Morton, M. v. Black, D.R. [1987] FCA 211
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- Australia
- Posture
- General Division / Evidentiary Ruling During Trial
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Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The Commonwealth Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 covers the field, and there was no evidence its terms had been infringed; thus, there is no proper basis for a claim of privilege, and the witness should answer the question.
Court disposition
Ruling: Witness directed to answer question; privilege claim dismissed.
Orders
- Witness is directed to answer the question.
02
Material facts
Parties
Mary Morton
ApplicantDonald Ross Black
RespondentMr. Brereton
Applicant's Counsel Counsel: Mr. BreretonMr. Gullotta
Respondent's Counsel Counsel: Mr. GullottaMr. Saunders
Witness03
Procedural history
Posture
General Division / Evidentiary Ruling During Trial
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether evidence of a telephone conversation overheard by a witness was admissible
- 02
Whether privilege against self-incrimination applied
- 03
Whether Commonwealth or NSW legislation was infringed
Party arguments
- Applicant
- Mr. Brereton submitted that the witness should answer the question, as there was no proper basis for a claim of privilege since there was no infringement of either the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 or the Listening Devices Act No. 69 of 1984.
- Respondent
- Mr. Gullotta suggested that the action and giving of evidence would contravene Commonwealth and NSW legislation, and the witness claimed privilege based on potential incrimination.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Miller v Miller (1978) 141 C.L.R. 269
Where the Commonwealth legislation covers the field, the State Act does not apply.
- 02
Court's reasoning
Privilege against self-incrimination does not arise where there is no proper basis for asserting statutory infringement.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The Commonwealth Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 covers the field, and there was no evidence its terms had been infringed; thus, there is no proper basis for a claim of privilege, and the witness should answer the question.
Obiter and limits
- The provision in the earlier Act referred to party lines and is not applicable to an extension phone.
Court disposition
Ruling: Witness directed to answer question; privilege claim dismissed.
- Witness is directed to answer the question.
Source and reliance status
Official court record
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Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Court record
Judgment
ail
NOT SUITABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY No. G.345 of 1985
eee es
GENERAL DIVISION
BETWEEN:
MARY MORTON
Applicant
AND:
DONALD ROSS BLACK
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BURCHETT J.
Mr. Brereton has sought to adduce evidence from the witness Mr. Saunders concerning things said in the course of a telephone conversation when Mr. Saunders was asked by one of the participants in the conversation to listen in on an extension telephone, the evidence suggesting that the other participant in the conversation was unaware of that request and of his compliance with it. Mr. Gullotta has suggested that the action evidenced, and the giving of the evidence, would contravene a
Commonwealth Act, the Telecommunications (Interception) Act,
1979, and also the NSW state legislation being the Listening
Devices Act No. 69 of 1984,
I have already ruled that I think the evidence is
admissible, but Mr. Gullotta having raised the question, the
witness has now claimed privilege on the basis that the answer
2.
might incriminate him. In response to that claim, Mr. Brereton has submitted that I should direct the witness to answer the question on the footing that there is no proper basis for a claim of privilege since there was no infringment of either of the
Acts.
In my opinion, having regard to what was said in the
High Court in Miller v. Miller (1978) 141 C.L.R. 269, the State
Act cannot be regarded as applicable to the events which have been referred to in the evidence. Miller v. Miller was concerned with an earlier version of the Commonwealth Act, but the only ground of distinction suggested is that in sub-section (3) of s.4 of the earlier Act, which is set out at p.274 of the report of Miller's case, there was a provision which does not appear in the present Act. However, I think that provision clearly referred to party lines, and is not applicable to the situation of an extension. I do not think that it affects any of the questions of principle discussed in the judgments in the High Court, nor do I think it affects the applicability of the decision of the High Court to the circumstances of the present case, which are quite
similar to those dealt with in that case.
I therefore think it is clear that for relevant purposes the Commonwealth legislation must be regarded as covering the field. So far as the Commonwealth Act is concerned, it does not appear to me that there is any basis for holding that it has been infringed, and indeed when I drew counsel's attention to the terms of s.6 no submission was directed to showing that those
terms had in fact been infringed. Accordingly it does not seem
we
3.
to me that the prohibition dependent upon the terms of s.6 could
itself be held to have been disobeyed.
In the circumstances I accept Mr. Brereton's submission that there is no propér basis for a claim of privilege and I
direct the witness to answer the question.
I certify that' this and the preceding two (2) pages are a ' true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour Mr. Justice Burchett.
enn Gil Associate '
Dated: 28 April, 1987.
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