COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2026/270

| Official Journal of the European Union | EN L series ---|---|--- * * * | 2026/270 | 5.2.2026 ---|---|--- COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2026/270 of 4 February 2026 imposing provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of 1,4-Butanediol originating in the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (1) (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 7 thereof, After consulting the Member States, Whereas: 1\. PROCEDURE 1.1. Initiation (1) | On 6 June 2025, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) initiated an anti-dumping investigation with regard to imports of 1,4-Butanediol (‘BDO’) originating in the People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’ or ‘China’), the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (‘Saudi Arabia’) and the United States of America (‘USA’ and, together with China and Saudi Arabia, ‘the countries concerned’) on the basis of Article 5 of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (2) (‘the Notice of Initiation’). ---|--- (2) | The Commission initiated the investigation following a complaint lodged on 24 April 2025 by INEOS Solvents SA (‘the complainant’ or ‘Ineos’). The complaint was made by the Union industry of BDO in the sense of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. The complaint contained evidence of dumping and of resulting material injury that was sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation. ---|--- 1.2. Registration (3) | The Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1718 (3) (‘the registration Regulation’). ---|--- 1.3. Interested parties (4) | In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited interested parties to contact it in order to participate in the investigation. In addition, the Commission specifically informed the complainants, other known Union producers, the known exporting producers and the authorities of the countries concerned, known importers, suppliers and users, traders, as well as associations known to be concerned about the initiation of the investigation and invited them to participate. ---|--- (5) | Qore LLC, a producer of BDO in the United States, requested to be registered as an interested party in the proceeding as, it argued, the procedure might affect it. According to Article 6(7) of the basic Regulation, interested parties are defined as Union producers, trade unions, importers and exporters and their representative associations, users and consumer organisations, as well as the representatives of the exporting country. Since Qore had no exports to the EU, it did not meet the criteria of an interested party as defined in the basic Regulation. Its request was therefore rejected. Qore and the United States Federal Government (‘USG’) submitted that the Commission should accept Qore as an interested party irrespective of the export activity, arguing that the latter is not a requirement to be considered an interested party under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘ADA’). The Commission noted that nothing in the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement or in the WTO jurisprudence contradicts the Commission’s decision to refuse interested party status to producers not exporting to the Union. Indeed, Article 6.11 ADA requires two categories of producers to be included in the definition of ‘interested parties’ within the meaning of the Agreement: a ‘foreign producer […] of a product subject to investigation’ (Article 6.11(i) ADA) and ‘a producer of the like product in the importing Member’ (Article 6.11(ii) ADA). Qore LLC being a foreign producer of a like product does not fall within any of the two categories. Thus, the USG failed to demonstrate why the Commission should accept Qore as interested party under the law governing this proceeding, i.e. the basic Regulation. ---|--- (6) | Interested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings. ---|--- 1.4. Comments on initiation (7) | Lyondell Chemie Nederland B.V. (‘LYB’), Sahara International Petrochemical Co. (‘Sipchem’), Helm AG (‘Helm’), Qore LLC (‘Qore’), the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (‘GKSA’) and the USG provided comments on the complaint and the initiation of the investigation. ---|--- (8) | At the outset, the Commission noted that it carried out its examination of the complaint in accordance with Article 5 of the basic Regulation and concluded that the requirements for initiation of an investigation were met, i.e. that there was sufficient evidence to initiate the investigation. ---|--- (9) | According to Article 5(2) of the basic Regulation, a complaint shall contain such information as is reasonably available to the complainant. The legal standard of evidence required for the purpose of initiating an investigation (‘sufficient’ evidence) is different from that which is necessary for the purpose of a preliminary or final determination of the existence of dumping, injury or of a causal link. Therefore, evidence which is insufficient in quantity or quality to justify a preliminary or final determination of dumping, injury or causation, may nevertheless be sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation. ---|--- (10) | Pursuant to Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation, a complaint is considered to ‘have been made by, or on behalf of, the Union industry’ if it is supported by Union producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 % of the total production of the like product produced by Union industry expressing their position on the complaint – be it in favour or against, and, second, it is supported by of the Union producers accounting for more than 25 % of the total production of the like product produced by the Union industry. ---|--- (11) | LYB took issue with the Commission’s analysis of the degree of support for the complaint (‘standing analysis’). Concretely, it claimed that the investigation should have not been initiated with respect to Saudi Arabia and the USA, as the complainant fell short of the standing requirement under Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation, given that LYB alone accounted for more than half of the production of the product concerned among those Union producers which expressed their position about the investigation and expressed a ‘neutral’ position to the initiation of the investigation because it had ‘[n]o concerns with regards to imports from Saudi Arabia & the USA’, and it was ‘[i]n favor of investigating imports originating in China’. ---|--- (12) | Sipchem also argued that the investigation should be discontinued as concerns BDO imports from Saudi Arabia and the USA. Concretely, Sipchem claimed that the Commission erred twice in its standing analysis: first, deeming LYB neutral regarding the investigation as concerns BDO imports from Saudi Arabia and the USA, and, second, concluding that the complaint complied with Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, Sipchem concluded that the investigation was wrongfully initiated as concerns BDO imports from Saudi Arabia and the USA, and, consequently, requested the Commission to terminate it immediately except for China. ---|--- (13) | The GKSA also claimed that the complainant failed to demonstrate that it accounted for a major proportion of the BDO Union production in the IP, hence it did not comply with the requirement on standing. GKSA underlined that the complainant itself indicated that it represented 39,1 % of the total Union production of the product concerned during the investigation period. It followed that without any evidence demonstrating the other two Union producers’ position, i.e. LBY and Novamont, it cannot be assumed, according to GKSA, that the 50 % threshold for the standing exercise was met. ---|--- (14) | Regarding the standing analysis, on 2 June 2025 the Commission issued a note for the file on standing (‘Note on standing’) for inspection by interested parties. The analysis established that companies supporting the complaint represented between 45 % and 46 % of the total EU production in 2024, that no producer expressing opposition came forward and that one producer expressed a neutral position. The Commission therefore concluded that the conditions of Article 5(4) of the basic Regulation to consider that a complaint had to been made by, or on behalf of, the Union industry were met. LYB expressly stated a neutral position. The claims were therefore rejected. ---|--- (15) | Second, according to LYB, imports from the USA should be addressed separately from imports from Saudi Arabia and China since they were supposedly not subject to the same conditions of competition and hence should not be cumulated with imports from the USA. According to LYB, (i) BDO imports originating from the USA were exclusively undertaken by two Union producers only, i.e. LYB itself and BASF; (ii) most of those imports were likely for captive consumption by the Union industry, and (iii) the remaining volumes were not imported for direct sale to independent customers on the Union market. Sipchem made similar claims regarding imports from Saudi Arabia. ---|--- (16) | The Commission found that the conditions for cumulation of the countries concerned at the stage of the complaint were met on the basis of the available information and statistics. ---|--- (17) | The dumping margins in the complaint were found to be above de minimis. As shown by available official import statistics, dumped imports were not negligible in terms of volumes for all countries concerned. Furthermore, the conditions of competition were considered similar, as | (a) | there was a general overlap in terms of geographical presence among the products from the countries concerned and the like product produced by the Union industry; ---|--- (b) | prices from all countries concerned were below Union industry price and full cost levels; ---|--- (c) | there had been a significant market presence of imports from all countries concerned, whether in absolute or relative terms, during the period examined. ---|--- (18) | Therefore, the Commission dismissed the claims that imports from the countries concerned should not have been cumulated at initiation. In addition, comments on cumulation were addressed in section 4.3 ‘Imports from the countries concerned’ of this regulation. ---|--- (19) | LYB argued that any injury suffered by the Union industry was directly caused by imports of BDO from China. Consequently, LYB argued that the pricing behaviour of the Chinese BDO industry was responsible for the situation of the Union industry. As a result, the Union industry could only follow the pricing behaviour of the Chinese BDO industry, as so to not be flooded by the surge of Chinese BDO imports. In LYB’s view, there was a direct coincidence in time between the surge in Chinese BDO imports in 2023 with, in parallel, a meaningful drop in production of the Union industry, which then reversed in 2024 when the Union industry began to recover. As to the decline in Chinese BDO imports, LYB asserted that it was not a systematic change in the dumping practices of the Chinese industry, but rather it was due to the BASF’s decision to divest from its joint ventures in China. Specifically, LYB contended that the decrease in Chinese imports was accompanying the relative stable flux of imports from the USA in 2023 and 2024, given that, to overcome the loss of supply from China, BASF had to resort to BDO imported from the USA. However, LYB underlined that such trend was artificial given that BASF used US BDO imports for captive consumption only. ---|--- (20) | The Commission does not dispute that Chinese dumped imports and price behaviour contributed to the Union industry injury. However, it could not be concluded that only Chinese imports were at fault based on the complaint submitted. The complaint provided sufficient evidence on the role of US and Saudi Arabia imports in causing an injury to the Union industry, such as for example the significantly increasing volume of imports and market shares in the Union, combined with substantial and continuously reduced prices from imports from the USA and Saudi Arabia in the period used in the complaint. In addition, based on the complaint the Commission could observe underselling, undercutting and dumping from the countries concerned. Finally, these comments were also further analysed as part of the injury assessment and causation. ---|--- (21) | LYB claimed that anti-dumping measures against the USA would directly harm the Union interest, as LYB deemed US BDO supply as a ‘vital lifeline for the Union industry’ given that it was closely integrated with EU production, serving BASF for captive use and LYB in exceptional circumstances to overcome production shortfalls. Qore claimed that the imposition of anti-dumping measures on BDO imports from the USA would harm Union downstream users. Chimica Organica Industriale Milanese S.p.a. (‘COIM’), a Union user of the product concerned, raised similar claims, namely that the imposition of measures would be against the interest of the Union as it would (i) have a negative impact due to the cumulation with potential anti-dumping duties on adipic acid from China, (ii) injure the Union downstream industry, (iii) make Union users dependant on the Complainant, and (iv) prejudice the position of Union users against competitors from third countries. Because of the alleged lack of Union interest, COIM called for the Commission to terminate the investigation without imposing any measures. ---|--- (22) | Union interest considerations are irrelevant for the initiation of an investigation. These claims were therefore addressed under section 7.3 ‘Interest of users’ of this regulation. ---|--- (23) | LYB asserted that the Commission should ensure the economic reality of US BDO imports be properly reflected when determining the injury margin. LYB submitted that the Commission should establish the injury margin at the level of undercutting margin, and, consequently, should not adjust the US BDO export price pursuant to Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation, nor construct ‘an artificial and entirely hypothetical’ (4) export price at the Union border. Consequently, LYB concluded that the price comparison should be done through the actual price paid by the first independent customer in the EU. ---|--- (24) | Such claim was irrelevant for the initiation of the investigation. It was therefore dismissed. ---|--- (25) | Qore submitted that (i) the Union industry did not suffer any material injury; (ii) the complainant failed to demonstrate that BDO US imports harmed the Union industry; and (iii) price and volume trends as presented in the complaint are better explained by internal decisions by the Union industry itself, downstream market shifts and cost-driven volatility. ---|--- (26) | Qore failed to provide any evidence supporting its claim, which were hence unsubstantiated. In addition, based on the complaint, there was sufficient evidence of injury such as for example significant reduced volumes, market shares and sales prices combined with a significant negative profitability due to dumped imports. Therefore, Qore’s claims were rejected. ---|--- (27) | The GKSA submitted that the complaint did not satisfy the requirements to initiate an anti-dumping investigation because it lacked sufficient evidence on dumping, injury and the causal link. ---|--- (28) | The analysis of the evidence provided by the complainants has yielded the result that the complaint contained sufficient prima facie evidence of dumping of BDO in the EU market. Indeed, the complaint provided sufficient evidence on both normal values and export prices for all countries concerned and, on this basis, established dumping margins of 87 % for the PRC, 27 % for Saudi Arabia and 57 % to 78 % for the United States. Regarding injury and causality, in accordance with the principles of Article 2 of the basic Regulation, the complaint provided prima facie evidence injury suffered by the Union industry from the dumped imports of the countries used in the complaint, for example a substantial loss of market share of the Union was accompanied with substantial increase in market share form the countries concerned in the Union, offered at continuously reduced prices in the period considered. Resulting in prices being lower than the cost of production and of significant losses by the Union producers. In addition the complaint provided sufficient evidence of underselling and undercutting. ---|--- (29) | The USG claimed that the Commission erred in including bio BDO in the product scope together with fossil BDO because of the fundamental differences between the two. The USG referred to the submission of Qore and BASF, which both requested the Commission to exclude bio BDO from the product scope of this investigation. Lastly, the USG contended that bio BDO should be examined as a separate domestic like product from BDO. Chimica Organica Industriale Milanese S.p.a. (‘COIM’), a Union user of the product concerned, at the outset stressed that bio BDO fundamentally differs from fossil BDO. The request for the exclusion of bio BDO from the product scope is addressed in section 2.4 ‘Claims regarding product scope’ of this regulation. ---|--- (30) | At the initiation of the investigation, COIM argued that the Union industry does not suffer any material injury because they alleged that there is no significant difference in prices between the Union-produced BDO and BDO imported from the countries concerned. In any event, any alleged injury is not attributable to BDO imports from the countries concerned, but solely to the Union industry’s increasing costs of production. ---|--- (31) | The Commission took note of COIM’s claims. However, COIM failed to provide evidence for any of the claims it raised. In accordance with the principles of Article 3 of the basic Regulation, the complaint provided sufficient evidence of injury suffered by the Union industry from the dumped imports of the countries considered, for example a substantial loss of market share of the Union was accompanied with substantial increase in market share form the countries concerned in the Union, offered at continuously reduced prices in the period considered. In addition, the complaint provided prima facie evidence of underselling and undercutting. Therefore, COIM’s claims were dismissed. ---|--- 1.5. Sampling (32) | In the Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it might sample the interested parties in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation. ---|--- Sampling of Union producers (33) | In its Notice of Initiation, the Commission stated that it had provisionally selected a sample of Union producers. This sample consisted of all 3 Union producers which took part in the sampling process. These were: | — | BASF SE, Ludwigshafen, Germany (BASF), ---|--- — | INEOS Solvents Marl GmbH, Marl, Germany (INEOS), ---|--- — | Lyondell Chemie Nederland B.V., Rotterdam, The Netherlands (LCN). ---|--- (34) | The sampled Union producers accounted for more than 70 % of production and sales quantities on the Union market. The Commission invited interested parties to comment on the provisional sample. No comments were received on the sample. The sample was deemed representative of the Union industry. ---|--- Sampling of unrelated importers (35) | To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked unrelated importers to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. ---|--- (36) | No unrelated importers provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. Industrial user/importers which came forward in this process as interested parties were directed to complete user questionnaires. In view of this, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary. ---|--- Sampling of exporting producers (37) | To decide whether sampling is necessary and, if so, to select a sample, the Commission asked all exporting producers in China and the USA to provide the information specified in the Notice of Initiation. In addition, the Commission asked the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, the Mission of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the European Union and the Mission of the United States of America to the European Union to identify and/or contact other exporting producers, if any, that could be interested in participating in the investigation. ---|--- (38) | With regard to China, six exporting producers in China provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In accordance with Article 17(1) of the basic Regulation, the Commission selected a sample of two producers on the basis of the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. One exporting producer, Shandong Yuanli Science and Technology Co., Ltd. (‘Shandong Yuanli’), requested, by way of a submission filed together with its sampling reply, to be sampled due to the specificities of the BDO it produced. The Commission analysed the request and sampling reply and concluded that it was not justified because such specificities alone when seen together with the volume of exports to the Union of Shandong Yuanli would not justify including Shandong Yuanli in a sample chosen on the basis of the largest representative volume of exports to the Union which could reasonably be investigated within the time available. ---|--- (39) | In accordance with Article 17(2) of the basic Regulation, all known exporting producers concerned and the authorities of China were consulted on the selection of the sample. No comments were received. ---|--- (40) | With regard to the USA, two exporting producers provided the requested information and agreed to be included in the sample. In view of the low number of replies, the Commission decided that sampling was not necessary. ---|--- (41) | On 23 June 2025, the Commission informed the two US exporting producers of its decision not to sample, granting them 30 days to submit their questionnaire replies. ---|--- 1.6. Individual examination (42) | No exporting producer in China, Saudi Arabia or the USA requested individual examination under Article 17(3) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- 1.7. Questionnaire replies and verification visits (43) | The Commission sent a questionnaire concerning the existence of significant distortions in the PRC within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation to the Government of the People’s Republic of China (‘GOC’). ---|--- (44) | The Commission sent questionnaires to the known Union producers, sampled exporting producers in China, known exporting producers in USA and Saudi Arabia, known importers and users. The same questionnaires were made available online (5) on the day of initiation. ---|--- (45) | On 8 July 2025, one of the US exporting producers, BASF Corporation (US), informed the Commission that they would not submit the questionnaire reply. The deadline for the submission of the questionnaire reply expired on 23 July 2025. On 1 August 2025, the Commission sent a letter to BASF Corporation informing them of its intention to apply Article 18 of the basic Regulation. No comments were received. ---|--- (46) | The Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for a provisional determination of dumping, resulting injury and Union interest. Verification visits pursuant to Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies: | | Union producers | — | BASF SE, Ludwigshafen, Germany ---|--- — | INEOS Solvents Marl GmbH, Marl, Germany ---|--- — | Lyondell Chemie Nederland B.V., Rotterdam, The Netherlands ---|--- | Users | — | Envalior BV, Geleen, The Netherlands ---|--- — | Envalior Deutschland GmbH, Dusseldorf, Germany ---|--- | Exporting producers in China | — | Xinjiang Markor Chemical Industry Co., Ltd., Korla ---|--- — | Wanhua Chemical (Sichuan) Co., Ltd., Meishan ---|--- | Exporting producer in Saudi Arabia | — | International Diol Company (‘IDC’), Al Khobar ---|--- | Exporting producer in the US | — | Lyondell Chemical Company, Houston ---|--- | Related traders | — | Wanhua Chemical (Sichuan) Sales Co., Ltd., Meishan, China ---|--- — | Wanhua Chemical (Singapore) Pte. Ltd., Meishan, China ---|--- — | Sipchem Marketing Company (‘SMC’), Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia ---|--- | Related importers | — | Lyondell Chemie Nederland B.V., Rotterdam, The Netherlands ---|--- — | Sipchem Europe SA (‘SESA’), Lausanne, Switzerland. ---|--- 1.8. Investigation period and period considered (47) | The investigation of dumping and injury covered the period from 1 January 2024 to 31 December 2024 (‘the investigation period’). The examination of trends relevant for the assessment of injury covered the period from 1 January 2021 to the end of the investigation period (‘the period considered’). ---|--- 2\. PRODUCT UNDER INVESTIGATION, PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT 2.1. Product under investigation (48) | The product under investigation is BDO usually falling under the Chemical Abstracts Service’s registration (CAS) number 110-63-4 and usually classified in the European Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical Substances (EINECS) under EC-number 203-786-5 and currently classified under CN codes 2905 39 26 and 2905 39 28 (‘the product under investigation’). ---|--- (49) | The main production processes of BDO include: (i) Reppe process using acetylene; (ii) N-Butane/Maleic Anhydride (MAN) process, which converts maleic anhydride into butanediol or n-butane to maleic anhydride; (iii) Propylene Oxide (PO) process, which uses propylene oxide to form allyl alcohol; (iv) Bio process using sugars, biomass material or other carbon-based compounds. ---|--- (50) | BDO is used in the production of a wide range of downstream chemical products including polybutylene terephthalate (PBT), polybutylene adipate terephthalate (PBAT), polyurethane (PU), saturated polyester (SAT), tetrahydrofuran (THF), n-methyl pyrrolidone (NMP), thermoplastic copolyester (TPC) and gamma-butyrolactone (GBL), which are then ultimately used in a wide range of applications, including in automotive, defence, textiles, plastics, electronics, construction, batteries, pharmaceutical and cosmetics. ---|--- 2.2. Product concerned (51) | The product concerned is product under investigation originating in China, Saudi Arabia and the USA, usually falling under the Chemical Abstracts Service’s registration (CAS) number 110-63-4 and usually classified in the European Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical Substances (EINECS) under EC-number 203-786-5, and currently classified under CN codes 2905 39 26 (‘bio BDO’), and 2905 39 28 (‘other BDO’ or ‘fossil based BDO’). ---|--- 2.3. Like product (52) | The investigation showed that the following products have the same basic physical chemical and technical characteristics as well as the same basic uses: | — | the product concerned when exported to the Union; ---|--- — | the product under investigation produced and sold on the domestic market of the PRC, Saudi Arabia and the US; and ---|--- — | the product under investigation produced and sold in the Union by the Union industry. ---|--- (53) | The Commission decided at this stage that those products are therefore like products within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- 2.4. Claims regarding product scope (54) | BASF, Helm AG, COIM and Qore made comments asking for the exclusion of BDO derived from bio-based carbon content of 100 % by mass, classified under CN code 2905 39 26 or ‘bio BDO’, from the product under investigation and therefore the scope of the measures. These parties pointed out several differences between bio BDO and fossil based BDO. ---|--- (55) | The main differences argued were as follows: | — | Different production processes, and different raw materials i.e. non-fossil sources, ---|--- — | Different chemical characteristics, ---|--- — | There are different consumer perceptions and end-uses, and ---|--- — | Bio BDO has higher costs and sales prices. ---|--- (56) | In the investigation the Commission found that BDO has several different production processes, with different use of raw materials, including for both bio BDO and other BDO. For instance, bio BDO is typically produced using sugars fermentation with for example E. coli bacteria, furfural or succinic acid methods, and can be produced using a wide range of different raw materials including corn, agricultural waste, sugar cane or wheat. Other BDO is typically produced using fossil-based materials, with multiple manufacturing processes, such as the Reppe process using acetylene, N-Butane/Maleic Anhydride process suing maleic anhydride into butanediol or n-butane to maleic anhydride or Propylene Oxide process, which uses propylene oxide to form allyl alcohol. The parties submitted that the production process and different use of raw materials for bio BDO affects the physical characteristics, chemical characteristics and the intended use of BDO, and that the differences in production process are of critical importance, resulting in key in physical characteristics, consumer perception and end-uses differences between the two products (bio BDO and other BDO). ---|--- (57) | The Commission noted however, that as per BASF own submission both BDO products can be used interchangeably, because both other BDO and bio BDO ‘[…] are chemically identical (C4H10O2) and share the same physical and chemical characteristics, namely being colourless, viscous liquids with a mild odour and no difference in weight’, despite having different production process or the different use of raw materials. In addition, INEOS submitted, and was confirmed by Novamont submission, that whilst BDO can be indeed produced with different raw materials and through different production processes these differences of production have no impact on the end-result of the downstream product. In addition, BASF, INEOS and Novamont confirmed there is a full interoperability between bio-based and other BDO for downstream products, being chemically identical. Despite the wide difference of raw materials and production process observed for BDO (both bio BDO and other BDO), during the investigation the Commission found that the products are used interchangeably, share the same physical, chemical and technical characteristics, whilst having the same end-uses. ---|--- (58) | BASF argued that substituting bio BDO with other BDO would result in the loss of the ‘bio-based content’ of the final product, for example in bioplastics and PBAT. Similarly, Qore submitted that bio BDO product is not interchangeable with fossil based BDO without invalidating downstream consumer claims. Helm AG in turn submitted that bio BDO and other BDO are not interchangeable products, and that ‘bio-BDO is vital for specialized applications requiring sustainable characteristics for which Conventional BDO cannot be used’. However, the Commission found, as also submitted by Novamont, that both BDO products can be used interchangeably and with different mix levels to produce a range of downstream products in the Union, including products under PBAT or bioplastics. The claimants did not provide any other specific example on how downstream consumers and/or products could be affected by the different use of BDO and bio BDO. However, the Commission noted that bio BDO and other BDO share the same molecules and the same basic functions and are interchangeable, despite downstream costumers preferring different BDO mixes for their design of downstream products or for their marketing reasons. In addition, BASF own submission clarifies that both bio BDO and other BDO can be used to produce PBAT or biodegradable plastics. In any event, as per explained by INEOS, fossil based BDO could be technically produced with an overall lower carbon footprint than bio based BDO, resulting in wider applications and potentially lower CO2 consumption of BDO downstream users. ---|--- (59) | Helm AG submitted that bio BDO enjoys an entirely different consumer perception by comparison with that of conventional BDO, with bio BDO marketed as a ‘green’, bio based low-carbon input, and other BDO marketed primarily as a commodity chemical and is used across a wide variety of industrial applications where bio-based content or traceability is not an issue. Qore submitted that the bio-BDO market exist in the Union, not as a voluntary consumer preference alone, but because of binding contracts with costumers or EU Law for which BDO is not a substitute of bio BDO, as it would ‘disturb sustainability specifications or invalidate certification-based product claims’. The parties commented that bio BDO is typically not in competition with other BDO. However, the Commission noted that BDO from fossil sources and bio BDO is used interchangeably for the production of various downstream products, including certified or biodegradable products, and users adjust the BDO mix when necessary. Consequently, both bio BDO and other BDO have the same use, are part of the same manufacturing process for downstream products and are in competition with each other in the Union. ---|--- (60) | BASF, Helm AG and Qore submitted that bio BDO has a different production process, which incurs in more costs and therefore selling price, which can result in different consumers and uses than other BDO, and a lack of competition between both products (Bio and other BDO) due to different pricing. However, the Commission noted that the observed divergence in price may also change in the future and be temporary: (i) as explained by BASF and Qore, new Bio BDO capacity is being installed which may result in additional supply to the Union, using new production technology, and the lowering of prices; (ii) a significant part of the cost is dependent on volatile wide range of raw materials, as per submitted by BASF, and since the raw materials are subject to price changes due to their volatile nature they may result, in comparison to the fossil BDO manufacturing process, in also reaching a lower price in the future. Indeed, the Commission noted that as per Novamont submission, bio BDO already became more economically advantageous than other BDO during certain periods of 2021-2023 when gas and oil prices spiked. In any case difference in price alone does not justify exclusion of bio BDO from the product scope. ---|--- (61) | Furthermore, BASF, Helm AG and Qore submitted that since bio BDO is not produced by the complainant, INEOS, it should be excluded from the investigation. In addition, Helm AG submitted that bio BDO is not imported into the Union from the countries concerned, nor produced outside the Union and therefore cannot be dumped. However, the Commission noted that bio BDO was imported into the Union during the investigation period, as confirmed in the verification visits. In addition, bio BDO is also produced by the Union industry producer Novamont. ---|--- (62) | Finally, Helm AG argued that the distinction between bio BDO and other BDO is reflected in their respective customs classification, meaning that they are classified as two different products due to the different CN codes. However, both CN codes relate exclusively to BDO, and as explained above, a distinction of the production process is not be sufficient to exclude either type of BDO from the product scope of the investigation. ---|--- (63) | In conclusion, the Commission does not dispute that there are differences between bio and other BDO in respect of input raw materials and production processes. However, since the bio and fossil-based BDO share the same basic technical, chemical and physical characteristics and their uses are largely interchangeable, the differences highlighted by interested parties were not considered as determinant and the products should be considered as one single product. In addition, these production methods and raw material differences are also present within the bio BDO and other BDO product classification. Furthermore, a low carbon footprint (green) product can also be technically made from fossil-based sources, meaning that customers requiring a green product can also be supplied with other BDO. Bio BDO products can have higher costs and sale prices, but such costs and sale prices vary and may converge or even become cheaper. The Commission therefore rejected the above claims to exclude bio BDO from the product scope. ---|--- 3\. DUMPING 3.1. China 3.1.1. Procedure for the determination of the normal value under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation (64) | In view of the sufficient evidence available at the initiation of the investigation pointing to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation with regard to the PRC, the Commission considered it appropriate to initiate the investigation with regard to the exporting producers from this country having regard to Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (65) | Consequently, in order to collect the necessary data for the eventual application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation, in the Notice of Initiation the Commission invited all exporting producers in the PRC to provide information regarding the inputs used for producing BDO. Two exporting producers submitted the relevant information. ---|--- (66) | In order to obtain information it deemed necessary for its investigation with regard to the alleged significant distortions, the Commission sent a questionnaire to the GOC. In addition, in point 5.3.2 of the Notice of Initiation, the Commission invited all interested parties to make their views known, submit information and provide supporting evidence regarding the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation within 37 days of the date of publication of the Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union. No questionnaire reply was received from the GOC and no submission on the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was received within the deadline. Subsequently, the Commission informed the GOC that it would use facts available within the meaning of Article 18 of the basic Regulation for the determination of the existence of the significant distortions in the PRC. No comments on the use of facts available were received from the GOC. ---|--- (67) | In point 5.3.2 of the Notice of Initiation the Commission also specified that, in view of the evidence available, it had provisionally selected Malaysia as an appropriate representative country pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation for the purpose of determining the normal value based on undistorted prices or benchmarks. The Commission further stated that it would examine other possible appropriate representative countries in accordance with the criteria set out in 2(6a)(a) first indent of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (68) | On 18 July 2025, the Commission informed by a note (‘the Note’) interested parties on the relevant sources it intended to use for the determination of the normal value. In that note, the Commission provided a list of all factors of production such as raw materials, labour and energy used in the production of BDO. In addition, based on the criteria guiding the choice of undistorted prices or benchmarks, the Commission identified possible representative countries, namely Brazil and Malaysia, as an appropriate representative country. The Commission received comments on the Note from the complainant, LYB, and Wanhua Chemical (Sichuan) Co., Ltd. together with its related companies (‘Wanhua Group’). ---|--- (69) | The Commission addressed the comments received in detail in section 3.1.2.4.1. Based on the comments received, the Commission identified the sources it intends to use for the determination of the normal value, with Brazil as the representative country. It also concluded that it would establish selling, general and administrative (‘SG & A’) costs and profits based on available information for the investigation period for Rhodia Brasil SA (‘Rhodia Brasil’), a producer in Brazil. ---|--- 3.1.2. Normal value (70) | According to Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation, ‘the normal value shall normally be based on the prices paid or payable, in the ordinary course of trade, by independent customers in the exporting country’. ---|--- (71) | However, according to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘in case it is determined […] that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the exporting country due to the existence in that country of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b), the normal value shall be constructed exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks’, and ‘shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount of administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’ (‘administrative, selling and general costs’ is referred hereinafter as ‘SG & A’). ---|--- (72) | As further explained below, the Commission concluded in the present investigation that, based on the evidence available, and in view of the lack of cooperation of the GOC, the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation was appropriate. ---|--- 3.1.2.1. Existence of significant distortions (73) | In recent investigations concerning the chemical sector in the PRC (6), the Commission found that significant distortions in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation were present. ---|--- (74) | In those investigations, the Commission found that there is substantial government intervention in the PRC resulting in a distortion of the effective allocation of resources in line with market principles (7). In particular, the Commission concluded that in the chemical sector not only does a substantial degree of ownership by the GOC persist in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation (8), but the GOC is also in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation (9). The Commission further found that the State’s presence and intervention in the financial markets, as well as in the provision of raw materials and inputs have an additional distorting effect on the market. Indeed, overall, the system of planning in the PRC results in resources being concentrated in sectors designated as strategic or otherwise politically important by the GOC, rather than being allocated in line with market forces (10). Moreover, the Commission concluded that the Chinese bankruptcy and property laws do not work properly in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation, thus generating distortions in particular when maintaining insolvent firms afloat and when allocating land use rights in the PRC (11). In the same vein, the Commission found distortions of wage costs in the chemical sector in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation (12), as well as distortions in the financial markets in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation, in particular concerning access to capital for corporate actors in the PRC (13). ---|--- (75) | Like in previous investigations concerning the chemical sector in the PRC, the Commission examined in the present investigation whether it was appropriate or not to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC, due to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. The Commission did so on the basis of the evidence available on the file, including the evidence contained in the complaint, and in the Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the Purposes of Trade Defence Investigations (14) (‘Report’), which relies on publicly available sources. That analysis covered the examination of the substantial government interventions in the PRC’s economy in general, but also the specific market situation in the relevant sector including the product under investigation. The Commission further supplemented these evidentiary elements with its own research on the various criteria relevant to confirm the existence of significant distortions in the PRC as also found by its previous investigations in this respect. ---|--- (76) | The complaint alleged that significant distortions exist in the Chinese BDO sector. It referred to the Report and in particular to the PRC’s economic system being a ‘socialist market economy’ and the active role of the Chinese Communist Party (‘CCP’) in both the public and private sectors in the PRC (15). ---|--- (77) | More specifically, the complaint pointed out that: | — | The Chinese BDO industry can be characterised by State ownership and a high level of State control/interference. Several BDO producers have close ties with the GOC, regional or local governments, either directly or through associations. ---|--- — | The GOC and the Chinese CCP maintain structures that ensure their continued influence and control over enterprises, in particular State-owned enterprises (‘SOEs’). Generally, the GOC actively formulates and oversees the implementation of general economic policies by individual companies as well as participates in operational decision-making through the rotation of cadres between government authorities and companies, the presence of CCP members on executive bodies and through the shaping of the corporate structure (16). ---|--- — | Chinese BDO producers receive subsidies and funding from government agencies at different levels, have preferential access to financing and production factors and are shielded from competition (17). ---|--- — | There are public policies or measures applicable to the Chinese BDO industry that discriminate in favour of domestic suppliers or otherwise influence free market forces. Specifically, the chemical industry is regarded as a strategic industry by the GOC, as explained in the 14th Five-Year Plan (18) (‘FYP’). The chemical industry is also considered a key industry under the Made in China 2025 Roadmap, which gives Chinese producers access to strategic support mechanisms. ---|--- — | The costs of essentially all factors of production of BDO are distorted in China and as such the Chinese costs and prices are not driven by market forces (19). Several raw materials to produce BDO, including calcium carbide and methanol, are chemical raw materials subject to the same distortions as the BDO industry itself. In addition, the GOC intervenes significantly and systematically in the Chinese power market so that energy prices are also distorted. Energy (natural gas and coal) is a significant cost in the production of the main raw materials of BDO and in the production of BDO itself (20). State policies also bring down the cost of equipment and machinery for encouraged industries, such as the chemical industry, including the BDO industry. The GOC also often covers the costs of research and development in the chemical sector through policy schemes. Finally, chemical producers are generally subject to top-down distortions arising from the discriminatory application of property laws and wage costs in the PRC (21).

Considering the above, it can be concluded that the GOC exerts a significant influence over price setting in and the development of the BDO industry in the PRC. ---|--- — | Access to finance and capital in the chemical industry, including the BDO industry, in the PRC is granted by institutions, often State-owned, that implement public policy objectives or otherwise do not act independently of the State. Bonds and credit ratings are often distorted and borrowing costs are kept artificially low to stimulate investment growth (22). Finally, Chinese bankruptcy laws are not strictly enforced in the chemical sector, of which the BDO sector is part, which generates distortions by maintaining insolvent firms afloat. ---|--- (78) | In conclusion, the complaint took the position that prices or costs, including the costs of raw materials, energy and labour, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government intervention within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. On that basis, according to the complaint, it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs to establish normal value in this case. ---|--- (79) | The Commission examined whether it was appropriate or not to use domestic prices and costs in China, due to the existence of significant distortions within the meaning of point (b) of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. That analysis covered the examination of the substantial government interventions in China’s economy in general, but also the specific market situation in the relevant sector including the product concerned. ---|--- (80) | In this regard, the Commission first assessed whether the BDO sector in the PRC is being served to a significant extent by enterprises which operate under the ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance of the Chinese authorities, within the meaning of the first indent of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. The sector of the product concerned is served by private companies, such as Shandong Yuanli (23) (24), Inner Mongolia Dongjing Bioenvironmental Protection Ltd. (25) which is 100% held by the private company Inner Mongolia Dongyuan Science and Technology Group Co., Ltd. (26) (27), as well as by private companies with minority state-owned shareholding like Wanhua Chemical Group Co., Ltd. (28) (29) and by SOEs such as Xinjiang Markor Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. (30), Henan Kaixiang Fine Chemical Co. Ltd. (31), Xinjiang Blue Ridge Tunhe Energy Co. Ltd. (32) or Sinopec Group (33). The exact ratio of private versus state-owned producers in the BDO market could not be determined. However, the Commission found that several producers are directly controlled by the State. Examples include Xinjiang Markor Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. (34) as well as Xinjiang Blue Ridge Tunhe Energy Co. Ltd. (35), both companies being ultimately controlled by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Furthermore, Sinopec Group is a central enterprise controlled by the State Council’s State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (36) (‘SASAC’) and Sinopec produces both BDO and calcium carbide, an input used to produce BDO (37). ---|--- (81) | Moreover, CCP interventions into operational decision-making have become the norm, not only in SOEs but also in private companies (38), with the CCP claiming leadership over virtually every aspect of the country’s economy. Indeed, the State’s influence by means of CCP structures within companies effectively results in economic operators being under the government’s control and policy supervision, given how far the State and Party structures have grown together in China. ---|--- (82) | The investigation found that the industry national association covering the chemical sector is the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation (39) (‘CPCIF’) and more particularly its Chemical New Materials Professional Committee (40). The CPCIF adheres to the overall leadership of the CCP, carries out Party activities, and provides necessary conditions for the activities of party organizations (41). Moreover, the ‘registration and management authority of the Association is the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ (42) and the conditions to be eligible as a representative of the CPCIF include to ‘adhere to the leadership of the CCP, support socialism with Chinese characteristics, resolutely implement the Party’s line, principles, and policies, and possess good political qualities’ (43). ---|--- (83) | Sinopec Group as well as Xinjiang Zhongtai Chemical Co. Ltd. which is the holding company of Xinjiang Markor Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. are both members of CPCIF (44). ---|--- (84) | More specifically, the investigation also found that another industry national association representing the producers of BDO is the China Chemical Fibers Association (‘CCFA’). The CCFA adheres to the overall leadership of the CCP, carries out Party activities, and provides necessary conditions for the activities of party organizations (45). Moreover, the ‘registration and management authority of the Association is the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ (46) and the conditions to be eligible as a representative of the CCFA include to ‘adhere to the leadership of the CCP, support socialism with Chinese characteristics, resolutely implement the Party’s line, principles, and policies, and possess good political qualities’ (47). ---|--- (85) | Wanhua Chemical Group Co. Ltd as well as various entities of Sinopec Group are members of CCFA (48). ---|--- (86) | Both public and privately owned enterprises in the chemical sector are subject to policy supervision and guidance. The latest Chinese policy documents concerning the chemical and petrochemical sector confirm the continued importance which the GOC attributes to the sector, including the intention to intervene in the sector to shape it in line with the government policies. This is exemplified by the 14th FYP on Economic and Social Development and 2035 Perspectives, according to which the GOC intends to ‘accelerate the transformation and upgrading of key industries such as chemicals’ (49). ---|--- (87) | Additionally, the Guiding Opinion on Promoting the High-Quality Development of the Petrochemical and Chemical Industries during the 14th FYP (50) (‘the Guiding Opinion’) also stipulates that the GOC will ‘accelerate the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries, vigorously develop new chemical materials and fine chemicals, […] and foster China’s transition from a large petrochemical and chemical country into a strong petrochemical and chemical power. […] By 2025, […] [t]he production concentration of bulk chemical products will be further improved, and the capacity utilization rate will reach more than 80 %’ (51). In addition, the GOC shall ‘[p]romote industrial structure adjustment: strengthen specific measures and scientifically regulate the scale of the industry [and] [s]trictly control new production capacity in industries such as […] calcium carbide, […] and accelerate the exit of inefficient and outdated production capacity; Promote the high-end, diversified, and low-carbon development of the coal chemical industry; and steadily and orderly develop modern coal chemical industry in accordance with the requirements of ecological priority, water-based production, total quantity control, and the development of clusters’ (52). ---|--- (88) | Similarly, the Notice on Promoting the Healthy Development of a Modern Coal Chemical Industry (53) stipulates that ‘[b]ased on the modern coal chemical industry layout outlined in the [14th FYP], and in accordance with regional major strategies [and] regional coordinated development strategies’, […] the GOC will ‘further strengthen planning guidance, optimize industrial layout, and promote the accelerated implementation of advanced technology and equipment upgrades for existing modern coal chemical projects’ (54). ---|--- (89) | Furthermore, the Work Plan for the Steady Growth of the Chemical and Petrochemical Industry (2025-2026) (55) (‘the Work Plan’) seeks to ‘appropriately deploy coal-to-oil and coal-to-chemicals projects, and carry out industrial application demonstrations of coal chemical industry together with new energy sources, advanced materials, technology and equipment, industrial operating systems’ (56) as well as to ‘cultivate and strengthen advanced manufacturing clusters and specific industrial clusters of small and medium-sized enterprises and leading enterprises in the fields of petrochemicals, coal chemicals, phosphorus chemicals, biochemicals and fine chemicals’ (57). ---|--- (90) | Similar examples of the intention of the Chinese authorities to supervise and guide the developments of the BDO sector can be found at the provincial level, such as in the Shandong 14th FYP on the Development of the Chemical Industry seeking to ‘[c]omprehensively promote the upgrading of industrial foundation and modernization of industrial chain, accelerate the withdrawal of backward and inefficient production capacity, and promote the development of chemical products in the direction of functionalization, refinement and differentiation. Guide enterprises to merge and reorganize, optimize resource allocation and industrial chain structure, and improve production efficiency and profitability’ (58). It also stipulates that the GOC will ‘rely on key [chemical] parks, optimize the allocation of resources, build a number of major projects [and] create a high-end chemical development pattern with outstanding technical advantages and orderly regional coordination; […] give full play to the advantages of the basic coal chemical industry […] and accelerate the research, development and production of downstream coal-based fine chemical products’ (59). ---|--- (91) | More specifically, the Catalogue of Encouraged Industries in the Western Regions (2025) (60) lists BDO as an encouraged industry in several provinces like Ningxia, Guizhou and Xinjiang. ---|--- (92) | As to the GOC being in a position to interfere with prices and costs through State presence in firms in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation, the Commission found that the chairman of Shandong Yuanli also serves as the secretary of the Party Branch and is reported to follow the principle that ‘Party building gives the enterprise the direction and the Party and the company are strongly integrated’ (61). ---|--- (93) | Additionally, the investigation found that Dongyuan Science and Technology Group Co. Ltd. is regularly involved in Party building activities so as to ‘guide cadres and workers to understand the greatness of the Party’ (62). ---|--- (94) | The chairman and a director of Wanhua Chemical Group Co. Ltd also serve respectively as the secretary and deputy secretary of the Party Committee (63). ---|--- (95) | Furthermore, the general manager of Zhongtai Chemical, the mother company holding Xinjiang Markor Chemical Industry Co., Ltd, also serves as the deputy secretary of the Party Committee. ---|--- (96) | Similarly, Sinopec Group’s chairman of the board of directors is the secretary of the Party committee and several members of the board serve as deputy secretaries of the Party committee (64). Sinopec Group stated that it intends to ‘focus on the company's new mission and new tasks on the new journey, carry forward the party's self-revolutionary spirit, strengthen the party's leadership and party building in an all-round and integrated manner, and systematically promote comprehensive and strict party governance, so as to provide a strong guarantee for writing a new chapter of China's modern petrochemical industry’ (65). ---|--- (97) | It was not possible to systematically establish the existence of personal connections between all the Chinese BDO producers and the CCP. However, given that the product under investigation represents a subsector of the chemical sector, the Commission considered that the information established in the recent investigations concerning the chemical sector, as indicated in recital 74, is relevant also to the product under investigation. ---|--- (98) | Further, policies discriminating in favour of domestic producers or otherwise influencing the market in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), third indent of the basic Regulation, are in place in the BDO sector. The Commission identified several documents demonstrating that the BDO industry benefits from the governmental guidance and intervention into the chemical sector, given that BDO represents a subsector of the chemical sector. ---|--- (99) | The chemical industry is consistently regarded as a key industry by the GOC (66). This is confirmed in the numerous plans, directives and other documents focused on chemicals, which are issued at national, regional, and municipal level. Under the 14th FYP, the GOC earmarked the chemical industry for optimization and upgrade (67). Similarly, the 14th FYP on Developing the Raw Materials Industry stipulates that the GOC will ‘Optimize the organizational structure: Make leading enterprises bigger and stronger. […] [S]upport enterprises to accelerate cross-regional and cross-ownership mergers and reorganizations, increase industrial concentration, and conduct international operations. In the chemical, petrochemical, steel, non-ferrous metals, building materials and other industries, cultivate a group of leading enterprises in the industrial chain with ecological dominance and core competitiveness’ (68) . ---|--- (100) | More specifically, the Shandong province released a Breakthrough Action Plan for the High-Quality Development of the High-End Chemical Industry (2021-2022) (69) and selected ‘10 high-end chemical industry chains such as coal-based chemicals, fluorine materials, polyurethane, nylon, and electronic chemicals and chose 25 enterprises as “leader of the industry chain”.’ BDO is one of the industry chains selected and the Shandong province ‘shall use financial rewards, promote experiences, grant priorities and use other methods to promote Wanhua Chemical Group Co. Ltd. […] and other enterprises to strengthen their basic advantages and create a number of leading enterprises with large scale, good efficiency and strong innovation ability’ (70) . ---|--- (101) | Additionally, in 2022 the Wuhai Municipality promoted ‘the construction of key projects, […] promptly solved the difficulties existing in the process of project promotion, made preparations for various production factors, and ensured that the projects progressed as scheduled […]. Thanks to the focus on the construction of new energy and new materials, the construction of a number of key projects in [Wuhai] has been rapidly promoted this year. After more than a year of intense construction, recently, Inner Mongolia Dongjing Bioenvironmental Protection Technology Co., Ltd. successfully commissioned the 280 000-ton 1,4-butanediol (BDO) project with an annual output of 280 000 tons. After the project is officially put into operation, Dongyuan Technology Co., Ltd. will have an annual output of 380 000 tons of BDO production capacity, becoming the largest production base for BDO and the whole industry chain of downstream deep processing products in China’ (71) . ---|--- (102) | In sum, the GOC has measures in place to induce operators to comply with the public policy objectives of supporting encouraged industries, including the production of the product under investigation. Such measures impede market forces from operating freely. ---|--- (103) | The present investigation has not revealed any evidence that the discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy and property laws in the chemical sector, according to Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation would not affect the manufacturers of the product under investigation. ---|--- (104) | Further, the product under investigation is also affected by the distortions of wage costs in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation, as referred to in recital 74. Those distortions affect the sector both directly (when producing the product under investigation or the main inputs), as well as indirectly (when having access to inputs from companies subject to the same labour system in the PRC) (72). ---|--- (105) | Moreover, no evidence was submitted in the present investigation demonstrating that the BDO sector is not affected by the government intervention in the financial system in the sense of Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation. The abovementioned Guiding Opinion requiring to ‘improve supporting policies, strengthen the coordination between fiscal, financial, regional, investment, import and export […] policies with the industry policies [to] give full play to the national cooperation platform between industry and finance and [to] foster the connection between enterprises and banks’ (73) also exemplifies this type of government intervention very well. Therefore, the substantial government intervention in the financial system leads to the market conditions being severely affected at all levels. ---|--- (106) | Finally, the Commission recalls that to produce the product under investigation, several inputs are needed. When the producers of the product under investigation purchase/contract these inputs, the prices they pay (and which are recorded as their costs) are clearly exposed to the same systemic distortions mentioned before. For instance, suppliers of inputs employ labour that is subject to the distortions. They may borrow money that is subject to the distortions on the financial sector/capital allocation. In addition, they are subject to the planning system that applies across all levels of government and sectors. ---|--- (107) | As a consequence, not only the domestic sales prices of the product under investigation are not appropriate for use within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, but all the input costs (including raw materials, energy, land, financing, labour, etc.) are also affected because their price formation is affected by substantial government intervention, as described in Parts I and II of the Report. Indeed, the government interventions described in relation to the allocation of capital, land, labour, energy and raw materials are present throughout the PRC. This means, for instance, that an input that was produced in the PRC by combining a range of factors of production is exposed to significant distortions. The same applies for the input to the input and so forth. ---|--- (108) | In sum, the evidence available showed that prices or costs of the product under investigation, including the costs of raw materials, land, energy and labour, are not the result of free market forces because they are affected by substantial government intervention within the meaning of Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation, as shown by the actual or potential impact of one or more of the relevant elements listed therein. ---|--- 3.1.2.2. Arguments raised by interested parties on the existence of significant distortions (109) | The GOC did not comment or provide evidence supporting or rebutting the existing evidence on the case file, including the Report and the additional evidence provided by the complainant, on the existence of significant distortions and/or appropriateness of the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation in the case at hand. ---|--- (110) | The Commission received comments concerning the significant distortions affecting the BDO industry from Wanhua Group. Wanhua Group argued that the allegation in the complaint on ‘significant distortions’ in China in accordance with Article 2(6)(a) of the basic Regulation, should be confirmed by the Commission in the specific proceeding and should not become a pre-determined conclusion. ---|--- (111) | In view of the above, the Commission’s investigation found evidence of significant distortions affecting the Chinese BDO industry, thus warranting the application of the methodology of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation to construct the normal value. Therefore, Wanhua Group’s claim was rejected. ---|--- 3.1.2.3. Conclusion on the existence of significant distortions (112) | In view of the above, the Commission concluded that it was not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs to establish normal value in this case. Consequently, the Commission proceeded to construct the normal value exclusively on the basis of costs of production and sale reflecting undistorted prices or benchmarks, that is, in this case, on the basis of corresponding costs of production and sale in an appropriate representative country, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, as described in the following section. ---|--- 3.1.2.4. Representative country 3.1.2.4.1. General remarks (113) | The choice of the representative country was based on the following criteria pursuant to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation: | — | A level of economic development similar to the PRC. For this purpose, the Commission used countries with a gross national income per capita similar to the PRC on the basis of the database of the World Bank (74); ---|--- — | Production of the product under investigation in that country; ---|--- — | Existence of relevant readily available data in the representative country; ---|--- — | Where there is more than one possible representative country, preference was given, where appropriate, to the country with an adequate level of social and environmental protection. ---|--- (114) | As explained in recital 68, the Commission issued the Note on the sources for the determination of the normal value. This Note described the facts and evidence underlying the relevant criteria. Based on the comments received, the Commission considered Brazil as an appropriate representative country in the present case. ---|--- A level of economic development similar to the PRC (115) | In the Note, the Commission explained that the product under investigation did not appear to be produced in any country with a similar level of economic development as the PRC according to the World Bank. The complainant also indicated that BASF Petronas Chemical had produced BDO in Malaysia until March 2021 and therefore proposed using Malaysia as representative country. ---|--- (116) | The Commission indicated in the Note that as all countries where there is production of BDO have a different level of economic development than the PRC, and since BDO is no longer produced in Malaysia, the Commission considered the production of a product in the same general category and/or sector of the product under investigation. The Commission therefore indicated it would use production of mono ethylene glycol (‘MEG’), a similar product to BDO, to establish an appropriate representative country for the application of Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation. Indeed, as explained in the Note, MEG is a diol which, as is the case for BDO, has a relatively high boiling point, a similar viscosity and is also miscible with water. Moreover, as some of the manufacturing pathways to produce BDO, MEG relies on a muti-step catalytic conversion of petrochemical products. Furthermore, MEG is produced from ethylene which in turn may be obtained from, for instance, cracking natural gas, ethane or naphtha, some of which are the same feedstocks required to produce BDO in some of the possible manufacturing pathways. In addition, the manufacturing processes for both BDO and MEG are energy intensive. In terms of applications, BDO and MEG can be used for polymer production, as solvents, chemical intermediates, antifreeze components or humectants. In summary, both products have comparable chemical structures, may share fossil fuel feedstocks and their manufacturing processes may involve comparable chemical and energy-intensive processes. ---|--- (117) | The Commission found production of MEG in the following countries with a similar level of economic development as the PRC: Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand and Türkiye. ---|--- (118) | Following the Note, Wanhua Group questioned whether the factors of production used to produce MEG could be considered representative for those used to produce BDO. ---|--- (119) | The Commission noted that, when establishing the normal value, it took into consideration only the factors of production used to produce the product under investigation (in this case BDO). Consequently, MEG was identified as a product in the same general category as BDO only for the purpose of selecting an appropriate representative country which could provide undistorted benchmarks and representative SG & A costs and profits of a producer of BDO. Therefore, the benchmarks were sought only for factors of production used to produce BDO, and not MEG. Furthermore, Wanhua Group did not propose any alternative product within the same general category or sector as BDO. Therefore, this claim was rejected. ---|--- (120) | The complainant supported the Commission’s approach and the choice of MEG, which was produced in Malaysia and Brazil, the most appropriate representative countries in its view. ---|--- (121) | LYB also agreed with the Commission that diol chemicals were in the same general category as BDO. However, it claimed that also the precursors of diol chemical production, such as ethylene and propylene, as well as solvents such as diethylene glycol, propylene glycol, or tetrahydrofuran, were in the same general category as BDO. Based on this assumption, LYB researched available 2024 financial data of profitable companies producing such products but was unable to find them in Indonesia, Mexico and Thailand. Moreover, LYB did not propose additional companies for Malaysia. On the contrary, LYB proposed a producer of solvents and propylene in Brazil or to resort to the sector-wide data of the chemical sector in Türkiye. ---|--- (122) | The Commission examined the additional products allegedly in the same general category or sector as BDO proposed by LYB. The Commission noted that ethylene and propylene are feedstocks for the production of BDO. While propylene is used by LYB itself in the production of BDO as propylene oxide, ethylene is generally used as ethylene oxide in the production of MEG, as indicated in the Note. This shows that, while BDO and MEG share the same position in the production chain and thus have a similar cost structure, propylene and ethylene are located a few steps upstream in the production chain, which takes their cost structure further from BDO. It follows that MEG is a more specific and appropriate product in the same general category or sector as BDO, compared to ethylene and propylene. Therefore, the Commission considered that MEG was a more appropriate product in the same general category or sector as BDO. The Commission further analysed solvents such as diethylene glycol, propylene glycol, or tetrahydrofuran. The Commission noted that diethylene glycol is a by-product of MEG production (75) and is therefore produced in the same countries as MEG. Propylene glycol appears to have a significant use in the food and drug sector, which is considerably different to the applications of BDO. Tetrahydrofuran is, instead, a derivative of BDO and is therefore located at a different level of the value chain compared to BDO, with the consequence that it could not be an adequate proxy for BDO itself and the risk that its producers could source the BDO from China. Thus, MEG remained the most appropriate product in the same general category or sector as BDO. Therefore, the Commission did not further investigate the production of these alternative products in countries with the same level of development as China, notably in Brazil and Türkiye. ---|--- Existence of relevant readily available data in the representative country (123) | In the Note the Commission indicated that for the countries identified as countries where MEG is being produced, i.e. Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand and Türkiye, the availability of data needed to be further verified in particular with regard to the readily available financial data from producers of MEG. ---|--- (124) | In addition, following the reply to the Information on inputs for exporting producers and the Note, an additional factor of production was reported by the sampled exporting producers and then verified by the Commission during the verification visits: formaldehyde. As a result, formaldehyde was also considered by the Commission in its analysis below. | — | Brazil ---|--- (125) | Wanhua Group claimed that the price for imports of oxygen, sodium hydroxide and nitrogen into Brazil was abnormally high, because it exceeded its actual purchase price. On the contrary, the complainant did not claim any distortion with regards to factors of production prices in Brazil. ---|--- (126) | The Commission noted that, following verification, it considered sodium hydroxide and nitrogen as consumables, as explained in recitals 180 to 182. Therefore, Wanhua Group’s comment was not relevant anymore in this respect. Moreover, the Commission noted that Wanhua Group did not explain why the import price of oxygen into Brazil should not be taken into account as an undistorted benchmark. The fact that it was higher than Wanhua Group’s own purchase price constituted no evidence that the import price into Brazil cannot be considered an undistorted benchmark. Therefore, the Commission decided to rely on the import price of oxygen into Brazil. ---|--- (127) | While the complainant considered the 2022 data for SGA costs and profit of the MEG producers identified in Brazil reliable, Wanhua Group and LYB claimed that the financial data of Oxiteno SA Industria e Comercio were outdated, and LYB added that, in 2023, the company was loss-making. ---|--- (128) | Wanhua Group and LYB also claimed that the financial data of Rhodia Brasil SA (‘Rhodia Brasil’) were outdated as they covered the 2022 financial year. Moreover, Wanhua Group claimed that Solvay SA (‘Solvay’), the group owning Rhodia Brasil, produced a large number of products and its P&L did not reflect the situation of BDO or MEG, therefore it could not be considered representative. Instead, LYB agreed with the use of the groups’ data. However, LYB claimed that the data sourced by the Commission was different from the data reported in Solvay’s 2024 financial statement. Thus, LYB proposed to rely on the published version of the accounts, apportioned by the share of revenue of the ‘performance chemical’ segment. ---|--- (129) | The Commission noted that Rhodia Brasil’s financial data for the investigation period had become available in the meantime (76). For this reason, the Commission decided to rely on Rhodia Brasil’s data for the investigation period and thus the comments concerning Solvay became irrelevant. ---|--- (130) | In the Note, the Commission noted that the selection of Brazil as an appropriate representative country was subject to further analysis of the low import volume of hydrogen and the high import share of calcium carbide from China (80 %) into Brazil. ---|--- (131) | In this respect, LYB claimed that imports of hydrogen into Brazil were low because Brazil is a major producer of hydrogen. LYB suggested to use as an alternative benchmark for hydrogen either a benchmark within Brazil or the average export price of hydrogen from Brazil to all countries. ---|--- (132) | The Commission acknowledged that the six cubic meters of hydrogen imported into Brazil during the investigation period was a volume insufficient to establish an undistorted benchmark. For this reason, the Commission decided to resort to an international benchmark represented by the grey hydrogen price index for the European region published by Businesss Analytiq as an undistorted benchmark (77). ---|--- (133) | LYB noted that the Commission had proposed investigating further the high import share of calcium carbide from China into Brazil and proposed using as a benchmark the average import price into all countries. The complainant noted that the share of Chinese imports of calcium carbide into Brazil was significantly lower than that into Malaysia, and that therefore data relating to imports of calcium carbide might be considered less affected by distortions than any other proposed countries. ---|--- (134) | The Commission noted that all potential representative countries, with the exception of Türkiye, reported high shares of imports of calcium carbide from China. With the exception of Türkiye, the shares of Chinese imports of calcium carbide into other potential representative countries were higher than the shares of Chinese imports of calcium carbide into Brazil. Therefore, the Commission considered that calcium carbide is a commodity generally sourced from China in all potential representative countries and that imports into Brazil represent the most appropriate benchmark, taking also into account that (i) Türkiye cannot be considered an appropriate representative country, as explained in recitals 166 to 174, (ii) the price of Chinese imports into Brazil is in line with the price of imports from other countries, and (iii) with the exception of Türkiye, Brazil has the lowest share of Chinese imports of calcium carbide amongst the possible representative countries. ---|--- (135) | The Commission also analysed the import data into Brazil of formaldehyde. The Commission identified a negligible import volume of formaldehyde into Brazil, corresponding to few transactions, which would appear to make the import price not representative. For this reason, the Commission used the average export price from Brazil in the investigation period, sourced from Global Trade Atlas (78) (‘GTA’). ---|--- (136) | In conclusion, the Commission concluded that Brazil constituted the most appropriate representative country. | — | Indonesia ---|--- (137) | Wanhua Group claimed that the price for imports of oxygen and sodium hydroxide into Indonesia was abnormally high, because it exceeded its actual purchase price. ---|--- (138) | The Commission noted that, following verification, it considered sodium hydroxide as a consumable, as explained in recitals 180 to 182. Therefore, Wanhua Group’s comment was not relevant anymore in this respect. Moreover, the Commission noted that Wanhua Group did not explain why it considered that the import price of oxygen into Indonesia should not be taken into account as an undistorted benchmark. The fact that it was higher than Wanhua Group’s own purchase price constitutes no evidence that the import price into Indonesia cannot be considered an undistorted benchmark. Thus, this claim was rejected. ---|--- (139) | The complainant and Wanhua Group claimed that the financial data available for PT Polychem Indonesia Tbk were outdated and the company was loss-making. Therefore, its data could not be used by the Commission. ---|--- (140) | The Commission reiterated that it did not consider such a profit reasonable. ---|--- (141) | In addition, LYB claimed that Indonesia should be rejected as a possible representative country due to the high share of imports from China on a number of factors of production and to the export restrictions on coal identified in the Note, in conjunction with the high share of imports of coal from Russia. Similarly, the complainant argued that Indonesia could not be considered an appropriate representative country due to the high share of imports of coal from Russia, given the sanctions package imposed by the Union against Russia and the fact that energy prices in Russia were heavily influenced by the state. ---|--- (142) | The Commission concluded that Indonesia could not be selected as an appropriate representative country due to the high share of imports from China for calcium carbide (higher than 99 %) and catalysts (higher than 82 %), due to the market distortions identified for coal in the Note, and due to the absence of reasonable financial data. As Indonesia could not be regarded as an appropriate representative country, other claims with regard to Indonesia did not need to be addressed. | — | Malaysia ---|--- (143) | Wanhua Group claimed that the price for imports of oxygen, sodium hydroxide and nitrogen into Malaysia was abnormally high, because it exceeded its actual purchase price. ---|--- (144) | The Commission noted that, following verification, it considered sodium hydroxide and nitrogen as consumables, as explained in recitals 180 to 182. Therefore, Wanhua Group’s comment was not relevant anymore in this respect. Moreover, the Commission noted that Wanhua Group did not explain why it considered that the import price of oxygen into Malaysia should not be taken into account as an undistorted benchmark. The fact that it was higher than Wanhua Group’s own purchase price constitutes no evidence that the import price into Malaysia cannot be considered an undistorted benchmark. Thus, this claim was rejected. ---|--- (145) | Wanhua Group and LYB claimed that Pengerang Petrochemical Company Sdn. Bhd reported a loss for 2023 and therefore such financial data should not be used. Moreover, LYB raised the fact that data dated back to 2023. ---|--- (146) | The Commission reiterated that such a profit cannot be considered reasonable. ---|--- (147) | The complainant deemed the 2023 data of Petronas Chemicals Glycols Sdn. Bhd reliable. Wanhua Group claimed that the financial data of Petronas Chemicals Group Berhad (‘Petronas Group’), the group owning Petronas Chemicals Glycols Sdn. Bh, was not representative since it was related to 2023 and its activities went beyond BDO or MEG. LYB did not object to the use of Petronas Group’s data but proposed not to separate the data into the segments pertaining to olefins and derivatives as it would lead to a profit of 1 %. ---|--- (148) | The Commission noted that, as reported in the Note, financial data for Petronas Group were available for 2024, i.e. the investigation period. However, Petronas Group’s financial data could not be further apportioned to meet Wanhua Group’s concern. Petronas Group’s financial data for 2024 remained the most granular data available for Malaysia. Still, they were less granular than the comparable financial data available for the investigation period for Rhodia Brasil in Brazil, because Petronas Group is only the parent company of a MEG producer in Malaysia, whereas Rhodia Brasil is the company producing MEG in Brazil, so Rhodia Brasil’s financial data are more directly related to the production of MEG. ---|--- (149) | The Commission noted that the selection of Malaysia as an appropriate representative country was subject to further analysis of the high Chinese share of imports of calcium carbide into Malaysia. ---|--- (150) | In this respect, the complainant claimed that the fact that only one factor of production – calcium carbide – was affected by a high share of imports from China made Malaysia a more appropriate representative country compared to the others, which had either more factors of production imported from China or Russia or did not have readily available data. In respect of the high share of imports of calcium carbide from China, LYB suggested to use as a benchmark the average import price into all countries. ---|--- (151) | The Commission noted that all potential representative countries, with the exception of Türkiye, reported high shares of imports of calcium carbide from China, with Brazil being affected by the lowest share. In particular, Malaysia’s share of Chinese imports of calcium carbide was in excess of 98 %. Therefore, the complainant’s claim was rejected. ---|--- (152) | Therefore, the Commission concluded that Malaysia could not be considered an appropriate representative country due to the facts that the share of Chinese imports of calcium carbide is higher than Brazil, that imports of catalysts are also affected by a significant share of Chinese imports of approximately 61 %, and that the financial data readily available in Malaysia are less accurate compared to the financial data available for the investigation period in Brazil. | — | Mexico ---|--- (153) | Wanhua Group claimed that the price for imports of sodium hydroxide into Mexico was abnormally high, because it exceeded its actual purchase price. ---|--- (154) | The Commission noted that, following verification, it considered sodium hydroxide as a consumable, as explained in recitals 180 to 182. Therefore, Wanhua Group’s comment was not relevant anymore in this respect. ---|--- (155) | Wanhua Group noted that there were no readily available financial data for the Mexican company. Given the absence of readily available data for this factor of production, the complainant submitted that Mexico could not be considered as a representative country. ---|--- (156) | The Commission reiterated that it could not find available financial information for Idesa Petroquimica SA de CV. ---|--- (157) | Therefore, Mexico could not be considered an appropriate representative country. | — | Thailand ---|--- (158) | Wanhua Group claimed that the price for imports of oxygen and sodium hydroxide into Thailand was abnormally high, because it exceeded its actual purchase price. ---|--- (159) | The Commission noted that, following verification, it considered sodium hydroxide as a consumable, as explained in the recitals 180 to 182. Therefore, Wanhua Group’s comment was not relevant anymore in this respect. Moreover, the Commission noted that Wanhua Group did not explain why it considered that the import price of oxygen into Thailand should not be taken into account as an undistorted benchmark. The fact that it was higher than Wanhua Group’s own purchase price constitutes no evidence that the import price into Thailand cannot be considered an undistorted benchmark. Thus, this claim was rejected. ---|--- (160) | Wanhua Group claimed that the profit of GC Polyols Company Limited should be rejected. ---|--- (161) | The Commission reiterated that it could not consider such a profit as a reasonable profitability. ---|--- (162) | Wanhua Group further claimed that the profit of 2,9 % achieved by Indorama Petrochem Co, Ltd could be considered reasonable. In this respect, Wanhua Group noted that the target profit of 6 % in Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation is used only in the context of the injury margin calculations. On the contrary, the complainant claimed that a very low profit of 2,9 % represented a risk with regards to the reliability of the information readily available in that country. ---|--- (163) | The Commission noted that, irrespective of the separate 6 % threshold for the target profit in the context of the injury margin determination, a profit of 2,9 % could not be considered reasonable because it is too low compared to the profits of the other profitable companies identified in the Note, which were at least 7,1 %. ---|--- (164) | In addition, the complainant and LYB claimed that Thailand should be rejected as a possible representative country because of the high share of imports of the factors of production from China. ---|--- (165) | The Commission concluded that Thailand could not be selected as an appropriate representative country due to the high share of imports from China for calcium carbide and oxygen, as indicated in the Note, and the lack of readily available data to establish a reasonable level of profit in Thailand. | — | Türkiye ---|--- (166) | Wanhua Group claimed that the price for imports of oxygen and nitrogen into Türkiye was abnormally high, because it exceeded its actual purchase price. ---|--- (167) | The Commission noted that, following verification, it considered nitrogen as a consumable, as explained in recitals 180 to 182. Therefore, Wanhua Group’s comment was not relevant anymore in this respect. Moreover, the Commission noted that Wanhua Group did not explain why it considered that the import price of oxygen into Türkiye should not be taken into account as an undistorted benchmark. The fact that it was higher than Wanhua Group’s own purchase price constitutes no evidence that the import price into Türkiye cannot be considered an undistorted benchmark. Thus, this claim was rejected. ---|--- (168) | Wanhua Group and the complainant noted that there were no readily available financial data for the Turkish producer of MEG. For this reason, the complainant claimed that Türkiye could not be a representative country. ---|--- (169) | The Commission reiterated that it could not find available financial information for Petkim Petrokimya Holding Anonim Sirketi. ---|--- (170) | LYB claimed that the share of Chinese imports of catalyst of 34 % was not significant enough to disregard the import price into Türkiye. In any case, alternatively, the Commission could use the import price into any other upper-middle income country reported in the Note. ---|--- (171) | Moreover, LYB submitted that the Commission could use an international benchmark for coal, affected by significant imports from Russia, such as the Australian export price of coal. The complainant on the other hand argued that Türkiye could not be considered an appropriate representative country precisely due to the high share of imports of coal from Russia, given the sanctions package imposed by the Union against Russia and the fact that energy prices in Russia were heavily influenced by the state. ---|--- (172) | In the absence of readily available financial data in Türkiye, the Commission did not take into consideration LYB’s proposed approach for catalyst and coal. ---|--- (173) | In conclusion, Türkiye cannot be considered an appropriate representative country. ---|--- (174) | In light of the above considerations, the Commission selected Brazil as an appropriate representative country and Rhodia Brasil for the establishment of undistorted SG & A costs and profit, in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation, in order to source undistorted prices or benchmarks for the calculation of normal value. ---|--- Level of social and environmental protection (175) | Having established that Brazil was the only available appropriate representative country, based on all of the above elements, there was no need to carry out an assessment of the level of social and environmental protection in accordance with the last sentence of Article 2(6a)(a) first indent of the basic Regulation. ---|--- 3.1.2.4.2. Conclusion (176) | In view of the above analysis, Brazil met the criteria laid down in Article 2(6a)(a), first indent of the basic Regulation to be considered as an appropriate representative country. ---|--- 3.1.2.5. Sources used to establish undistorted costs (177) | In the Note, the Commission listed the factors of production such as materials, energy and labour used in the production of the product under investigation by the sampled exporting producers and invited the interested parties to comment and propose publicly available information on undistorted values for each of the factors of production mentioned in that Note. ---|--- (178) | The Commission, in order to construct the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, used GTA to establish the undistorted cost of most of the factors of production, notably the raw materials. Moreover, as explained in recitals 132 and 135, the Commission relied on the grey hydrogen price index for the European region published by Business Analitiq (79) to establish the undistorted cost of hydrogen and on the average export price from Brazil in the investigation period, sourced from GTA, to establish the undistorted cost of formaldehyde.

---|--- (179) | In addition, the Commission used the statistics published by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (‘IBGE’) for establishing undistorted costs of labour (80), the industrial electricity price statistics published by the Ministry of Mines and Energy of Brazil (81), the price of natural gas for industrial users in Brazil as published by the Ministry of Mines and Energy of Brazil (82), the price of coal in Brazil as published by the Ministry of Mines and Energy of Brazil (83), and the water tariff charged by Companhia de Saneamento Básico do Estado de São Paulo (84) (‘SABESP’) for establishing undistorted benchmarks for electricity, natural gas, coal and water. ---|--- (180) | Due to the large number of factors of production of the sampled exporting producers that provided complete information and the negligible weight of some of the raw materials in the total cost of production, these negligible items were grouped under ‘consumables’. Notably, such consumables included: nitrogen, sodium hydroxide, caustic soda, sulfuric acid, nickel aluminium catalysts, compressed air, steam, and other factors of production individually weighting less than 0,1 % in the total cost of production. ---|--- (181) | The Commission considered also some by-products as consumables. These included: ammonium sulphate, liquid nitrogen, tar, liquid argon, carbon black, PSA desorbed gas, steam, and other by-products individually weighting less than 0,1 % in the total cost of production. ---|--- (182) | Collectively, the factors of production considered as consumables amounted to less than 2,5 % of the total cost of production, whereas the by-products considered as consumables amounted to an absolute value of [0,5–2] %. The Commission calculated the percentage of the consumables on the total cost of raw materials and applied this percentage to the recalculated cost of raw materials when using the established undistorted benchmarks in the appropriate representative country. ---|--- 3.1.2.5.1. Factors of production (183) | Considering all the information submitted by the interested parties and collected during the verification visits, the following factors of production and their sources have been identified in order to determine the normal value in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation: Table 1 Factors of production of BDO | Factor of Production | Commodity Code | Sources of data | Undistorted value | Unit of measurement ---|---|---|---|--- Raw materials Natural gas | 2711 21 | Ministry of Mines and Energy of Brazil | 4,25 | CNY/m3 Calcium carbide | 2849 10 | GTA | 7,31 | CNY/kg Coal | 2701 12 | Ministry of Mines and Energy of Brazil | 1,26 | CNY/kg Methanol | 2905 11 | GTA | 2,97 | CNY/kg Hydrogen | 2804 10 | Business Analitiq | 2,01 | CNY/m3 Oxygen | 2804 40 | GTA | 17,04 | CNY/m3 Copper catalysts | 3815 19 | GTA | 311,19 | CNY/kg Formaldehyde / Formaldehyde (45 %) | 2912 11 | GTA (exports from Brazil) | 3 504,19 | CNY/tonne Labour Labour | n/a | IBGE | 97,98 | CNY/hour Energy Electricity | n/a | Ministry of Mines and Energy of Brazil | 0,97 | CNY/kWh Water | n/a | SABESP | 23,10 | CNY/m3 By-products Semi-finished n-butanol | 2905 13 | GTA | 9,33 | CNY/kg Acetylene tail gas | 2901 29 | Pro rata based on the benchmark for natural gas (85) | 1,42 | CNY/m3 Methanol | 2905 11 | GTA and pro rata based on the benchmark for natural gas (85) | 4,42 | CNY/kg (184) | The Commission included a value for manufacturing overhead costs in order to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above. To establish this amount, the Commission used the manufacturing overhead cost incurred by the sampled exporting producers, applied to the undistorted costs of manufacturing. The methodology is duly explained in recitals 205 to 207. ---|--- Raw materials (185) | In order to establish the undistorted price of raw materials (other than coal, hydrogen and formaldehyde) as delivered at the gate of a representative country producer, the Commission used as a basis the weighted average import price to the representative country as reported in the GTA to which import duties and transport costs were added. An import price in the representative country was determined as a weighted average of unit prices of imports from all third countries excluding the PRC and countries which are not members of the WTO, listed in Annex 1 of Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and the Council (86). The Commission decided to exclude imports from the PRC into the representative country as it concluded in recital 112 that it is not appropriate to use domestic prices and costs in the PRC due to the existence of significant distortions in accordance with Article 2(6a)(b) of the basic Regulation. Given that there is no evidence showing that the same distortions do not equally affect products intended for export, the Commission considered that the same distortions affected export prices. ---|--- (186) | For a number of factors of production the actual costs incurred by the sampled exporting producers represented a negligible share of total raw material costs in the review investigation period. As the value used for these had no appreciable impact on the dumping margin calculations, regardless of the source used, the Commission decided to include those costs into consumables as explained in the recitals 180 and 182. ---|--- (187) | With regard to import duties, the Commission consulted the International Trade Centre’s Market Access Map to determine the applicable import duties per good code and country of origin (87). The import duties were added to the CIF value recorded in the Brazilian import statistics as available in the GTA database. ---|--- (188) | The Commission expressed the transport cost incurred by the sampled exporting producers for the supply of raw materials as a percentage of the actual cost of such raw materials and then applied the same percentage to the undistorted cost of the same raw materials in order to obtain the undistorted transport cost. The Commission considered that, in the context of this investigation, the ratio between the exporting producer’s raw material and the reported transport costs could be reasonably used as an indication to estimate the undistorted transport costs of raw materials when delivered to the company’s factory. ---|--- By-products (189) | As mentioned in recital 181, the Commission considered certain by-products as consumables. ---|--- (190) | For the remaining by-products, the Commission analysed the accounting practices of the sampled Chinese exporting producers pertaining to by-products. On that basis, the Commission relied on GTA import data for establishing a benchmark for semi-finished n-butanol since it was sold to customers. For acetylene tail gas, which one sampled exporting producer had used internally, the Commission took the ratio between the price in the PRC for acetylene tail gas compared to the price in the PRC for the main input material, i.e. natural gas, as reported by the exporting producer. This ratio was applied to the price for natural gas in Brazil, as derived from the source indicated in recital 179 in order to calculate the benchmark for this by-product. For methanol, which the relevant exporting producer had partially sold to customers and partially used internally, the Commission used a composite value from GTA import data and from the value resulting from the method described for acetylene tail gas. ---|--- Labour (191) | The Commission used the statistics published by the IBGE for establishing undistorted costs of labour (88). The Commission relied on the detailed information on wages in companies with 30 or more employees for the latest available statistics covering 2023, for the economic activity 20.2 – ‘Fabricação de produtos químicos orgânicos’ according to NACE Rev.2 classification. The IBGE statistics provide information on the total annual wages and related charges and on the number of employees in the manufacturing of organic chemicals for the year 2023. The 2023 value was duly adjusted for inflation using the domestic consumer price index as published by the IBGE itself (89) to adapt it to the investigation period (year 2024). ---|--- Electricity (192) | The price of electricity for industrial users in Brazil is published by the Ministry of Mines and Energy of Brazil (90) in its monthly bulletin. The Commission used the data of the industrial electricity prices in the corresponding consumption band in kWh covering the investigation period. ---|--- (193) | The rates published in the monthly bulletins include the Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços (‘ICMS’), a state-level tax levied on the circulation of goods and on the provision of inter-state and inter-municipal transport and communication services. This tax is recoverable by industrial users and, accordingly, was deducted from the established benchmark. ---|--- (194) | As the ICMS was applied at rates ranging between 17 % and 18 % depending on the state (91), the Commission applied an average deduction of 17,5 % ICMS for the recalculation of the benchmark. ---|--- (195) | Wanhua Group claimed that the benchmark for electricity was not included in the Note. ---|--- (196) | The Commission noted that, in the Note, only benchmarks for raw materials based on import data were reported. The Commission included the benchmark for electricity in the pre-disclosure. ---|--- Natural gas (197) | The price of natural gas for industrial users in Brazil is published by the Ministry of Mines and Energy of Brazil (92). The Commission used the consumption band in cubic meters covering the investigation period. The rates published in the monthly bulletins for 2024 included the same ICMS tax as explained for electricity above, and the Commission treated this tax in the same way as done for electricity. ---|--- (198) | Wanhua Group claimed that the benchmark data for natural gas were missing from Annex II of the Note, despite the importance of this factor of production in the total cost of manufacturing. ---|--- (199) | The Commission noted that, as indicated in Annex I to the Note, it did not intend to use import data of natural gas as an undistorted benchmark, and for this reason natural gas was not included in Annex II. On the contrary, as indicated above, the Commission relied on the monthly bulletins of the Ministry of Mines and Energy of Brazil for gas. The Commission included the benchmark for natural gas in the pre-disclosure. ---|--- Coal (200) | The Commission used the price of coal in Brazil as published by the Ministry of Mines and Energy of Brazil (93) in its monthly bulletins. ---|--- Water (201) | The Commission used the water tariff charged by SABESP (94), that is responsible for water supply, sewage collection and treatment in the state of São Paulo. The information enabled to identify tariffs applicable for industrial users in July 2024 in an area under the abbreviation OJ including the city of Paulínia, where the main production facility of Rhodia Brasil in Brazil is located. ---|--- Steam (202) | The Commission noted that, following verification, steam was considered to be a consumable, as indicated in recital 180. Therefore, the Commission did not establish a benchmark for steam. ---|--- (203) | Wanhua Group claimed that the benchmark data for steam were missing from Annex II of the Note. ---|--- (204) | The Commission noted that, as indicated in Annex I to the Note, it did not intend to use import data of steam as an undistorted benchmark, and for this reason steam was not included in Annex II. ---|--- Manufacturing overhead costs, SG & A, costs and profits (205) | According to Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation, ‘the constructed normal value shall include an undistorted and reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits’. In addition, a value for manufacturing overhead costs needs to be established to cover costs not included in the factors of production referred to above. ---|--- (206) | The manufacturing overheads incurred by the sampled exporting producers were expressed as a share of the costs of manufacturing actually incurred by the exporting producers. This percentage was applied to the undistorted costs of manufacturing. ---|--- (207) | For establishing an undistorted and reasonable amount for SG & A costs and profit, the Commission relied on the financial data for 2024 for Rhodia Brasil as extracted from Data Mercantil (95). ---|--- Calculation (208) | On the basis of the above, the Commission constructed the normal value on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (209) | First, the Commission established the undistorted manufacturing costs. The Commission applied the undistorted unit costs to the actual consumption of the individual factors of production of the sampled exporting producer. These consumption rates were verified during the verification. The Commission multiplied the usage factors by the undistorted costs per unit observed in the representative country, as described in recitals 177 to 204. ---|--- (210) | Then the Commission added manufacturing overheads, as explained in recitals 205 to 207 to the undistorted cost of manufacturing in order to arrive at the undistorted costs of production. ---|--- (211) | To the costs of production established as described in the previous recital, the Commission applied SG & A costs and profit of Rhodia Brasil. SG & A costs expressed as a percentage of the Costs of Goods Sold (‘COGS’) and applied to the undistorted costs of production amounted to 14,6 %. The profit expressed as a percentage of the COGS and applied to the undistorted costs of production amounted to 8,0 %. ---|--- (212) | On that basis, the Commission constructed the normal value on an ex-works basis in accordance with Article 2(6a)(a) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- 3.1.3. Export price (213) | The sampled exporting producers exported to the Union either directly to independent customers or to a related company acting as a user. ---|--- (214) | For the exporting producers that exported the product concerned directly to independent customers in the Union, the export price was the price actually paid or payable for the product concerned when sold for export to the Union, in accordance with Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (215) | For the exporting producer that exported the product concerned to the Union to a related company acting not only as an importer but also as a user, as the product concerned was not resold in the condition in which it was imported, the export price had to be constructed on any reasonable basis pursuant to Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. The investigation established that the product concerned constituted a very small part of the cost of production of the product that was eventually sold to the first independent customer in the Union by the related user. Consequently, the Commission could not establish a reliable export price based on the sales of the final product to the first independent buyer for those sales. The Commission constructed the export price using the monthly average of the prices at which the same sampled exporting producer sold the product concerned to independent customers in the Union, as established pursuant to Article 2(8) of the basic Regulation. For the month for which the sampled exporting producer in question reported no sales to independent customers in the Union, the Commission established the export price on the basis of the average price of the exporting producer’s sales to independent customers in the Union throughout the investigation period. ---|--- 3.1.4. Comparison (216) | Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation requires the Commission to make a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price at the same level of trade and to make allowances for differences in factors which affect prices and price comparability. In the case at hand the Commission chose to compare the normal value and the export price of the sampled exporting producers at the ex-works level of trade. As further explained below, where appropriate, the normal value and the export price were adjusted in order to: (i) net them back to the ex-works level; and (ii) make allowances for differences in factors which were claimed, and demonstrated, to affect prices and price comparability. ---|--- 3.1.4.1. Adjustments made to the normal value (217) | As explained in recital 212, the normal value was established at the ex-works level of trade by using costs of production together with amounts for SG & A costs and for profit, which were considered to be reasonable for that level of trade. Therefore, no adjustments were necessary to net the normal value back to the ex-works level. ---|--- 3.1.4.2. Adjustments made to the export price (218) | In order to net the export price back to the ex-works level of trade, adjustments were made on the account of: freight, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary expenses. ---|--- (219) | Allowances were made for the following factors affecting prices and price comparability: credit cost, bank charges and, for one of the two sampled exporting producers, commissions. ---|--- (220) | One sampled exporting producer exported to the Union through a related company outside the Union. The investigation established that the functions of the related trader were similar to those of an agent working on a commission basis. Indeed, such related trader obtained a profit for its services and traded a broad array of goods other than the product concerned. Consequently, the Commission made an adjustment to the export price pursuant to Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation for the mark-up received by the related trader. ---|--- (221) | The adjustment for the constructed commission was based on the SG & A costs incurred by the related trader and, given the relationship between both companies and the fact that no unrelated importer cooperated in the current investigation, a notional profit of 6,89 % considered reasonable in a previous investigation concerning imports of another chemical product, namely polyvinyl alcohols (‘PVA’) originating in China (96). Such level of profit of 6,89 % was provisionally considered reasonable also in this case because it was realised by unrelated importers involved in the trade of chemical products. ---|--- 3.1.5. Dumping margin (222) | For the sampled exporting producers, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of each type of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (223) | On this basis, the provisional weighted average dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows: | Country | Company | Provisional dumping margin (%) ---|---|--- China | Xinjiang Markor Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. | 311,9 Wanhua Chemical (Sichuan) Co., Ltd. | 522,4 (224) | For the cooperating exporting producers outside the sample, the Commission calculated the weighted average dumping margin, in accordance with Article 9(6) of the basic Regulation. Therefore, that margin was established on the basis of the margins of the sampled exporting producers. ---|--- (225) | On this basis, the provisional dumping margin of the cooperating exporting producers outside the sample is 362,8 %. ---|--- (226) | For all other exporting producers in the PRC, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. To this end, the Commission determined the level of cooperation of the exporting producers. The level of cooperation is the volume of exports of the cooperating exporting producers to the Union expressed as proportion of the total imports from the country concerned to the Union in the investigation period, as established on the basis of Eurostat. ---|--- (227) | The level of cooperation in China is high because the exports of the cooperating exporting producers constituted around 85 % of the total imports from China during the investigation period. On this basis, the Commission decided to establish the dumping margin for non-cooperating exporting producers in China at the level of the sampled company with the highest dumping margin in each country. ---|--- (228) | The provisional dumping margins, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows: | Country | Company | Provisional dumping margin (%) ---|---|--- China | Xinjiang Markor Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. | 311,9 Wanhua Chemical (Sichuan) Co., Ltd. | 522,4 Other cooperating companies in China | 362,8 All other imports originating in China | 522,4 3.2. Saudi Arabia (229) | The sole exporting producer in Saudi Arabia, International Diol Company (‘IDC’), exported to the Union exclusively through its related trader Sipchem Marketing Company (‘SMC’), established in Saudi Arabia. In turn, SMC exported to the Union exclusively through its fully owned subsidiary Sipchem Europe SA (‘SESA’), which is established in Switzerland. The three companies are part of the Saudi International Petrochemical Company (‘Sipchem’) group. ---|--- 3.2.1. Normal value (230) | IDC made no sales of BDO intended for domestic consumption in the investigation period. Therefore, the Commission constructed the normal value in accordance with Article 2(3) and (6)(c) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (231) | Normal value at the ex-works level was constructed by adding the following to the average cost of production of the like product of the cooperating exporting producer during the investigation period: | (a) | the weighted average selling, general and administrative (‘SG & A’) expenses incurred by IDC on sales of the product under investigation to the Union during the IP; and ---|--- (b) | the weighted average profit realised in 2024 by companies in Saudi Arabia active in the production of products falling under NACE code 201 (97), as reported by Moody’s ORBIS database (98). The Commission considered that there is no reason why domestic sales of such products would be less profitable than export sales, and therefore, the requirement of Article 2(6)(c), that the profit used would not exceed the profit normally realised by other exporters or producers on sales of products of the same general category in the domestic market of the country of origin, is met. ---|--- 3.2.2. Export price (232) | As explained in recital 229, IDC exported to the Union exclusively through SMC, its related trader established in Saudi Arabia. In turn, SMC exported to the Union exclusively through its fully owned subsidiary SESA, which is established in Switzerland. For these sales, SESA acted as an importer for the Union market, incurring the relevant costs and accruing profits. ---|--- (233) | In view of this, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold by SESA to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. In this case, adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG & A expenses, and for profits accruing. The adjustment was made using the actual SG & A costs incurred by SESA and, on the grounds explained in recital 221, a notional profit of 6,89 %. ---|--- (234) | Sipchem claimed that its sales to a certain Union BDO producer and marketer should be excluded from the export price calculation, on the grounds that the price of these sales were much lower than Sipchem’s average prices and were the result of hard negotiations. ---|--- (235) | The Commission recalled that for the determination of the dumping margin, all export sales must be considered. The claim was therefore rejected. ---|--- 3.2.3. Comparison (236) | Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation requires the Commission to make a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price at the same level of trade and to make allowances for differences in factors which affect prices and price comparability. In the case at hand the Commission chose to compare the normal value and the export price of the sampled exporting producers at the ex-works level of trade. As further explained below, where appropriate, the normal value and the export price were adjusted in order to: (i) net them back to the ex-works level; and (ii) make allowances for differences in factors which were claimed, and demonstrated, to affect prices and price comparability. ---|--- 3.2.3.1. Adjustments made to the normal value (237) | As explained in recital 231, the normal value was established at the ex-works level of trade by using costs of production together with amounts for SG & A and for profit, which were considered to be reasonable for that level of trade. Therefore, no adjustments were necessary to net the normal value back to the ex-works level. ---|--- (238) | The Commission found no reasons for making any allowances to the normal value, nor were such allowances claimed by the sole cooperating exporting producer. ---|--- 3.2.3.2. Adjustments made to the export price (239) | In order to net the export price back to the ex-works level of trade, adjustments were made on the account of: customs duty, other import charges, freight, insurance, handling loading and ancillary expenses. ---|--- (240) | Allowances were made for the following factor affecting prices and price comparability: credit costs and commissions ---|--- (241) | As all Union sales were made via a related trader in Saudi Arabia (SMC), and that company carried out functions similar to those of an agent working on a commission basis, and received a commission for those sales, an adjustment to the export price was made under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation. The adjustment was made using the actual SG & A costs incurred by SMC and, given the relationship between the companies, a notional profit of 6,89 % as set out in recital 221. ---|--- (242) | In its questionnaire reply, the company had claimed that IDC, SMC, and SESA form a single economic entity and therefore, such an adjustment would not be justified. To substantiate its claim, the company argued that SMC/SESA have been entrusted by IDC, which has no sales functions of its own, with tasks that normally fall within the scope of responsibilities of a centralized internal sales department (SMC) and export department (SESA). However, the Commission found that there is a very detailed contract between IDC and SMC, setting out the commissions paid by IDC and also including an arbitration clause, thereby demonstrating a limited economic solidarity between the two companies. In view of this, the Commission rejected the claim and considered the adjustment of the export price under Article 2(10)(i) of the basic Regulation as warranted. ---|--- 3.2.4. Dumping margins (243) | For the cooperating exporting producer, the Commission compared the weighted average normal value of the like product with the weighted average export price of the corresponding type of the product concerned, in accordance with Article 2(11) and (12) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (244) | As there was only one exporting producer that covered the totality of exports from Saudi Arabia to the Union in the investigation period, it was not necessary to calculate a weighted average dumping margin which would normally be applied for cooperating not sampled companies. ---|--- (245) | For all other imports originating in Saudi Arabia, the Commission established the dumping margin on the basis of the facts available, in accordance with Article 18 of the basic Regulation. On this basis, the Commission found it appropriate to establish the dumping margin at the level of the dumping margin of the cooperating producer. ---|--- (246) | On this basis, the provisional weighted average dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows: | Company | Provisional dumping margin (%) ---|--- International Diol Company | 52,4 All other imports originating in Saudi Arabia | 52,4 3.3. USA 3.3.1. Normal value (247) | The Commission first examined whether the total volume of domestic sales for the cooperating exporting producer was representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales are representative if the total domestic sales volume of the like product to independent customers on the domestic market per exporting producer represented at least 5 % of its total export sales volume of the product concerned to the Union during the investigation period. On this basis, the total sales of the cooperating exporting producer of the like product on the domestic market were representative. ---|--- (248) | The Commission subsequently identified the product types sold domestically that were identical or comparable with the product types sold for export to the Union for the exporting producer with representative domestic sales. ---|--- (249) | The Commission then examined whether the domestic sales by the cooperating exporting producer on its domestic market for each product type that is identical or comparable with a product type sold for export to the Union were representative, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation. The domestic sales of a product type are representative if the total volume of domestic sales of that product type to independent customers during the investigation period represents at least 5 % of the total volume of export sales of the identical or comparable product type to the Union. The Commission established that the domestic sales of each product type were representative for the exporting producer. ---|--- (250) | The Commission next defined the proportion of profitable sales to independent customers on the domestic market for each product type during the investigation period in order to decide whether to use actual domestic sales for the calculation of the normal value, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (251) | The normal value is based on the actual domestic price per product type, irrespective of whether those sales are profitable or not, if: | (a) | the sales volume of the product type, sold at a net sales price equal to or above the calculated cost of production, represented more than 80 % of the total sales volume of this product type; and ---|--- (b) | the weighted average sales price of that product type is equal to or higher than the unit cost of production. ---|--- (252) | In this case, the normal value is the weighted average of the prices of all domestic sales of that product type during the IP. ---|--- (253) | The normal value is the actual domestic price per product type of only the profitable domestic sales of the product types during the IP, if: | (a) | the volume of profitable sales of the product type represents 80% or less of the total sales volume of this type; or ---|--- (b) | the weighted average price of this product type is below the unit cost of production. ---|--- (254) | The analysis of domestic sales showed that [8 %–12 %] of all domestic sales were profitable and that the weighted average sales price was lower than the cost of production. Accordingly, the normal value was calculated as a weighted average of the profitable sales only. ---|--- 3.3.2. Export price (255) | The cooperating exporting producer exported to the Union through a related company acting as an importer. ---|--- (256) | For the exporting producers that exported the product concerned to the Union through a related company acting as an importer, the export price was established on the basis of the price at which the imported product was first resold to independent customers in the Union, in accordance with Article 2(9) of the basic Regulation. In this case, adjustments to the price were made for all costs incurred between importation and resale, including SG & A expenses, and for profits accruing. ---|--- (257) | The Commission relied on the actual SG & A costs reported by the related importer. With regard to profit, the Commission used the notional profit of 6,89 % for the reasons set out in recital 221, namely the relationship between companies and the lack of cooperation of unrelated importers in this investigation. ---|--- 3.3.3. Comparison (258) | Article 2(10) of the basic Regulation requires the Commission to make a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price at the same level of trade and to make allowances for differences in factors which affect prices and price comparability. In the case at hand the Commission chose to compare the normal value and the export price of the sampled exporting producers at the ex-works level of trade. As further explained below, where appropriate, the normal value and the export price were adjusted in order to: (i) net them back to the ex-works level; and (ii) make allowances for differences in factors which were claimed, and demonstrated, to affect prices and price comparability. ---|--- 3.3.3.1. Adjustments made to the normal value (259) | In order to net the normal value back to the ex-works level of trade, adjustments were made on the account of transport, handling, loading, ancillary and insurance expenses as well as expenses for technical assistance and services. ---|--- (260) | Allowances were made for the following factors affecting prices and price comparability: commission, credit costs and bank charges. ---|--- 3.3.3.2. Adjustments made to the export price (261) | In order to net the export price back to the ex-works level of trade, adjustments were made on the account of: customs duty, freight, insurance, handling loading and ancillary expenses. ---|--- (262) | Allowances were made for the following factor affecting prices and price comparability: credit costs. ---|--- 3.3.4. Dumping margins (263) | On this basis, the dumping margin for Lyondell Chemical Company, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, was 135,7 %. ---|--- (264) | The level of cooperation in the USA is low because the imports of the cooperating exporting producer constituted around 17 % of the total exports to the Union during the IP. ---|--- (265) | The Commission recalled that Section 10 of the Notice of Initiation (99) had informed interested parties that failure to cooperate, or only partial cooperation, could lead to findings based on facts available under Article 18 of the basic Regulation, potentially resulting in less favourable outcomes for those parties. Given that the interested parties were clearly warned of the consequences of non-cooperation in the Notice of initiation and in the proceeding as stated in recital 45, and that the level of cooperation in this case was particularly low, the Commission deemed it appropriate to determine the residual anti-dumping duty based on a representative subset of sales by Lyondell Chemical Group which, itself, represented over 47 % of the sales of the company and 8 % of the total export volume of all sampled companies to the Union during the investigation period. These sales were considered a reasonable and representative proxy for the dumping behaviour of the non-cooperating exporters. ---|--- (266) | On this basis, the residual dumping margin for the USA was set at 142,5 %. ---|--- (267) | The provisional dumping margins for the USA, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are as follows: | Country | Company | Provisional dumping margin (%) ---|---|--- US | Lyondell Chemical Company | 135,7 All other imports originating in the US | 142,5 4\. INJURY 4.1. Definition of the Union industry and Union production (268) | The like product was manufactured by four producers in the Union during the investigation period. They constitute the ‘Union industry’ within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (269) | The total Union production during the investigation period was established at around 189 700 tonnes. The Commission established the figure on the basis of the questionnaire replies of the three sampled Union producers: BASF SE (‘BASF’), INEOS Solvents Marl GmbH (‘INEOS’) and Lyondell Chemie Nederland BV (‘LCN’) and the macro questionnaire reply of Novamont S.p.A (‘Novamont’). The three sampled producers manufactured fossil based BDO whereas Novamont produced bio BDO. As indicated in recital 34, the three sampled Union producers represented more than 70 % of the total Union production and sales of the like product. ---|--- 4.2. Determination of the relevant Union market (270) | To establish whether the Union industry suffered injury and to determine consumption and the various economic indicators related to the situation of the Union industry, the Commission examined whether and to what extent the subsequent use of the Union industry’s production of the like product had to be taken into account in the analysis. ---|--- (271) | BDO is used as an intermediate material for the production of a wide range of downstream chemical products including PBT, PBAT, TPU, THF and GBL. The Commission found that a substantial part of the sampled Union producers’ production was destined for captive use. The business model of the Union producers and their degree of vertical integration varied. Nevertheless, the Union industry can overall be characterised as an industry with a high degree of vertical integration, as Union producers were found to be at the same time producers, importers, sellers and users of the product under investigation and regarding other chemical products. ---|--- (272) | BDO was often transferred at cost within the same company for further downstream processing. Union producers could source BDO either from other unrelated Union producers, imports or from own internal production which was then further processed to a wide range of downstream products and/or resold, and in the market conditions which existed in 2023 and the investigation period multiple sourcing methods of BDO were employed by Union producers. In addition, related parties were free to source their BDO purchases from either related or unrelated suppliers, within or outside the Union. Furthermore, BDO was often produced in chemical parks which included downstream products and other chemical products. ---|--- (273) | Bearing in mind that, in the market conditions which existed in 2023 and the investigation period, captive use could be sourced from either related parties or unrelated suppliers, within or outside the Union, and the sales from related parties were fixed at international market prices, it was considered that the captive sales are part of the free market. This finding supports the view that total consumption should be used to calculate market shares in this case. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, the Commission also showed other market share trends in its analysis. Therefore, given that the Union producer source BDO for downstream production both from their own production or from the free market, depending on prices and cost of the product concerned, the Commission considered that total consumption (free market plus captive) is the best indicator for the injury analysis. ---|--- 4.3. Union consumption (274) | The Union industry is vertically integrated and the product under investigation is regarded as a primary material for the production of various value-added downstream products. The captive and free market consumptions were analysed separately. ---|--- (275) | The Commission established the total Union consumption on the sum of the free market and the captive markets. ---|--- (276) | The Commission established the captive market based on captive use of the Union industry, and the free market use on the basis of production sold of the Union industry to third parties plus imports into the Union from all third countries. ---|--- (277) | On that basis Union consumption developed as follows: Table 2 Union consumption (tonnes) | | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | Investigation period ---|---|---|---|--- Captive market | 264 489 | 183 604 | 134 693 | 163 036 Index | 100 | 69 | 51 | 62 Free market | 159 456 | 138 725 | 150 534 | 184 036 Index | 100 | 87 | 94 | 115 Total Union consumption | 423 944 | 322 329 | 285 226 | 347 072 Index | 100 | 76 | 67 | 82 | Source: | Producer questionnaires replies, Union customs import statistics. ---|--- (278) | Captive market consumption in tonnes decreased from 2021 to 2023, with a substantial decrease of 31 % in 2022 and a decrease of 49 % in 2023 when compared to 2021 consumption. In the IP, captive market consumption increased compared to 2023, but still remained below 2021 levels with a decrease of 38 % in the period considered. This resulted in captive market consumption falling to 163 036 tonnes in the IP from 264 489 tonnes in 2021. ---|--- (279) | Free market consumption experienced a slight decrease in 2022 and 2023, with consumption decreasing by 13 % in 2022 and 6 % in 2023 when compared to 2021. However, overall free market consumption grew significantly over the period considered, with a 15 % increase in the IP when compared to 2021. This resulted in an increase from 159 456 tonnes in 2021 to 184 036 tonnes in the IP. ---|--- (280) | Overall, total Union consumption reduced in the period considered. First, it reduced by 24 % in 2022, and then by 33 % in 2023 when compared to the total Union consumption in 2021. Despite an increase of total Union consumption in the IP compared to 2023, the total Union consumption remained 18 % lower in the IP than in 2021. This is because an increase in free market consumption in the IP was not enough to compensate the decline of the Union captive market consumption, resulting in a lower total Union consumption of the product concerned from 423 944 tonnes in 2021 to 347 072 tonnes in the IP. ---|--- (281) | Total Union consumption was high in 2021 due to high demand in the numerous downstream BDO value chain industries, largely related to COVID-19 issues. Consumption fluctuated from 2022 to the investigation period and in fact increased by 8 % over this period. The Union industry explained that for the foreseeable long-term, demand for BDO globally and in the Union is stable. ---|--- (282) | Table 2 shows a contrast between the developments of the captive market, which fell by 38 % over the period considered and the free market which increased by 15%. Taking into account the finding at recital 273, the important total Union consumption in 2023 and the investigation period was supplied less from the Union production and more from dumped imports. These developments are further analysed under in the ‘injury’ and ‘causation’ sections. ---|--- 4.4. Imports from the countries concerned 4.4.1. Cumulative assessment of the effects of imports from the countries concerned (283) | The Commission examined whether imports of BDO originating in the countries concerned should be assessed cumulatively, in accordance with Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (284) | As established in section 3, the margin of dumping established in relation to the imports from China, Saudi Arabia and the USA was above the de minimis threshold laid down in Article 9(3) of the basic Regulation. The volume of imports from each of the countries concerned was not negligible within the meaning of Article 5(7) of the basic Regulation. As per Table 3, market shares (of the total Union market) in the investigation period were around 7 %, 11 % and 7 %, respectively. ---|--- (285) | In respect of the conditions of competition, LCN argued that BDO imports from the USA are not subject to the same conditions of competition as imports from Saudi Arabia and China. LCN pointed out that imports from the USA consisted exclusively of intra-company deliveries within the Lyondell Basell and BASF groups. It further stated that whilst LCN deliveries from the USA were traded on the Union market, BASF’s imports were to be used by the company to produce downstream products. ---|--- (286) | The Commission does not dispute the facts concerning US imports as commented by LCN, but does not agree that different conditions of competition apply to US imports as compared to imports from Saudi Arabia and China. In fact, imports from all three countries were used by Union producers to produce downstream products and/or traded on the free market, and the frequency varied through the period considered. The same was true of the production of the Union producers. This like product was either used captively or sold to industrial users (on similar contractual terms as those of imports) on the Union market. The imports from the countries concerned were all in competition with each other and the Union production, because they were made using similar contract price conditions using ICIS (100) indices as a benchmark. The imports all consisted of BDO sharing the same basic characteristics meaning that they were fully interchangeable. In addition, they were often competing for the same use, namely of supplying BDO for the captive Union demand and/or free market demand, including the reselling of imported BDO. ---|--- (287) | Comments on cumulation of imports as regards the Saudi Arabia were made by Sipchem, INEOS and Will and Co. In respect of the conditions of competition, Sipchem argued that BDO imports from Saudi Arabia are not subject to the same conditions of competition as imports from USA and China. Sipchem pointed out that Sipchem’s sales to INEOS make clear that the market behaviour of Sipchem is different from that of Chinese BDO exporters, which make many opportunistic spot sales, and USA BDO exporters, who mostly sell to related entities in the Union for downstream use to complement their EU BDO production. In addition, Will and Co argued that imports from Saudi Arabia follow the prices set by China in BDO, and because of this should not be cumulated. INEOS disagreed with the comments of Sipchem and Will and Co pointing out that similar pricing arrangements existed for imports from Saudi Arabia as existed for other imports and Union industry sales in general during the period considered. ---|--- (288) | Again, the Commission did not agree that different conditions of competition apply to Saudi Arabian imports as compared to imports from the USA and China, and that there were different production methods, cost of production and selling prices to the Union from the countries considered. Imports from all three countries were used captively by Union producers and/or traded on the free market, and the frequency varied through the investigation period. The same was true of the production of the Union producers. This like product was either used in downstream products or sold to industrial users (on similar terms as those of imports) on the Union market. The imports from the countries concerned were all in competition with each other because they were made using similar contract price conditions using ICIS indices as a benchmark. In addition, the product imported shared the same basic characteristics meaning that they were fully interchangeable. ---|--- (289) | Therefore, the conditions of competition between the dumped imports from the countries concerned and the like product were similar. More specifically, the imported BDO competed with each other and with the BDO produced in the Union, because they are sold through the same sales channels, had the same uses and were ultimately sold to the same customers.

---|--- (290) | As a result, the criteria set out in Article 3(4) of the basic Regulation were met and imports from the three countries concerned were examined cumulatively for the purposes of the injury determination. ---|--- 4.4.2. Volume and market share of the imports from the countries concerned (291) | The Commission established the volume of imports on the basis of Union imports statistics. The market share of the imports was established on the basis of Union imports statistics compared total Union consumption as per Table 2. ---|--- (292) | Imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows: Table 3 Import quantity and market share | | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | Investigation period ---|---|---|---|--- CHINA Quantity of imports from China (tonnes) | 10 220 | 17 415 | 36 725 | 23 776 Market share China (%) | 2 | 5 | 13 | 7 SAUDI ARABIA Quantity of imports from Saudi Arabia (tonnes) | 26 183 | 35 928 | 28 474 | 39 821 Market share Saudi Arabia (%) | 6 | 11 | 10 | 11 USA Quantity of imports from the USA (tonnes) | 12 415 | 15 719 | 39 283 | 25 449 Market share USA (%) | 3 | 5 | 14 | 7 TOTAL COUNTRIES CONCERNED Quantity of imports from the countries concerned (tonnes) | 48 818 | 69 062 | 104 483 | 89 047 Index | 100 | 141 | 214 | 182 Market share countries concerned (%) | 12 | 21 | 37 | 26 Index | 100 | 186 | 318 | 223 | Source: | Eurostat for imports quantities, and market shares is comparing imports quantities against Total Union consumption as per Table 2. ---|--- (293) | Imports from the countries concerned increased over the period considered, from about 48 800 tonnes in 2021 to about 89 000 tonnes in the IP, an increase of 82 %. Imports reduced in the IP when compared to 2023, but this decline is partly attributed to the Red Sea Crisis (101) affecting the ability to import BDO to the Union. In addition, LCN stated that the imports from China in 2024 would have fallen due to BASF’s strategic decision to divest from its joint venture in China in Q4 2023 thereby reducing total imports from China. ---|--- (294) | Market shares of countries concerned followed a similar trend to imports, in the IP the market share reduced compared to 2023 from 37 % to 26 %. However, across the entire period considered, the market share more than doubled, from 12 % in 2021 to 26 % in the IP, a 14 percentage points increase. ---|--- 4.5. Prices of the imports from the countries concerned and price undercutting and price depression (295) | The Commission established the prices of imports on the basis of Eurostat data. Price undercutting of the imports was established on the basis of information from the sampled cooperating producers from China, cooperating exporting producers from Saudi Arabia and the USA and the sampled Union producers. ---|--- (296) | The weighted average price of imports into the Union from the countries concerned developed as follows: Table 4 Import prices (EUR/ tonne) | | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | Investigation period ---|---|---|---|--- CHINA Average price from China dumped imports | 3 007 | 3 230 | 1 590 | 1 351 Index | 100 | 107 | 53 | 45 SAUDI ARABIA Average price from Saudi Arabia dumped imports | 2 390 | 3 652 | 1 611 | 1 188 Index | 100 | 153 | 67 | 50 USA Average price from US dumped imports | 2 130 | 4 477 | 2 477 | 1 211 Index | 100 | 210 | 116 | 57 COUNTRIES CONCERNED Average price from Countries Concerned dumped imports | 2 453 | 3 733 | 1 929 | 1 238 Index | 100 | 152 | 79 | 50 | Source: | Eurostat data. ---|--- (297) | The average price of imports into the Union from the countries concerned first increased in 2022 by 52 % to about 3 700 EUR/tonne and then considerably reduced in 2023 to about 1 900 EUR/tonne. Overall, the average price reduced significantly during the period considered by 50 %, from about 2 400 EUR/tonne in 2021 to about 1 200 EUR/tonne in the IP. ---|--- (298) | The fluctuation of price was mostly influenced by the development of raw material costs and energy prices, in combination with substantial capacity investments, increased imports to the Union and the spare capacity from the countries concerned during the period considered. In addition, import sales were subject to contracts linked to ICIS benchmark prices. ---|--- (299) | The Commission determined the price undercutting during the investigation period by comparing: | (a) | the weighted average sales prices per product type of the sampled Union producers charged to unrelated customers on the Union market, adjusted to an ex-works level; and ---|--- (b) | the corresponding weighted average prices per product type of the imports from the sampled cooperating producers from China and cooperating producers from Saudi Arabia and the USA to the first independent customer on the Union market, established on a Cost, insurance, freight (CIF) basis, with appropriate adjustments for customs duties and post-importation costs. ---|--- (300) | The price comparison was made on a type-by-type basis for transactions at the same level of trade, duly adjusted where necessary, and after deduction of rebates and discounts. The result of the comparison was expressed as a percentage of the sampled Union producers’ theoretical turnover during the investigation period. It showed a weighted average undercutting margin of 6,9 % by the countries concerned on the Union market. There was no undercutting for the sampled Chinese exporting producers. However, the Commission refers to other price effects (depression) at section 4.6.3.1 of this Regulation (see for example recitals 331 to 334). In addition, it was clear that prices of both imports and the Union industry were on a similar trend as the investigation established that contracts to industrial users used ICIS prices as a benchmark as found at recital 331. ---|--- (301) | LCN argued that imports from the USA did not undercut or cause injury to the Union industry, because they were imported by both LCN and BASF and when sold (or used captively) on the Union market, they would be sold (or consumed) at the same prices (or costs) as Union production sold (or consumed) on the Union market. However, as found at section 4.6.3.1 of this Regulation, the sales prices of the Union were significantly depressed and this price depression was in fact a major cause of injury. In addition, the imports from the USA did, on average, undercut the sales prices of the Union industry. Therefore, the undercutting of the US imports was a significant factor in the injury investigation. ---|--- (302) | Sipchem and Will and Co. argued that imports from Saudi Arabia did not undercut or cause injury to the Union industry, because they helped the Union industry to maintain its position on the Union market. However, as found at section 4.6.3.1 of this Regulation, the sales prices of the Union were seriously depressed and this price depression was in fact a major cause of injury. In addition, the imports from the USA did, on average, undercut the sales prices of the Union industry. Therefore, the undercutting of the Saudi imports was a significant factor in the injury investigation. ---|--- (303) | Sipchem also provided data on its post investigation period (2025) exports to an unrelated Union customer. Sipchem claimed that the volume and prices of these exports supported its view that the sales in the investigation period should be excluded from the export price calculations for the calculation of dumping and injury. This was because Sipchem was a price taker on the Union market. However, as the conditions for cumulation are met in respect of imports from Saudi Arabia, it would not be appropriate or justified to exclude sales from export price calculations. It also follows from the ‘conclusion on injury’ below that imports from Saudi Arabia played a role in the injury suffered by the Union industry. Furthermore, data in the post investigation period should not be taken into account in the analysis of dumping and injury. The claim was therefore rejected. ---|--- 4.6. Economic situation of the Union industry 4.6.1. General remarks (304) | In accordance with Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the Union industry included an evaluation of all economic indicators having a bearing on the state of the Union industry during the period considered. ---|--- (305) | As mentioned in recital 33, sampling was used for the determination of possible injury suffered by the Union industry. ---|--- (306) | For the injury determination, the Commission distinguished between macroeconomic and microeconomic injury indicators. The Commission evaluated the macroeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies, from all four Union producers. The Commission evaluated the microeconomic indicators on the basis of data contained in the questionnaire replies from the three sampled Union producers. Both sets of data were found to be representative of the economic situation of the Union industry. ---|--- (307) | The macroeconomic indicators are: production, production capacity, capacity utilisation, captive use, sales volume, market share, growth, employment, productivity and magnitude of the dumping margin. ---|--- (308) | The microeconomic indicators are: average unit prices, unit costs, labour costs, inventories, profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments, and ability to raise capital. ---|--- 4.6.2. Macroeconomic indicators 4.6.2.1. Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation (309) | The total Union production, production capacity and capacity utilisation developed over the period considered as follows: Table 5 Production, production capacity, capacity utilisation and share of captive use | | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | Investigation period ---|---|---|---|--- Production quantity (tonnes) | 345 847 | 210 509 | 112 400 | 189 714 Index | 100 | 61 | 32 | 55 Production capacity (tonnes) | 467 198 | 465 434 | 470 271 | 470 271 Index | 100 | 100 | 101 | 101 Capacity utilisation (%) | 74 | 45 | 24 | 40 Index | 100 | 61 | 32 | 54 | Source: | Producer questionnaire replies. ---|--- (310) | The Union production reduced significantly during the period considered. First reducing by 39 % in 2022 when compared to 2021, and then dropping again by 68 % in 2023 when compared to 2021 production quantities. Production quantities recovered in the IP when compared to 2023, but overall it reduced in the period considered, being 45 % lower in the IP than of 2021. This increase of production in the IP relative to 2023 was observed mainly due to the need to produce BDO of Union producers for captive use and sales, in order to compensate for a temporary Union limitation to source BDO imports as per mentioned in recital 293 and to maintain existing client commitments and reputation in the Union. In addition, production levels could only be reduced to a certain minimum level by each Union producer, due to fixed and other costs from operating the facilities, even if the Union producers wished to reduce volumes further due to the lower sales price and volume. This decline of sales volume and price resulted from the competition of dumped imports, the prices of imports from the period considered were significantly lower than the Union producers’ cost of production in 2023 and the IP. ---|--- (311) | Production capacity remained stable during the period considered at around 470 000 tonnes. ---|--- (312) | Therefore, capacity utilisation followed very similar trends to production volume first reducing in 2022 to 45 % and then again in 2023 to 24 % of total utilisation, and increasing in the IP when compared to 2023. In the period considered capacity utilisation declined by 34 percentage points, from 74 % in 2021 to 40 % in the IP. ---|--- (313) | The reduction of production was due to production cost in the Union becoming uncompetitive when compared to the very low price of dumped imports. ---|--- 4.6.2.2. Sales quantity and market share (314) | The Union industry’s sales quantity and market share developed over the period considered as follows: Table 6 Sales quantity, captive use and market shares of the Union Industry | | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | Investigation period ---|---|---|---|--- | A. | Production quantity sold on the Union market (tonnes) ---|--- 117 513 | 67 577 | 58 979 | 107 252 Index | 100 | 58 | 50 | 91 | B. | Captive use (tonnes) (from Table 2) ---|--- 264 489 | 183 604 | 134 693 | 163 036 Index | 100 | 69 | 51 | 62 | A+B | Production sold plus captive use (tonnes) ---|--- 382 002 | 251 180 | 193 672 | 270 288 Index | 100 | 66 | 51 | 71 Production sold as a % of the free market | 74 | 49 | 39 | 58 Index | 100 | 66 | 53 | 79 Captive use as a % of total Union consumption | 62 | 57 | 47 | 47 Index | 100 | 91 | 76 | 76 Production sold plus captive use as a % of total Union consumption | 90 | 78 | 68 | 78 Index | 100 | 86 | 75 | 86 | Source: | Producer questionnaires replies and Eurostat data. ---|--- (315) | The investigation has shown, as recital 273 explains, that when market conditions deteriorated, captive use from own production was replaced by imports because the latter caused significant price depression and were priced below the Union industry’s cost of production. Therefore, given the market conditions created by dumped imports it was economically not viable for the Union producers to keep producing at such levels, not even for captive use as shown in Table 6. As captive use was replaced by imports, the Commission examined market shares in this investigation both as a percentage of the total market and as a percentage of free and captive markets separately. The Commission analysed both production sold on free market and production sold plus captive use as a percentage of the total market. This latter indicator showed the overall market position of the Union industry on the Union market in the period considered. ---|--- (316) | The quantity of Union industry production sold on the free market significantly declined in 2022 and then again in 2023 dropping to 50 % of 2021, but then recovered to a certain extent in the IP while still remaining below the 2021 level. Throughout the period analysed, Union industry sales volume in the Union decreased by 9 % during the period considered, from about 117 500 tonnes to around 107 000 tonnes. ---|--- (317) | The quantity of Union industry production sold plus captive use also significantly declined in 2022 and then again in 2023 reaching 49 % of 2021, but then recovered in the IP to a certain extent while remaining below the 2021 level. Throughout the period analysed, Union industry sales volume plus captive use in the Union decreased by 14 % during the period considered, from about 382 000 tonnes to 270 000 tonnes. ---|--- (318) | The Union Industry production sold market share of the Union free market reduced in the period considered by 16 percentage points. First reducing in 2022 by 25 percentage points compared to 2021, and in 2023 by 35 percentage points compared to 2021. It then increased 19 percentage points from 39 % in 2023 to 58 % in the IP, this increase was mainly due to a higher degree of production and sales in the IP when compared to 2023 as explained in recital 310 combined with a decline in total BDO consumption in the Union. The Union industry captive market share of total consumption declined by 15 percentage points in the period considered. First reducing in 2022 by 5 percentage points compared to 2021, and then by 15 percentage points in 2023 when compared to 2021, remaining at this level until the IP. ---|--- (319) | The Commission then considered both the Union Industry’s production sold and captive use (cumulatively) as a percentage of total consumption and found that overall conclusion in respect of market share was most clearly evidenced since it included both economic activities of the Union industry, being the sale in the free market of producers and the captive use of BDO. Under this metric, the market share of the Union industry reduced by 12 percentage points in 2022 and 22 percentage points 2023, when compared to 2021. On this basis, the Union industry’s market share fell by 12 percentage points in the period considered, decreasing from 90 % in 2021 to 78 % in the IP. ---|--- (320) | In a period of shrinking market prices Union production has been substantially replaced by imports mainly from the countries concerned. For this reason, the Commission considered that only by examining free market sales together with captive use was it possible to evaluate the real impact that increasing imports had on the Union market. ---|--- 4.6.2.3. Growth (321) | Bearing in mind the overall market share decline depicted at recital 318, the Union industry has shown no growth over the period considered, but in fact had a worse position on the Union market in the investigation period than it had in 2021. ---|--- 4.6.2.4. Employment and productivity (322) | Employment and productivity developed over the period considered as follows: Table 7 Employment and productivity | | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | Investigation period ---|---|---|---|--- Number of employees | 508 | 499 | 507 | 505 Index | 100 | 98 | 100 | 99 Productivity (tonnes/employee) | 681 | 422 | 222 | 376 Index | 100 | 62 | 33 | 55 | Source: | Producer questionnaires replies. ---|--- (323) | Numbers of employees remained stable during the period considered, reducing by 1 % overall. The Union producers maintained a minimum number of employees to be able to continue to run the production facilities in an efficient and safe manner. The number of employees did not vary according to the level of production. ---|--- (324) | However, a significant reduction of production combined with a stable number of employees meant that the productivity of the Union producers reduced significantly in the period considered by 45 %, from 681 tonnes per employee in 2021 to 376 tonnes per employee in the IP. ---|--- 4.6.2.5. Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping (325) | All dumping margins were significantly above the de minimis level. The impact of the magnitude of the actual margins of dumping on the Union industry was substantial, given the volume and prices of imports from the countries concerned. ---|--- (326) | This is the first anti-dumping investigation regarding the product concerned. Therefore, no data were available to assess the effects of possible past dumping. ---|--- 4.6.3. Microeconomic indicators (327) | The microeconomic indicators of the Union industry were sourced from the verified questionnaire responses of the three sampled Union producers. However, depending on the degree of vertical integration, the microeconomic indicators were largely sourced from only two producers. As publication of the actual figures would mean that sensitive data of the relevant Union industry producers would be revealed, the Commission has used ranges and indices in this part of the injury assessment to protect confidentiality. ---|--- 4.6.3.1. Prices and factors affecting prices (328) | The weighted average unit sales prices of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers in the Union developed over the period considered as follows: Table 8 Sales prices and cost of production in the Union | | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | Investigation period ---|---|---|---|--- Average unit sales price on the free market (EUR/tonne) | [2 100 –2 800 ] | [3 000 –3 900 ] | [1 400 –1 900 ] | [1 000 –1 400 ] Index | 100 | 136 | 67 | 48 Unit cost of production sold (EUR/tonne) | [1 600 –2 000 ] | [2 800 –3 400 ] | [2 600 –3 100 ] | [1 900 –2 400 ] Index | 100 | 171 | 156 | 121 | Source: | Sampled Union producers’ questionnaires replies. ---|--- (329) | Sales prices on the free market of the Union producers first increased in 2022, by 36 % when compared to 2021. However, the sales price then reduced considerably in 2023, from 3 000–3 900 EUR/tonne in 2022 to 1 400–1 800 in 2023. During the period considered sales prices of the Union producers reduced considerably by 52 %. The Union producers were able to pass higher production costs in 2022, however they were unable to do so in 2023 and IP, due to the increased competition in the Union from a much higher volume of dumped imports and at increasingly lower prices. ---|--- (330) | Sales prices on the Union BDO market are dominated by framework contracts which set agreed quantities and typically prices were regularly updated on a monthly basis, based on ICIS data. The monthly ICIS data was available for both the Chinese and Union markets. During the period considered, sale prices in the Union were influenced by: (i) the increasing competition with dumped imports, both in terms of increased volumes and of lower prices; (ii) the continuedly lowering of BDO ICIS prices. ICIS prices in the Union were in turn influenced by the prices of dumped imports of the countries concerned. In particular in the case of China, it is observed a substantial increase of new BDO capacity of production and spare capacity in the country, for which installed capacity was estimated by Union producers to have reached at least 9 times the Union in the IP and to be by far the biggest installed capacity globally. This significant installed capacity and spare capacity allowed China to be a reference for global BDO prices and influence global BDO prices, such as in the Union, resulting in a strong correlation between China based BDO ICIS and the BDO ICIS price in Europe or the Union sales prices. In addition, Union sales prices were also directly influenced by China based ICIS BDO prices, as it was on occasions used directly in the sales contracts for major customers in the Union. ---|--- (331) | Therefore, dumped imports and ICIS prices of the Chinese market were the price setter on the Union market, and the prices of both the Union industry and imports from all other countries had to compete with this price. ---|--- (332) | The cost of production sold of the Union producers increased considerably in 2022 by 71 % when compared to 2021, mainly due to an increase of raw material costs (for example, natural gas, naphtha, hydrogen or steam) and electricity prices. The cost of production then declined from [2 800–3 400] EUR per tonne in 2022 to [2 600–3 100] EUR per tonne in 2023 but remained 58 % higher than 2021. In the IP, costs of production reduced significantly compared to 2023 reaching [1 900–2 400] EUR per tonne. This change was mainly from a reduction of raw material costs and electricity prices. Overall, however, the cost of production increased by 21 % in the period considered, as in addition to the development of raw material and energy prices, the Union producers experienced higher fixed costs per unit due to the significant lower production levels. ---|--- (333) | Therefore, Union producers’ cost of production was higher than the sale price of the Union producers for 2023 and the IP. Union producers experienced price depression from the lowering of sales prices to the level of the dumped imports, at the expense of selling the product under investigation at below production costs especially during 2023 and the IP. ---|--- (334) | The Commission analysed the sales prices and costs of the Union industry (as shown in Table 8), together with its profitability (Table 11) and the import prices and quantities of the cumulated imports (Tables 2 and 3). It was clear that a very serious depression of prices took place on the Union market in 2023 and the investigation period. In 2022 the higher costs of the Union industry (as compared to 2021) were passed onto customers, but in 2023 and the IP it was no longer possible to recover costs due to the price pressure of the increasing volumes of dumped imports at low and decreasing prices. ---|--- 4.6.3.2. Labour costs (335) | The average labour costs of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows: Table 9 Average labour costs per employee | | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | Investigation period ---|---|---|---|--- Average labour costs per employee (EUR) | [100 000 –120 000 ] | [100 000 –120 000 ] | [100 000 –120 000 ] | [100 000 –120 000 ] Index | 100 | 103 | 102 | 102 | Source: | Sampled producer questionnaires replies. ---|--- (336) | Average cost per employee increased slightly during the period considered, by 2 %, as numbers of employees remained stable to be able to keep production facilities on and salaries and other employee cost increased slightly during the period considered from about EUR 100 000 to EUR 120 000. ---|--- (337) | Labour costs were around (7–15 %) of the total cost of production reported in Table 8 during the IP. ---|--- 4.6.3.3. Inventories (338) | Stock levels of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows: Table 10 Stocks | | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | Investigation period ---|---|---|---|--- Closing stock (tonnes) | [7 000 –10 000 ] | [9 000 –13 000 ] | [5 000 –9 000 ] | [11 000 –15 000 ] Index | 100 | 130 | 73 | 150 Closing stock as a percentage of production (%) | 3 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Source: | Sampled Union producer questionnaires replies. ---|--- (339) | Closing stock in tonnes increased by 50 % during the period considered, from about 7 000–10 000 tonnes in 2021 to 11 000–15 000 tonnes in the IP. Overall, closing stock increased over the period considered when compared to production volumes increasing from 3 % in 2021 to 6 % in 2023, and then reaching 7 % in the IP. ---|--- (340) | However, BDO is a chemical which is costly to stock safely, and that has to be stored in special tanks which are temperature controlled. Therefore, the Union industry was more likely to control production volumes rather than increase/reduce stocks levels which are limited in the Union. For that reason, the Commission did not consider that the increase in closing stocks was an important indicator of injury. ---|--- 4.6.3.4. Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital (341) | Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments of the sampled Union producers developed over the period considered as follows: Table 11 Profitability, cash flow, investments and return on investments | | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | Investigation period ---|---|---|---|--- Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover) | [20 to 40 ] | [10 to 25 ] | [–70 to –30 ] | [–90 to –50 ] Index | 100 | 54 | – 178 | – 198 Cash flow (EUR) (000) | [100 000 to 200 000 ] | [40 000 to 120 000 ] | [–40 000 to –10 000 ] | [– 100 000 to –50 000 ] Index | 100 | 46 | –19 | –58 Investments (EUR) (000) | [30 000 to 60 0000] | [50 000 to 90 000 ] | [10 000 to 40 000 ] | [50 000 to 90 000 ] Index | 100 | 132 | 50 | 93 Return on investments (%) | [20 to 40 ] | [10 to 25 ] | [–30 to –10 ] | [–50 to –20 ] Index | 100 | 58 | –84 | – 122 | Source: | Sampled producer questionnaires replies. ---|--- (342) | The Commission established the profitability of the sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union, as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. In 2021 and 2022 the Union producers managed to achieve profitability, as the Union producers faced less competition from dumped imports and was able to pass higher production costs to its customers. However, in 2023 profitability was at (– 70 % to – 30 %) and then reached a low (– 90 % to – 50 %) of during the IP. Despite a lower production cost than 2022 for the Union producers and a stabilization of electricity and raw material costs in the Union during 2023 and the IP, the Union sales prices continued to reduce further due to the price pressure of the increasing volumes of dumped imports, with significantly lower prices than 2022 resulting in price depression. To recall, average prices of dumped imports from the countries concerned fell by 50 % over the period considered as illustrated in Table 4 and explained in recital 297. Union producer’s sales prices were thereby depressed and Union producers could only sell the product under investigation at a deep negative profit, as the sales price in the Union plummeted below cost of production, in 2023 and the IP. ---|--- (343) | Cash flow followed lower sales levels and the negative profitability of 2023 and IP, resulting in cash flow reaching about EUR (– 100 000 to – 50 000) million in the IP from a positive cash flow of EUR (100 000 to 200 000) million in 2021. ---|--- (344) | Investments fluctuated over the period considered. The Union industry explained that investment planning was carried out periodically (every 4–5 year) in a lump sum per producer. Therefore, during the period considered total investment varied significantly year per year, depending on the timing of the turnaround investments. Investments in the period considered mainly related to the minimum required investments to maintain the existing production levels in accordance with safety and environmental standards in force. Investments increased by 32 % in 2022, then reduced significantly to 50 % in 2023 when compared to 2021. In the IP investments were slightly lower than in 2011 at – 7 %. ---|--- (345) | The sampled Union producers’ return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments and followed the same trend as profitability, with a positive return of investment in 2021 and in 2022. However, this was followed by substantial losses in 2023 and in the IP. ---|--- (346) | The sampled Union producers’ ability to raise capital was constrained in 2023 and the IP, due to substantial cash outflows from the deeply negative profitability, only minimum capex was invested to maintain minimum safe conditions to produce BDO and turn on the facilities. In addition, Union producers either extended turnaround plans or considered shutting down facilities due to the deep negative profitability explained above. ---|--- 4.7. Conclusion on injury (347) | The investigation found that the Union industry suffered material injury as all performance injury indicators showed significant negative trends, especially in 2023 and the IP. The earlier years of the period considered (2021 and 2022) demonstrated what can be achieved by the Union Industry under more normal conditions of competition, even during periods of high raw material or energy costs. The Union producers however had to drastically cut production to minimum levels as production became uncompetitive due to the increasing quantities of dumped imports from the countries concerned in 2023 and the period considered. In 2023 and IP the price depression created a severe injurious situation, which did not allow the Union industry to set prices at levels to enable it to recover costs of production nor make any profit. The losses of the Union producers were between 30 % and 70 % on turnover in 2023 and between 50 % and 90 % in the investigation period as shown in Table 11. ---|--- (348) | The Union producers have only survived this period of high losses because profits were made in 2021 and 2022, and because the companies are part of large groups. Increasing dumped imports and at continuously lower prices, prevented adequate price increases and negatively affected production and sales quantities of BDO. This situation did not allow the Union producers to reduce their fixed costs of production which would be the case at more normal utilization levels nor to raise prices to a sustainable level. In fact, in 2023 and the investigation period the prices and costs of the Union producers were so disconnected, and losses of the Union producers were at such high levels, that the situation of the BDO industry became so serious as to represent a major threat to its existence in the short term. In 2023 import volumes from these countries increased by 51 % and prices fell by 48 % as compared to 2022 levels. In the investigation period, import volumes fell by 15 % but prices fell by a further 36% as compared to 2023 levels. These figures are shown in Tables 2 and 3. ---|--- (349) | The clear price depression caused by dumped imports into the Union is explained in recitals 330 to 333. This price depression and losses in 2023 and IP also resulted in serious injury in terms of other performance indicators such as cash flow and return on investment (as shown at Table 11) and the ability to raise capital. Despite keeping investments in order to meet safety and environmental requirements, in the IP the Union industry was clearly in a much worse situation, so that their ability to raise capital had reduced. The deterioration in the economic situation of the Union industry in 2023 and IP took place despite an 8 % rise in consumption of BDO in the Union from 2022. ---|--- (350) | Table 6 shows the development of market shares in this investigation. A comparison of Union industry free market sales plus captive use as compared to total consumption gives the best indication of the Union industry’s position on the total market. Under this metric the Union industry market share declined over the period considered. But in the IP, the market share partly recovered as the Union industry increased production due to a reduced import quantity due to the Red Sea Crisis. In the period from 2022 to the investigation period the Union industry was protecting existing sales contracts, reputation and position on the Union market. However, this increase in production and sales came with the consequences of severe losses due to price depression forcing the Union industry to sell at loss as explained above. ---|--- (351) | All Union producers increased imports of BDO in order to be able to keep supplying key customers and to meet their captive needs, due to the substantial production reductions in the period considered. The practice of replacing production with imports also took place in 2022 when raw material and energy costs hiked, as shown by the production costs in Table 8. However, BDO sales prices were not as low in 2022 and a big surge in dumped imports took place in 2023. This is why material injury occurred from 2023, as demonstrated by the very injurious performance indicators for 2023 and the IP. ---|--- (352) | Although the injury in this investigation was quite evident in price and performance indicators, the Union industry also suffered a significant decline and injury in volume indicators, namely production volume, capacity utilisation, productivity, captive use and sales on the Union market all significantly declined over the period considered. ---|--- (353) | The indicators for employment, labour costs and capacity remained stable over the period considered showing the industry’s readiness for an upturn in market conditions. The indicator of inventories was not considered determinant in the injury assessment as explained at recital 344. ---|--- (354) | On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded at this stage that the Union industry suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- 5\. CAUSATION (355) | In accordance with Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. In accordance with Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation, the Commission also examined whether other known factors could at the same time have injured the Union industry. The Commission ensured that any possible injury caused by factors other than the dumped imports from the countries concerned was not attributed to the dumped imports. These factors are: imports from third countries, the export performance of the Union industry, the impact of consumption, captive use, imports by the Union industry and increases in raw material and energy costs. ---|--- 5.1. Effects of the dumped imports (356) | As shown in Table 3, the volume of dumped imports from the countries concerned increased from around 49 000 tonnes in 2018 to around 89 000 tonnes in the investigation period, an increase of 82 %. In terms of market share (of the total market), the increase over the same period was from 12 % to 26 %, an increase of 123 %. Bearing in mind that the conclusion on injury found that material injury took place in 2023 and the investigation period, the Commission also analysed the development of imports in these two years, from 2022 to the investigation period imports from the countries concerned increased by around 20 000 tonnes, an increase of 29 %. In terms of market share (of the total market), the increase from 2022 to the investigation period was around 4 percentage points or around 20 %. ---|--- (357) | From 2021 to the investigation period the Union industry sales quantity on the free market plus captive use decreased by 29 %, as shown in Table 6. In terms of overall market share the Union industry these were lower in 2023 and IP, reducing to around 78 % and 68 % compared to 90 % in the IP. ---|--- (358) | As explained in recitals 347 and 349, imports from the countries concerned caused price depression for the Union industry, which accelerated in 2023 and the investigation period. In this period the Union producers were no longer able to adjust their prices in a way that would allow them to cover their costs and significant losses in the IP ensued. This grave and unsustainable situation existed in both 2023 and the IP. ---|--- (359) | In addition, a price undercutting analysis was performed for the investigation period on a type-by-type basis. This demonstrated that competition between the Union industry and imports from the countries concerned was strong. ---|--- (360) | Sale prices in the Union were influenced by the increased competition with dumped imports, both in terms of increased dumped volumes and of lower prices. This was possible because of the nature of the BDO market whereby ICIS prices for BDO were used as a benchmark in the majority of sales contracts. Chinese ICIS is a reference for global BDO prices and influenced global BDO prices such as in the Union, as explained in recital 330. In addition, imports to the US market had become severely reduced as a result of increased import duties under various US legislation changes. Imports to the Union increased from Saudi Arabia, due to the restricted US market access and due to the penetration of Chinese imports in other traditional Saudi export markets (such as Asia). ---|--- (361) | Finally, as explained above, supply problems for the exporting producers temporarily lessened the pressure on the Union industry in the investigation period. This allowed the Union industry to increase production and sales quantities, but such sales were still highly unprofitable due to the price pressure from imports. ---|--- (362) | Therefore, the Union industry was forced into a situation of trying to maintain its position on the Union free and captive markets by lowering prices to unsustainable levels and with heavy losses. The only viable alternative to this was to vacate the Union market and leave it to the dumped imports. ---|--- (363) | Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the dumped imports from the countries concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. ---|--- 5.2. Effects of other factors 5.2.1. Imports from third countries (364) | The quantity, average price and market share of imports from third countries developed over the period considered as follows. The market shares are as a percentage of the total Union market. Table 12 Imports from third countries | | | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | Investigation period ---|---|---|---|---|--- Taiwan | Quantity (tonnes) | 3 467 | 19 531 | 13 157 | 6 771 | Index | 100 | 563 | 379 | 195 | Market share (%) | 0,8 | 6,1 | 4,6 | 2,0 | Index | 100 | 741 | 564 | 239 | Average price | 3 252 | 3 712 | 1 823 | 1 274 | Index | 100 | 114 | 56 | 39 Other third countries | Quantity (tonnes) | 2 075 | 184 | 1 735 | 1 773 | Index | 100 | 9 | 84 | 85 | Market share (%) | 0,5 | 0,1 | 0,6 | 0,5 | Index | 100 | 12 | 124 | 104 | Average price | 2 763 | 4 307 | 1 738 | 1 389 | Index | 100 | 156 | 63 | 50 Total of all third countries | Quantity (tonnes) | 5 542 | 19 716 | 14 893 | 8 544 | Index | 100 | 356 | 269 | 154 | Market share (%) | 1,3 | 6,1 | 5,2 | 2,5 | Index | 100 | 468 | 399 | 188 | Average price | 3 069 | 3 718 | 1 813 | 1 298 | Index | 100 | 121 | 59 | 42 | Source: | Eurostat. ---|--- (365) | Import volumes from Taiwan increased by over 400 % in 2022, but then fell in 2023 and the investigation period. In terms of volume, they increased from around 3 500 tonnes in 2021 to 6 800 tonnes in the investigation period. The market share of these imports (as a % of total consumption) reached 6,1 % in 2022, but fell back to 2 % in the investigation period. The average price of imports from Taiwan fluctuated in a similar manner and at a similar level to those of imports from the countries concerned. Their market share fell to 2 % in the investigation period. ---|--- (366) | Import volumes from other third countries (mainly South Korea in the investigation period) fell from around 2 000 tonnes in 2021 to 1 700 tonnes in the investigation period. The market share of these imports (as a % of total consumption) was always below 1 %. The average price of imports from third countries fluctuated in a similar manner and at a similar level to those of imports from the countries concerned. ---|--- (367) | Bearing in mind that imports from Taiwan and other third countries had a low market share and slightly higher prices than imports from the countries concerned, the Commission concluded that these imports did not attenuate the causal link with respect to the imports from the countries concerned. ---|--- 5.2.2. Export performance of the Union industry (368) | The volume of exports of the Union producers developed over the period considered as follows in Table 13. Also, shown in Table 13, is the average price of exports to unrelated parties of the sampled Union industry. Table 13 Export performance of the sampled Union producers | | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | Investigation period ---|---|---|---|--- Export volume (tonnes) | [20 000 –25 000 ] | [15 000 –20 000 ] | [1 000 –2 000 ] | [2 000 –5 000 ] Index | 100 | 77 | 7 | 16 Average EXW price (EUR/tonne) | [2 000 –3 000 ] | [4 000 –5 000 ] | [1 000 –3 000 ] | [1 000 –2 000 ] Index | 100 | 152 | 72 | 54 | Source: | Union industry questionnaire replies. ---|--- (369) | The export quantity of the Union industry decreased by 84 % over the period considered. Export quantities represented around 10 % of Union industry sales (including captive use) in 2021, but this fell to around 1 % in the investigation period. ---|--- (370) | The sales prices of these exports fluctuated in line with its sales on the Union market as shown in Table 8, i.e. due to the influence of imports to those markets and raw material prices. It is evident that the export performance of the Union industry deteriorated over the analysis period. However, as the Union industry has not been a major supplier to the export markets, the deteriorating export performance was not considered as a major factor in the overall assessment of the economic situation of the Union industry. ---|--- (371) | Therefore, the Commission concluded that the export performance of the Union industry did not cause material injury to the Union industry or was able to attenuate the causal link with respect to imports from the countries concerned. ---|--- 5.2.3. Increases in Raw Material and Energy Costs (372) | The sampled Union producers had different production technologies, using different raw materials. However, the costs of the major raw materials and energy followed similar trends and for all three sampled producers raw material and energy costs represented over 50 % of their total cost of production. ---|--- (373) | As can be seen from Table 8 costs increased by 94 % in 2022 and then fell in 2023 (by 19 %) and fell again the investigation period (by a further 29 %). Despite the reduction in costs in 2023 and the investigation period, costs were still 13 % higher in the investigation period than in 2021. ---|--- (374) | Bearing in mind raw material and energy costs it was clear that the development of costs had played a major role in the BDO industry over the period considered. However, Table 8 shows that when costs were at their highest in 2022 the Union industry was nevertheless able to pass on these cost increases to their customers. From 2023 onwards, however, despite falling raw material and electricity costs, it could not sell at a profitable level or above production costs. This was due to the price pressure from the increasing volumes of imports, which caused a disconnect between costs and prices in the Union. ---|--- (375) | In addition, fixed costs per unit increased dramatically due to lower Union production from the lower sales generated by the Union due to the unfair competition of dumped imports. This contributed as well to the increase of production costs per unit for the Union industry, and increased for example energy, water or other fixed costs per unit. Energy costs in addition, had typically a significant fixed component which needed to be spread over high production levels by the Union producers and this could not be achieved, due to reduced sales under price pressure of dumped imports. ---|--- (376) | Celanese submitted that there was a sharp increase in global BDO prices between 2020 and 2022, due to the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis and from BDO shortages, combined with an energy crisis. But from 2023 BDO markets stabilised and the any price decrease is instead a sign of normalization rather than injury. Therefore, Celanese alleged that it is the high energy costs and inflation which are rather causing challenges to the EU industry and not the dumped imports from the countries concerned. However, the Commission disputed this view as, first although BDO energy prices in the Union were falling during the period considered, yet the price of dumped imports have fallen more steeply and have not allowed the Union industry to sell at prices above their cost of production. Second, there doesn’t seem to be any global BDO shortage during the period considered, instead there seems rather a widely acknowledged substantial capacity increase, in the magnitude of multiples of global BDO demand in the period considered, which resulted in substantial over-capacity and the lowering of BDO prices. Thirdly, the cost of production is also influenced by the fixed cost of production for which the Union is suffering from an increasing amount of dumped imports from the countries concerned in the period considered, which didn’t allow the industry to increase sales and therefore production volumes, resulting in further costs of production per unit of BDO regardless of raw material costs. Finally, the increased volumes and price declines from dumped imports of the countries concerned depressed BDO prices in 2023 and IP to such levels that BDO Union production is not sustainable even at short term, despite the significantly reduced electricity, natural gas and other raw material costs of production when compared to 2022. ---|--- (377) | Also, in respect of costs several interested parties commented that the Union industry was simply not competitive enough due to its high costs. This claim was also rejected as the industry was profitable in 2021 and 2022. In addition, the alleged high costs were not the cause of the injury in 2023 and the investigation period as such costs were falling in that period. ---|--- (378) | The Commission concluded that the increases in raw material and energy costs provided context to the injury suffered by the Union industry.

However, the root cause of the injury was increasing volumes of dumped imports from the countries concerned which depressed BDO prices to levels which did not permit the Union industry to recover its costs and increased the cost of production per unit of the Union from lower sales and production levels. ---|--- (379) | Therefore, the Commission concluded that increases in raw material and energy costs did not cause injury to the Union industry. ---|--- 5.2.4. Imports by the Union Producers (380) | The Union producers all imported significant quantities of BDO from the countries concerned. Several interested parties commented that this was a cause of the injury suffered by the Union producers. The Commission therefore assessed why these imports took place because all Union producers had spare capacity in the Union and could therefore have produced these quantities themselves. ---|--- (381) | The Union producers commented that, under normal conditions of competition, imports from the countries concerned would take place to deal with short term production issues with installed capacity. It is not cost-effective to stock large quantities of BDO because such storage must be held in large, temperature-controlled tanks meaning that deliveries to customers are normally made soon after production. The level of production would therefore be adjusted to cope with the needs of industrial users and captive needs. ---|--- (382) | However, in 2023 and the investigation period imports by the Union industry increased because BDO prices on the Union market became depressed by dumped imports and the Union industry costs, although falling from 2022 levels, were above the depressed price level in the Union. ---|--- (383) | Imports were also made to counteract any production issues which might arise or maintenance downtime during the period considered, in order to continue to meet customer contracts or continue to produce downstream products due to the low stock capacities in the Union. ---|--- (384) | Therefore, the imports by the Union industry were a short-term defence measure in order that they could maintain their position and reputation on the Union market by reliably supplying the industrial users whilst continuing captive production. ---|--- (385) | Therefore, the Commission concluded that imports by the Union industry in 2023 and the investigation period were a symptom of the injury caused by the dumped imports rather than a cause of injury in itself. ---|--- 5.2.5. Developments in Consumption (386) | The Commission assessed the impact of consumption on the Union market by examining captive use, sales on the free market and by assessing developments in total consumption using the data shown in Table 2. ---|--- (387) | Captive use fell by 38 % over the period considered. Most of this decline took place in 2022, by around 81 000 tonnes or 31 %. From 2022 to the investigation period captive use fell by around 20 000 tonnes or by 11 %. ---|--- (388) | Free market consumption increased by around 25 000 tonnes or 15 % over the period considered. From 2022 to the investigation period such sales increased by around 25 000 tonnes or by 33 %. ---|--- (389) | When assessed cumulatively captive use and sales on the free market decreased by around 77 000 tonnes or 18 % over the period considered. However, total consumption increased by from 2022 to the investigation period by around 25 000 tonnes or by 8 %. ---|--- (390) | The cumulative decrease of Union sales and captive use in the key period of 2022 to the investigation(389) represents a quantity issue for the Union industry. However, the main injury in this investigation relates to price depression and resulting heavy losses in return on turnover and other performance indicators. ---|--- (391) | Therefore, the Commission concluded that developments in consumption on the Union market did not cause material injury to the Union industry. ---|--- 5.3. Conclusion on causation (392) | The Union producers of BDO in the Union in the investigation period sold to a several industrial users in many user sectors. The investigation showed that the presence of low-priced dumped imports from the countries concerned, at significant and increasing quantities, had the effect of depressing prices in the period considered especially in 2023 and the investigation period. This development had the impact of seriously decoupling BDO prices from the cost of production, and of affecting sales and production levels. Consequently, the profitability of the Union industry sales was heavily loss-making in 2023 and the investigation period. Such losses are clearly unsustainable and threaten the survival of the Union industry even in the short term. ---|--- (393) | Other factors examined were imports from other sources, the export performance of the Union industry, developments in consumption including captive use, imports by the Union industry and increases in raw material and energy costs. ---|--- (394) | Therefore, the Commission has distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors affecting the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. None of the factors, collectively or separately, were found to have a significant bearing on the situation of the Union industry sufficient to call into question the conclusion that the imports from the countries concerned were causing material injury. ---|--- (395) | On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that the dumped imports from the country concerned caused material injury to the Union industry. The injury consists mainly of price depression, inadequate profitability, return on investments, cash flow, ability to raise capital. ---|--- 6\. LEVEL OF MEASURES (396) | To determine the level of the measures, the Commission examined whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped imports to the Union industry. ---|--- 6.1. Injury margin (397) | The injury would be removed if the Union industry were able to obtain a target profit by selling at a target price in the sense of Articles 7(2c) and 7(2d) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (398) | In accordance with Article 7(2c) of the basic Regulation, for establishing the target profit, the Commission took into account the following factors: the level of profitability before the increase of imports from the countries under investigation, the level of profitability needed to cover full costs and investments, research and development (R & D) and innovation, and the level of profitability to be expected under normal conditions of competition. Such profit margin should not be lower than 6 %. ---|--- (399) | As a first step, the Commission established a basic profit covering full costs under normal conditions of competition. This was obtained from the profitability of the Union industry in 2022 which was the most recent year prior to the surge of dumped imports in 2023. A much higher profitability figure was achieved in 2021 however, this was considered to be a boom year for the industry because of high Union consumption due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The profit margin in 2022 was established at [10 %–25 %], as per Table 11. ---|--- (400) | Two of the sampled Union producers provided evidence that its level of investments, research and development (R & D) and innovation during the period considered would have been higher under normal conditions of competition. The Commission verified this information using investment plans which were to be implemented in the period considered but were cancelled due to the impact of the dumped imports from the countries concerned. Therefore, the claims of the Union Industry were found to be warranted. To reflect this in the target profit, the Commission calculated the difference between investments, R & D and innovation (‘IRI’) expenses under normal conditions of competition as provided by the Union Industry and verified by the Commission with actual IRI expenses over the period considered. Such difference, expressed as a percentage of turnover, was 0,30 %. ---|--- (401) | Such percentage of 0,3 % was added to the basic profit margin of [10 % to 25 %], mentioned in the recital 399, leading to a target profit of [10,30 % to 25,30 %]. ---|--- (402) | On this basis, the non-injurious price is [2 000 to 2 800] EUR per tonne, resulting from applying the above-mentioned profit margin of [10,30 % to 25,30 %], to the cost of production during the IP of the sampled Union producers. ---|--- (403) | In accordance with Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation, as a final step, the Commission assessed the future costs resulting from Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and protocols thereunder, to which the Union is a party, and of ILO Conventions listed in Annex Ia that the Union industry will incur during the period of the application of the measure pursuant to Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation. The Union industry provided evidence that that their costs under the EU ETS scheme and similar national programs would increase during the life of the measures. These increased costs would arise because the Union industry would receive less free allowances under the ETS from 2026-2030 (on average) as compared to the investigation period. Additionally, an extraction of ETS futures sourced from Bloomberg (made available on the case file) showed that ETS allowances in 2026-2030 are forecasted to increase in price per tonne of CO2 emitted. The Commission accepted the claims and added the cost amounting to 25 EUR per tonne to the non-injurious price mentioned in recital 402. ---|--- (404) | In addition, the sampled Union producers claimed that CO2 indirect costs by, resulting from future extra costs associated with CO2 emitted from electricity purchased and consumed should be taken into account as future costs under Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation. This claim was provisionally rejected as the costs claimed were not directly incurred by the Union producer concerned and were not substantiated. ---|--- (405) | On this basis, the Commission calculated a non-injurious price of [2 000 to 2 800] EUR per tonne for the like product of the Union industry by applying the above-mentioned target profit margin to the cost of production of the sampled Union producers during the investigation period and then adding the adjustments under Article 7(2d) of the basic Regulation on a type-by-type basis. ---|--- (406) | The Commission then determined the injury margin level on the basis of a comparison of the weighted average import price of the sampled cooperating exporting producers in countries concerned, as established for the price undercutting calculations, with the weighted average non-injurious price of the like product sold by the sampled Union producers on the Union market during the investigation period. Any difference resulting from this comparison was expressed as a percentage of the weighted average import CIF value. ---|--- (407) | The injury elimination level for ‘other cooperating companies’ and for ‘all other imports originating in each of the countries concerned’ is defined in the same manner as the dumping margin for these companies and imports. | Country | Company | Dumping margin (%) | Injury margin (%) ---|---|---|--- China | | | Xinjiang Markor Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. ---|--- 311,9 | 105,6 | | Wanhua Chemical (Sichuan) Co., Ltd ---|--- 522,4 | 113,7 Other cooperating companies in China | 362,8 | 107,5 All other imports originating in China | 522,4 | 113,7 Saudi Arabia | International Diol Company | 52,4 | 127,8 All other imports originating in Saudi Arabia | 52,4 | 127,8 USA | Lyondell Chemical Company | 135,7 | 148,3 All other imports originating in the US | 142,5 | 153,4 6.2. Conclusion on the level of measures (408) | Following the above assessment, provisional anti-dumping duties should be set as below in accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation: | Country | Company | Provisional anti-dumping duty (%) ---|---|--- China | Xinjiang Markor Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. | 105,6 Wanhua Chemical (Sichuan) Co., Ltd | 113,7 Other cooperating companies in China | 107,5 All other imports originating in China | 113,7 Saudi Arabia | International Diol Company | 52,4 All other imports originating in Saudi Arabia | 52,4 USA | Lyondell Chemical Company | 135,7 All other imports originating in the USA | 142,5 7\. UNION INTEREST 7.1. Interest of the Union industry (409) | There are four companies producing BDO in the Union Industry directly employing around 500 staff. The producers are located in Germany, Netherlands and Italy. All four Union producers co-operated fully with the investigation by submitting questionnaire replies. ---|--- (410) | BDO is an intermediate chemical product with several downstream chemical products including PBT, PBAT, TPU, THF and GBL, which are then ultimately used in a wide range of applications, including in automotive, defence, textiles, plastics, electronics, construction, batteries and cosmetics (‘the BDO value chain’) in the Union market. Around 47 % of BDO was used captively by the Union industry, and 53 % sold onto the free market in the IP. Therefore, the Union industry is also a very large user of BDO themselves. Whether BDO is used captively or sold on the market the main downstream products are often themselves intermediate chemical products which can either be sold on the Union market or used captively. ---|--- (411) | The Union producers supported the initiation of the investigation and their comments since initiation showed that, in general terms, they support the imposition of anti-dumping measures. However, LCN do not support measures against the USA, where they have group production, while Novamont Italy expressed concerns as regard the impact of the duties on their downstream products as they are a big importer from China. Overall, Union producers have advocated for the imposition of duties to the main downstream products, in addition to the duties on BDO, as they fear they will lose competitiveness against Chinese competitors in the BDO value chain once duties are imposed on BDO. In addition, as discussed in section 2.4 ‘Claims regarding product scope’ of this Regulation, BASF submitted that bio BDO should be excluded from the definition of the product under investigation. ---|--- (412) | Given the finding of material injury to the Union industry described in section 4.2 ‘Conclusion on injury’ of this regulation, imposing measures would allow the Union industry to improve its profitability towards sustainable levels, increase investment, and thus regain a competitive position in their core market. The Union industry would also be able to regain lost market share by increasing production and sales volumes in the Union market. ---|--- (413) | The absence of measures is likely to have further negative and significant effects on the Union industry. The grave situation, described above in the ‘conclusion on injury’ section, threatens the existence of the whole Union industry, as the substantial and increasing losses made in the period considered and deepening in the IP are not sustainable in the short term and threaten the ability to continue producing BDO in the Union for both captive and free market use. Although, raw material and energy prices have fallen in 2024, the Union industry faced further BDO sales prices declines, and increasing dumped imports with continuously lower prices, resulting in an inability to raise prices and cover the lower production costs. Such price depression will continue in the absence of measures, including due to increasing and already substantial spare capacities in the countries concerned, leading to further volume and financial deterioration for the Union industry and jeopardizing its short-term future and employment. The Union industry has established an integrated chain for BDO, including for example PBAT and bio-compounding, which is maintained from investments over the years across various parts of the value chain. BDO producing capacity, and its supply chain, is enough to meet BDO demand in the Union. The Union industry has already been forced to replace part of its own production with cheap imports from the countries concerned. This was done to maintain their standing and reputation on the Union market by enabling them to continue to supply BDO to the captive BDO value chain, Union users and to supply other key producers using in the Union. However, the sourcing of cheap imports from the countries concerned is not a sustainable development for the Union industry which has a large BDO capacity and a long history of producing BDO to the Union market, whilst investing to maintain the efficiency of its production facilities, vertical integrated production of chemicals and complying with safety and environmental standards. Simply put – the situation observed in the IP is untenable as the Union industry cannot be expected to continue defending itself by replacing own production with dumped imports or selling in the Union to keep key BDO customers relationships alive, while making significant losses. Without measures the Union industry would be forced to close down its BDO production facilities and rely solely on imports. ---|--- (414) | The imposition of duties would allow the Union industry to source BDO for captive use from its own production or within the Union increased production, resulting in the protection of existing and recent investment of vertically integrated production infrastructure, expertise and jobs and the wide producing BDO related ecosystem within the Union, including the production of PBT, PBAT, TPU, THF and GBL for which BDO Union producers are also the main producers in the Union, and in some chemical products the only supplier in the Union. Measures would allow the sourcing of BDO for captive use within the Union industry, given the limited ability in the Union to store BDO or to have significant quantities of BDO as stocks which need also to be procured months in advance and usually under sales contracts rather than spot purchases. Measures therefore would result in a more stable, resilient and secure Union supply from Union producers, mitigating the supply or logistics risks such as observed in recital 293, that already affected the BDO Union supply in 2024 and which would have risked the ability to maintain or even produce by the Union industry captive products under the BDO value chain, if there was a lower or no Union production of the like product. ---|--- (415) | Furthermore, Novamont, BASF, INEOS and as well several BDO users, submitted comments for the need to protect and look to impose duties for additional products under the BDO value chain and not only the product concerned, in order to protect the existing substantial investments of vertical production facilities and the Union captive use and overall chemical ecosystem within the Union. The protection of the Union Industry would allow to continue the efficient operation of the integrated chemical production facilities, allowing to continue the sharing of fixed cost such as waste, electricity, transport, water or steam with the production and facilities for other chemicals, including the BDO downstream use, which is key for maintaining the overall efficiency of chemical production costs in the Union Industry. ---|--- (416) | In addition, measures would allow captive users to continue to source BDO in the Union. The Union producers claimed that Union production, of BDO generates less CO2 and this would not incur additional shipping, rail and transportation CO2 generation. ---|--- (417) | The imposition of measures on BDO from the countries concerned is therefore clearly in the interest of the Union industry. ---|--- 7.2. Interest of unrelated importers and traders (418) | Most imports of BDO in the period considered were made directly to industrial users or to related companies in the Union such as BASF, LCN and BorsodChem. Some purchases of BDO by industrial users were made by unrelated importers or traders. However, no cooperation was received from unrelated importers/traders. ---|--- (419) | Several users that are also importers of BDO, including importing from the countries considered, submitted comments. However, as their main economic activity was rather to use BDO for production their comments are addressed below under ‘interest of users’. ---|--- (420) | Will & Co, a distributor of raw materials including BDO from Sipchem, submitted comments but did not provide minimum information, including requested to importers, to be able to establish the impact that the imposition of measures would have on its activities. Will & Co argued that there was an oversupply of BDO from China, and that Chinese and Taiwanese producers were offering aggressive prices, including below cost of production, during the period considered. In addition, it was submitted that 2021-2022 represented a period for which lower imports from these countries featured in the Union and for which market prices were at a sustainable level in the Union for BDO. However, from 2023 onwards increased competition from Chinese producers and at very aggressive prices meant that BDO Union prices collapsed to unsustainable levels, mainly as a result of the building of new production facilities and increasing additional capacity in the PRC, which is already larger than the total world BDO demand, and especially in the last two years for which China alone has added production capacity that is on the multiples to the overall global BDO demand. Will & Co also submitted that it is very important for Sipchem to continue supplying the Union for the stability of the market and that Saudia Arabia imports should not be cumulated. The latter point was already addressed under the section 4.3 ‘Imports from the countries concerned’. ---|--- (421) | In addition, Helm AG provided comments regarding the exclusion of bio BDO, which were addressed under section 2.4 ‘Claims regarding product scope’. ---|--- (422) | The Commission did not have information to precisely establish the impact that the imposition of measures would have on the activities of the unrelated importers/traders. The absence of cooperation suggests that importers do not consider that the imposition of anti-dumping measures would significantly affect their business. Importers were likely to be general importers of chemical products rather than focussing solely on BDO. In addition, whilst a reduction in imports and resale of goods affected by measures may be observed in a first step, any such negative effect on turnover could eventually compensated by increased resale of products purchased from other sources such as South Korea or Taiwan. ---|--- (423) | Therefore, the Commission concluded that the impact of measures would not be disproportionate for importers/traders. ---|--- 7.3. Interest of users (424) | Whether BDO is used captively or sold on the market, the main Union users of BDO are immediate downstream products such as polybutylene terephthalate (PBT), polybutylene adipate terephthalate (PBAT), polyurethane (PU), saturated polyester (SAT), tetrahydrofuran (THF), n-methyl pyrrolidone (NMP), thermoplastic copolyester (TPC) and gamma-butyrolactone (GBL). These are in turn intermediate products which can either be sold on the Union market or used captively. The ultimate user industries of BDO are many and varied and include agriculture, automotive, chemical, cosmetics, pharmaceutical, plastics and textiles. ---|--- (425) | Nine Union industrial users in addition to three sampled integrated Union producers, which used BDO captively, co-operated with the investigation fully by submitting questionnaire replies and making their views on Union interest known. These industrial users represented about 25 % of the total BDO consumption in the Union in the IP whereas BDO users which are also BDO producers represent 100 % of the quantity of BDO used captively in the Union in the IP. Overall, cooperating industrial users together with Union producers using captively BDO represented about 65 % of total Union consumption of BDO in the IP. These users sourced BDO from own production, Union producers and/or imports. Most imports by users were from the countries concerned. ---|--- (426) | These twelve users are as follows: | (a) | Integrated BDO producers/captive users: | — | BASF SE ---|--- — | INEOS Solvents Marl GmbH ---|--- — | Novamont ---|--- (b) | Industrial Users: | — | BorsodChem z.r/t, Hungary (a user related to a Chinese exporting producer) ---|--- — | Chimica Organica Industriale Milanese spa – (COIM), Italy ---|--- — | Dow Europe GmbH, Switzerland (sourcing from Union BDO producers, and with production facilities in the Union) ---|--- — | Elachem SpA, Italy ---|--- — | Envalior BV, The Netherlands ---|--- — | Envalior GmbH, Germany ---|--- — | Performance Solutions Luxembourg Sarl (‘Celanese’), Luxemburg ---|--- — | Dubay Polymer GmbH, Germany (a joint venture between Celanese and Envalior) ---|--- — | Tosoh Europe BV, The Netherlands. ---|--- (427) | Several users made comments on Union interest as part of their submissions. Elachem SpA, and Envalior BV & Envalior GmbH, were against the imposition of measures mainly because the measures against BDO would not include other chemical product derived from BDO and especially in the next downstream use of BDO, which would impact the raw material cost of these downstream products and reduce in turn their competitiveness against imports. This is because of a potential increase of cost of BDO in the Union following the imposition of measures. Performance Solutions Luxembourg Sarl, recognized the importance of a resilient and competitive BDO Union industry, but urged the Commission to consider the full value chain of BDO in the Union, as duties would dramatically increase manufacturing cost in the EU downstream industry whilst simultaneously increasing the competition from imports. This is because producers from the country concerned would move one step down the BDO value production chain and instead dump these imports into the Union, if these are not subject to measures. In addition, they argued that costs cannot be passed to customers due to the global and competitive nature of these BDO downstream markets, thereby threatening the financial viability of the Union producers, and that there is not enough capacity within the Union to satisfy the demand of BDO. In addition, they claimed that Union producers’ sales at an unsustainably high price level and that there is inadequate supply of BDO from countries other than the countries considered. COIM and BorsodChem were against all measures. These claims and the views of users are examined as part of the interest of users’ analysis below. ---|--- Analysis of the Industrial Users (428) | Based on the data provided by the nine cooperating Union industrial users, during the IP they purchased around two thirds of their BDO from the Union industry and around one third from imports, mainly from the countries concerned. ---|--- (429) | The importance of BDO to industrial users varied widely and depending on the type of product and its application in the IP. For example, certain downstream products used less BDO than others: more BDO was used for immediate downstream products such as those usually categorised as ‘performance’ chemicals whereas less BDO was used in the ‘specialised’ chemical segments. In general the importance of BDO derived products as compared to the total turnover widely varied depending of the user. Thus for a small number of non-diversified industry users a BDO derived product was the only product or was more than 70 % of total sales. However, for the typical industrial users, which usually had a portfolio of performance and specialised products, the use of BDO derived products ranged from about 0,1 % to 25 % of the total sales of the company. On average, sales of products incorporating BDO represented 57 % of total turnover of the cooperating Union industrial users. ---|--- (430) | BDO was in some cases used to produce downstream products, that were then partly exported to third countries by the users in the IP. Such sales would not be affected by BDO duties provided that conditions for inward processing arrangements are met. ---|--- (431) | The cost of BDO as a raw material as compared to the total costs of the downstream products also varied in the IP. It was estimated from data submitted by the industrial users and captive producer/users that BDO accounted for an important percentage of the manufacturing cost of THF, PBT, PBAT and NMP (the latter being a derivative of GBL). However, the total cost of BDO could then reduce significantly depending on the degree of specialisation of the product, for example if derivatives required higher R & D input, or if BDO was combined with other raw materials for its production. These products were usually found under the ‘specialty’ and ‘performance’ segments. On average the cost of BDO as a raw material was 14 % of the total cost of the product for the cooperating users, but for the certain derivatives could be much higher. ---|--- (432) | The profitability margins of the industrial users (for products incorporating BDO) when provided, ranged between about 40 % to – 11 %, with an average profitability of 10 % in the IP. The profitability of some downstream products was negative, but for the majority was profitable. The most profitable products were usually found under the ‘specialty’ segment, for which price sensitivity was less important and margins could be high, as sales were not commodities and were subject to less competition even if quantities sold were usually more limited. However, the profitability data provided by cooperating industrial users, did not always relate to products containing BDO and the profitability of two users was not substantiated during the verification visit. Therefore, at the provisional stage of the investigation, the co-operating users have not substantiated their profitability of products containing BDO. The issue of profitability of users will therefore be examined further at the definitive stage of the investigation. ---|--- (433) | As regard the effect of the measures on the cooperating users, the Commission considered that their profits would be affected by the imposition of measures on BDO unless the increases in BDO purchase costs could be passed on to customers. This was due to the importance of BDO in the cost of production of the derivatives, especially for some immediate derivatives which are themselves commodities. However, certain factors would likely mitigate the impact of the measures for downstream products. Firstly, as explained above, the industrial users also produced products which did not contain BDO, as BDO downstream products formed only about of 57 % of their total sales as an average, but with a majority of users being diversified for which use of BDO derived products ranged from about 0,1 % to 25 % of the total sales of the company. Secondly, industrial users sourced more than half of their BDO from the Union, and less than half from the countries concerned and from third countries, such as South Korea or Taiwan. Although, BDO prices on the Union market would be likely to increase because of the measures, it would be possible for them to switch their sources of supply to minimise the impact of the measures such as South Korea or Taiwan. In addition, Union prices are not expected to increase severely given than the substantial additional production volume increase from the measures would allow to run the facilities more efficiently and reduce unit costs of production of BDO. Furthermore, BDO sales in the Union are typically done over long-term contracts which are also making reference to ICIS prices, including ICIS China in some cases. Therefore, Union BDO sales contract prices track global BDO prices, and a severe deviation in price would allow imports, not from the countries considered, to become more competitive in the Union and increase their sales to users. Thirdly, BDO as a raw material only accounted to about 14 % of the total cost of production for the downstream products, it then varied by product type and tended to be of far less importance for certain products under the ‘specialisation’ segment and even under the ‘performance’ segment for which BDO costs accounted for a much lower percentage of the total cost of production. Fourthly, some industrial users were profitable in production of BDO downstream products in the investigation period and would be able to either absorb the cost increases or pass them on to their customers, especially for products that were not price sensitive (or commoditised), commanded high margins and for which BDO as a percentage of total cost was limited which was usually found under the ‘specialised’ segment. Fifthly, the total capacity of the Union industry to produce BDO is about 470 200 and current total use was about 347 000 tonnes in the IP, allowing the Union industry to comfortably supply the whole Union demand and for users to source BDO within the union and not be subject to measures. Finally, some users exported sometimes most of the products containing BDO to third countries, meaning that they would be able to avoid the effect of anti-dumping duties due to inward processing arrangements with Union Customs authorities. Due to these mitigations, it was expected that the effect of the measures on users would not be disproportionate. ---|--- (434) | Given the major losses of the Union BDO industry and price depression on the market, it can reasonably be assumed that BDO prices will increase after measures are imposed. Nevertheless, the impact measures may have on certain users should be balanced against the risk of a discontinuation of Union industry activity as the current situation is not sustainable. Not imposing measures will lead to a discontinuation of production in the Union, and a far less reliable, resilient and stable sources of BDO supply, then inevitably to BDO price increases with more uncertainty in the sourcing of downstream production of BDO on the Union market which will be then only reliant on shipping to enter the Union combined with a very limited ability to safely and economically store BDO in the Union. Discontinuation of the Union industry would then in turn hamper the viability of production of BDO downstream products in the Union, as they need to source BDO on time, economically, with a continued resilient supply and with a diversified supply based (including Union sourced), to be able to produce at continuous levels and meet minimum efficiency production volume for the downstream products and allowing in turn to meet customers’ needs on time. ---|--- (435) | In addition, the Commission found that the production capacity of the Union industry was sufficient to meet the entire consumption in the EU market. During the IP, the Union industry had around 40 % of spare capacity and, if conditions of fair competition are restored, Union producers could increase production, and reduce the cost of production by spreading fixed costs over larger quantities, in order to meet the demand in the Union. In addition, as mentioned above industrial users could switch sources of supply to South Korea and Taiwan. ---|--- (436) | Therefore, the Commission concluded that imposing anti-dumping measures would not lead to a shortage of supply of BDO on the Union market. ---|--- (437) | Finally, as regards of the total users of the product concerned, which is the industrial users plus the captive use of BDO by the Union industry, 62 % of the total use of BDO in the Union that cooperated with this investigation were in favour of the imposition of duties, Union industry users were in favour of the measures as per further explained under the section of Interest of the Union industry. ---|--- 7.4. Conclusion on Union interest (438) | On the basis of the above, the Commission concluded that there were no compelling reasons that it was not in the Union interest to impose measures on imports of product concerned originating in countries concerned at this stage of the investigation. ---|--- 8\. PROVISIONAL ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES (439) | On the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission on dumping, injury, causation, level of measures and Union interest, provisional measures should be imposed to prevent further injury being caused to the Union industry by the dumped imports. ---|--- (440) | Provisional anti-dumping measures should be imposed on imports of product originating in countries concerned, in accordance with the lesser duty rule in Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation. The Commission compared the injury margins and the dumping margins as shown in recital 407. The amount of the duties was set at the level of the lower of the dumping and the injury margins. ---|--- (441) | On the basis of the above, the provisional anti-dumping duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border price, customs duty unpaid, should be as follows: | Country | Company | Provisional anti-dumping duty (%) ---|---|--- China | Xinjiang Markor Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. | 105,6 Wanhua Chemical (Sichuan) Co., Ltd | 113,7 Other cooperating companies in China | 107,5 All other imports originating in China | 113,7 Saudi Arabia | International Diol Company | 52,4 All other imports originating in Saudi Arabia | 52,4 USA | Lyondell Chemical Company | 135,7 All other imports originating in the USA | 142,5 (442) | The individual company anti-dumping duty rates specified in this Regulation were established on the basis of the findings of this investigation. Therefore, they reflect the situation found during this investigation with respect to these companies. These duty rates are exclusively applicable to imports of the product concerned originating in the countries concerned and produced by the named legal entities. Imports of the product concerned produced by any other company not specifically mentioned in the operative part of this Regulation, including entities related to that those specifically mentioned, should be subject to the duty rate applicable to ‘all other imports originating in country concerned’. They should not be subject to any of the individual anti-dumping duty rates. ---|--- (443) | To minimise the risks of circumvention due to the difference in duty rates, special measures are needed to ensure the application of the individual anti-dumping duties. The application of individual anti-dumping duties is only applicable upon presentation of a valid commercial invoice to the customs authorities of the Member States. The invoice must conform to the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation. Until such invoice is presented, imports should be subject to the anti-dumping duty applicable to ‘all other imports originating in country concerned’. ---|--- (444) | While presentation of this invoice is necessary for the customs authorities of the Member States to apply the individual rates of anti-dumping duty to imports, it is not the only element to be taken into account by the customs authorities. Indeed, even if presented with an invoice meeting all the requirements set out in Article 1(3) of this regulation, the customs authorities of Member States must carry out their usual checks and may, like in all other cases, require additional documents (shipping documents, etc) for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the particulars contained in the declaration and ensure that the subsequent application of the lower rate of duty is justified, in compliance with customs law. ---|--- (445) | Should the exports by one of the companies benefiting from lower individual duty rates increase significantly in volume after the imposition of the measures concerned, a percentage may be introduced, depending on the case, although not advisable such an increase in volume could be considered as constituting in itself a change in the pattern of trade due to the imposition of measures within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the basic Regulation. In such circumstances and provided the conditions are met an anti-circumvention investigation may be initiated. This investigation may, inter alia, examine the need for the removal of individual duty rate(s) and the consequent imposition of a country-wide duty. ---|--- 9\. REGISTRATION (446) | As mentioned in recital 3, the Commission made imports of the product concerned subject to registration. Registration took place with a view to possibly collecting duties retroactively under Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation. ---|--- (447) | No decision on a possible retroactive application of anti-dumping measures can be taken at this stage of the proceeding. ---|--- 10\. INFORMATION AT PROVISIONAL STAGE (448) | In accordance with Article 19a of the basic Regulation, the Commission informed interested parties about the planned imposition of provisional duties. This information was also made available to the general public via DG TRADE's website. Interested parties were given three working days to provide comments on the accuracy of the calculations specifically disclosed to them. ---|--- (449) | Lyondell Chemical Company provided comments on the calculations. In view of these comments, the Commission revised its dumping and injury calculations for Lyondell Chemical company. The rest of comments received from interested parties did not relate to the accuracy of the calculations itself but to the methodology used by the Commission and were thus outside of the scope of pre-disclosure. ---|--- 11\. FINAL PROVISIONS (450) | In the interests of sound administration, the Commission will invite the interested parties to submit written comments and/or to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings within a fixed deadline. ---|--- (451) | The findings concerning the imposition of provisional duties are provisional and may be amended at the definitive stage of the investigation, ---|--- HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: Article 1 1\. A provisional anti-dumping duty is imposed on imports of 1,4-Butanediol, usually falling under the Chemical Abstracts Service’s registration (CAS) number 110-63-4 and usually classified in the European Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical Substances (EINECS) under EC-number 203-786-5, currently classified under CN codes 2905 39 26 and 2905 39 28 , and originating in the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America. 2\. The rates of the provisional anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 and produced by the companies listed below shall be as follows: Country of origin | Company | Provisional anti-dumping duty (%) | TARIC additional code ---|---|---|--- People’s Republic of China | Xinjiang Markor Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. | 105,6 | 88AL Wanhua Chemical (Sichuan) Co., Ltd | 113,7 | 88AM Other cooperating companies listed in the Annex | 107,5 | All other imports originating in the People’s Republic of China | 113,7 | 8999 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia | International Diol Company | 52,4 | 88AN All other imports originating in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia | 52,4 | 8999 United States of America | Lyondell Chemical Company | 135,7 | 88AO All other imports originating in the United States of America | 142,5 | 8999 3\. The application of the individual duty rates specified for the companies mentioned in paragraph 2 shall be conditional upon presentation to the Member States’ customs authorities of a valid commercial invoice, on which shall appear a declaration dated and signed by an official of the entity issuing such invoice, identified by his/her name and function, drafted as follows: ‘I, the undersigned, certify that the (volume in kilograms) of (product concerned) sold for export to the European Union covered by this invoice was manufactured by (company name and address) (TARIC additional code) in country concerned. I declare that the information provided in this invoice is complete and correct’. Until such invoice is presented, the duty applicable to all other imports originating in the applicable country concerned shall apply. 4\. The release for free circulation in the Union of the product referred to in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provision of a security deposit equivalent to the amount of the provisional duty. 5\. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply. Article 2 1\. Interested parties shall submit their written comments on this regulation to the Commission within 15 calendar days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation. 2\. Interested parties wishing to request a hearing with the Commission shall do so within 5 calendar days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation. 3\. Interested parties wishing to request a hearing with the Hearing Officer in trade proceedings are invited to do so within 5 calendar days of the date of entry into force of this Regulation. The Hearing Officer may examine requests submitted outside this time limit and may decide whether to accept to such requests if appropriate. Article 3 1\. Customs authorities are hereby directed to discontinue the registration of imports established in accordance with Article 1 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1718. 2\. Data collected regarding products which entered the EU for consumption not more than 90 days prior to the date of the entry into force of this regulation shall be kept until the entry into force of possible definitive measures, or the termination of this proceeding. Article 4 This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Done at Brussels, 4 February 2026. For the Commission The President Ursula VON DER LEYEN * * * (1) OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/1036/oj. (2) Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 1,4-Butanediol originating in the People’s Republic of China, Saudi Arabia and the United States of America (OJ C, C/2025/3135, 6.6.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3135/oj). (3) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1718 of 5 August 2025 making imports of 1,4-Butanediol originating in the People’s Republic of China, Saudi Arabia and the United States of America subject to registration (OJ L, 2025/1718, 6.8.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/1718/oj). (4) LYB hearing presentation dated 17 July 2025. (5) https://tron.trade.ec.europa.eu/investigations/case-view?caseId=2800. (6) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959 of 17 July 2024 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of erythritol originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L, 2024/1959, 19.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/1959/oj); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180 of 16 October 2023 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/607 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of citric acid originating in the People’s Republic of China as extended to imports of citric acid consigned from Malaysia, whether declared as originating in Malaysia or not, following a new exporter review pursuant to Article 11(4) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L, 2023/2180, 17.10.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/2180/oj);

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752 of 12 April 2023 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of sodium gluconate originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 100, 13.4.2023, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2023/752/oj); Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/441 of 11 March 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of sulphanilic acid originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 85, 12.3.2021, p. 154, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2021/441/oj). (7) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959, recitals 161-162; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180, recitals 89-90; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752, recital 70. (8) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959, recitals 103-113; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180, recitals 46-50; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752, recital 49. (9) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959, recitals 114-122; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180, recitals 51-55; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752, recitals 50-54. While the right to appoint and to remove key management personnel in SOEs by the relevant State authorities, as provided for in the Chinese legislation, can be considered to reflect the corresponding ownership rights, CCP cells in enterprises, state owned and private alike, represent another important channel through which the State can interfere with business decisions. According to the PRC’s company law, a CCP organisation is to be established in every company (with at least three CCP members as specified in the CCP Constitution) and the company shall provide the necessary conditions for the activities of the party organisation. In the past, this requirement appears not to have always been followed or strictly enforced. However, since at least 2016 the CCP has reinforced its claims to control business decisions in SOEs as a matter of political principle. The CCP is also reported to exercise pressure on private companies to put ‘patriotism’ first and to follow party discipline. In 2017, it was reported that party cells existed in 70 % of some 1,86 million privately owned companies, with growing pressure for the CCP organisations to have a final say over the business decisions within their respective companies. These rules are of general application throughout the Chinese economy, across all sectors, including to the producers of the product under review and the suppliers of their inputs. (10) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959, recitals 123-133; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180, recitals 65-65; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752, recitals 55-63. (11) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959, recitals 134-138; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180, recitals 66-69; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752, recital 64. (12) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959, recitals 139-142; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180, recitals 71-72; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752, recital 65. (13) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959, recitals 143-152; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180, recitals 72-81; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752, recital 66. (14) Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 10 April 2024 (SWD(2024) 91 final), available at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents- register/detail?ref=SWD(2024)91&lang=en, including the previous version of the document: Commission Staff Working Document on Significant Distortions in the Economy of the People’s Republic of China for the purposes of Trade Defence Investigations, 20 December 2017 (SWD(2017) 483 final/2), available at: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents- register/detail?ref=SWD(2017)483&lang=en. (15) See page 18 the complaint (open version). (16) See pages 19-23 of the complaint (open version). (17) See pages 20-22 of the complaint (open version). (18) See page 23 of the complaint (open version). (19) See pages 22-23 of the complaint (open version). (20) See page 24 of the complaint (open version). (21) See pages 26-27 of the complaint (open version). (22) See pages 24- 26 of the complaint (open version). (23) See at: https://en.yuanlichem.com.cn/ (accessed on 4 November 2025). (24) See Shandong Yuanli Annual report, p. 69, available at: https://static.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/new/2025-04-25/603217_20250425_I1XA.pdf (accessed on 4 November 2025). (25) See at: http://www.dongyuantech.com/page101?article_id=74 (accessed on 4 November 2025). (26) See at: http://www.dongyuantech.com/ (accessed on 5 November 2025). (27) See at: http://www.wuhai.gov.cn/wuhai/whyw75/qyjj/1932832/index.html (accessed on 5 November 2025). (28) See at: https://www.whchem.com/column/84/ (accessed on 4 November 2025). (29) See Wanhua Chemical Group Co., Ltd Annual report 2024, p. 5, available at: https://static.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/new/2025-04-15/600309_20250415_5QB0.pdf (accessed on 4 November 2025). (30) See at: http://www.markor.com.cn/ (accessed on 4 November 2025). (31) See at: https://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2024-11-14/doc- incvzfqs1332548.shtml (accessed on 4 November 2025). (32) See at: https://www.lanshantunhe.com/ (accessed on 4 November 2025). (33) See at: http://www.sinopecgroup.com/group/en/000/000/041/41558.shtml (accessed on 4 November 2025). (34) See Xinjiang Zhongtai Group Ltd. Annual report 2024, p. 13 and 106, available at: https://www.shclearing.com.cn/xxpl/cwbg/nb/202504/t20250425_1577647.html (accessed on 4 November 2025). (35) See at: https://www.lanshantunhe.com/ as well as at: https://www.xj- inv.com/jianjie/ (accessed on 4 November 2025). (36) See at: http://wap.sasac.gov.cn/n2588045/n27271785/n27271792/c14159097/content.html (accessed on 4 November 2025). (37) See at: http://lyxs.sinopec.com/lyxs/pro_presentation/profile/ (accessed on 4 November 2025). (38) See Article 33 of the CCP Constitution, Article 19 of the Chinese Company Law. See also the Report, Chapter 3, p. 47-50. (39) See at: https://finance.sina.com.cn/jjxw/2025-11-03/doc- infwckpi5523797.shtml?froms=ggmp (accessed on 5 November 2025). (40) See at: http://www.cpcif.org.cn/list/40288043661dc14701661de581c4001c and also at: http://www.cpcif.org.cn/detail/e7d79e3b-8a8d-441e-b862-9836210774a3 (accessed on 4 November 2025). (41) See CPCIF Articles of Association, Article 3, available at: http://www.cpcif.org.cn/detail/40288043661e27fb01661e386a3f0001?e=1 (accessed on 5 November 2025). (42) Ibid. (43) See CPCIF Articles of Association, Article 36, available at: http://www.cpcif.org.cn/detail/40288043661e27fb01661e386a3f0001?e=1 (accessed on 5 November 2025). (44) See at: http://www.cpcif.org.cn/list/40288043661dc14701661ddbe0980010 (accessed on 20 October 2025). (45) See CCFA Articles of Association, Article 3, available at: https://www.ccfa.com.cn/3/202109/2260.html (accessed on 5 November 2025). (46) Ibid. (47) See CCFA Articles of Association, Article 36, available at: https://www.ccfa.com.cn/3/202109/2260.html (accessed on 5 November 2025). (48) See at: https://www.ccfa.com.cn/11/202404/4264.html (accessed on 5 November 2025). (49) See Section III.8.3 of the 14th FYP on economic and social development and 2035 perspectives, available at: https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-03/13/content_5592681.htm (accessed on 5 November 2025). (50) See at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2022-04/08/content_5683972.htm#msdynttrid=WRmyf07ph0z74SHmXoOLKjRWl09BdZ4lGdYp9fiI9xU (accessed on 5 November 2025). (51) Ibid., Section I.3. (52) Ibid., Section III.4. (53) See at: https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/tz/202307/t20230727_1358715.html (accessed on 5 November 2025). (54) Ibid., Section II. (55) See at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202509/content_7042418.htm (accessed on 5 November 2025). (56) Ibid., Section III.2. (57) Ibid., Section III.4. (58) See Section II.2.4, available at: https://huanbao.bjx.com.cn/news/20211201/1191133.shtml (accessed on 5 November 2025). (59) Ibid., Section III. (60) See at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202411/content_6990315.htm (accessed on 5 November 2025). (61) See at: http://wfrb.wfnews.com.cn/content/20210624/Articel05006TB.htm (accessed on 5 November 2025). (62) See at: http://www.dongyuantech.com/page111?article_id=80 (accessed on 5 November 2025). (63) See Wanhua Chemical Group Co. Ltd. annual report 2024, p. 37, available at: https://static.sse.com.cn/disclosure/listedinfo/announcement/c/new/2025-04-15/600309_20250415_CQ5Z.pdf (accessed on 5 November 2025). (64) See at: http://www.sinopecgroup.com/group/gsglc/index.shtml, (accessed on 5 November 2025). (65) See at: http://www.sinopecgroup.com/group/000/000/041/41878.shtml (accessed on 5 November 2025). (66) The Report, Part III, Chapter 16. (67) Ibid., Section 16.3. (68) See Section IV.1.3, available at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2021-12/29/content_5665166.htm (accessed on 5 November 2025). (69) See at: http://gxt.shandong.gov.cn/art/2021/9/13/art_310618_10320587.html (accessed on 5 November 2025). (70) Ibid. (71) See at: https://www.sohu.com/a/606540835_121106854 (accessed on 5 November 2025). (72) Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1959, recitals 153-157 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2180, recitals 82-84; Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/752, recital 67. (73) See Section VIII.16, available at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2022-04/08/content_5683972.htm#msdynttrid=WRmyf07ph0z74SHmXoOLKjRWl09BdZ4lGdYp9fiI9xU (accessed on 20 October 2025). (74) World Bank Open Data – Upper Middle Income (https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income). (75) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/1976 of 12 November 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and definitively collecting the provisional duty imposed on imports of mono ethylene glycol originating in the United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (OJ L 402, 15.11.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2021/1976/oj), recital 222. (76) https://datamercantil.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/05-08-2025-Data- Mercantil-certificado.pdf. (77) https://businessanalytiq.com/procurementanalytics/index/grey-hydrogen- price-index/. (78) https://connect.ihsmarkit.com/gta/home/. (79) https://businessanalytiq.com/procurementanalytics/index/grey-hydrogen- price-index/. (80) https://www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/economicas/industria/9042-pesquisa- industrial-anual.html?=&t=destaques. (81) https://www.gov.br/mme/pt- br/assuntos/secretarias/sntep/publicacoes/boletins-mensais-de- energia/boletins%20anos%20anteriores/2024/english. (82) https://www.gov.br/mme/pt- br/assuntos/secretarias/sntep/publicacoes/boletins-mensais-de- energia/boletins%20anos%20anteriores/2024/english. (83) https://www.gov.br/mme/pt- br/assuntos/secretarias/sntep/publicacoes/boletins-mensais-de- energia/boletins%20anos%20anteriores/2024/english. (84) https://www.sabesp.com.br/assets/pdf/servicos/para-voce/comunicado- sabesp-2-24.pdf. (85) See the explanation of the methodology in recital 190. (86) Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries (OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 33, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/755/oj). Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation considers that domestic prices in those countries cannot be used for the purpose of determining normal value. (87) https://www.macmap.org/. (88) https://www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/economicas/industria/9042-pesquisa- industrial-anual.html?=&t=destaques. (89) https://www.ibge.gov.br/en/statistics/economic/prices-and- costs/17136-national-consumer-pricce-index.html?edicao=36055&t=downloads. (90) https://www.gov.br/mme/pt- br/assuntos/secretarias/sntep/publicacoes/boletins-mensais-de- energia/boletins%20anos%20anteriores/2024/english. (91) https://mrsadvogados-com.translate.goog/lei-complementar- no-194-2022-icms-gas-natural-energia-eletrica-comunicacoes-e-transporte- coletivo-servicos-essenciais-e- indispensaveis/?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en. (92) https://www.gov.br/mme/pt- br/assuntos/secretarias/sntep/publicacoes/boletins-mensais-de- energia/boletins%20anos%20anteriores/2024/english. (93) https://www.gov.br/mme/pt- br/assuntos/secretarias/sntep/publicacoes/boletins-mensais-de- energia/boletins%20anos%20anteriores/2024/english. (94) https://www.sabesp.com.br/assets/pdf/servicos/para-voce/comunicado- sabesp-2-24.pdf. (95) https://datamercantil.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/05-08-2025-Data- Mercantil-certificado.pdf. (96) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1336 of 25 September 2020 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain polyvinyl alcohols originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 315, 29.9.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2020/1336/oj), recital 352. (97) Basic chemicals, fertilisers and nitrogen compounds, plastics and synthetic rubber in primary forms. (98) https://orbis-r1.bvdinfo.com/. (99) See recital 1. (100) Independent Commodity Intelligence Services (ICIS) ICIS provides specialist information for the chemicals, energy, gas, carbon and coal markets via a fee. (101) The Deepening Red Sea Shipping Crisis: Impacts and Outlook, World Bank Document, accessed on 16 October 2025. * * * ANNEX Other cooperating exporting producers not sampled Country | Name | TARIC additional code ---|---|--- People’s Republic of China | Shandong Yuanli Science and Technology Co., Ltd. | 88AP Inner Mongolia Dongjing Biological Green Technology Co., Ltd. | 88AQ Henan Kaixiang Fine Chemical Co., Ltd. | 88AR Xinjiang Blue Ridge Tunhe Energy Co., Ltd. | 88AS * * * ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2026/270/oj ISSN 1977-0677 (electronic edition) * * *