Cap. 347 - Limitation Ordinance

To consolidate and amend the law relating to the limitation of actions. (Amended 17 of 2010 s. 112) [11 June 1965](Format changes—E.R. 4 of 2020) Part I Preliminary 1. Short title This Ordinance may be cited as the Limitation Ordinance. 2. Interpretation (1) In this Ordinance, unless the context otherwise requires—action (訴訟) includes any proceeding in a court of law;land (土地) includes corporeal hereditaments and rentcharges, and any legal or equitable estate or interest therein, including an interest in the proceeds of the sale of land held upon trust for sale, but save as aforesaid does not include any incorporeal hereditament;personal estate (非土地遺產) and personal property (非土地財產) do not include chattels real;personal injuries (人身傷害) includes any disease and any impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition, and injury (傷害) shall be construed accordingly; (Replaced 67 of 1976 s. 2)rent (租金) includes a rentcharge and a rent service;rentcharge (租費) means any annuity or periodical sum of money charged upon or payable out of land, except a rent service or interest on a mortgage on land;ship (船舶) includes every description of vessel used in navigation not propelled solely by oars;the court (法院), in relation to an action, means the court in which the action has been, or is intended to be, brought;trust (信託), trustee (受託人) and trust for sale (售產信託) have the same meanings respectively as in the Trustee Ordinance (Cap. 29).(Amended E.R. 4 of 2020)(2) A person shall be deemed to claim through another person, if he became entitled by, through, under, or by the act of that other person to the right claimed: Provided that a person becoming entitled to any estate or interest by virtue of a special power of appointment shall not be deemed to claim through the appointer. (3) References in this Ordinance to a right of action to recover land shall include references to a right to enter into possession of the land or, in the case of rentcharges, to distrain for arrears of rent, and references to the bringing of such an action shall include references to the making of such an entry or distress.(4) In the case of rentcharges, references in this Ordinance to the possession of land shall be construed as references to the receipt of the rent, and references to the date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession of land shall be construed as references to the date of the last receipt of rent.(5) In Part III of this Ordinance, references to a right of action shall include references to a cause of action and to a right to receive money secured by a mortgage or charge on any property or to recover proceeds of the sale of land, and to a right to receive a share or interest in the personal estate of a deceased person; and references to the date of the accrual of a right of action shall—(a) in the case of an action for an account, be construed as references to the date on which the matter arose in respect of which an account is claimed;(b) in the case of an action upon a judgment, be construed as references to the date on which the judgment became enforceable;(c) in the case of an action to recover arrears of rent or interest, or damages in respect thereof, be construed as references to the date on which the rent or interest became due.(Amended 31 of 1991 s. 2)[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 31 U.K.; 1954 c. 36 s. 2(3) U.K.] Part II Periods of Limitation for Different Classes of Action 3. Part II to be subject to Part III (1) This Part prescribes the ordinary limitation periods for bringing actions of the various classes mentioned in this Part.(2) The ordinary limitation periods are subject to extension or exclusion in accordance with Part III.(Replaced 31 of 1991 s. 3)[cf. 1980 c. 58 s. 1 U.K.]Actions of Contract and Tort and Certain Other Actions 4. Limitation of actions of contract and tort, and certain other actions (1) The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, that is to say—(a) actions founded on simple contract or on tort;(b) actions to enforce a recognizance;(c) actions to enforce an award, where the submission is not by an instrument under seal;(d) actions to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any Ordinance or imperial enactment, other than a penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of penalty or forfeiture: Provided that— (i) (Repealed 31 of 1991 s. 4) (ii) nothing in this subsection shall be taken to refer to any action to which section 6 applies. (2) An action for an account shall not be brought in respect of any matter which arose more than 6 years before the commencement of the action.(3) An action upon a specialty shall not be brought after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued: Provided that this subsection shall not affect any action for which a shorter period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Ordinance. (4) An action shall not be brought upon any judgment after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the judgment became enforceable, and no arrears of interest in respect of any judgment debt shall be recovered after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the interest became due.(5) An action to recover any penalty or forfeiture, or sum by way of penalty or forfeiture, recoverable by virtue of any Ordinance or imperial enactment shall not be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued: Provided that for the purposes of this subsection the expression penalty (罰金) shall not include a fine to which any person is liable on conviction of a criminal offence. (6) Subsection (1) shall apply to an action to recover seamen’s wages, but save as aforesaid this section shall not apply to any cause of action within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court which is enforceable in rem.(7) This section shall not apply to any claim for specific performance of a contract or for an injunction or for other equitable relief, except in so far as any provision thereof may be applied by the court by analogy in like manner as the corresponding enactment contained in the Limitation Act 1980 (1980 c. 58 U.K.) is applied in the English Courts. (Amended 31 of 1991 s. 4)(8) (Repealed 31 of 1991 s. 4)[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 2 U.K.; 1954 c. 36 s. 2(1) U.K.] 5. Limitation in case of successive conversions and extinction of title of owner of converted goods (1) Where any cause of action in respect of the conversion or wrongful detention of a chattel has accrued to any person and, before he recovers possession of the chattel, a further conversion or wrongful detention takes place, no action shall be brought in respect of the further conversion or detention after the expiration of 6 years from the accrual of the cause of action in respect of the original conversion or detention.(2) Where any such cause of action has accrued to any person and the period prescribed for bringing that action and for bringing any action in respect of such a further conversion or wrongful detention as aforesaid has expired and he has not during that period recovered possession of the chattel, the title of that person to the chattel shall be extinguished.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 3 U.K.] 6. Time limit for claiming contribution (1) Where under section 3 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Ordinance (Cap. 377) any person becomes entitled to a right to recover contribution in respect of any damage from any other person, no action to recover contribution by virtue of that right shall (subject to sections 22 and 26) be brought after the end of the period of 2 years from the date on which that right accrued.(2) For the purposes of this section the date on which a right to recover contribution in respect of any damage accrues to any person (in this subsection referred to as the relevant date) shall be ascertained as follows, that is to say—(a) if the person in question is held liable in respect of that damage by a judgment given in any civil proceedings, or an award made on any arbitration, the relevant date shall be the date on which the judgment is given, or the date of the award, as the case may be;(b) if, in any case not falling within paragraph (a), the person in question makes or agrees to make any payment to one or more persons in compensation for that damage (whether he admits any liability in respect of the damage or not), the relevant date shall be the earliest date on which the amount to be paid by him is agreed between him (or his representative) and the person (or each of the persons, as the case may be) to whom the payment is to be made,and for the purposes of this subsection no account shall be taken of any judgment or award given or made on appeal in so far as it varies the amount of damages awarded against the person in question.(Replaced 77 of 1984 s. 10)[cf. 1978 c. 47 Sch. 1 para. 6 U.K.]Actions to Recover Land and Rent 7. Limitation of actions to recover land (1) No action shall be brought by the Crown to recover any land after the expiration of 60 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the Crown or, if it first accrued to some person through whom the Crown claims, to that person.(2) No action shall be brought by any other person to recover any land after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him or, if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person: Provided that, if the right of action first accrued to the Crown through whom the person bringing the action claims, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of the period during which the action could have been brought by the Crown, or of 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to some person other than the Crown, whichever period first expires. (Amended 31 of 1991 s. 5) 8. Accrual of right of action in case of present interests in land (1) Where the person bringing an action to recover land, or some person through whom he claims, has been in possession thereof, and has while entitled thereto been dispossessed or discontinued his possession, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of the dispossession or discontinuance.(2) Where any person brings an action to recover any land of a deceased person, whether under a will or on intestacy, and the deceased person was on the date of his death in possession of the land or, in the case of a rentcharge created by will or taking effect upon his death, in possession of the land charged, and was the last person entitled to the land to be in possession thereof, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of his death.(3) Where any person brings an action to recover land, being an estate or interest in possession assured otherwise than by will to him, or to some person through whom he claims by a person who, at the date when the assurance took effect, was in possession of the land or, in the case of a rentcharge created by the assurance, in possession of the land charged, and no person has been in possession of the land by virtue of the assurance, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date when the assurance took effect.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 5 U.K.] 9. Accrual of right of action in case of future interests (1) Subject as hereafter provided in this section the right of action to recover any land shall, in a case where the estate or interest claimed was an estate or interest in reversion or remainder or any other future estate or interest and no person has taken possession of the land by virtue of the estate or interest claimed, be deemed to have accrued on the date on which the estate or interest fell into possession by the determination of the preceding estate or interest.(2) If the person entitled to the preceding estate or interest, not being a term of years absolute, was not in possession of the land on the date of the determination thereof, no action shall be brought by the person entitled to the succeeding estate or interest after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person entitled to the preceding estate or interest, or 6 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to the person entitled to the succeeding estate or interest, whichever period last expires:Provided that, where the Crown is entitled to the succeeding estate or interest, the foregoing provisions of this subsection shall have effect with the substitution for the reference to 12 years of a reference to 60 years, and for the reference to 6 years of a reference to 12 years. (Amended L.N. 100 of 1968; 31 of 1991 s. 6)(3) No person shall bring an action to recover any estate or interest in land under an assurance taking effect after the right of action to recover the land had accrued to the person by whom the assurance was made or some person through whom he claimed or some person entitled to a preceding estate or interest, unless the action is brought within the period during which the person by whom the assurance was made could have brought such an action.(4) Where any person is entitled to any estate or interest in land in possession and, while so entitled, is also entitled to any future estate or interest in that land, and his right to recover the estate or interest in possession is barred under this Ordinance, no action shall be brought by that person, or by any person claiming through him, in respect of the future estate or interest, unless in the meantime possession of the land has been recovered by a person entitled to an intermediate estate or interest.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 6 U.K.] 10. Provisions in case of land held on trust (1) Subject to the provisions of section 20(1), the provisions of this Ordinance shall apply to equitable interests in land, including interests in the proceeds of the sale of land held upon trust for sale, in like manner as they apply to legal estates, and accordingly a right of action to recover the land shall, for the purposes of this Ordinance but not otherwise, be deemed to accrue to a person entitled in possession to such an equitable interest in the like manner and circumstances and on the same date as it would accrue if his interest were a legal estate in the land.(2) Where any land is held upon trust, including a trust for sale, and the period prescribed by this Ordinance has expired for the bringing of an action to recover the land by the trustees, the estate of the trustees shall not be extinguished if and so long as the right of action to recover the land of any person entitled to a beneficial interest in the land or in the proceeds of sale either has not accrued or has not been barred by this Ordinance, but if and when every such right of action has been so barred, the estate of the trustee shall be extinguished.(3) Where land is held upon trust, including a trust for sale, an action to recover the land may be brought by the trustees on behalf of any person entitled to a beneficial interest in possession in the land or in the proceeds of sale whose right of action has not been barred by this Ordinance, notwithstanding that the right of action of the trustees would apart from this provision have been barred by this Ordinance.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 7 U.K.] 11. Accrual of right of action in case of forfeiture or breach of condition A right of action to recover land by virtue of a forfeiture or breach of condition shall be deemed to have accrued on the date on which the forfeiture was incurred or the condition broken:Provided that, if such a right has accrued to a person entitled to an estate or interest in reversion or remainder and the land was not recovered by virtue thereof, the right of action to recover the land shall not be deemed to have accrued to that person until his estate or interest fell into possession, as if no such forfeiture or breach of condition had occurred.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 8 U.K.] 12. Accrual of right of action in case of certain tenancies (1) A tenancy at will shall, for the purposes of this Ordinance, be deemed to be determined at the expiration of a period of 1 year from the commencement thereof, unless it has previously been determined, and accordingly the right of action of the person entitled to the land subject to the tenancy shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of such determination.(2) A tenancy from year to year or other period, without a lease in writing, shall, for the purposes of this Ordinance, be deemed to be determined at the expiration of the first year or other period, and accordingly the right of action of the person entitled to the land subject to the tenancy shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of such determination: Provided that, where any rent has subsequently been received in respect of the tenancy, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date of the last receipt of rent. (3) Where any person is in possession of land by virtue of a lease in writing by which a rent of not less than $20 is reserved, and the rent is received by some person wrongfully claiming to be entitled to the land in reversion immediately expectant on the determination of the lease, and no rent is subsequently received by the person rightfully so entitled, the right of action of the last-named person to recover the land shall be deemed to have accrued at the date when the rent was first received by the person wrongfully claiming as aforesaid and not at the date of the determination of the lease.(4) Subsections (1) and (3) shall not apply to any tenancy at will or lease granted by the Government. (Amended 29 of 1998 s. 105)[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 9 U.K.] 13. Right of action not to accrue or continue unless there is adverse possession (1) No right of action to recover land shall be deemed to accrue unless the land is in the possession of some person in whose favour the period of limitation can run (hereafter in this section referred to as adverse possession) and where under the foregoing provisions of this Ordinance any such right of action is deemed to accrue on a certain date and no person is in adverse possession on that date, the right of action shall not be deemed to accrue unless and until adverse possession is taken of the land.(2) Where a right of action to recover land has accrued and thereafter, before the right is barred, the land ceases to be in adverse possession, the right of action shall no longer be deemed to have accrued and no fresh right of action shall be deemed to accrue unless and until the land is again taken in adverse possession.(3) For the purposes of this section—(a) possession of any land subject to a rentcharge by a person (other than the person entitled to the rentcharge) who does not pay the rent shall be deemed to be adverse possession of the rentcharge; and(b) receipt of rent under a lease by a person wrongfully claiming, in accordance with section 12(3), the land in reversion shall be deemed to be adverse possession of the land.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 10 U.K.] 14. Limitation of redemption actions When a mortgagee of land has been in possession of any of the mortgaged land for a period of 12 years, no action to redeem the land of which the mortgagee has been so in possession shall thereafter be brought by the mortgagor or any person claiming through him.(Amended 31 of 1991 s. 7)[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 12 U.K.] 15. No right of action to be preserved by formal entry or continual claim For the purposes of this Ordinance, no person shall be deemed to have been in possession of any land by reason only of having made a formal entry thereon, and no continual or other claim upon or near any land shall preserve any right of action to recover the land.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 13 U.K.] 16. Administration to date back to death For the purposes of the provisions of this Ordinance relating to actions for the recovery of land, an administrator of the estate of a deceased person shall be deemed to claim as if there had been no interval of time between the death of the deceased person and the grant of the letters of administration.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 15 U.K.] 17. Extinction of title after expiration of period Subject to the provisions of section 10, at the expiration of the period prescribed by this Ordinance for any person to bring an action to recover land (including a redemption action), the title of that person to the land shall be extinguished.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 16 U.K.] 18. Limitation of actions to recover rent No action shall be brought, or distress made, to recover arrears of rent, or damages in respect thereof, after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the arrears became due.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 17 U.K.]Actions to Recover Money Secured by a Mortgage or Charge or toRecover Proceeds of the Sale of Land 19. Limitation of action to recover money secured by a mortgage or charge or to recover proceeds of the sale of land (1) No action shall be brought to recover any principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge on property, or to recover proceeds of the sale of land, after the expiration of 12 years from the date when the right to receive the money accrued. (Amended 31 of 1991 s. 8)(2) No foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged personal property shall be brought after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the right to foreclose accrued: (Amended 31 of 1991 s. 8) Provided that if, after that date the mortgagee was in possession of the mortgaged property, the right to foreclose on the property which was in his possession shall not, for the purposes of this subsection, be deemed to have accrued until the date on which his possession discontinued. (3) The right to receive any principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge and the right to foreclose on the property subject to the mortgage or charge shall not be deemed to accrue so long as that property comprises any future interest or any life insurance policy which has not matured or been determined.(4) Nothing in this section shall apply to a foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged land, but the provisions of this Ordinance relating to actions to recover land shall apply to such an action.(5) No action to recover arrears of interest payable in respect of any sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge or payable in respect of proceeds of the sale of land, or to recover damages in respect of such arrears, shall be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the interest became due: Provided that— (a) where a prior mortgagee or other incumbrancer has been in possession of the property charged, and an action is brought within 1 year of the discontinuance of such possession by the subsequent incumbrancer, he may recover by that action all the arrears of interest which fell due during the period of possession by the prior incumbrancer or damages in respect thereof, notwithstanding that the period exceeded 6 years; (b) where the property subject to the mortgage or charge comprises any future interest or life insurance policy and it is a term of the mortgage or charge that arrears of interest shall be treated as part of the principal sum of money secured by the mortgage or charge, interest shall not be deemed to become due before the right to receive the principal sum of money has accrued or is deemed to have accrued. (6) This section shall not apply to any mortgage or charge on a ship.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 18 U.K.]Actions in respect of Trust Property or the Personal Estate of Deceased Persons 20. Limitation of actions in respect of trust property (1) No period of limitation prescribed by this Ordinance shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust, being an action—(a) in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy; or(b) to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds thereof in the possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to his use.(2) Subject as aforesaid, an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property or in respect of any breach of trust, not being an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Ordinance, shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the right of action accrued: Provided that the right of action shall not be deemed to have accrued to any beneficiary entitled to a future interest in the trust property, until the interest fell into possession. (3) No beneficiary as against whom there would be a good defence under this Ordinance shall derive any greater or other benefit from a judgment or order obtained by any other beneficiary than he could have obtained if he had brought the action and this Ordinance had been pleaded in defence.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 19 U.K.] 21. Limitation of actions claiming personal estate of a deceased person Subject to the provisions of section 20(1), no action in respect of any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest in such estate, whether under a will or on intestacy, shall be brought after the expiration of 12 years from the date when the right to receive the share or interest accrued, and no action to recover arrears of interest in respect of any legacy, or damages in respect of such arrears, shall be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the interest became due.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 20 U.K.] Part III Extension or Exclusion of Limitation Periods in Certain Cases (Amended 31 of 1991 s. 9)Disability 22. Extension of limitation period in case of disability (1) If on the date when any right of action accrued for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Ordinance, the person to whom it accrued was under a disability, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of 6 years from the date when the person ceased to be under a disability or died, whichever event first occurred, notwithstanding that the period of limitation had expired: Provided that— (a) this section shall not affect any case where the right of action first accrued to some person (not under a disability) through whom the person under a disability claims; (b) when a right of action which has accrued to a person under a disability accrues, on the death of that person while still under a disability, to another person under disability, no further extension of time shall be allowed by reason of the disability of the second person; (Amended L.N. 100 of 1968) (c) no action to recover land or money charged on land shall be brought by virtue of this section by any person after the expiration of 30 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to that person or some person through whom he claims; (d) this section shall not apply to any action to recover a penalty or forfeiture, or sum by way thereof, by virtue of any Ordinance or imperial enactment, except where the action is brought by an aggrieved party. (2) If the action is one to which section 27 or 28(3) applies subsection (1) shall have effect as if for the words “6 years” there were substituted the words “3 years”. (Replaced 67 of 1976 s. 4) [cf. 1975 c. 54 s. 2 U.K.](2A) Where this section applies by virtue of section 6, subsection (1) shall have effect as if for the words “6 years” there were substituted the words “2 years”. (Added 67 of 1976 s. 4)(3) For the purposes of this section and section 22A, a person shall be deemed to be under a disability while he is an infant or of unsound mind, and, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions of this subsection, a person shall be conclusively presumed to be of unsound mind while he is detained in pursuance of any Ordinance or imperial enactment authorizing the detention of persons of unsound mind, including persons convicted of offences or awaiting trial, or while he is receiving treatment voluntarily under the provisions of the Mental Health Ordinance (Cap. 136). (Amended 31 of 1991 s. 10)[cf. 1939 c. 21 ss. 22 & 31(2) & (3) U.K.; 1954 c. 36 s. 2(2) U.K.] 22A. Extension for cases where the limitation period is the period under section 31(4)(b) (1) Subject to subsection (2), if in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by section 31—(a) the period applicable in accordance with section 31(4) is the period mentioned in section 31(4)(b);(b) on the date which is for the purposes of that section the date of knowledge, the person by reference to whose knowledge that date fell to be determined under section 31(1) was under a disability; and(c) section 22 does not apply to the action,the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of 3 years from the date when he ceased to be under a disability or died (whichever first occurred) notwithstanding that the period mentioned above has expired.(2) An action may not be brought by virtue of subsection (1) after the end of the period of limitation prescribed by section 32.(Added 31 of 1991 s. 11)[cf. 1980 c. 58 s. 28A U.K.]Acknowledgment and Part Payment 23. Fresh accrual of action on acknowledgment or part payment (1) Where there has accrued any right of action (including a foreclosure action) to recover land or any right of a mortgagee of personal property to bring a foreclosure action in respect of the property, and—(a) the person in possession of the land or personal property acknowledges the title of the person to whom the right of action has accrued; or(b) in the case of a foreclosure or other action by a mortgagee, the person in possession as aforesaid or the person liable for the mortgage debt makes any payment in respect thereof, whether of principal or interest,the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or payment. (Amended L.N. 100 of 1968)(2) Where a mortgagee is by virtue of the mortgage in possession of any mortgaged land and either receives any sum in respect of the principal or interest of the mortgage debt or acknowledges the title of the mortgagor, or his equity of redemption, an action to redeem the land in his possession may be brought at any time before the expiration of 12 years from the date of the payment or acknowledgment.(3) Where any right of action has accrued to recover any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim, or any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest therein, and the person liable or accountable therefor acknowledges the claim or makes any payment in respect thereof, the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or the last payment: Provided that a payment of a part of the rent or interest due at any time shall not extend the period for claiming the remainder then due, but any payment of interest shall be treated as a payment in respect of the principal debt. (Amended L.N. 346 of 1982) [cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 23 U.K.] 24. Formal provisions as to acknowledgments and part payments (1) Every such acknowledgment as aforesaid shall be in writing and signed by the person making the acknowledgment.(2) Any such acknowledgment or payment as aforesaid may be made by the agent of the person by whom it is required to be made under section 23, and shall be made to the person, or to an agent of the person, whose title or claim is being acknowledged or, as the case may be, in respect of whose claim the payment is being made.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 24 U.K.] 25. Effect of acknowledgment or part payment on persons other than the maker or recipient (1) An acknowledgment of the title to any land or mortgaged personalty by any person in possession thereof shall bind all other persons in possession during the ensuing period of limitation.(2) A payment in respect of a mortgage debt by the mortgagor or any person in possession of the mortgaged property shall, so far as any right of the mortgagee to foreclose or otherwise to recover the property is concerned, bind all other persons in possession of the mortgaged property during the ensuing period of limitation.(3) Where 2 or more mortgagees are by virtue of the mortgage in possession of the mortgaged land, an acknowledgment of the mortgagor’s title or of his equity of redemption by one of the mortgagees shall bind only him and his successors and shall not bind any other mortgagee or his successors, and where the mortgagee by whom the acknowledgment is given is entitled to a part of the mortgaged land and not to any ascertained part of the mortgage debt, the mortgagor shall be entitled to redeem that part of the land on payment, with interest, of the part of the mortgage debt which bears the same proportion to the whole of the debt as the value of the part of the land bears to the whole of the mortgaged land.(4) Where there are 2 or more mortgagors, and the title or right to redemption of one of the mortgagors is acknowledged as aforesaid, the acknowledgment shall be deemed to have been made to all the mortgagors.(5) An acknowledgment of any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall bind the acknowledgor and his successors but not any other person:Provided that an acknowledgment made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for the bringing of an action to recover the debt or other claim shall not bind any successor on whom the liability devolves on the determination of a preceding estate or interest in property under a settlement taking effect before the date of the acknowledgment.(6) A payment made in respect of any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim shall bind all persons liable in respect thereof:Provided that a payment made after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for the bringing of an action to recover the debt or other claim shall not bind any person other than the person making the payment and his successors, and shall not bind any successor on whom the liability devolves on the determination of a preceding estate or interest in property under a settlement taking effect before the date of the payment.(7) An acknowledgment by one of several personal representatives of any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person, or to any share or interest therein, or a payment by one of several personal representatives in respect of any such claim shall bind the estate of the deceased person.(8) In this section the expression successor (繼承人), in relation to any mortgagee or person liable in respect of any debt or claim, means his personal representatives and any other person on whom the rights under the mortgage or, as the case may be, the liability in respect of the debt or claim devolve, whether on death or bankruptcy or the disposition of property or the determination of a limited estate or interest in settled property or otherwise.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 25 U.K.]Fraud, Concealment and Mistake 26. Postponement of limitation period in case of fraud, concealment or mistake (1) Subject to subsection (4), where in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Ordinance, either—(a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant;(b) any fact relevant to the plaintiff’s right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant; or(c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake,the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake (as the case may be) or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.(2) References in subsection (1) to the defendant include references to the defendant’s agent and to any person through whom the defendant claims and his agent.(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty.(4) Nothing in this section shall enable any action—(a) to recover, or recover the value of, any property; or(b) to enforce any charge against, or set aside any transaction affecting, any property,to be brought against the purchaser of the property or any person claiming through him in any case where the property has been purchased for valuable consideration by an innocent third party since the fraud or concealment or (as the case may be) the transaction in which the mistake was made took place.(5) A purchaser is an innocent third party for the purposes of this section—(a) in the case of fraud or concealment of any fact relevant to the plaintiff’s right of action, if he was not a party to the fraud or (as the case may be) to the concealment of that fact and did not at the time of the purchase know or have reason to believe that the fraud or concealment had taken place; and(b) in the case of mistake, if he did not at the time of the purchase know or have reason to believe that the mistake had been made.(6) Sections 31 and 32 shall not apply to any action to which subsection (1)(b) applies (and accordingly the period of limitation referred to in that subsection, in any case to which either of those sections would otherwise apply, is the period applicable under section 4(1)).(Replaced 31 of 1991 s. 12)[cf. 1980 c. 58 s. 32 U.K.]Special Provisions Applicable to Certain Actions in respect of Personal Injuries 27. Time limit for personal injuries (1) This section applies to any action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or under an Ordinance or imperial enactment or independently of any contract or any such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person.(2) Section 4 shall not apply to an action to which this section applies.(3) Subject to section 30, an action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the expiration of the period specified in subsections (4) and (5).(4) Except where subsection (5) applies, the said period is 3 years from—(a) the date on which the cause of action accrued; or(b) the date (if later) of the plaintiff’s knowledge.(5) If the person injured dies before the expiration of the period in subsection (4), the period as respects the cause of action surviving for the benefit of the estate of the deceased by virtue of section 20 of the Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 23) shall be 3 years from—(a) the date of death; or(b) the date of the personal representative’s knowledge,whichever is the later.(6) In this section, and in section 28, references to a person’s date of knowledge are references to the date on which he first had knowledge of the following facts—(a) that the injury in question was significant; and(b) that that injury was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence, nuisance or breach of duty; and(c) the identity of the defendant; and(d) if it is alleged that the act or omission was that of a person other than the defendant, the identity of that person and the additional facts supporting the bringing of an action against the defendant,and knowledge that any acts or omissions did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence, nuisance or breach of duty is irrelevant.(7) For the purposes of this section an injury is significant if the plaintiff would reasonably have considered it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.(8) For the purposes of this section and section 28 a person’s knowledge includes knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire—(a) from facts observable or ascertainable by him; or(b) from facts ascertainable by him with the help of medical or other appropriate expert advice which it is reasonable for him to seek,but a person shall not be fixed under this subsection with knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice.(9) For the purposes of this section personal representative (遺產代理人) includes any person who is or has been a personal representative of the deceased, including an executor who has not proved the will (whether or not he has renounced probate); and regard shall be had to any knowledge acquired by any such person while a personal representative or previously.(10) If there is more than one personal representative, and their dates of knowledge are different, subsection (5)(b) shall be read as referring to the earliest of those dates.(Replaced 67 of 1976 s. 5)[cf. 1975 c. 54 s. 1 U.K.] 28. Time limit for actions under Fatal Accidents Ordinance (1) This section has effect subject to section 30.(2) An action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) shall not be brought if the death occurred when the person injured could no longer maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the injury (whether because of a time limit in this Ordinance or in any other Ordinance, or any other reason); and where any such action by the injured person would have been barred by the time limit in section 27, no account shall be taken of the possibility of that time limit being overridden under section 30.(3) An action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) shall not be brought after the expiration of 3 years from—(a) the date of death; or(b) the date of knowledge of the person for whose benefit the action is brought,whichever is the later.(4) Subsection (3) shall not apply to an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by or under any Ordinance other than this Ordinance, and section 27 shall not apply to an action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22).(5) An action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) shall be one to which section 22 applies, but otherwise sections 22 to 26, inclusive, and Part IV shall not apply to the action. (Replaced 67 of 1976 s. 5)[cf. 1975 c. 54 s. 1 U.K.] 29. Dependants subject to different time limits (1) This section applies where there is more than one person for whose benefit an action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) is brought.(2) Section 28(3)(b) shall be applied separately to each of them, and if that would debar one or more of them, but not all, the court shall direct that any person who would be so debarred shall be excluded from those for whom the action is brought unless it is shown that if the action were brought exclusively for the benefit of that person it would not be defeated by a defence of limitation (whether in consequence of section 22, or an agreement between the parties not to raise the defence, or otherwise).(Replaced 67 of 1976 s. 5)[cf. 1975 c. 54 s. 1 U.K.] 30. Court’s power to override time limits (1) If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which— (Amended L.N. 307 of 1998)(a) the provisions of section 27 or 28 prejudice the plaintiff or any person whom he represents; and(b) any decision of the court under this subsection would prejudice the defendant or any person whom he represents,the court may direct that those provisions shall not apply to the action, or shall not apply to any specified cause of action to which the action relates.(2) The court shall not under this section disapply section 28(2) except where the reason why the person injured could no longer maintain an action was because of the time limit in section 27; so that if, for example, the person injured could at his death no longer maintain an action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) because of the time limit under the Carriage by Air Ordinance (Cap. 500), the court has no power to direct that section 28(2) shall not apply. (Amended 13 of 1997 s. 20)(3) In acting under this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular to—(a) the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the plaintiff;(b) the extent to which, having regard to the delay, the evidence adduced or likely to be adduced by the plaintiff or the defendant is or is likely to be less cogent than if the action had been brought within the time allowed by section 27 or 28, as the case may be;(c) the conduct of the defendant after the cause of action arose, including the extent, if any, to which he responded to requests reasonably made by the plaintiff for information or inspection for the purpose of ascertaining facts which were or might be relevant to the plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant;(d) the duration of any disability of the plaintiff arising after the date of the accrual of the cause of action;(e) the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once he knew whether or not the act or omission of the defendant, to which the injury was attributable, might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damages;(f) the steps, if any taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of any such advice he may have received.(4) In a case where the person injured died when, because of section 27, he could no longer maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the injury, the court shall have regard in particular to the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the deceased.(5) In a case under subsection (4), or any other case where the time limit, or one of the time limits, depends on the date of knowledge of a person other than the plaintiff, subsection (3) shall have effect with appropriate modifications, and shall have effect in particular as if references to the plaintiff included references to any person whose date of knowledge is or was relevant in determining a time limit.(6) A direction by the court disapplying the provisions of section 28(2) shall operate to disapply the provisions to the same effect in section 3 of the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22).(7) In this section the court (法院) means the court in which the action has been brought.(8) References in this section to section 27 include references to that section as extended by any provision of this Part and Part IV.(Replaced 67 of 1976 s. 5)[cf. 1975 c. 54 s. 1 U.K.]Actions in respect of Latent Damage not Involving Personal Injuries 31. Special time limit for negligence actions where facts relevant to cause of action are not known at date of accrual (1) This section applies to any action for damages for negligence, other than one to which section 27 applies, where the earliest date on which the plaintiff or any person in whom the cause of action was vested before him first had both—(a) the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant damage; and(b) a right to bring such an action,(referred to in this section as the date of knowledge) falls after the date on which the cause of action accrued.(2) The period of limitation prescribed by section 4(1) in respect of actions founded on tort shall not apply to an action to which this section applies.(3) An action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the expiration of the period applicable in accordance with subsection (4).(4) That period is either—(a) 6 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued;

or(b) 3 years from the date of knowledge, if that period expires later than the period mentioned in paragraph (a).(5) In subsection (1) the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant damage (就有關損害而提出損害賠償訴訟所需的知悉) means knowledge— (a) of such facts about the damage in respect of which damages are claimed as would lead a reasonable person who had suffered such damage to consider it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment; (b) that the damage was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence; (c) of the identity of the defendant; and (d) if it is alleged that the act or omission was that of a person other than the defendant, of the identity of that person and the additional facts supporting the bringing of an action against the defendant. (6) Knowledge that any acts or omissions did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence is irrelevant for the purposes of subsection (1).(7) For the purposes of this section or section 33 a person’s knowledge includes knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire—(a) from facts observable or ascertainable by him; or(b) from facts ascertainable by him with the help of appropriate expert advice which it is reasonable for him to seek,but a person shall not be taken by virtue of this subsection or section 33 to have knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice.(Added 31 of 1991 s. 13)[cf. 1980 c. 58 s. 14A U.K.] 32. Overriding time limit for negligence actions not involving personal injuries (1) An action for damages for negligence, other than one to which section 27 applies, shall not be brought after the expiration of 15 years from the date (or, if more than one, from the last of the dates) on which there occurred any act or omission—(a) which is alleged to constitute negligence; and(b) to which the damage in respect of which damages are claimed is alleged to be attributable (in whole or in part).(2) This section bars the right of action in a case to which subsection (1) applies notwithstanding that—(a) the cause of action has not yet accrued; or(b) where section 31 applies to the action, the date which is for the purposes of that section the date of knowledge has not yet occurred,before the end of the period of limitation prescribed by this section.(Added 31 of 1991 s. 13)[cf. 1980 c. 58 s. 14B U.K.] 33. (Repealed 67 of 1976 s. 5) Part IV General 34. (Repealed 17 of 2010 s. 112) 35. New claims in pending actions: rules of court (1) For the purposes of this Ordinance, any new claim made in the course of any action shall be deemed to be a separate action and to have been commenced—(a) in the case of a new claim made in or by way of third party proceedings, on the date on which those proceedings were commenced; and(b) in the case of any other new claim, on the same date as the original action.(2) In this section a new claim means any claim by way of set-off or counterclaim, and any claim involving either—(a) the addition or substitution of a new cause of action; or(b) the addition or substitution of a new party, (Amended L.N. 446 of 1994)and third party proceedings (第三方法律程序) means any proceedings brought in the course of any action by any party to the action against a person not previously a party to the action, other than proceedings brought by joining any such person as defendant to any claim already made in the original action by the party bringing the proceedings.(3) Except as provided by section 30 or by rules of court, the court shall not allow a new claim within subsection (1)(b), other than an original set-off or counterclaim, to be made in the course of any action after the expiry of any time limit under this Ordinance which would affect a new action to enforce that claim.(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), a claim is an original set-off or an original counterclaim if it is a claim made by way of set-off or (as the case may be) by way of counterclaim by a party who has not previously made any claim in the action.(5) Rules of court may provide for allowing a new claim to which subsection (3) applies to be made as there mentioned, but only if the conditions specified in subsection (6) are satisfied, and subject to any further restrictions the rules may impose.(6) The conditions referred to in subsection (5) are—(a) in the case of a claim involving a new cause of action, if the new cause of action arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as a cause of action in respect of which relief has already been claimed in the action by the party applying for leave to make the amendment; and(b) in the case of a claim involving a new party, if the addition or substitution of the new party is necessary for the determination of the original action.(7) The addition or substitution of a new party shall not be regarded for the purposes of subsection (6)(b) as necessary for the determination of the original action unless either— (Amended L.N. 446 of 1994)(a) the new party is substituted for a party whose name was given in any claim made in the original action in mistake for the new party’s name; or(b) any claim already made in the original action cannot be maintained by or against an existing party unless the new party is joined or substituted as plaintiff or defendant in that action. (Amended L.N. 446 of 1994)(8) Subject to subsection (5), rules of court may provide for allowing a party to any action to claim relief in a new capacity in respect of a new cause of action notwithstanding that he had no title to make that claim at the date of the commencement of the action.(9) Subsection (8) shall not be taken as prejudicing the power of rules of court to provide for allowing a party to claim relief in a new capacity without adding or substituting a new cause of action.(10) Subsections (3) to (9) shall apply in relation to a new claim made in the course of third party proceedings as if those proceedings were the original action, and subject to such other modifications as may be prescribed by rules of court in any case or class of case.(11) The power to make rules of court under section 54 of the Supreme Court Ordinance (Cap. 4) shall include power to make rules of court for the purposes of this section.(12) Rules of court made before the commencement# of the Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance 1984 (58 of 1984) which would have been validly made had this section been in operation when they were made shall have effect as from the commencement# of the Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance 1984 (58 of 1984) as if made by virtue of this section.(Replaced 58 of 1984 s. 2)[cf. 1980 c. 58 s. 35 U.K.] Editorial Note: # Commencement date: 27 July 1984. 36. Acquiescence Nothing in this Ordinance shall affect any equitable jurisdiction to refuse relief on the ground of acquiescence or otherwise.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 29 U.K.] 37. Application to the Crown Save as in this Ordinance otherwise expressly provided and without prejudice to the provisions of section 40, this Ordinance shall apply to proceedings by or against the Crown in like manner as it applies to proceedings between subjects:Provided that this Ordinance shall not apply to any proceedings by the Crown for the recovery of any tax or duty or interest thereon or to any forfeiture proceedings under the Dutiable Commodities Ordinance (Cap. 109) or any Ordinance relating to duties of excise or to any proceedings in respect of the forfeiture of a ship.[cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 30(1) U.K.] 38. Transitional provisions and provisions as to actions already barred (1) Sections 22(2) and (2A), 27, 28, 29 and 30 shall have effect in relation to causes of action which accrued before, as well as causes of action which accrue on or after, 1 February 1977 and shall have effect in relation to any cause of action which accrued before 1 February 1977 notwithstanding that an action in respect thereof has been commenced and is pending on 1 February 1977. (Replaced 67 of 1976 s. 6)(2) For the purposes of this section an action shall not be taken to be pending at any time if a final order or judgment has been made or given therein, notwithstanding that an appeal is pending or that the time for appealing has not expired. (Replaced 67 of 1976 s. 6)(3) A decision taken at any time by a court to grant, or not to grant, leave under the former sections 27 to 33 inclusive (which, so far as they relate to leave, are repealed by the Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance 1976 (67 of 1976)) does not affect the determination of any question in proceedings under the Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance 1976 (67 of 1976), but in such proceedings account may be taken of evidence admitted in proceedings under the said sections repealed by the Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance 1976 (67 of 1976). (Replaced 67 of 1976 s. 6. Amended L.N. 587 of 1995) (3A) In this section action (訴訟) includes any proceedings in a court of law, an arbitration and a claim by way of set-off or counterclaim. (Added 67 of 1976 s. 6)(4) Save as aforesaid, nothing in this Ordinance shall—(a) affect any action or arbitration commenced before the commencement* of this Ordinance or the title to any property which is the subject of any such action or arbitration; or(b) enable any action to be brought which, immediately before the commencement* of this Ordinance, was then barred by the provision of any imperial enactment or Ordinance which ceases to apply in the Colony by virtue of or, as the case may be, is repealed by section 39, except in so far as the cause of action or right of action may be revived by an acknowledgment or part payment made in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance. [cf. 1939 c. 21 s. 33 U.K.](5) Subject to the provisions of section 6 and subsection (4) of this section, the time for bringing proceedings in respect of a cause of action which accrued before the commencement* of this Ordinance shall, if it has not then already expired, expire at a time when it would have expired apart from the provisions of this Ordinance or at any time when it would have expired if the provisions of this Ordinance had at all material times been in force, whichever is the later:Provided that where a cause of action, for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Ordinance, has accrued before the commencement of this Ordinance in any case in which, but for the provisions of this Ordinance, no time for bringing proceedings in respect thereof is limited, the time for bringing such proceedings, as limited by the provisions of this Ordinance, shall commence to run from the date of the coming into operation of this Ordinance. [cf. 1954 c. 36 s. 7(1) U.K.][cf. 1975 c. 54 s. 3 U.K.] Editorial Note: * Commencement date: 11 June 1965. 38A. Transitional provisions relating to 1991 amendments (1) The time for bringing proceedings in respect of a cause of action—(a) to recover any land;(b) to redeem mortgaged land;(c) to recover any principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge on property, or to recover proceeds of the sale of land; or(d) to foreclose on mortgaged personal property,which accrued before 1 July 1991 shall, if it has not then already expired, expire at the time when it would have expired apart from the provisions of the Limitation (Amendment) Ordinance 1991 (31 of 1991).(2) Nothing in section 22A, 31 or 32 shall—(a) enable any action to be brought which was barred by this Ordinance before 1 July 1991; or(b) affect any action commenced before 1 July 1991.(3) Subject to subsection (2), sections 22A, 31 and 32 shall have effect in relation to causes of action accruing before, as well as in relation to causes of action accruing on or after, 1 July 1991.(Added 31 of 1991 s. 14)[cf. 1980 c. 58 s. 4 U.K.] 39. Cessations of application The imperial enactments set out in the first column of the Schedule shall, to the extent specified in the second column thereof, cease to apply in the Colony. 40. Saving This Ordinance shall not apply to any action or arbitration for which a period of limitation is prescribed by or under any other Ordinance or any imperial enactment, or to any action or arbitration to which the Crown is a party and for which, if it were between subjects, a period of limitation would be prescribed by or under any other enactment.(Amended 67 of 1976 s. 8) Schedule [s. 39]Cessation of Application of Enactments Imperial enactments Extent of cessation of application An Act concerning Informers (1588 c. 5 U.K.) Section 5 The Limitation Act 1623 (1623 c. 16 U.K.) Sections 3, 4 and 7 An Act for the amendment of the Law and the better Advancement of Justice (1705 c. 3 U.K.) Sections 17 to 19 The Crown Suits Act 1769 (1769 c. 16 U.K.) The whole Act The Statute of Frauds Amendment Act 1828 (1828 c. 14 U.K.) Sections 1, 3, 4 and 8 The Real Property Limitation Act 1833 (1833 c. 27 U.K.) The whole Act The Civil Procedure Act 1833 (1833 c. 42 U.K.) Sections 3 to 7 The Real Property Limitation Act 1837 (1837 c. 28 U.K.) The whole Act The Limitations of Actions and Costs Act 1842 (1842 c. 97 U.K.) Section 5