AI-assisted research summary: If land or an interest in it is covered by § 28-2-105, no person and the State of Tennessee may bring or continue a court action to recover it.
Where such land or interest therein is held as set out in § 28-2-105 , no person, whether upon disability or not, nor the state of Tennessee, shall commence or sustain an action for the recovery of same in any court. Acts 1923, ch. 90, § 2; Shan. Supp., § 4460a2; Code 1932, § 8587; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-206. Cross-References. Adverse possession, assurance of title, § 28-2-105 . Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Adverse Possession, § 51. Law Reviews. Adverse Possession and the Presumption of Title (R.D. Cox), 11 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 1. NOTES TO DECISIONS 1. Application and Scope. 2. Commencement of Period. 3. Against State. 4. Owner of Land Under Disability. 1. Application and Scope. Sections 28-2-105, 28-2-106 do not save any person from the operation thereof. Savely v. Bridges, 57 Tenn. App. 372, 418 S.W.2d 472, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967). 2. Commencement of Period. Deeds by father and stepmother of pretermitted son of testatrix which conveyed farm to third party and back to them as tenants by the entireties would not cause statute of limitations to run against pretermitted son where son had remainder in fee simple under pretermitted child statute after father's life estate by curtesy and son had no notice, either actual or constructive, of father's intention to defeat his remainder interest. Young v. Young, 48 Tenn. App. 645, 349 S.W.2d 545, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961). 3. Against State. Sections 28-2-105, 28-2-106 specifically apply against the State. Whitaker v. House, 213 Tenn. 61, 372 S.W.2d 194, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 495 (1963). 4. Owner of Land Under Disability. Adverse possession under the statute of limitations will not confer title where the owner of the land is under disability, and one claiming title by adverse possession must necessarily make out his case by showing the facts necessary to confer title. Davis v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 147 Tenn. 1, 244 S.W. 483, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1922). Trial court properly determined that suit to set aside a warranty deed was not barred by the statute of limitations due to the property seller's history of drug and alcohol abuse, which rendered the seller mentally incompetent, and T.C.A. § 28-2-106 was the applicable statute. Owen v. Summers, 97 S.W.3d 114, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 953 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Grantee stated a legally sufficient defense of adverse possession where she alleged that she and her predecessors in interest possessed the subject property adversely and exclusively in excess of seven years and had color of title through the succession of quitclaim deeds; T.C.A. § 28-2-106 did not apply as the property was in the name of an adult trustee, and therefore was not considered to be laboring under a disability and the prescriptive period for purposes of adverse possession was not tolled. Brewer v. Piggee, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 406 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2007).