received by the parties on these elements and on the relevant sources. In the Second Note, the Commission informed interested parties of its intention to consider Turkey as an appropriate representative country in the present case if the existence of significant distortions pursuant to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation would be confirmed. ---|--- 3.3.2.2. A level of economic development similar to the PRC (63) | In the First Note on production factors, the Commission identified Turkey and Thailand as countries with a similar level of economic development as the PRC according to the World Bank, i.e. they are all classified by the World Bank as ‘upper-middle income’ countries on a gross national income basis where production of the product under review or of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the product under review was known to take place. ---|--- (64) | There was one comment received on the note from the applicant. The applicant agreed that both countries were classified as upper middle-income countries. However, the applicant, in its response to the first Note, stated that based on decades of manufacturing and selling the product under review, they had no knowledge of companies in Turkey and Thailand producing ring binder mechanisms. Moreover, the applicant maintained there was confusion between the production of ring binders, i.e. a downstream product, and ring binder mechanisms, i.e. the metal part of the binder. Concerning the companies presented by the Commission as producers in Turkey and Thailand, the applicant commented that all the companies listed in the Note of 20 October were stationery companies producing the downstream product. The applicant explained that, in the request for review, it had chosen Turkey due to its size and economic development, well aware of the absence of RBM production in Turkey. Therefore, it had proposed companies with similar production methods, FOP and manufacturing elements based on NACE Rev2 code 2599. ---|--- (65) | As all countries where there is production of the product under review have a different level of economic development than the PRC, the Commission indicated it would use the production of a product in the same general product category, NACE Rev2 code 2599, to the product under review, to establish an appropriate representative country for the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- 3.3.2.3. Availability of relevant public data in the representative country (66) | For the countries considered and mentioned above, the Commission further verified the availability of the public data, and in particular public financial data from the producers in the general category of NACE Rev2 code 2599. ---|--- (67) | The Commission further investigated the publicly available financial data of the companies identified by the applicant (NACE Rev2 code 2599). Though there are no products under review produced by these companies, they use similar FOPs in their manufacturing processes. The Commission found that only two of the six companies identified operated under the NACE Rev2 code 2599, namely D S C Otomotiv and Samet Kalip ve Madeni, both in Turkey. The Commission found that the two identified companies were profitable in the review investigation period. The comparatively high levels of SG&A and profit when using the weighted average of the two companies can be explained by the fact that both of these companies are major producers in their respective sectors. D S C Otomotiv supplies the automobile sector, while Samet Kalip is a major player in the global market of the furniture accessory industry. In any event, the Commission has not obtained any information suggesting that the levels of SG&A and profit of D S C Otomotiv and Samet Kalip would not be reasonable for the sector in which they operate. ---|--- (68) | The Commission also analysed the imports of the main factors of production into Turkey. The analysis of import data showed that the imports into Turkey of the major factors of production were not materially affected by imports from the PRC or any of the countries listed in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council (41) and therefore Turkey could be used as an appropriate representative country. ---|--- (69) | In the light of the above considerations, the Commission informed the interested parties with the Second Note that it intended to use Turkey as an appropriate representative country, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation in order to source undistorted prices or benchmarks for the calculation of normal value. ---|--- (70) | Interested parties were invited to comment on the appropriateness of Turkey as a representative country. No comments were received. ---|--- (71) | The initial selection of potential representative countries and of suitable companies with publicly available data does not prevent the Commission from supplementing or refining its selection and its research at a later stage, including by putting forward new suggestions in terms of potential representative countries. Indeed it is the very purpose of the Notes on factors of production to invite interested parties to comment on the Commission services’ preliminary research and, if warranted, to receive alternatives for the Commission services’ further consideration. The Notes contain a specific annex to guide parties in submitting information on possible additional representative countries and/or companies for the purpose of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- 3.3.2.4. Level of social and environmental protection (72) | Having established that Turkey was an appropriate representative country, based on all of the above elements, there was no need to carry out an assessment of the level of social and environmental protection in accordance with the last sentence of Article 2(6a)(a) first indent of the basic Regulation. ---|--- 3.3.2.5. Conclusion (73) | In view of the above analysis, Turkey met the criteria laid down in Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation in order to be considered as an appropriate representative country. ---|--- 3.3.3. Sources used to establish undistorted costs (74) | In the First Note, the Commission listed the factors of production such as materials, energy and labour used in the production of the product under review by the exporting producers and invited the interested parties to comment and propose publicly available information on undistorted values for each of the factors of production mentioned in that note. ---|--- (75) | Subsequently, in the Second Note, the Commission stated that, in order to construct the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, it would use Global Trade Atlas (‘GTA’) to establish the undistorted cost of most of the factors of production, notably the raw materials and by-products. In addition, the Commission stated that it would use the National Statistics Office of Turkey (42) for establishing undistorted costs of labour and energy. ---|--- (76) | The Commission included in the calculation a value of manufacturing overhead costs in order to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above. To establish this amount, it made use of the financial data of one of the Union producers that cooperated in the investigation and that provided specific information for that purpose (43), Koloman Handler Kft (‘KH’). The methodology is duly explained in Section 3.3.5. ---|--- (77) | Finally, as stated in the second Note, the Commission used the financial data from the selected Turkish companies mentioned in recital (67) to establish SG&A costs and profit. ---|--- 3.3.4. Undistorted costs and benchmarks (78) | Through the two notes on production factors, the Commission sought to establish a list of factors of production and sources intended to be used to establish a full list of inputs such as materials, energy and labour used in the production of the product under review by the producers in the PRC. The Commission did not receive any comments concerning the list of factors of production. ---|--- (79) | In the absence of cooperation by the Chinese exporting producers in the review procedure, the Commission had to rely on the European producer KH in order to establish the factors of production used in the production of RBM. Based on data collected from the Chinese companies in the original investigation and information available on the websites of the Chinese RBM producers, their production process and the materials used appear to be similar to the ones provided by KH. ---|--- (80) | In the absence of cooperation, the Commission did not have more detailed commodity codes for each factor of production than 6-digit Harmonised System (‘HS’) codes. ---|--- (81) | Considering all the information submitted by KH and the absence of comments on the two notes on the sources for determination of the normal value concerning the factors of production, the following factors of production and HS codes, where applicable, have been identified: Factors of production of RBM | Factors of Production | HS Code | Source of data | Unit undistorted value ---|---|---|--- Raw materials Blank steel wire | 7217 10 | GTA | 9,15 CNY/KG Nickel coated steel strip | 7226 99 | GTA | 12,71 CNY/KG Blank steel strip | 7211 23 | GTA | 4,52 CNY/KG Labour Labour | National Statistics Office, Turkey. | 25,25 CNY/hour Energy Electricity | National Statistics Office, Turkey. | 0,57 CNY/kWh By-product/waste. Waste and scrap of tinned iron or steel (excl. radioactive, and waste and scrap of batteries and electric accumulators). | 7204 30 | GTA | 0,59 CNY/KG 3.3.4.1. Raw materials (82) | In order to establish undistorted prices of raw materials as delivered at the gate of a representative country producer, the Commission used as a basis, for each raw material used in the production of RBM by KH, the weighted average import price to the representative country as reported in the GTA to which import duties and transport costs were added. The Commission verified the reported raw materials used and the relevant consumption ratios in the manufacturing of the product under review. An import price in the representative country was determined as a weighted average of unit prices of imports from all third countries excluding the PRC and countries which are not members of the WTO, listed in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2015/755 (44). The data on imports statistics remained sufficiently representative after the exclusion of these imports. The Commission decided to exclude imports from the PRC into the representative country as it concluded in recital (60) that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC due to the existence of significant distortions in accordance with Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. Given that there is no evidence showing that the same distortions do not equally affect products intended for export, the Commission considered that the same distortions affected export prices. ---|--- (83) | In order to establish the undistorted price of raw materials, delivered at the gate of the producer’s factory the Commission applied the import duty of the representative country, at the respective levels, depending on the country of origin of the imported volumes (45). The Commission added domestic transport cost calculated per kg on the basis of quotations for Istanbul-Kapikule border deliveries, as provided by the World Bank Doing Business Report (46). ---|--- 3.3.4.2. By-products (84) | In the absence of cooperation by Chinese exporting producers in the review procedure, the Commission relied on the data provided by KH in order to specify by-products obtained in in the production of RBM. The company reported only one by-product: waste and scrap of tinned iron or steel. ---|--- (85) | In the absence of imports of the above item in Turkey, the Commission looked for an alternative benchmark source. On the basis of an extraction from the GTA, the Commission identified the biggest world exporter of the product in question – the United States of America (‘USA’). The benchmark was subsequently calculated as the weighted average unit export landed price (CIF + import duties in the countries with US imports) based on the USA’s exports to the rest of the world in the review investigation period. ---|--- 3.3.4.3. Labour (86) | To establish the benchmark for labour costs, the Commission used publicly available Turkish national statistics, which includes employers’ taxes and levies (47). ---|--- (87) | The Commission used as a basis for calculation statistics from the Turkstat Data Portal, which provided detailed information hourly labour cost in different economic sectors by year. The Commission used as a benchmark figure reported for the NACE Rev2 code C.25 “Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment”. ---|--- 3.3.4.4. Electricity (88) | To establish the benchmark for electricity, the Commission used the industry’s electricity prices by consumption bands published on the website of the Turkish National Statistics Office (‘Turkstat’) (48). ---|--- (89) | The Commission used the quotation of the electricity price available in the Turkstat Data Portal, which provides half-year averages electricity unit prices. The Commission used as a benchmark an average of the industrial rates provided for the review investigation period. ---|--- 3.3.5. Manufacturing overhead costs, SG&A and profits (90) | According to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, “the constructed normal value shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits”. In addition, a value for manufacturing overhead costs needs to be established to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above. ---|--- (91) | Further to the factors of production in recital (81) above, the Commission calculated manufacturing overhead costs. In view of the lack of cooperation from the Chinese producers, the calculation of these manufacturing overhead costs was based on the ratio of manufacturing overhead divided by the cost of manufacturing reported by KH. This percentage was applied to the undistorted costs of manufacturing. ---|--- (92) | For SG&A and profit, the Commission used the financial data of the two Turkish producers listed in recital (67). The Commission first determined the percentage of SG&A and profit over the costs of goods sold (‘COGS’) for each producer. Then, an average SG&A and profit in the representative country (weighted by the companies’ turnover) was established. Publicly available audited accounts of these companies were made available to the interested parties as an attachment to the Second Note. ---|--- 3.3.6. Calculation of the normal value (93) | On the basis of the above benchmarks, the Commission constructed the normal value according to the following methodology. ---|--- (94) | First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. In the absence of cooperation by the exporting producers, the Commission relied on the information provided by KH on the consumption of each factor of production (raw-materials, labour and energy) for the production of the product under review. These consumption volumes were multiplied by the undistorted costs per unit established in Turkey, as described in Section 3.3.4. ---|--- (95) | Second, to arrive to the undistorted costs of production, the Commission added the percentage of the manufacturing overheads determined as described in recital (90) to the undistorted costs of manufacturing. ---|--- (96) | Finally, in addition to the cost of production established as described in recital (95), the Commission applied the SG&A and profit in the representative country established as explained in recital (92). The SG&A and profit expressed as a percentage of COGS and applied to the undistorted costs of production amounted to 31,3 % and 24,7 % respectively. ---|--- (97) | The normal value, calculated as described in recitals (93) to (96), was reduced by the undistorted value of the by-product.

Undistorted value of the by-product was established by multiplying the quantity sold in the review investigation period, as reported by KH, by its undistorted price per unit as established in Turkey, as described in section 3.3.4.2 above. ---|--- (98) | For certain products, the PRC applies a policy of reimbursing VAT only partially upon export. To ensure that the normal value is expressed at the same level of taxation as the export price, the normal value is adjusted upward by the part of VAT charged on exports of the product under review that was not refunded to the Chinese exporting producers. Data from the Chinese tax and custom administration website and data of Transcustoms (49) indicated that in the review investigation period, the VAT charged on exports of RBM was not fully refunded. The final normal value was therefore adjusted upward by 3 % accordingly. ---|--- (99) | On that basis, the Commission constructed the normal value on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. Due to the fact that no exporting producer cooperated, the normal value is applicable on a countrywide basis. ---|--- 3.4. Export price and conclusion on continuation of dumping (100) | In the absence of cooperation of Chinese exporting producers, the export price was determined on the basis of facts available in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (101) | Only 356 thousand pieces of RBM were imported from the PRC during the review investigation period according to Eurostat. This amount is negligible not only in light of total Union consumption, but also since, as explained in recital (26), a large number of different types of RBM were sold in the Union during the review investigation period. In the absence of cooperation from Chinese exporting producers, the Commission has no indication of the product mix within such small volumes of imports. For these reasons, the Commission concluded that these low volumes do not provide a sufficient basis for a finding on continuation of dumping and examined the likelihood of recurrence of dumping should the measures be allowed to lapse. ---|--- 4\. LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF DUMPING (102) | Further to the conclusion of recital (101), the Commission investigated, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the likelihood of recurrence of dumping should the measures be repealed. The following elements were analysed: the existence of dumping based on exports to third countries, the production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC and the attractiveness of the Union market. ---|--- 4.1. Exports to third countries (103) | Based on GTA imports statistics, the Commission identified four biggest importers of the RBM from the PRC during the review investigation period: Mexico, the USA, Malaysia and Vietnam (50). These four countries accounted for 61 % of the total “world” imports of the product under review from China. ---|--- (104) | With regard to Chinese exports of RBM to these four main markets, dumping calculations were made following the methodology described below. ---|--- 4.1.1. Normal value (105) | To assess dumping from the PRC to third countries, the Commission used the normal value constructed as described in recitals (93) to (99). ---|--- 4.1.2. Export price (106) | As there was no cooperation from the Chinese producers, the likely export price to the Union was estimated by analysing Chinese export prices to third countries in the review investigation period, based on the relevant country specific GTA import statistics. ---|--- (107) | Malaysia and Vietnam reported their import values only at CIF level. Therefore, the Commission adjusted the reported values to FOB level by deducting sea freight and insurance cost (51). This adjustment was not necessary for Mexico and the USA as imports values at FOB level were available. ---|--- (108) | In the second step FOB import values of all the four countries were adjusted to the ex-work level by deducting domestic transport cost in China (52). ---|--- 4.1.3. Comparison and dumping margins (109) | The Commission compared the constructed normal value and the export prices to the third countries on an ex-work basis. ---|--- (110) | The above comparison showed countrywide dumping margins for the Chinese exports to the four countries, expressed as a percentage of their respective CIF values (53) as follows: | Country | % of total “world” imports of the product under review from the PRC | Dumping margin (%) ---|---|--- Mexico | 35 | 37,6 USA | 13 | 21,9 Malaysia | 7 | 100,8 Vietnam | 6 | 61,6 (111) | The average export price found during the review investigation period for each of the above countries would lead to a dumping margin of more than 20 % when compared to the normal value established in in section 3.3.6. This indicates that, if imports from the PRC would arrive in the Union at that level, such imports would be dumped. ---|--- 4.2. Production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC (112) | Spare capacity in China, estimated at 375 million pieces according to the expiry review request, exceeds more than 7 times the total Union consumption of 40 million pieces – 60 million pieces during the review investigation period. Chinese capacity has been built up dramatically over the last decade, currently standing around 830 million pieces, which is well beyond its present output of 455 million pieces. ---|--- (113) | Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the Chinese exporting producers have significant spare capacities, which they could use to produce RBM to export to the Union if the measures were allowed to lapse. ---|--- 4.3. Attractiveness of the Union market (114) | According to the GTA data, the Chinese exporting producers exported to their main third markets at prices which were 1,2 % to 32,5 % lower as compared to the average sales prices of the Union producers on the Union market. Taking into account this price level, exporting to the Union is potentially attractive for the Chinese exporters, as the expiry of the measures would allow them to sell at prices higher than those at which they export to other countries but still below the EU industry prices. ---|--- (115) | The Union market is also attractive to the Chinese producers in view of its size, as it is the largest market globally for some types of RBM according to the expiry review request. ---|--- 4.4. Conclusion on the likelihood of recurrence of dumping (116) | In view of the above, the Commission concluded that there is a strong likelihood that dumping would recur if the current measures were allowed to lapse. In particular, the level of the normal value established in the PRC, the level of Chinese export prices to third country markets, the attractiveness of the Union market and the availability of significant production capacity in the PRC all point to a strong likelihood of recurrence of dumping in case the current measures would be allowed to lapse. ---|--- 5\. INJURY 5.1. Definition of the Union industry and Union production (117) | The like product was manufactured by two producers in the Union during the investigation period: Ring Alliance Ringbuchtechnik GmbH (Oroszlany, Hungary) and I.M.L. Industria Meccanica Lombarda S.r.l. (Offanengo, Italy). They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (118) | Both producers (the first of them being the applicant) have cooperated in the investigation. Since both companies together represented the total Union production of RBM in the review investigation period, they are considered to represent the Union industry within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (119) | The total Union production during the review investigation period was established at around [40 000 – 60 000] pieces (54). The Commission established the figure on the basis of the questionnaire replies of the two producers. Because the micro- and macroeconomic figures were established on the basis of the data of two Union producers, the data was provided in ranges to ensure confidentiality. ---|--- 5.2. Union consumption (120) | The Commission established the Union consumption on the basis of (a) the verified sales volumes of the like product by the Union industry into the Union market reported in the respective questionnaire replies of the Union producers, and (b) import volumes of RMBs (TARIC level) into the Union market reported in Eurostat and converted into pieces. Within the TARIC nomenclature valid at the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2016/703, the Commission identified two groups of RBM: | — | RBM other than those with 17 or 23 rings (TARIC codes 8305100011, 8305100013, 8305100019 and 8305100034); and ---|--- — | RBM with 17 and 23 rings (TARIC codes 8305100021, 8305100023, 8305100029 and 8305100035). ---|--- (121) | In Eurostat, the unit of measurement for RBM is weight (KG). The Commission calculated a conversion factor for each of the above groups of RBM, on the basis of the verified production data of the Union industry. It used the conversion factors thus calculated to establish the relevant import volumes in pieces. ---|--- (122) | The calculation of these conversion factors was duly explained in a note for the file (55). In that note the Commission provided the source of the data it used to calculate the two conversion factors (Union industry sales figures for the review investigation period submitted in weight and unit) and the methodology applied (total weight of each product group’s Union sales divided by the corresponding number of pieces). No comments were received in respect of this note for the file. ---|--- (123) | Union consumption developed as follows: Table 1 Consumption in Union market | Volume | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | RIP ---|---|---|---|--- Index (2017 = 100) | 100 | 95 | 86 | 69 Ranges (‘000 pcs) | 70 000 – 90 000 | 60 000 – 80 000 | 60 000 – 80 000 | 40 000 – 60 000 Source: Eurostat and questionnaire replies (124) | The review showed that Union consumption of RBM declined by 31 % over the period considered from around 70 – 90 million pieces in 2017 to 40 – 60 million pieces in the review investigation period (56). ---|--- (125) | The continued decline of the Union consumption is explained by digitalisation. However, the Union industry believes that the impact of digitalisation is in its last phase and that the market will gradually stabilize, especially for the main markets, i.e. the school market and the samples market. Moreover, the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020 resulted in an additional temporary decrease of demand in that year. ---|--- 5.3. Imports from the country concerned 5.3.1. Volume and market share of the imports from the country concerned (126) | The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Eurostat statistics, as duly explained in recital (120) above. Its market share was established by comparing imports to the Union consumption as set out in table 1. ---|--- (127) | Imports from the country concerned developed as follows: Table 2 Import volume and market share | | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | RIP ---|---|---|---|--- PRC index (2017 = 100) | 100 | 89 | 35 | 39 PRC ranges (‘000 pcs) | 800 – 1 300 | 800 – 1 300 | 300 – 800 | 300 – 800 Market share ranges (%) | 1 – 3 | 0,5 – 2,5 | 0,2 – 2,2 | 0,5 – 2,5 Market share index (2017 = 100) | 100 | 93 | 41 | 57 Source: Eurostat and the note for the file (128) | The volume of imports of RBM originating in the PRC remained at a very low level throughout the period considered and fluctuated around a market share of 1 %. ---|--- 5.3.2. Prices of the imports from the country concerned and price undercutting. (129) | Since there was no cooperation from exporting producers in the PRC, and in view of the very low quantities imported in the Union from the PRC as explained in recital (101), no reliable import prices could be established during the review investigation period and therefore it was not possible to perform a meaningful calculation of price undercutting. ---|--- (130) | Under these circumstances, the Commission determined the price undercutting by imports from the PRC during the review investigation period by comparing: | (1) | the weighted average prices of the product under review produced in the PRC and sold to its main export markets, as explained in recitals (106)-(107), established on a CIF basis, with appropriate adjustments for the conventional rate of customs duty (2,7 %) and post-importation costs (2 %), and ---|--- (2) | the corresponding weighted average sales prices of the product under review of the Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to ex-works level. ---|--- (131) | The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the Union producers’ turnover during the review investigation period. It showed undercutting of up to 32,5 % depending on the prices to the main export markets used. Similar levels of undercutting on the Union market are expected should the measures be allowed to lapse. ---|--- 5.4. Volumes and prices of imports from third countries other than the PRC (132) | The Commission established the volumes and prices of imports applying the same methodology as for the PRC (see recital (126)). ---|--- (133) | The volume of imports from third countries developed over the period considered as follows: Table 3 Imports from third countries | Country | Import volume | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | RIP ---|---|---|---|---|--- Cambodia | Index (2017 = 100) | 100 | 100 | 64 | 58 Ranges (‘000 pcs) | 10 000 – 15 000 | 10 000 – 15 000 | 5 000 – 10 000 | 4 000 – 9 000 Market share (%) | 15 -17 | 16 – 18 | 10 -12 | 12 – 14 Average price (EUR/000pcs) | 154 | 145 | 146 | 148 India | Index (2017 = 100) | 100 | 121 | 75 | 42 Ranges (‘000 pcs) | 10 000 – 15 000 | 13 000 – 18 000 | 8 000 – 13 000 | 4 000 – 9 000 Market share (%) | 16 – 18 | 19 – 21 | 13 – 15 | 9 – 11 Average price (EUR/000pcs) | 153 | 136 | 147 | 143 Others | Index (2017 = 100) | 100 | 18 | 5 | 29 Ranges (‘000 pcs) | 100 – 600 | 50 – 550 | 10 – 510 | 50 – 550 Market share (%) | 0,3 – 1 | 0,1 – 0,5 | 0,1 – 0,5 | 0,2 – 0,7 Average price (EUR/000pcs) | 210 | 489 | 1 301 | 438 Total | Index (2017 = 100) | 100 | 109 | 68 | 50 Ranges (‘000 pcs) | 23 000 – 28 000 | 25 000 – 30 000 | 15 000 – 20 000 | 10 000 – 15 000 Market share (%) | 30 – 35 | 35 – 40 | 25 – 30 | 23 – 28 Average price (EUR/000pcs) | 154 | 141 | 148 | 149 Source: Eurostat and expiry review request (134) | During the whole period considered the main exporting countries of RBM to the Union were India and Cambodia. Imports from these countries held significant shares of the Union market over the whole period considered, ranging between 10 % and 16 %. It should however also be noted that the volumes and market share of imports from India and Cambodia strongly decreased over the period considered. Prices of such imports also decreased, and the Union industry has not provided any evidence that such imports are dumped on the Union market. ---|--- (135) | The imports from the other third countries are negligible. Thailand, once the second largest exporter to the Union, almost disappeared from the market. ---|--- 5.5. Economic situation of the Union industry 5.5.1. General remarks (136) | In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered. ---|--- (137) | As mentioned in recital (16), no sampling was used for the determination of possible injury suffered by the Union industry. Consequently, for the injury determination, the Commission did not distinguish between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators because all the Union producers cooperated in the review. ---|--- (138) | In order to respect confidential business information, it has been necessary to present information concerning the two Union producers in ranges. Presenting the exact figures would allow either Union producer to calculate the exact production figures of the other producer, and there would be a risk that other market operators possessing market data would be able to do so likewise. ---|--- 5.5.2. Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation (139) | The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows: Table 4 Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation | | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | RIP ---|---|---|---|--- Production ‘000 pcs (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 97 | 92 | 78 Production ‘000 pcs (ranges) | 50 000 – 60 000 | 49 000 – 59 000 | 48 000 – 58 000 | 40 000 – 50 000 Production capacity (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 Production capacity (ranges) | 80 000 – 90 000 | 80 000 – 90 000 | 80 000 – 90 000 | 80 000 – 90 000 Capacity utilisation (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 97 | 92 | 78 Capacity utilisation rate (ranges) (%) | 60 – 70 | 58 – 68 | 55 – 65 | 50 – 60 Source: Questionnaire replies (140) | The production of the Union industry declined by 22 % over the period considered. This trend followed the trend in the consumption although the drop in the production output of the Union industry was lighter than the drop in consumption. Over the period considered, the Union industry experienced the same decrease by 22 % in the capacity utilisation rate, as capacity itself remained stable. The capacity utilisation rate reached a record low level of 50 % to 60 % in absolute terms in the review investigation period. ---|--- 5.5.3. Sales volume and market share (141) | The Union industry’s sales volume and market share developed over the period considered as follows: Table 5 Sales volume and market share | | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | RIP ---|---|---|---|--- Total sales volume on the Union market – unrelated customers (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 89 | 97 | 80 Total sales volume on the Union market – unrelated customers (ranges) | 40 000 – 50 000 | 35 000 – 45 000 | 40 000 – 50 000 | 35 000 – 45 000 Market share (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 93 | 112 | 115 Market share (ranges) (%) | 63 – 68 | 58 – 63 | 70 – 75 | 72 – 77 Source: Questionnaire replies (142) | Sales volumes of the Union industry to unrelated customers decreased by 21 % over the period considered. Although the main reason of this decrease was the simultaneous decrease in consumption, the drop in sales volumes was less pronounced than the drop in the consumption and in the imports from the third countries of the product under review. As a result, the market share of the Union industry increased by 15 % over the period considered and amounted to 70 % – 80 % in the review investigation period. ---|--- 5.5.4. Prices and factors affecting prices (143) | The weighted average unit sales prices of the Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union and the unit cost of production developed over the period considered as follows: Table 6 Sales prices in the Union and Cost of production | | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | RIP ---|---|---|---|--- Weighted average unit sales price in the Union on the total market (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 100 | 92 | 93 Weighted average unit sales price in the Union on the total market (EUR/’000pcs) | 170 – 200 | 175 – 205 | 150 – 180 | 155 – 185 Unit cost of production (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 103 | 99 | 98 Unit cost of production (ranges) | 160 – 190 | 165 – 195 | 148 – 178 | 150 – 180 Source: Questionnaire replies (144) | The decrease of the weighted average unit sales prices, by 7 %, was much more pronounced than the slight drop in cost of production. ---|--- (145) | The Union industry’s average sales prices followed the trend of the weighted average Union sales prices of the main exporting countries of RBM to the Union, as reported in table 3. Despite the low capacity utilisation, the average cost of production slightly decreased over the period considered, mainly due to decrease in labour costs following the restructuring efforts by the Union producers. ---|--- 5.5.5. Employment and productivity (146) | Employment, productivity and average labour costs of the Union producers developed over the period considered as follows: Table 7 Employment and productivity | | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | RIP ---|---|---|---|--- Number of employees (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 88 | 83 | 80 Number of employees (FTE ranges) | 150 – 200 | 130 – 180 | 120 – 170 | 115 – 165 Labour Productivity (unit/employee – index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 110 | 111 | 98 Labour Productivity (unit/employee – ranges) | 320 – 370 | 360 – 410 | 365 – 415 | 300 – 350 Average labour costs per employee (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 102 | 107 | 96 Average labour costs per employee (ranges) | 18 000 – 22 000 | 19 000 – 23 000 | 20 000 – 24 000 | 17 000 – 21 000 Source: Questionnaire replies (147) | The employment in full time equivalent has decreased over the period considered by 22 %, which is a result of continuing restructuring of the Union industry in order to face the changing market circumstances. At the same time, due to these continuous restructuring efforts, the Union industry’s labour productivity remained stable over the period considered in spite of the pronounced drop of the production as shown in table 4. ---|--- (148) | Average labour costs per employee steadily increased from 2017 to 2019 and then dropped strongly, by 4 % as compared to 2017, in the review investigation period, mainly due to temporary measures in view of the COVID-19 pandemic. ---|--- 5.5.6. Inventories (149) | Stock levels of the two Union producers developed over the period considered as follows: Table 8 Inventories | | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | RIP ---|---|---|---|--- Closing stocks (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 118 | 109 | 112 Closing stocks (ranges) | 25 000 – 35 000 | 30 000 – 40 000 | 25 000 – 35 000 | 27 000 – 37 000 Closing stocks as a percentage of production (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 121 | 118 | 144 Closing stocks as a percentage of production (ranges) (%) | 40 – 50 | 50 – 60 | 48 – 58 | 60 – 70 Source: Questionnaire replies (150) | The Union industry’s year-end stock levels increased by 12 % in the period considered. However, taking into account the simultaneous decrease in production, stocks were at a relatively high level throughout the period considered, which was considered as normal by the Union producers in order to allow flexibility to react to demand and especially to seasonal fluctuations. ---|--- 5.5.7. Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital (151) | Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the Union producers developed over the period considered as follows: Table 9 Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments | | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | RIP ---|---|---|---|--- Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover indexed) (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 141 | 114 | 72 Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover – ranges) | 3 – 8 | 5 -10 | 4 – 9 | 2 – 7 Cash flow (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 63 | 99 | 72 Investments (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 62 | 45 | 40 Return on investments (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 100 | 87 | 53 Return on investments (ranges) (%) | 8 – 13 | 8 – 13 | 7 – 12 | 5 – 10 Source: Questionnaire replies (152) | The Commission established the profitability of the Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. From 2017 to 2019, the Union industry’s profit fluctuated around the minimum level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition according to Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation (6 %). In the review investigation period it dropped however far below that level. The decrease in profitability is mainly due the decrease in sales price. ---|--- (153) | The net cash flow is the ability of the Union producers to self-finance their activities. The Union industry managed to maintain positive cash flow over the period considered although it decreased in the review investigation period by 28 % as compared to 2017. ---|--- (154) | The investigation showed that the Union industry was not able to maintain its level of investment over the period considered. Investments decreased by 60 % in the review investigation period as compared to 2017. Moreover, the current investments concern maintenance and not machineries to increase production. ---|--- (155) | The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. The Union industry also managed to maintain positive return on investments over the period considered although it decreased in the review investigation period by 47 % as compared to 2017. ---|--- (156) | The Union producers’ ability to raise capital was not reported as a difficulty during the period considered. ---|--- 5.5.8. Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping (157) | As explained in recital (101), imports from the PRC in the review investigation period do not provide a sufficient basis for a finding on continuation of dumping. Anti-dumping measures against RBM are in place since 1997 and the Union industry has since then continuously been confronted with related unfair trade practices, resulting in additional investigations and several extensions of the measures (see recitals (1) to (7)). The indicators presented above demonstrate that the continuous dumping, circumvention and absorption practices from the past have weakened the Union industry which therefore remains vulnerable to the injurious effects of any dumped imports on the Union market. ---|--- 5.5.9. Export performance of the Union industry (158) | The volume of exports of the Union producers developed over the period considered as follows: Table 10 Export performance of the Union producers | | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | RIP ---|---|---|---|--- Export volume ‘000 pcs (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 117 | 89 | 77 Export volume ‘000 pcs (ranges) | 6 000 – 10 000 | 7 000 – 11 000 | 5 000 – 9 000 | 4 000 – 8 000 Average price (index 2017 = 100) | 100 | 79 | 89 | 85 Average price EUR/’000 pcs (ranges) | 200 – 250 | 150 – 200 | 180 – 240 | 170 – 230 Source: Questionnaire replies (159) | Export volumes of the Union industry to the unrelated customers decreased by 23 % over the period considered. The Union industry’s exports represented 10 % – 15 % of the total Union industry sales over the period considered. ---|--- (160) | Average unit export price to the unrelated customers decreased twice more than the decrease of the average unit sales price in the Union on the total market over the period considered. ---|--- 5.5.10. Conclusion on the situation of the Union industry (161) | The volume of imports of RBM originating in PRC remained very low during the period considered. ---|--- (162) | The review showed that the continuation of the measures as from 1997 and the low volume of low-priced dumped imported products from the PRC allowed the Union industry to maintain a positive profitability throughout the period considered. Nevertheless, the profitability achieved was low and well below 6 % in the review investigation period. ---|--- (163) | The injury indicators show that the economic situation of the Union industry is difficult, in a context of worldwide competition and declining consumption. The Union industry has responded to these challenges by restructuring its employment. ---|--- (164) | The indicators examined demonstrate that the anti-dumping measures have achieved their intended result of removing the injury suffered by the Union producers. ---|--- (165) | On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the Union industry did not suffer material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- 6\. LIKELIHOOD OF RECURRENCE OF INJURY IF THE MEASURES WERE TO BE REPEALED (166) | As the Commission concluded that the Union industry did not suffer material injury during the review investigation period, the Commission assessed, in accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of injury from the dumped imports from the PRC if the measures were allowed to lapse. On the basis of the above-described trends, it appears that the anti-dumping measures have achieved their intended result of removing the injury suffered by the Union producers. ---|--- (167) | In that regard, the Commission examined the production capacity and spare capacity in the country concerned, the attractiveness of the Union market, and the likely impact of imports from the country concerned on the situation of the Union industry should the measures be allowed to lapse. ---|--- 6.1. Spare production/processing capacity (168) | As mentioned in recital (113), Chinese exporters have significant spare capacity to increase their exports rapidly. Their spare capacity is estimated around 375 million pieces, which is more than seven times the consumption within the Union. ---|--- 6.2. Attractiveness of the Union market (169) | Chinese exporting producers have engaged in a number of different unfair trade practices to circumvent the measures against imports of Chinese RBM, as explained in recitals (3), (5) and (6) above. Moreover, the investigation showed that prices on the Union market are higher as compared to prices on third country markets, as described in recital (114). ---|--- (170) | All the above points to the fact the Union market is considered an attractive market by the Chinese exporting producers and it is likely that significant quantities currently exported to other countries as well as production from some of the existing spare capacity would be directed to the Union market in the event of the anti-dumping measures being allowed to lapse. ---|--- 6.3. Impact of a new influx of dumped imports from the PRC on the situation Union industry should the measures be allowed to lapse (171) | If measures were allowed to lapse, an increase in imports from the country concerned is expected, due to the existing spare capacities and the attractiveness of the Union market as set out in recitals (168) to (170). These imports are likely to be undercutting the prices of the Union industry or at least put a heavy downward pressure on the non-injurious price level of the Union industry, as set out in recitals (129) to (131). ---|--- (172) | With the likely arrival of large quantities of Chinese imports at dumped prices, the Union industry would be forced to reduce its production or further lower its prices as compared to its costs. The Union industry already finds itself in a fragile situation with modest profitability levels, as explained in recitals (162) and (163). Therefore, it is not in a position to either further lower its prices or to sacrifice sales volumes without putting its viability at risk. ---|--- 6.4. Conclusion on likelihood of recurrence of material injury (173) | In view of the above, the Commission concluded that the expiry of the measures would in all likelihood result in recurrence of material injury to the Union industry. Indeed, in the absence of measures, the likely significant increase of dumped imports from the PRC at prices undercutting the Union industry prices, would further aggravate the already fragile economic situation of the Union industry and, consequently, put its viability at risk. ---|--- 7\. UNION INTEREST 7.1. Introduction (174) | In accordance with Article 21 of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the maintenance of the measures would be against the Union interest as a whole. The determination of the Union interest was based on an appreciation of the various interests involved, namely those of the Union industry, of importers and users. ---|--- (175) | All interested parties were given the opportunity to make their views known pursuant to Article 21(2) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (176) | On this basis, the Commission examined whether, despite the conclusions on the likelihood of recurrence of dumping and the likelihood of recurrence of injury, compelling reasons existed which would lead to the conclusion that it was not in the Union interest to maintain the existing measures. ---|--- 7.2. Interest of the Union industry (177) | As concluded in recital (165), the Union industry is not anymore injured but in a fragile state. In such situation, the Union industry cannot cope with a removal of the measures, which is likely to result in a strong increase of dumped imports. A repeal of the measures would therefore put the industry’s viability at stake. The continuation of the measures, therefore, is in the interest of Union industry. ---|--- 7.3. Interest of unrelated importers and users (178) | All known unrelated importers and users were informed about the initiation of the review. However, the Commission received no cooperation from unrelated importers and users. One unrelated importer came forward and was registered as an interested party, but that party did not make any submissions for the file. ---|--- (179) | Therefore, there were no indications that the maintenance of the measures would have a negative impact on the users and/or importers outweighing the positive impact of the measures. ---|--- 7.4. Conclusion on Union interest (180) | On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons showing that it was not in the Union interest to maintain measures on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China. ---|--- 8\. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES (181) | On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on continuation or recurrence of dumping, recurrence of injury and Union interest, the anti-dumping measures on certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China should be maintained. ---|--- (182) | To minimize the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The companies with individual anti-dumping duties must present a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(4) of this regulation. Imports not accompanied by that invoice should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other companies’. ---|--- (183) | While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(4) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc.) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law. ---|--- (184) | Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty. ---|--- (185) | The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in Article 1(3) of this Regulation are exclusively applicable to imports of the product under review originating in the PRC and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product under review produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other companies’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates. ---|--- (186) | A company may request the application of these individual anti-dumping duty rates if it changes subsequently the name of its entity. The request must be addressed to the Commission (57). The request must contain all the relevant information demonstrating that the change does not affect the right of the company to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it. If the change of name of the company does not affect its right to benefit from the duty rate which applies to it, a regulation about the change of name will be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. ---|--- (187) | All interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to recommend that the existing measures be maintained. All parties were also granted a period to make representations subsequent to this disclosure and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. The submissions and comments were duly taken into consideration. ---|--- (188) | In view of Article 109 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council (58), when an amount is to be reimbursed following a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the interest to be paid should be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations, as published in the C series of the Official Journal of the European Union on the first calendar day of each month. ---|--- (189) | The Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 delivered a positive opinion, ---|--- HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 1\. A definitive anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms, currently falling under CN code ex 8305 10 00 (TARIC codes 8305100019, 8305100029, 8305100039, and 8305100042) and originating in the People’s Republic of China. 2\. For the purpose of this Article, ring binder mechanisms shall consist of two steel sheets or wires with at least four half-rings made of steel wire fixed on them and which are kept together by a steel cover. They can be opened either by pulling the half rings or with a small steel trigger mechanism fixed to the ring binder mechanism. 3\. The rate of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free- at-Union-frontier price, before duty, shall be as follows: (a) | for mechanisms with 17 and 23 rings (TARIC codes 8305100029 and 8305100042), the amount of duty shall be equal to the difference between the minimum import price of EUR 325 per 1 000 pieces and the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty; ---|--- (b) | for mechanisms other than those with 17 or 23 rings (TARIC codes 8305100019 and 8305100039): | | Rate of duty (%) | TARIC additional code ---|---|--- People’s Republic of China: | — | World Wide Stationery Mfg, Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China ---|--- 51,2 | 8 934 | — | all other companies ---|--- 78,8 | 8 900 4\. The application of the individual duty rate specified for the company mentioned in paragraph 3 shall be conditional upon presentation to the Member States’ customs authorities of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by his/her name and function, drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume) of ring binder mechanisms sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in the People’s Republic of China. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct.’ If no such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to ‘all other companies’ shall apply. 5\. The definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to imports originating in in the People’s Republic of China as set out in paragraph 3, is extended to imports of the same certain ring binder mechanisms consigned from Vietnam, whether declared as originating in Vietnam or not (TARIC codes 8305100011, 8305100021, 8305100037 and 8305100040) and to imports of the same certain ring binder mechanisms consigned from Lao People’s Democratic Republic, whether declared as originating in Lao People’s Democratic Republic or not (TARIC codes 8305100013, 8305100023, 8305100038 and 8305100041). 6\. In cases where goods have been damaged before entry into free circulation and, therefore, the price actually paid or payable is apportioned for the determination of the customs value pursuant to Article 131(2) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 (59), the minimum import price set out in paragraph 3 shall be reduced by a percentage which corresponds to the apportioning of the price actually paid or payable. The duty payable will then be equal to the difference between the reduced minimum import price and the reduced net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before customs clearance. Article 2 Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. Article 3 This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 27 June 2022. For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN * * * (1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21. (2) Council Regulation (EC) No 119/97 of 20 January 1997 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in Malaysia and the People’s Republic of China and collecting definitively the provisional duties imposed (OJ L 22, 24.1.1997, p. 1). (3) Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/2000 of 29 September 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 119/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 250, 5.10.2000, p. 1). (4) Council Regulation (EC) No 1208/2004 of 28 June 2004 extending the definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Regulation (EC) No 119/97 on imports of certain ring-binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (OJ L 232, 1.7.2004, p. 1). (5) Council Regulation (EC) No 2074/2004 of 29 November 2004 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 359, 4.12.2004, p. 11). (6) Council Regulation (EC) No 33/2006 of 9 January 2006 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Regulation (EC) No 2074/2004 on imports of certain ring-binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of the same product consigned from the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (OJ L 7, 12.1.2006, p. 1). (7) Council Regulation (EC) No 818/2008 of 13 August 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 2074/2004 imposing a definitive antidumping duty on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China and terminating the investigation concerning the possible circumvention of anti- dumping measures imposed by that Regulation by imports of certain ring binder mechanisms consigned from Thailand, whether declared as originating in Thailand or not (OJ L 221, 19.8.2008, p. 1). (8) Implementing Regulation of the Council (EU) No 157/2010 of 22 February 2010 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 384/96 (OJ L 49, 26.2.2010, p. 1). (9) Implementing Regulation of the Council (EU) 2016/703 of 11 May 2016 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (OJ L 122, 12.5.2016, p. 1). (10) Notice of impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures (OJ C 331, 7.10.2020, p. 14). (11) Notice of initiation of an expiry review of the anti-dumping measures applicable to imports of certain ring binder mechanisms originating in the People’s Republic of China and extended to Vietnam and Lao People’s Democratic Republic (OJ C 183, 11.5.2021, p. 8). (12) https://trade.ec.europa.eu/tdi/case_details.cfm?id=2526 (13) See Implementing Regulation (EU) No 157/2010. (14) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 of 16 February 2022 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 36, 17.2.2022, p. 1); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 of 15 December 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain utility scale steel wind towers originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 450, 16.12.2021, p. 59); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 of 16 April 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain welded pipes and tubes of iron or non-alloyed steel originating in Belarus, the People’s Republic of China and Russia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 132, 19.4.2021, p. 145) and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 of 7 April 2020 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain hot rolled stainless steel sheets and coils originating in Indonesia, the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan (OJ L 110, 8.4.2020, p. 3). (15) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recitals 206-208, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recital 135, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 149-150 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 158-159. (16) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 192, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 58-61, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 115-118 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 122-127. (17) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recitals 193-194, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 62-66, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 119-122 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 128-132: While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in SOEs by the relevant State authorities, as provided for in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights, CCP cells in enterprises, state owned and private alike, represent another important channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the PRC’s company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline.

In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1.86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies. These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including to the producers of ring binder mechanisms and the suppliers of their inputs. (18) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recitals 195-201, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recitals 67-74, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 123-129 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 133-138. (19) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 202, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recital 75, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 130-133 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 139-142. (20) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 203, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recital 76, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 134-135 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 143-144. (21) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/191 recital 203, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/2239 recital 76, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 136-145 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 145-154. (22) Commission staff working document SWD(2017) 483 final/2, 20. 12. 2017, available at: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/december/tradoc_156474.pdf (23) TISCO, ‘Company profile’, http://en.tisco.com.cn/CompanyProfile/20151027095855836705.html (last viewed 2 March 2020) (24) Baowu, ‘Company profile’, http://www.baowugroup.com/en/contents/5273/102759.html (last viewed 6 May 2021) (25) Report – Chapter 14, p. 358: 51 % private and 49 % SOEs in terms of production and 44 % SOEs and 56 % private companies in terms of capacity. (26) Available at: www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-02/04/content_5039353.htm (last viewed 6 May 2021); https://policycn.com/policy_ticker/higher-expectations-for-large-scale- steel-enterprise/?iframe=1&secret=c8uthafuthefra4e (last viewed 6 May 2021), and www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/23/c_138001574.htm (last viewed 6 May 2021). (27) Available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/23/c_138001574.htm (last viewed 6 May 2021) and http://www.jjckb.cn/2019-04/23/c_137999653.htm (last viewed 6 May 2021). (28) As was the case of the merger between the private company Rizhao and the SOE Shandong Iron and Steel in 2009. See Beijing steel report, p. 58, and the acquired majority stake of China Baowu Steel Group in Magang Steel in June 2019, see https://www.ft.com/content/a7c93fae-85bc-11e9-a028-86cea8523dc2 (last viewed 6 May 2021). (29) TISCO, ‘Company profile’, http://en.tisco.com.cn/CompanyProfile/20151027095855836705.html (last viewed 2 March 2020). (30) Report, Part III, Chapter 14, p. 346 ff. (31) Introduction to The Plan for Adjusting and Upgrading the Steel Industry. (32) Report, Chapter 14, p. 347. (33) The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (2016-2020), available at https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease_8232/201612/P020191101481868235378.pdf (last viewed 2 March 2020). (34) Report – Chapter 14, p. 349. (35) Report – Chapter 14, p. 352. (36) Catalogue for Guiding Industry Restructuring (2011 Version) (2013 Amendment) issued by Order No 9 of the National Development and Reform Commission on 27 March 2011, and amended in accordance with the Decision of the National Development and Reform Commission on Amending the Relevant Clauses of the Catalogue for Guiding Industry Restructuring (2011 Version) issued by Order No 21 of the National Development and Reform Commission on 16 February 2013. (37) Report – Chapter 14, pp. 375 – 376. (38) See Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/635 recitals 134-135 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/508 recitals 143-144. (39) World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income, https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income (40) If there is no production of the product under review in any country with a similar level of development, production of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the product under review may be considered. (41) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33) as amended by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/749 (OJ L 113, 29.4.2017, p. 11). (42) https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Electricity-and-Natural-Gas- Prices-Period-II:-July-December,-2020-37458 (43) Figures provided for the manufacturing overheads were verified on spot and reconciled with the company accounts. (44) Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation considers that domestic prices in those countries cannot be used for the purpose of determining normal value and, in any event, such imports were negligible. (45) Available at https://www.macmap.org/en/query/customs-duties (last seen on 10 March 2022). (46) https://archive.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/t/turkey/TUR.pdf page 51 (last seen on 10 March 2022). (47) Available at: https://data.tuik.gov.tr (48) Available at: https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Electricity-and- Natural-Gas-Prices-Period-II:-July-December,-2020-37458 (49) http://www.transcustoms.cn/index.asp (last seen on 10 March 2022). (50) Countries are listed according to the volumes of imports from the PRC. (51) On the basis of the OECD Dataset: International Transport and Insurance Costs of Merchandise Trade (ITIC) – China-country in question: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CIF_FOB_ITIC (52) On the basis of quotation for Tianjin Port – Beijing deliveries as provided by the World Bank https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/country/c/china/CHN.pdf page 88. (53) In the case of Mexico, CIF values were obtained by using the FOB/CIF value ratio available for the USA. (54) Only ranges are given in order to protect confidentiality of data of the two Union producers. (55) t22.000638. (56) Only ranges are given to protect confidentiality of data of the two Union producers. (57) European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, Directorate G, Rue de la Loi 170, 1040 Brussels, Belgium. (58) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1). (59) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ L 343, 29.12.2015, p. 558). * * *