Canada Hanjiang Construction Ltd. v. Lee's Noodle House Ltd.
- Citation
- 2020 BCSC 1598
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Court
- Supreme Court of British Columbia
- Decision
- 8 October 2020
- Posture
- Builders Lien Act Application / Chambers Application (oral Reasons)
- Language
- English
More details
- Court
- Supreme Court of British Columbia
- Decision
- 8 October 2020
- Posture
- Builders Lien Act Application / Chambers Application (oral Reasons)
- Language
- English
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The 20-day suspension effected by Ministerial Order M086 applied to suspend the running of the limitation period for filing the CPL under s.33 of the Builders Lien Act; Ministerial Order M098 should not be read to eliminate that suspension, and accordingly the CPL was filed within the extended period and the defendants' application to strike it is dismissed.
Court disposition
Defendants' application to strike the certificate of pending litigation dismissed; CPL treated as timely under the suspension effected by M086.
Orders
- Dismiss the defendants' application to strike the certificate of pending litigation
- Each party to bear their own costs of the application
02
Material facts
Parties
Canada Hanjiang Construction Ltd.
Plaintiff Counsel: R. VangenneLee's Noodle House Ltd.
Defendant Counsel: W.C. Vaughan1110837 B.C. Ltd.
Defendant Counsel: W.C. VaughanAngela Lee
Defendant Counsel: W.C. VaughanShu-Mei Liu
Defendant Counsel: W.C. VaughanAmounts and remedies
- Limitation Extension Days: 20
03
Procedural history
Posture
Builders Lien Act Application / Chambers Application (oral Reasons)
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the CPL was filed within the statutory limitation period prescribed by s.33 of the Builders Lien Act
- 02
Whether ministerial orders M086 and M098 extended or suspended the limitation period applicable to a CPL under the Builders Lien Act
- 03
Whether M098 negated the 20-day suspension effected by M086
- 04
Allocation of costs given inadequate legal argument
Party arguments
- Applicant
- Plaintiff submitted M086 (March 26, 2020) suspended limitation periods for 20 days so the CPL deadline moved from May 7, 2020 to May 27, 2020; LTSA initially refused filing on May 25, 2020 but later accepted on June 3, 2020; plaintiff not seeking discretionary relief.
- Respondent
- Defendants submitted M098 (April 8, 2020) excluded the Builders Lien Act from its suspension provision so no extension applied and the CPL deadline remained May 7, 2020, rendering the CPL late.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Builders Lien Act, S.B.C. 1997, c.45, s.33
Statutory time limit for filing a certificate of pending litigation is set by s.33 of the Builders Lien Act
- 02
Ministerial Order M086 (March 26, 2020) under Emergency Program Act
Ministerial orders under the Emergency Program Act can suspend or extend limitation periods during the declared emergency
- 03
Ministerial Order M098 (April 8, 2020) and principles of statutory interpretation
A subsequent ministerial order that replaces an earlier order should not be interpreted to retroactively nullify the operative effects of the earlier order absent clear language to that effect
- 04
Builders Lien Act and related case law (see Alan Jones Construction Ltd. v. Hicks, 2019 BCSC 568)
Courts may strike instruments filed outside statutory time limits unless an applicable suspension or extension applies
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The 20-day suspension effected by Ministerial Order M086 applied to suspend the running of the limitation period for filing the CPL under s.33 of the Builders Lien Act; Ministerial Order M098 should not be read to eliminate that suspension, and accordingly the CPL was filed within the extended period and the defendants' application to strike it is dismissed.
Obiter and limits
- The LTSA's initial refusal to accept the CPL was not determinative of the court's decision
- The plaintiff's legal basis materials were inadequate; parties must plead and argue application of law to facts with sufficient detail (citing Zecher v. Josh, 2011 BCSC 311)
- Alan Jones Construction v. Hicks, 2019 BCSC 568 was not determinative because the plaintiff did not seek a discretionary order
Court disposition
Defendants' application to strike the certificate of pending litigation dismissed; CPL treated as timely under the suspension effected by M086.
- Dismiss the defendants' application to strike the certificate of pending litigation
- Each party to bear their own costs of the application
Source and reliance status
Supreme Court of British Columbia · 8 October 2020
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Supreme Court of British Columbia
Judgment· 8 October 2020
2020 BCSC 1598 Canada Hanjiang Construction Ltd. v. Lee's Noodle House Ltd.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Canada Hanjiang Construction Ltd. v. Lee's Noodle House Ltd., 2020 BCSC 1598 Date: 20201008 Docket: S201727 Registry: Victoria Between: Canada Hanjiang Construction Ltd. Plaintiff And Lee's Noodle House Ltd. 1110837 B.C. Ltd., Angela Lee and Shu-Mei Liu Defendants Before: Master Harper Oral Reasons for Judgment In Chambers Counsel for the Plaintiff, appearing via teleconference: R. Vangenne Counsel for the Defendants, appearing via teleconference: W.C. Vaughan Place and Date of Hearing: Victoria, B.C. October 8, 2020 Place and Date of Judgment: Victoria, B.C. October 8, 2020 [1] THE COURT: The application before the court arises from the plaintiff's registration of a builders lien and certificate of pending litigation ("CPL") against lands owned by the defendants. The plaintiff did some work at the property and filed its builders lien on May 7, 2019. [2] The issue that arises is whether the CPL was filed late and accordingly should be struck. The impact of two ministerial orders as a result of the COVID‑19 pandemic are central to the analysis in this application. [3] As the builders lien was filed May 7, 2019, s. 33 of the Builders Lien Act, S.B.C. 1997, c. 45 ("BLA") requires that a CPL would have to be filed by May 7, 2020. Although the plaintiff tried to register the CPL on May 25, 2020, it in fact was registered on June 3,
2020. [4] The two ministerial orders at issue here are ministerial order nos. M086 and M098. [5] M086 extended limitation periods. M098 was made April 8, 2020 to come into effect on April 15, 2020. M098 repealed M086 but replaced it with a new order. Specifically, paragraph 1(1) under the heading "Application" says: This order applies during the period that starts on the date this order is made and ends on the date on which the last extension of the declaration of a state of emergency made on March 18, 2020 under section 9(1) of the Emergency Program Act expires or is cancelled. [6] But importantly, paragraph 2 of M098 under the heading "Limitation periods in court proceedings", which addresses every mandatory limitation period and any mandatory time period which is suspended, does not apply to a mandatory limitation period and any other mandatory time period established under the BLA. [7] The defendants argue that because of M098, the plaintiff only had until May 7, 2020 to file the CPL as that is the time limit required under the BLA. [8] The plaintiff says that because of the operation of M086, which was made March 26, 2020, there was a 20‑day suspension of the running of the limitation period, which means that the limitation period for filing the CPL would be May 27, 2020. [9] The plaintiff tried to file the CPL on May 25, 2020, but the BC Land Title & Survey Authority
("LTSA") officials would not accept it on the basis of the running of the limitation period. The LTSA reconsidered its position and accepted the CPL on June 3, 2020, accepting that the limitation period was extended. [10] I do not see the position of the LTSA as being determinative in this application, nor do I see that the plaintiff is seeking a discretionary order of the court today. I do not agree that the case referred to by the defendants, Alan Jones Construction Limited v. Hicks, 2019 BCSC 568, is against the plaintiff here. The plaintiff is not seeking a discretionary order. [11] In my view, the limitation period was extended for the 20 days as argued by the plaintiff. [12] The plaintiff agrees that the second ministerial order, M098, applies, but so does the first one, M086, and I do not think it is logical at all to interpret the second ministerial order as eliminating the 20‑day extension that operated under the first ministerial order. Otherwise, the first ministerial order would be meaningless. I do not think the second ministerial order resurrected the limitation period that was in fact suspended by the first ministerial order. [13] I agree with the position of the plaintiff, and I dismiss the defendants' application. [14] These reasons are very brief for a couple of reasons. First, the application was estimated to be 30 minutes which indicates that counsel thought
it was a relatively summary matter. [15] But second, and of more concern, is that the the plaintiff's application response is really inadequate in the legal basis section. What was required is a legal argument that applies the law to the facts of the particular case before me. The legal basis here simply cites s. 33 of the BLA and the two ministerial orders. [16] I am compelled to bring to the attention of counsel a long line of cases which decry the inadequacy of legal bases. The case authorities start with Zecher v. Josh, 2011 BCSC 311, a decision of Master Bouck, and there are many, many cases that cite that case. It is very important for the party on the other side to clearly understand the legal argument of the opposite party. If my reasons seem a little disjointed, it is, in my defence, partly because of that problem. [17] With those brief reasons, that is my decision. [18] The plaintiff was successful, but I am not inclined to grant the plaintiff its costs of this application. I am more inclined to order that each party bear their own costs of the application, but I will hear some alternative submissions to that. Presumably it will be for you, Mr. Vaughan, to make that submission. [19] MR. VAUGHAN: Well, I think your decision for the parties to bear their own costs under the circumstances due to the insufficiency of the respondent's material is fair under the circumstances. [20] THE COURT: All right. Well, that will be the decision then. Each party will bear their own costs of the application. "Master Harper"
Case-aware research
Ask AI about this case
The judgment and available research above are public. New questions open in a separate private conversation grounded in this case.