TB8-23066

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-23066 TB8-23067 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal

XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision July 29, 2020 Date de la décision Panel Patricia Broad Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Rodney L. Woolf Barrister and Solicitor Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre

REASONS FOR DECISION

OVERVIEW [1] The Appellants are a husband (XXXX XXXX XXXX/the Principal Appellant) and a wife (XXXX XXXX/the Associate Appellant) who claim that they are Convention refugees and/or persons in need of protection. Their claims were denied by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), and they have appealed to the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD).

DECISION [2] I dismiss the appeal. The Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection.

BACKGROUND [3] The Appellants base their claims on the following. [4] The Principal Appellant was born in Afghanistan in 1990, and, in 1992, his family moved to India. His father started a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The Principal Appellant was educated and raised in India. He became involved XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. He married the Associate Appellant XXXX XXXX2015. [5] His father went back to Afghanistan to try to recover some property. However, he was unsuccessful. [6] The Principal Appellant's father was not able to acquire Indian citizenship. His lawyer told him that, as he was a citizen of Afghanistan, he would not acquire it, so the Principal Appellant's father acquired passports from an agent. The Principal Appellant used the passport to travel about 15-20 times1 and to apply for visas for business travel. [7] In 1996, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan refused to recognize the Principal Appellant's family. A powerful man took possession of their property. A cousin of the Principal Appellant's father did go to Afghanistan to try to repossess his property and that of the Principal Appellant's father. He was killed. [8] In 2012, the Principal Appellant XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The business was doing poorly. By 2015, they had a large debt. In mid-2015, a union boss called XXXX XXXX contacted the Principal Appellant and said that, if they were not paid the money owed to the union, XXXX

XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The Principal Appellant tried to negotiate with the union boss but could not do so. The union boss told him that he had to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX If the Principal Appellant did not, XXXX would use his connections. Further, he would kidnap the Associate Appellant or arrange for the Appellants' accidental death. [9] The Appellants came to Canada in XXXX2017. While in Canada the Principal Appellant's father warned them not to come back to India, as they still owed XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and their lives are at risk. [10] The Associate Appellant is from India and bases her claim on that of the Principal Appellant.

NEW EVIDENCE AND HEARING [11] The new evidence consists of the following: (a) a printout from the website of the RCMP Identity Theft and Identity Fraud Victim Assistance Guide.2 [12] According to the law,3 I can only accept evidence that: (i) arose after the RPD's decision; or (ii) was not reasonably available at the time of the decision; or (iii) that you could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to bring to the RPD before its decision. [13] If the evidence meets one or more of these requirements, I must decide if the evidence is new, credible and relevant before I can accept it.4 [14] The RPD placed a significant amount of weight on the credibility of the Principal Appellant's assertion that he was told by Immigration to report his lost passport, although it was a false passport. Although this was discussed at the hearing, I have considered whether it would have been reasonable for the Appellants to provide this printout before the date of rejection or the date of decision, which is August 23, 2018. In this case, and in these circumstances, I find it unlikely that the Appellants could have anticipated that the RPD would place so much weight on this finding. For these reasons, it would not have been reasonable for the Appellants to provide the printout before the rejection and the printout is in evidence. Late evidence [15] After the Appellants provided the

Appellants' Record, they also provided a partial copy of the Principal Appellant's Afghanistan passport that was issued after the RPD's decision. [16] The Notice of Appeal was received by the RAD on September 18, 2018. The Appellant provided the pages from the passport well over 30 days since it was received by the RAD. Counsel had requested an extension of time to perfect the appeal, and it was perfected on November 23, 2018. After the RAD received the passport, it wrote a letter on December 18, 2018 informing the Appellants that it was returning the passport, as there was no application for late evidence. To date, the Appellants have not provided an application in accordance with Rule 37 of the RAD Rules to seek to submit the passport under Rule 29. For this reason, the passport is not introduced into evidence. [17] However, even if the Appellants had provided an application in accordance with Rule 29, there are significant flaws with the evidence that would lead to not allowing it onto the record in accordance with subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA or Act) and the Raza principles cited in Singh.5 [18] In an abundance of caution, I have considered the passport. Specifically, the evidence consists of two pages of a passport and cover, which are of poor quality. Needless to say, if it is late evidence, and there is no application, it is not

entered into evidence. The Appellants did not respond to the RAD letter; the pages of the Afghanistan passport are not entered into evidence. [19] Even if I did not consider it as late evidence, it would not meet the requirements of new evidence. Considerations regarding the source and circumstances of this document apply to assess the credibility of it.6 [20] The passport is dated October 18, 2018; it was acquired after the RPD's decision. There are only two pages of it; one page does not have any identifying information other than the Principal Appellant's height on it. It states that there are 50 pages on the passport. There is no occupation identified. Most of the rest of the page is blank. They only description of any physical attribute is the height noted at 165 cm. It does not have any other sections of physical attributes noted and does not have any other sections containing information regarding the physical description of the holder. On the face of it, it does not appear to be a complete copy of the page. Further, many pages of the passport are missing. This calls into question the source and the circumstances of the document. It is not credible on the face of it; there are only a few pages with much of the pertinent data missing. In addition, it is not relevant as, for reasons given later in the decision, I find that, even if the Principal Appellant is a citizen of

Afghanistan, the Appellants do not have a well-founded fear of persecution in India. [21] For these reasons, even if the Afghanistan passport was not new evidence without an application, it would not be accepted into evidence. Hearing [22] I have considered whether the RAD would hold a hearing because of the new evidence. However, I do not find that the print-out raises a significant credibility concern, is central to the decision, nor does it provide a reason to allow or dismiss the appeal.7 It is evidence to support the Appellants' account of what happened to their passports. However, there are other reasons that this appeal is not allowed. Further, it does not raise a significant credibility concern; the passport is but one consideration. For these reasons, the RAD will not conduct a hearing.

ANALYSIS [23] I have conducted an independent assessment of the evidence and arguments. This review includes listening to the entire recording of the RPD hearing. This recording is on record. Is the Appellant a citizen of Afghanistan? [24] The Appellant claims that he was born in Afghanistan. It is possible that the Appellant could have been born in Afghanistan, but there is no birth certificate, and the documentation that has been provided was recently issued. [25] In the Appellants' Memorandum, they argue that the statement from the Afghan Embassy8 is sufficient to find that the Principal Appellant's Afghan Citizen ID (Tazkira) is genuine. The statement is dated December 27, 2017. The Tazkira appears to have been issued in Canada on November 8, 2017.9 It is more likely than not that the Principal Appellant acquired this document while in Canada. However, even with the letter from the consulate, there are some issues with it. It is unclear why the Principal Appellant would not have attempted to acquire one earlier. There is only one wet seal; according to documentary evidence, there is supposed to be two wet seals.10 That being said, the one wet seal is partially over the photo, which is akin to a security feature.11 [26] Even if the Principal Appellant was a citizen of Afghanistan, there is insufficient evidence that he would face serious harm or be a person in need of

protection in Afghanistan. The Appellant alleges that, if he were to return Afghanistan, the powerful XXXX XXXX would perceive that he was there to reacquire the land and would have him killed. I find that this is speculative. While a cousin was killed when he returned, he did return to reclaim the land. There is insufficient evidence that the agent of persecution would conclude that the Principal Appellant was there to reclaim his land if he made no attempt to do so. I do not question the motivation of the agent of persecution and that, if the Principal Appellant tried to take the land, he would retaliate. However, that XXXX XXXX would conclude that the Principal Appellant was in Afghanistan to reclaim the property is speculative. There is insufficient evidence that the Principal Appellant would make any attempt to reclaim the property. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that the mere presence of the Principal Appellant in Afghanistan would lead to the conclusion that he was there to reclaim his father's property. Further, in this case and in these circumstances, I do not find that reclaiming property is a fundamental human right. [27] In addition, there is insufficient credible evidence that the Appellants have a well-founded fear of persecution in India. Are the Appellants citizens of India? [28] The Appellants acknowledged that the Associate Appellant is a citizen

of India. However, although the Principal Appellant moved to India in 1992 and was raised there, he claims that he never became a citizen of India. The RPD found that the allegation that he was not a citizen of India was not plausible. The Appellants have challenged the plausibility findings. [29] The Principal Appellant states that his Indian passport was false. Their father could not acquire citizenship and had paid an agent to acquire their passports. The Principal Appellant used it to travel and to apply for visas about 15-20 times. The RPD's plausibility arguments [30] The Appellants argue that the RPD erred when it found that it was not plausible that the Immigration officials would tell the Appellant to report the loss of a false passport to the police. However, the RPD noted that the Principal Appellant had reported the loss of the false passport to the police. I find that it is not just that it is not plausible, but the Principal Appellant's explanation and behavior is not reasonable or consistent. [31] I note that implausibility findings should be made only in the clearest of cases and with showing sensitivity to cultural differences. I note that the Federal Court also found that: ...the RPD is also entitled to draw conclusions concerning an applicant's credibility based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality. It can reject evidence if it is inconsistent

with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole, or where inconsistencies are found in the evidence. ...12 [32] The same reasoning should also apply to the RAD. Similarly, I have considered if this account is consistent with the "probabilities that surround the currently existing conditions".13 As stated by the BC Court of Appeal: ... the real test of the truth of the story of a witness in such a case must be its harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions. [33] It is not legal to travel on false passports, and the police are authorities. The Appellants reported that they lost their passports at an "unknown location during an unknown time period".14 I do not find that it is consistent that the Appellants would report that their passports were missing, even if they suspected that they were stolen, to the authorities if the Principal Appellant's passport was acquired through false documentation. The issue is also that the Principal Appellant's behavior is not consistent with his allegation that the passport from India was a false passport. The Principal Appellant noted in his Basis of Claim (BOC) that his father bribed authorities to acquire the passport. However, even if it came from authorities, the Principal Appellant claims that it is a false passport

and that it is not evidence that he is a citizen of India. I do not find that this allegation is sufficient to find that he is not a citizen of India; rather, the fact that he reported the loss to authorities is evidence that weighs in favour of a finding that the Appellant is a citizen of India. In other words, it is not consistent to report the loss of a passport that is false, even if the Immigration officials have told them to do so. [34] The Appellants have argued that Canada Immigration authorities told them that they had to report the missing passports to process their claims. I have considered this argument. However, the fact that the Appellants reported their passports as lost to the police is not the only consideration that leads to the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the passports are valid. [35] I find that the new evidence does not support the Appellants' allegations. The printout from the website "Identity Theft and Identity Fraud Victim Assistance Guide - Royal Canadian Mounted Police" sets out the process in the event of the loss of a Canadian passport. The owner is advised to report it and that it is no longer valid. However, the Appellants claim that it is a false Indian passport that was lost, not a Canadian one. Further, the Principal Appellant claims that the passport was never valid. As a false passport, it should not have been used again.

The information in the printout clearly refers to valid passports, not false passports. I do not find that the printout provides weight to support a finding that it was reasonable to report the theft/loss of a false passport or likely that the Appellants would report the loss of a false passport to the police. I do not find that it provides any evidence that supports the Appellants' claims that, while the passport was false, they reported the theft to the RCMP. [36] Further, while the printout also speaks to loss of Immigration documents that may be lost, these are Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) documents. Again, I do not find that the printout provides weight to support a finding it was reasonable or likely that the Appellants would report the loss of a false passport to the police. [37] In short, the fact that the Appellants reported the passports as lost weighs in favour of a finding that the passports were valid. [38] Second, the Appellants argue that it was an error for the RPD to find that it was implausible that the Principal Appellant could travel on a "bogus passport" many times. The RPD noted that the Principal Appellant had used it about 15-20 times. According to the Principal Appellant's BOC, his father had acquired it from the authorities, so it might have been sufficient for this travel. This consideration alone would not be sufficient to find that the

passport was genuine, but it is a consideration in the context of other considerations. [39] In the Principal Appellant's Immigration forms, Schedule 12, there is a handwritten note that says: visa applied for w[ith] truthful information - false Indian [passport] - Applied for false [passport] and received though smuggler in 1996. Now when passport is reissued, client has been paying off police when they come to verify identity.15 [40] The Appellants also quote an Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) Response to Information Request (RIR)16 about the availability and prevalence of fraudulent documents to support the finding that the Appellants were able to acquire false passports. This RIR states that the most common fraudulent documents are birth certificates, driving licences, municipal documents, voter cards and ration cards. It is possible to bribe officials to get a passport, and their authenticity is more reliable than other documents. This RIR also has accounts of people being caught by authorities for issuing false passports. [41] I agree that it is possible that the passport could be false. However, there is more evidence that weighs in favour of it being a valid passport. The RIR does not explain how the Principal Appellant got through customs, applied for visas, etc. with a false passport. It was a passport that was, according to the Principal Appellant, used about

15-20 times for travel and applying for visa. This is a passport that the authorities had reviewed many times, and this consideration weighs in favour of a finding that it is valid. [42] In addition, while I have considered the fact that the father, in his affidavit, mentions the "taskara" number, he does not confirm that he had not acquired citizenship of India or that the passports are false.17 I do not give significant weight to an omission in evidence, but it is an additional consideration. [43] The Principal Appellant states that his father consulted lawyers and was told that, because they were from Afghanistan, they could not acquire citizenship.18 However, this is vague evidence and does not describe if there were any attempts to acquire the citizenship or a passport. Even the account of how the passports were acquired is vague. The Appellants did not describe which documents were false, how they acquired them and other supporting facts. [44] The Appellants argue that it is difficult to prove a negative; in other words, it is difficult to prove that he is not a citizen of India; however, the Appellants have been provided sufficient opportunity to provide evidence to show it is more likely than not that the passports are false. They have not provided any examples of how the difficulties of proving a negative would apply in this case other than stating that it is

impossible.19 The Appellants have provided an affidavit from the Principal Appellant's father which does not discuss the issues with Indian citizenship. The Appellants, although given many opportunities, have not provided further evidence. I find that they have had sufficient opportunity to provide evidence that they are not Indian citizens and have not done so. [45] Further, the documentary evidence states that, after seven years, a resident can apply for citizenship in India.20 The Appellants' evidence is vague, and the law states that the Principal Appellant would be entitled to apply for citizenship. The weight of the evidence, the fact that he used it so often without evidence of any difficulties to do so, the law itself saying that, after seven years, he would be entitled to citizenship, all weigh in favour of a finding that the Principal Appellant is a citizen of India. This must be weighed in the context of the vague and inconsistent evidence that the Principal Appellant is not a citizen of India. Even taking into consideration possible obstacles in proving a negative, the weight of the evidence is that the Principal Appellant is a citizen of India [46] In addition, the Appellants argue that the RPD erred when it placed weight on the fact that the Principal Appellant listed his mother as Indian citizen on a visa application and rejected the explanation that he did so

because he was afraid that, if he listed her as a citizen of Afghanistan, he would not obtain a visa. The RPD noted that the Principal Appellant was not travelling with his mother; this weighed against the likelihood the visa would be refused. In other words, there was no reason to lie about the mother's place of birth on the certificate; the Principal Appellant would not have to lie in order to acquire his visa. I have considered the evidence, and I do not see how listing his mother as a citizen of India instead of Afghanistan would interfere with the application for a Canadian Visa. [47] The Appellant has argued that it his fear that led him to do it. In his memorandum, Counsel writes that: ... It may well be that the Appellant had a completely incorrect view of how and why a visa application might be rejected; while this might speak to his sophistication, or knowledge of immigration procedures, it does not form the basis for an implausibility finding. ... the fact that a refugee claimant has an incorrect understanding of the visa application process does not damage his credibility.21 [48] I find that this is worded in a speculative manner. Counsel writes that it "might" be a reflection of the Appellants' knowledge and that "a", not "the", refugee claimant's incorrect understanding of immigration is not a reason to find that he is not credible. The Principal Appellant has not

provided an affidavit that he did not understand the Immigration process. Rather, he has provided evidence that he is a sophisticated traveller. [49] According to the Minister's submission to the RPD, it was the mother who stated that she was from India. This is supported by the evidence. The Principal Appellant's mother's application for a visit to Canada in 2006 states that it was the mother who was applying with her son for a visa, and she put in that she was born in India.22 I do not see how listing his mother as a citizen of India instead of Afghanistan would interfere with the visa application. [50] Further, even if the Principal Appellant would have to renounce citizenship of Afghanistan to the Indian authorities,23 the evidence regarding whether Afghanistan does recognize dual citizenship is mixed.24 There is insufficient evidence to conclude that applying for and acquiring Indian citizenship necessarily leads to the conclusion that the Principal Appellant would lose his Afghanistan citizenship in the eyes of Afghanistan. Further, the Principal Appellant did not state why he would want to retain his Afghanistan citizenship. [51] The Principal Appellant has a passport from India, lived there, was educated there and had a company there. In more than one document his mother is listed as having been born there. The law states that one may apply for Indian citizenship if one

lives there for seven years. The evidence to dispute that he is a citizen of India is vague, although the Appellants have had many opportunities to provide further evidence. The weight of the evidence supports a conclusion that the Principal Appellant has Indian citizenship. For these reasons, I find that it is more likely than not that the Principal Appellant is a citizen of India. Is there sufficient credible evidence that the Appellants have a well-founded fear of persecution in India? [52] I have considered whether there is sufficient credible evidence that the Appellants are Convention refugees from India. I find that the Appellants had raised this issue when they argued that three plausibility findings are not sufficient to rebut presumption of truthfulness and that the Appellants are credible.25 [53] Further, they argued the following at paragraph 33 of the Appellant's Memorandum: Second, the RPD's reasoning reflects the panel's continued disregard for the presumption of truthfulness. The panel wrote that it has "insufficient evidence" to find that the allegations are true. The Appellants provided their own detailed narratives, specific testimony, and clear documents. Unless the RPD had good reason to disbelieve this evidence, it was obligated to presume that it is true. It is not open to the RPD to simply dismiss it as "insufficient" - such an analysis is not compatible

with the presumption of truthfulness, and is an error in law.26 [54] This is consistent with their statement which identifies an RPD error by ignoring relevant evidence. I find that the Appellants have raised the issue of the assessment of the evidence and will address it in the decision. As the Appellants have argued that they are Convention refugees, I have considered the evidence as part of my independent assessment.27 [55] Aside from the credibility issues already mentioned, the evidence about the threat from the union boss is not credible, as it is not consistent. In the BOC, the Appellants state that the arrangement was the Appellants were to XXXX XXXX XXXX to the union if they could not pay. They could not pay, so they XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. This is evidence that the debt was paid by XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. Then the Principal Appellant XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. However, this is not consistent with the account of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in the BOC. [56] Further, although the father was the owner of the company and the Appellants state he had told them to stay away, the affidavit from the father is not consistent with the description of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The father states in the affidavit that there were financial problems and calls from a supplier; XXXX XXXX XXXX

XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The Principal Appellant offered contradictory reasoning about the union boss, stating that the union boss had connections with the suppliers, but this evidence was unclear.28 It is more likely than not that the father is not describing the same agent of persecution that the Appellants are describing. This, in turn, undermines the credibility of the claim about the union boss. [57] In addition, I note that there is a significant period of time between when the Appellants were first threatened and when they left. In the BOC narrative, the Appellants claim that they were first threatened in 2015. However, they did not leave until 2017. The Principal Appellant states that there was a period of negotiations, but the evidence about what transpired between the Appellants and the agent of persecution during a significant period of time is too vague to be credible. There are no accounts of interaction. Again, the Appellants were represented by Counsel at the hearing and have had numerous and adequate opportunities to present sufficient evidence. Summary of lack of evidence for India [58] The mere fact that the RPD proceeds first with the questioning is not sufficient to alleviate the Appellants of their obligation to provide sufficient credible evidence to support their claim. They have not provided sufficient evidence to

show that it is more likely than not that the events they described occurred. This is in the context of a lack of credibility on other issues. For this reason, I find that there is insufficient evidence that the Appellants are Convention refugees. The Associate Appellant's claim [59] The Appellants have argued that the RPD erred when it did not independently assess and address the Associate Appellant 's claim. However, they have not produced any independent argument or evidence for her. Again, there is no dispute that the Associate Appellant is a citizen of India. Further, the Associate Appellant's claim is dependent on the claim of the Principal Appellant. Having reviewed the argument, I see no grounds for any other claim for her. As there is insufficient evidence for the claim of the Principal Appellant, there is also insufficient credible evidence for the Associate Appellant. Are the Appellants persons in need of protection? [60] I note that there is also insufficient evidence that the Appellants are persons in need of protection. The burden of proof to establish that one is a person in need of protection is higher than that for a Convention refugee. The standard to establish that one is a Convention refugee, in accordance with section 96 of the Act, is whether there is more than a mere possibility; the standard to establish that one is a person in need of protection, in

accordance with section 97 of the Act, is whether, on a balance of probabilities, one is in need of protection. One must show that there is merely a risk of persecution under section 96. Section 97 stipulates that one must show that there is a danger of torture; alternatively, that there is a risk to one's life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The level of proof required to establish a sufficient risk is higher under section 97 than it is in section 96. As there is insufficient evidence to establish that the Appellants face more than a mere possibility of persecution in India and Afghanistan, there is also insufficient evidence that they are persons in need of protection in India and Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION [61] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. (signed) Patricia Broad Patricia Broad July 29, 2020 Date 1 Audio Recording of the RPD hearing, at 00:14:24. 2 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 8. 3 Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. 4 M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96; Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FC 385. 5 M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96. 6 The "Raza" principles as modified in Singh (ibid.). 7 Subsection 110(6) of the Act. 8 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 172. 9 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 169. 10 NDP for Afghanistan (April 30, 2018), item 3.10, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), Response to Information Request (RIR) AFG103812.E, "?Description and samples of the Tazkira booklet and the Tazkira certificate; information on security features", September 16, 2011, at p. 6. 11 NDP for Afghanistan (April 30, 2018), item 3.10 (ibid.), at p. 8. 12 Lawani, Patience v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-21-18), Gascon, September 17, 2018, 2018 FC 924, at para. 26. 13 Faryna v. Chorny, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A.), at 357, per O'Halloran J.A. 14 Exhibit

RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 214-217, Police Report. 15 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 59. 16 NPD for India (May 31, 2018), item 3.5 IRB, RIR IND104839.E, "Availability and prevalence of fraudulent identity documents, including membership cards of political parties (2011-April 2014)", May 5, 2014. 17 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 87; I note that, although this document was notarized, the deponent did not swear that it was true. However, for the purpose of this decision, I have called it an affidavit as the Appellants have done so. 18 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, BOC, at p. 18. 19 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Appellants' Memorandum, at paragraph 32. 20 NDP for India (May 31, 2018), item 3.2, India, "Citizenship Rules, 2009", 2009. 21 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 20, Appellants' Memorandum, at paragraph 25. 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 135. 23 NPD for India (May 31, 2018), item 3.2 (supra, footnote 21). 24 NDP for Afghanistan (April 30, 2018), item 3.1, IRB, RIR AFG104269.E, "Citizenship, including legislation and whether dual citizenship is permitted (2008-2013)", February 5, 2013. 25 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, Appellants' Memorandum, at paragraph 29. 26 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 22, Appellants' Memorandum, at paragraph 33. 27 Akram, Naeem v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5353-17), Boswell, July 26, 2018, 2018 FC 785. 28 Audio Recording of the RPD

hearing, at 00:38:48. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-23066 TB8-23067 RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français