TCA § 16-15-726 — Remittitur

If the sum found for either plaintiff or defendant exceeds the jurisdiction of the general sessions court, that party may remit the excess, and take judgment for the residue, but the party cannot afterwards sue for the amount so remitted. Code 1858, § 4161; Shan., § 5974; Code 1932, § 10175; impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 68, §§ 2, 3; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 19-418; Acts 1993, ch. 241, § 42; T.C.A., § 19-1-114 . Cross-References. Additur, § 20-10-101 . Remittitur, §§ 20-10-102 , 20-10-103 . NOTES TO DECISIONS 1. Purpose. 2. Remittitur before Justice — Necessity. 3. Interest Making Excess. 4. Appeal in Nature of Writ of Error. 5. Weight of Jury's Determinations. 6. Power of Trial Judges. 7. Scope of Review. 1. Purpose. The remittitur and additur statutes were enacted for the purpose of giving the plaintiff, in the case of remittiturs, and the defendant, in the case of additurs, the right to accept, under protest and appeal, a right that had been denied those respective classes of litigants by case law prior to the enactment of such statutes. Smith v. Shelton, 569 S.W.2d 421, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. 1978), overruled in part, Foster v. Amcon International, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 142, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. 1981), superseded by statute as stated in, Palanki v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 S.W.3d 380, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 2. Remittitur before Justice — Necessity. The defendant, before judgment, may remit the excess over the justice's jurisdiction, and take a valid judgment upon his setoff for a sum within the justice's (now general sessions judge's) jurisdiction; but if the remittitur is not made before the justice, it cannot be made upon appeal in the circuit court to give jurisdiction. Crow v. Cunningham, 45 Tenn. 255, 1868 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1868). 3. Interest Making Excess. If interest on the judgment makes an excess, the circuit court may render a judgment including it though it is in excess of the justice's (now general sessions judge's) jurisdiction. Patterson v. Sheffield, 54 Tenn. 373, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1872). 4. Appeal in Nature of Writ of Error. Where a case is tried with the intervention of a jury, the appeal is expressly governed by § 27-3-108 (repealed) , being in the nature of a writ of error, and neither the trial judge's disagreement with the amount of the jury verdict, nor acceptance of a remittitur or additur rather than a new trial, provides a basis for the application of § 27-3-103 (repealed) . Smith v. Shelton, 569 S.W.2d 421, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. 1978), overruled in part, Foster v. Amcon International, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 142, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. 1981), superseded by statute as stated in, Palanki v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 S.W.3d 380, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 5. Weight of Jury's Determinations. Appellate review of a trial judge's actions in making use of remittitur or additur resolves into a determination of whether or not the jury verdict is within the range of reasonableness established by the credible proof, and throughout the review the jury's determinations should be given primary weight and the trial judge's secondary weight. Smith v. Shelton, 569 S.W.2d 421, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. 1978), overruled in part, Foster v. Amcon International, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 142, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. 1981), superseded by statute as stated in, Palanki v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 S.W.3d 380, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 6. Power of Trial Judges. It is the exclusive province of the jury to assess damages within the range of reasonableness established by the credible proof; and trial judges are without authority to reduce or increase jury verdicts that are between the upper and lower limits of that range, but if a trial judge sitting as thirteenth juror cannot approve a jury verdict that is within the range of reasonableness established by the credible proof, he has the authority to order a new trial, but not to increase or reduce the verdict. Smith v. Shelton, 569 S.W.2d 421, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. 1978), overruled in part, Foster v. Amcon International, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 142, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. 1981), superseded by statute as stated in, Palanki v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 S.W.3d 380, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 7. Scope of Review. If it is determined on appeal that the jury's verdict is within the range of reasonableness or that both the jury's and the trial judge's awards are within that range, the appellate court must restore the jury verdict; if only the trial judge's award is within the range, it must be affirmed; if neither are within the range of reasonableness, the court of appeals should make appropriate use of remittitur or additur and render judgment within the range of reasonableness based upon the credible proof of damages. Smith v. Shelton, 569 S.W.2d 421, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 619 (Tenn. 1978), overruled in part, Foster v. Amcon International, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 142, 1981 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. 1981), superseded by statute as stated in, Palanki v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 S.W.3d 380, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 731 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).