Canada Judgment

Refugee Appeal Division

TC0-08543

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Professional case brief

Research organized from the available case record

01

Holding and result

On an independent assessment the RAD found the RPD correctly determined Port Harcourt is a viable IFA: applicants failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that agents of persecution have the means to locate them there and failed to show relocation would be objectively unreasonable given their personal circumstances; new evidence was either inadmissible or not determinative; appeal is dismissed and RPD decision is confirmed under paragraph 111(1)(a) IRPA.

Court disposition

Appeal dismissed; RPD decision confirmed under paragraph 111(1)(a) of the IRPA

02

Material facts

Parties

XXXX XXXX XXXX

Principal Appellant Counsel: Pablo Irribarra

XXXX XXXX XXXX

Male Associate Appellant Counsel: Pablo Irribarra

XXXX XXXX XXXX

Female Associate Appellant Counsel: Pablo Irribarra

XXXX XXXX XXXX

Minor Associate Appellant Counsel: Pablo Irribarra

Amounts and remedies

  • Nigeria Population (estimated): 214,000,000
  • Port Harcourt Population (approximate): 3,000,000

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Refugee Protection Appeal / Reasons and Decision (appeal Dismissed)

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The RPD erred in finding Port Harcourt a viable IFA; new evidence and affidavits show motive and changing country conditions (including COVID-19 and reports of discrimination and insecurity) making relocation unreasonable and demonstrate agents have means to locate the family.
Respondent
The RPD correctly found Port Harcourt viable; applicants failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that agents have the means to locate them there, much of the new evidence is not determinative or admissible, and relocation is not objectively unreasonable given the applicants' education, employment prospects and family circumstances.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Jurisprudence cited (Rasaratnam; Thirunavukkarasu; Ranganathan) and RAD practice cited in reasons

    Two-prong test for viable IFA: no serious possibility of persecution/section 97 risk in IFA and relocation must not be unreasonable in all circumstances

  2. 02

    Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, subsection 110(4); Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh and Raza v. Canada; RAD Rules Rule 29

    Admissibility of new evidence requires that it arose after RPD decision or was not reasonably available or could not reasonably have been provided; evidence must also be credible and relevant

  3. 03

    Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica; Rozas del Solar v. Canada and RAD practice noted in decision

    Standard of review is correctness where RAD has no meaningful advantage in assessing credibility of oral evidence

  4. 04

    Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, section 97 and cited jurisprudence

    Section 97 risk encompasses danger of torture, risk to life, or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment and must be shown on a balance of probabilities

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

On an independent assessment the RAD found the RPD correctly determined Port Harcourt is a viable IFA: applicants failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that agents of persecution have the means to locate them there and failed to show relocation would be objectively unreasonable given their personal circumstances; new evidence was either inadmissible or not determinative; appeal is dismissed and RPD decision is confirmed under paragraph 111(1)(a) IRPA.

Obiter and limits

  • Remarks that indigeneship may present obstacles but did not amount to objectively unreasonable hardship in this case
  • Comments that general concerns about data protection and police corruption are speculative without specific evidence of intermediary access by persecutors
  • Observation that COVID-19 has economic and human rights impacts but effects must be assessed against applicants' comparative advantages and concrete evidence
  • Procedural notes on late supplementary submissions and Member's Direction and denial of oral hearing as new evidence was not determinative

Court disposition

Appeal dismissed; RPD decision confirmed under paragraph 111(1)(a) of the IRPA

Source and reliance status

Refugee Appeal Division · 5 March 2021

This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.

Judgment reading view

Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Refugee Appeal Division

Judgment· 5 March 2021

TC0-08543

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TC0-08543 TC0-08544 / TC0-08545 / TC0-08546 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal

XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision March 5, 2021 Date de la décision Panel C. Lindberg Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Pablo Irribarra Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative

XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre

REASONS FOR DECISION

OVERVIEW AND HISTORY [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (Principal Appellant) and her children, XXXX XXXX XXXX (Male Associate Appellant), XXXX XXXX XXXX (Female Associate Appellant), and XXXX XXXX XXXX (Minor Associate Appellant), are citizens of Nigeria. They allege that they fear being harmed or killed by the family of the Principal Appellant's husband, who is the father of the Associate Appellants. The Appellants allege that the family are idol worshippers who blame the Principal Appellant for her husband's conversion to Christianity and his refusal to take on the role of head of worship.1 [2] The Appellants came to Canada in 2017, the Principal Appellant arriving on XXXX XXXX XXXX the Female Associate Appellant and the Minor Associate Appellant on XXXX XXXX XXXX and the Male Associate Appellant on XXXX XXXX XXXX The Appellants made claims for refugee protection on April 30, 2018. Their claims were heard by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) on January 3, 2020 and rejected on February 24, 2020. The determinative issue was the existence of a viable internal flight alternative (IFA) in Port Harcourt. [3] The Principal Appellant was appointed as designated representative for the two female Associate Appellants, who were both minors at the time of the RPD proceedings. One of them, the Female Associate Appellant, is no longer a minor so she no longer requires a designated representative. [4]

The Appellants argue that the RPD erred in finding that Port Harcourt is a viable IFA. They argue that the RPD's findings were incorrect in relation to both prongs of the test for an IFA. After the perfection of the appeal, I notified the Appellants' counsel by Member's Direction2 on January 22, 2021 that I would be considering the evidence in the current National Documentation Package (NDP) for Nigeria.3 I invited counsel to provide submissions by February 5, 2021. On February 5, 2021, counsel requested an extension of time, until February 19, 2021. No reason was given. I granted an extension of time until February 10, 2021. On February 21, 2021 counsel filed supplementary submissions in response to the Member's Direction.4 No explanation was given for the late filing. I have considered the submissions.

DECISION [5] I dismiss the appeal. The determinative issue is IFA. The RPD was correct in finding that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection because they have a viable IFA in Port Harcourt.

NEW EVIDENCE AND ORAL HEARING [6] The Appellants seek to rely on new evidence in this appeal. They submitted the following documents with the Appellants' Record: a. the Affidavit of XXXX XXXX XXXX (Principal Appellant), sworn August 17, 2020,5 and the following Exhibits to the Affidavit; b. Exhibit "A", the Affidavit of XXXX XXXX XXXX, sworn May 12, 2020;6 c. Exhibit "B", the Affidavit of XXXX XXXX XXXX, sworn May 12, 2020, with copy of employment ID card;7 d. Exhibit "C", the Affidavit of XXXX XXXX XXXX, sworn August 17, 2020;8 e. Exhibit "D", article from The Nation newspaper, dated April 29, 2020;9 and f. Exhibit "E", screenshots from the website of Nigeria's Federal Road Safety Corps, and photo of XXXX XXXX XXXX Drivers Licence.10 [7] The Appellants submitted nine documents with their supplementary submissions. These documents were published on various dates and address country conditions in Nigeria.11 [8] According to the law,12 I can accept the evidence only if: i. it arose after the RPD decision; or ii. it was not reasonably available at the time of the decision; or iii. the Appellants could not reasonably have been expected to provide it before the decision. [9] If the evidence meets at least one of these requirements, I must decide that the evidence is new, credible and relevant before I can accept it.13 In addition, if the evidence was submitted after the perfection

of the appeal, I must consider relevant factors, as set out in Rule 29 of the Refugee Appeal Division Rules.14 [10] I find that the Principal Appellant's Affidavit is admissible, with the exception of paragraphs 7-14, and that Exhibits "A", "B", "C", and "D" are admissible and Exhibit "E" is not. I find that the nine documents included with the supplementary submissions are admissible. My reasons follow. Portions of the Affidavit plus Exhibits "A" to "D" are admissible [11] The Principal Appellant's Affidavit was sworn after the date of the RPD decision and includes explanations relevant to determining the admissibility of the attached Exhibits. As such, I find that it arose after the RPD's decision, with the exception of paragraphs 7-14. Paragraphs 7-14 refer to events alleged by the Principal Appellant in her Basis of Claim Form and at the RPD hearing. These paragraphs largely repeat evidence that was available and was given at the hearing. With respect to new information included in paragraphs 7-14, the Appellants have not explained why such evidence was not presented at the hearing or why they could not reasonably have been expected to provide it before the RPD made its decision. Therefore, I find that paragraphs 7-14 are not admissible because the evidence in those paragraphs is not new or does not meet the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee

Protection Act (IRPA).15 Other paragraphs of the Affidavit are admissible because they refer to events arising after the RPD decision and they meet the requirements of newness, relevance and the credibility standard for admission of new evidence. [12] Exhibits "A" and "C" are Affidavits sworn by the Principal Appellant's husband and Exhibit "B" is an Affidavit sworn by his neighbour. All three Affidavits were prepared after the RPD's decision and relate to events occurring after the date of the decision. Therefore, they are not inadmissible under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. The evidence is new and is relevant to the allegation that the agents of persecution are motivated to harm the Appellants. The Appellants argue that the Affidavits are credible, in that they are duly sworn before competent authorities in Nigeria. I accept that, on a balance of probabilities, they are credible and I find that they are admissible. [13] The article attached as Exhibit "D" was published after the RPD decision and refers to events occurring after that date. Therefore, it could not have been provided before the RPD's decision. I accept the Appellants' argument that it is new, that it is from a credible source, an independent news agency in Nigeria, and that it is relevant because it relates to conditions in Port Harcourt, the IFA location. I find that it is admissible. Exhibit "E" is not

admissible [14] Exhibit "E" consists of screenshots from the website of Nigeria's Federal Road Safety Corps and a copy of the Principal Appellant's husband's driver's licence. This evidence shows the results of a search using the number on the driver's licence. The Principal Appellant swears in her Affidavit that she obtained this information after being recently informed through her counsel about the website.16 The Appellants argue that, although this evidence existed before the RPD decided their claims, they could not have provided it then as they were unaware of the website until they retained new counsel to appeal the RPD's decision.17 I do not find that this reasonably explains why the evidence was not provided or why the Appellants could not reasonably have been expected to provide it before the date of the RPD's decision. The Appellants knew that the means by which the agents of persecution might locate them was relevant to their claims.18 The Principal Appellant's husband's driver's licence has a date of issue prior to the RPD hearing and there is no evidence that the online search function of the website was not available until after the RPD's decision. The Appellants were represented by counsel at the RPD and there is no allegation that they did not have competent representation. Consequently, I find that the Appellants have failed to establish, on a balance of

probabilities, that Exhibit "E" meets the admissibility requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and I do not accept it in evidence. Documents submitted with supplementary submissions are admissible [15] The Appellants ask the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to admit nine documents included with their supplementary submissions in response to the Member's Direction.19 These documents provide evidence of conditions in Nigeria after the date of the RPD's decision. The documents at items 1 to 6 could not have been provided at the time the Appellants' Record was filed, given that they had not yet been published. The documents at items 7 to 9 were published after the date of the RPD's decision but before the Appellants' Record was filed. The Appellants argue that these documents are in response to the Member's Direction indicating reliance on the new NDP for Nigeria. I accept this argument and I find that the evidence in the nine documents is new and is both relevant and of probative value to the issue of IFA. Accordingly, the documents are admissible under Rule 29 of the Refugee Appeal Division Rules. Because the documents were published after the date of the RPD decision and describe conditions in Nigeria after that date, they satisfy the admissibility requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. I find that they are credible because they come from verifiable and reputable

news agencies and organizations and they are relevant to the issue of a viable IFA so I will admit them. No oral hearing [16] The Appellants have requested an oral hearing.20 I deny the request. The new evidence does not raise a serious issue of credibility that would be determinative.21 Exhibit "D" and the documents accompanying the supplementary submissions are evidence of country conditions. Furthermore, Exhibits "A", "B" and "C" are not determinative. They speak only to the motivation of the agents of persecution to pursue the Appellants, and not the means by which the agents would locate the Appellants in the IFA. The new evidence in the Principal Appellant's Affidavit is also not determinative because it does not address the issue of how the agents of persecution would locate the Appellants in the IFA.

ROLE OF THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION [17] The role of the RAD is to look at all the evidence and decide whether the RPD made the correct decision.22 I find that the RPD had no meaningful advantage in assessing the credibility of oral evidence. Therefore, the standard of review is correctness.

ANALYSIS [18] The determinative issue in this appeal is IFA. The Appellants submit that the RPD did not question the credibility of the Appellants' evidence or raise credibility issues regarding their allegations of events in Nigeria that caused them to flee.23 I do not agree with the implication that the RPD found the Appellants' evidence credible. The RPD did not make findings about the Appellants' credibility or their allegations, other than those that are relevant to the issue of IFA. Nor do I. For purposes of my analysis, unless otherwise stated, I accept the allegations in the Principal Appellant's narrative, as set out in her answer to question 2(h) in her Basis of Claim Form, and in the Male Associate Appellant's narrative, as set out in his answer to question 2(h) in his Basis of Claim Form.24 [19] In assessing the viability of the IFA locations, the RPD applied the reasoning in Jurisprudential Guide TB7-19851.25 The Guide was subsequently revoked and the Appellants submit that the RAD must conduct a full independent review of the evidence without reliance on the Guide. I agree that it is the RAD's responsibility to conduct an independent assessment of the evidence on the record. I agree that findings based on country conditions that have changed must be reconsidered. However, while no longer a Jurisprudential Guide, RAD Decision TB7-19851 still provides a useful

conceptual framework of analysis for considering the viability of an IFA for persons fleeing non-state actors in Nigeria. Such analysis must be based on evidence of current country conditions. In conducting my independent assessment, I have considered the evidence on the record and in the most recent NDP. The legal test for IFA [20] There are two prongs to the legal test for a viable IFA. First, it must be determined that, in the IFA location, there is no serious possibility of persecution and, on a balance of probabilities, no risk under section 97 of the IRPA, meaning no danger of torture, risk to life, or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. Secondly, it must not be unreasonable in all the circumstances, including those personal to the claimant, to relocate there. The standard is high and requires proof of adverse conditions that would jeopardize the life and safety of the claimant in travelling to and living in the IFA location. Both prongs must be satisfied for a finding that there is an IFA.26 The RPD correctly found that the Appellants would not face a serious possibility of persecution or, on a balance of probabilities, a section 97 risk in Port Harcourt [21] The RPD found that the Appellants did not meet their onus to establish that the agents of persecution have the means and motivation to locate them in Port Harcourt.27 The Appellants argue that the RPD

ignored evidence and engaged in a selective analysis of the evidence.28 I find, on an independent assessment, that the RPD was correct in finding that the Appellants did not meet their burden under the first prong of the test for a viable IFA. [22] The Appellants argue that the RPD ignored evidence which supports the allegation that they were attacked on three separate occasions and corroborates the motivation of the agents of persecution.29 They argue, additionally, that the Affidavits submitted as new evidence30 provide further corroboration of motive.31 I find it unnecessary to deal with these arguments because, on an independent assessment, I find that the Appellants have not established, on a balance of probabilities, that the agents of persecution have the means to locate them in Port Harcourt. In making this finding, I have considered the new evidence in the Affidavits but find it to be of little weight because, while it addresses motivation, it does not provide evidence that assists in establishing the means by which the agents of persecution could locate the Appellants in the IFA. [23] The agents of persecution are alleged, according to the new evidence, to continue threatening the Appellants, stating that they will find them anywhere in Nigeria. There is only one indication given as to how they might do this. In Exhibit "C", the Principal Appellant's husband swears

that three of his uncles, along with two unknown people, told him that his wife could not hide anywhere in Nigeria as they have agents and worshippers in every part of the country and they will kill her where they see her.32 The Appellants' home is in Ibadan and the agents of persecution are alleged to live in Adeoyo, both places being in Oyo State.33 I find this evidence in Exhibit "C" speculative and insufficient to establish that they would be able to locate the Principal Appellant in a country where the population is estimated to be more than 214 million people, including in Port Harcourt, which has a population of over 3 million.34 The RPD correctly found that the Appellants did not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the agents of persecution have the means to locate them in Port Harcourt [24] In finding that the Appellants failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, the means by which the agents of persecution would locate them in Port Harcourt, the RPD referred to the testimony of the Principal Appellant and the Male Associate Appellant. The RPD found that the Appellants had little knowledge of the husband's family or community or how they could locate the Appellants in the IFA. The Appellants have not argued that their testimony is sufficient to establish the means by which the agents of persecution would locate them. On an independent assessment, I

agree with the RPD that their testimony is insufficient to establish such means.35 [25] In arguing that the agents of persecution would locate them, the Appellants rely on the documentary evidence36 about nationwide databases that include personal information, including an individual's address. They refer to evidence that such information is collected and stored by mobile telephone service providers and banks as well as evidence suggesting that personal banking information is not adequately protected. They argue that the agents of persecution would be able to access the Appellants' personal information through corrupt officials, that the incident in which the Male Associate Appellant was injured demonstrates the use of corruption by the agents of persecution, and that the Appellants would need to live in hiding in the IFA.37 I am not persuaded by these arguments. The Appellants have not established, on a balance of probabilities, that they would be located through database information [26] There is no evidence, nor have the Appellants argued, that the agents of persecution would be able to obtain their personal information without an intermediary. Their argument rests on establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that the agents of persecution would gain access through corrupt officials. I find this speculative. The Appellants argue that the agents of persecution have used

corruption in the past, demonstrating their capacity to do so in the future. I am not persuaded by this argument. [27] The documentary evidence indicates that, without the subscriber's written consent, access to the information of mobile telephone subscribers can only be provided to security agencies and the request must be made in writing by an official not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner of Police or equivalent.38 The Appellants have not established, on a balance of probabilities, that the agents of persecution have connections, least of all connections at such a high level, within law enforcement or security agencies. The evidence is that access to banking information is restricted to entities including law enforcement agencies and requires approval from the Central Bank of Nigeria. There is evidence that a valid court order must first be obtained.39 As the Appellants note, a report prepared for the United Nation's Universal Periodic Review of Nigeria highlighted some concerns with the protection of personal information in the banking information database, particularly in relation to safeguards around the collection of personal information, monitoring mechanisms, and accountability.40 I do not find that these overarching concerns about the need for better protocols are sufficient for me to conclude that, on a balance of probabilities, the Appellants' personal

information could be accessed by the agents of persecution. I find it speculative to suggest that this could occur. The Appellants have not established, on a balance of probabilities, that they would be located through police corruption [28] In relation to the July 18, 2017 incident involving persons in police uniform, during which the Male Associate Appellant was injured, the Appellants pose three possible scenarios involving corruption. They concede that it is impossible to ascertain which scenario is correct.41 I agree, with the added proviso that it is impossible to ascertain if any of the proposed scenarios is correct. In reaching this conclusion, I have considered the Appellants' evidence, including their supporting evidence.42 I do not accept their premise that the only possible scenarios involve corruption. For example, perhaps the uniforms were simply costumes made to look like police uniforms. As the Appellants concede, it is impossible to determine the correct scenario. That being the case, I find it speculative to conclude that police corruption was involved. I acknowledge the documentary evidence that police corruption in Nigeria is not uncommon.43 However, I do not find this evidence sufficient to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the agents of persecution have exploited the possibility of police corruption or would be able to do so to locate the

Appellants in Port Harcourt. The Appellants have not established, on a balance of probabilities, that they would need to live in hiding [29] The Appellants argue that they cannot be expected to live in hiding.44 I agree. They argue that they should not be expected to "minimize the disclosure of all of their personal information for the rest of their lives in order to remain safe."45 It is unclear what this means, however, I find it reasonable to expect that they would exercise some discretion in revealing their personal information. That said, I do not find that the RPD assumed they would live in hiding. Nor do I find, on an independent assessment, that the Appellants have established that, on a balance of probabilities, they would be unable to safely attend school, go to work, and otherwise participate in daily life in Port Harcourt. The Appellants have not established a serious possibility of persecution or, on a balance of probabilities, a section 97 risk in Port Harcourt [30] On an independent assessment, I find that the Appellants have not established that, in Port Harcourt, they would face a serious possibility of persecution or, on a balance of probabilities, a danger of torture, a risk to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The RPD did not err in finding that, on a balance of probabilities, it would not be unreasonable for the Appellants to

relocate to Port Harcourt [31] The RPD found that the Appellants did not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that it would be unreasonable for them to relocate to Port Harcourt. On an independent assessment, for the reasons that follow, I agree that this is correct. [32] The RPD assessed the reasonableness of the IFA on the basis that the Principal Appellant and her husband remain a married couple.46 I have done the same. It has not been argued and there is no evidence to suggest that their relationship has broken down. The Female Associate Appellant was a minor at the time of the RPD proceedings and is now an adult. I have considered her circumstances and those of the Male Associate Appellant as young adult members of the family. Indigeneship [33] The RPD found that the Appellants failed to establish that it would be unreasonable for them to relocate to Port Harcourt because of indigeneship.47 The Appellants argue that the RPD erred in its assessment of the impact of indigeneship and how, as Yoruba non-indigenes, they would face discrimination to a degree that would render Port Harcourt unreasonable as an IFA.48 I am not persuaded by this argument. [34] I recognize that there is evidence that indigeneship can, in some circumstances, be a significant barrier to internal relocation in Nigeria. The Appellants have referred to the evidence of tensions in Port Harcourt

towards those who relocate there.49 They rely, in particular, on documentary evidence about the experiences of non-indigenes and Christians relocating to Port Harcourt.50 I have considered and weighed this evidence. The evidence indicates Nigeria's large cities have large migrant communities, making indigeneity less significant, particularly for those with financial resources.51 The evidence specific to Port Harcourt highlights the high cost of living, which affects all inhabitants, generally.52 Finding employment is difficult, and there is evidence that "most" non-indigenes who thrive there are oil workers or allied to oil-servicing companies.53 Some economic and political opportunities within government may not be open to non-indigenes.54 Some employers may discriminate. Government assistance may not be available.55 I have weighed this evidence in light of the Appellants' personal circumstances and find that, on a balance of probabilities, the difficulties that being non-indigenes may pose do not rise to the level of hardship that would make Port Harcourt unreasonable as an IFA. I explain, in addressing employment and all other issues relating to relocation, how their personal circumstances provide them with advantages that outweigh the challenges they may face. [35] The Appellants point to the article, dated April 29, 2020, that Rivers State government sent 150 non-indigenes

back to their places of origin.56 They argue that this is evidence of state-sanctioned discrimination against non-indigenes, demonstrating that State authorities can and do send non-indigenes back to their home state, and that this renders Port Harcourt unreasonable as an IFA for the Appellants.57 I find this report has little relevance to the Appellants' situation. The persons removed from Rivers State are described as vagrants and the official who is quoted in the article states that "the exercise was not targeted at any ethnic group but aimed at removing vagrants with potential to spread Coronavirus on the streets and in their communities."58 The article also refers to people being arrested for violating a lockdown order. The evidence of the Appellants' circumstances does not suggest that they would be vagrants nor do I have any basis for concluding that they would fail to comply with public health measures to control the spread of the coronavirus. I find it speculative to suggest that the Appellants would be targeted by authorities in Port Harcourt for removal from the area. I am also not persuaded that the removals are evidence that, on a balance of probabilities, the Appellants would face systemic discrimination in Port Harcourt that would make relocation unreasonable, having regard to their personal circumstances. I explain my reasons in the paragraphs that

follow. Employment [36] The RPD considered the documentary evidence of country conditions and the personal circumstances of the Appellants and concluded that they did not establish that it would be unreasonable to expect them to find employment in Port Harcourt.59 On an independent assessment, I find no error in this conclusion. [37] The Principal Appellant's evidence is that she has 19 years of education, a university degree in XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX.60 There is evidence that she is a XXXX XXXX and that she was a XXXX in XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in Nigeria for 17 years.61 Her evidence is that her husband is a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX.62 There is evidence that he has personal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in Nigeria.63 The Male Associate Appellant's evidence is that he has a secondary school education and three years of university education in XXXX.64 These are significantly higher education levels than most Nigerians attain. The senior secondary school completion rate in Nigeria is approximately one-third for males and below 30% for females.65 The evidence indicates that the greatest problems faced by non-indigenes in large cities are financial and that a good level of education, experience or expertise facilitates the ability to find employment.66 [38] The Appellants argue that developments in Nigeria since the

date of the RPD's decision make an IFA in Port Harcourt unreasonable for them. They argue that the impact of COVID-19, including the impact on the economy, means that relocation to Port Harcourt would force the Appellants to endure severe hardship, so as to render Port Harcourt unreasonable as an IFA.67 The evidence shows that the global pandemic has had a harmful economic impact on Nigeria.68 It may be that the Appellants will face greater financial challenges than they otherwise would have, given the impact of the pandemic on the Nigerian economy. However, they remain favourably positioned in contrast to the majority of Nigerians. Taking into account the Appellants' personal circumstances, I find that, on a balance of probabilities, they will be able to obtain employment in Port Harcourt that can sustain the family. Education [39] The RPD found that the Appellants failed to establish that it would be unreasonable for them to attend school in Port Harcourt.69 The Principal Appellant testified that her children attended private school in Nigeria and she was afraid they would be kidnapped in Port Harcourt.70 The RPD found this to be speculative.71 I agree. I do not find evidence to establish a link between school attendance and the prevalence of kidnapping in Port Harcourt. The Male Associate Appellant testified that it would be possible for him to attend school in Port Harcourt

although the standards were not as high as in Canada.72 This is not a circumstance that makes Port Harcourt unreasonable for either adult Associate Appellant. Given that the Appellants chose private schools for their children when living in Ibadan, I see no reason they could not do the same for the Minor Appellant in Port Harcourt. I have considered the evidence addressing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on children's access to education in Nigeria.73 The evidence is that the impact is most significant for children in poor households, particularly those in which people earn their livelihood in the informal sector. This is not the situation of the Appellants. The research also suggests that private schools are facing financial problems, affecting their ability to operate effectively. This could lead to higher school fees and fewer schools from which to choose. However, I do not find that the Appellants have established that, in their circumstances, the challenges involved in accessing education in Port Harcourt rise to the level of hardship that makes the IFA unreasonable. Housing [40] The RPD found that the Appellants did not establish that access to accommodation would make relocation to Port Harcourt unreasonable for them.74 On an independent assessment, I find no error in this conclusion. While the evidence indicates that women on their own, particularly if they are

disadvantaged in the labour market, may face discrimination in housing, I see no basis for concluding that the Appellants would not be able to obtain housing in Port Harcourt. The evidence indicates that the main obstacle to finding accommodation is financial and a key factor is the ability to find gainful employment, which is facilitated by a good level of education and experience.75 Weighing the evidence, I find that the Appellants' positive financial prospects place them in a favourable position to find housing, despite any challenges that non-indigeneship might pose. Religion and language [41] The RPD found that the Appellants did not establish that they would be unable to practice their Christian Pentecostal religion in Port Harcourt.76 I agree. Almost half the population of Nigeria are Christians, with Christianity being the major religion in the south, and major cities comprising a fluid mix of religions.77 The documentary evidence is that treatment of Christians relocating to Port Harcourt from northern Nigeria depends on their ethnicity, with language and culture being more important than religion.78 The RPD found that the Appellants did not establish that they would be unable to speak the language in Port Harcourt.79 The Appellants all speak English, the official language of Nigeria. I find no linguistic barrier to relocation in Port Harcourt.80 The cultural

difficulties referenced in the documentary evidence relate to persons relocating from northern Nigeria, whereas the Appellants are from southwestern Nigeria. As the RPD noted, the Appellants' religious faith might facilitate their integration in Port Harcourt, should they choose to affiliate with a church and a religious community. Health care [42] The RPD found that the Appellants did not establish that it would be unreasonable for them to access health care in Port Harcourt.81 The Appellants have not presented any evidence that they have health care needs that cannot be met in Nigeria. The Principal Appellant testified that she used private health care when living in Nigeria.82 I find no basis on which to conclude that the Appellants would lack the resources to obtain adequate health care. Other effects of COVID-19 and the global pandemic on Nigeria [43] The Appellants argue that the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the human rights situation in Nigeria, including the situation for women and children, would force the Appellants to endure severe hardship, so as to render Port Harcourt unreasonable as an IFA.83 I have considered the evidence84 and I am not persuaded by this argument, given the Appellants' personal circumstances. The human rights situation in Nigeria is but one factor to consider in assessing the reasonableness of the IFA. As with the economic impact, the

situation is worst for those who are already vulnerable, economically or for other reasons. Single women are more vulnerable, as are women working in the informal economy. I have also considered the evidence that Nigeria is currently experiencing a very high level of COVID-19.85 The Appellants have not presented evidence that they are particularly vulnerable to COVID-19. I find that they have not established how the presence of COVID-19 would make the IFA unreasonable for them. The RPD did not err in finding that the Appellants failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that relocation to Port Harcourt would be unreasonable [44] Relocation to Port Harcourt may be difficult for the Appellants. However, the "objectively unreasonable" standard set by the Federal Court is very high.86 It requires establishing, through actual and concrete evidence, conditions that would jeopardize their life and safety in relocating to the IFA.87 On an independent assessment of the totality of the evidence, I find that the Appellants have not met their onus to establish such conditions, on a balance of probabilities. Consequently, it would not be unreasonable for them to relocate to Port Harcourt.

CONCLUSION [45] I dismiss the appeal and pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. (signed) C. Lindberg C. Lindberg March 5, 2021 Date 1 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibits 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. 2 Exhibit RAD-1, Member's Direction, January 22, 2021. 3 National Documentation Package (NDP) for Nigeria (November 30, 2020). 4 Exhibit P-3, Response to Member's Direction, February 21, 2021. 5 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 13-17. 6 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 18-20. 7 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 21-24. 8 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 25-27. 9 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 28-32. 10 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 33-38. 11 Exhibit P-3, Response to Member's Direction, February 21, 2021. 12 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended, subsection 110(4). 13 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96; Raza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385. 14 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257. 15 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended. 16 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 16. 17 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 52, para 33. 18 The Principal Appellant states, in her Basis of Claim Form, that the Appellants did

not move to another part of Nigeria because "there is no place that we can hide in Nigeria, that family members and the community will not trace and locate us for elimination" (see Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 2.1, at p. 17). The RPD identified IFA as an issue at the hearing (see Transcript of January 3, 2020 RPD Hearing, at p. 9, lines 43-44; and at p. 15, lines 19-21). The Principal Appellant was questioned about how she could be located by the agents of persecution (see Transcript of January 3, 2020 RPD Hearing, at p. 33, lines 32-43). 19 Exhibit P-3, Response to Member's Direction, February 21, 2021, at pp. 4-44. 20 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 53, paras 37-39. 21 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended, subsection 110(6). 22 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93; Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145. 23 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 41, para 4 and p. 54, para 42. 24 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 2.1, at p. 18, 22-23; Exhibit 2.2, at p. 30. 25 Jurisprudential Guide - Decision TB7-19851, Guide identified by the Chairperson pursuant to paragraph 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Effective date July 6, 2018, Revoked April 6, 2020. 26 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.), p.

710; Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1993 CanLII 3011 (FCA), [1994] 1 FC 589; Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 16789 (FCA), [2001] 2 FC 164. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at p. 5, para 13 to p. 7, para 21. 28 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 41, para 6; at p. 57, para 54 to p. 65, para 67. 29 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 41, para 6; at p. 54, para 44 to p. 57, para 51. 30 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 18-27. 31 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 57, paras 52-53. 32 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 26-27. 33 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 1, at p. 81; Transcript of January 3, 2020 RPD Hearing, at p. 17, line 34 to p. 18, line 22. 34 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 1.6: Nigeria. The World Factbook. United States. Central Intelligence Agency. 18 November 2020. 35 See testimony of Principal Appellant and Male Associate Appellant, Transcript of January 3, 2020 RPD Hearing, at p. 17, line 8 to p. 18, line 22; p. 33, line 42 to p. 34, line 43; p. 35, lines 5-7; and p. 45, line 32 to p. 46, line 20. 36 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 1.14: Requirements and procedures to obtain a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card and to open a bank account; extent to which SIM card and banking information is available to third parties, including

authorities and elected politicians (2018-February 2019). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 18 February 2019. NGA106245.E. 37 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 57, para 54 to p. 65, para 67. 38 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 1.14: Requirements and procedures to obtain a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card and to open a bank account; extent to which SIM card and banking information is available to third parties, including authorities and elected politicians (2018-February 2019). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 18 February 2019. NGA106245.E, at p. 5, section 3.1.1. 39 Ibid., at pp. 5-6, section 3.1.2. 40 Ibid., at pp. 6-7, section 3.1.2. 41 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 63, paras 60-61. 42 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 2.1, at p. 22; Exhibit 2.2, at p. 27; Exhibit 5, at pp. 367-371; Transcript of January 3, 2020 RPD Hearing, at p. 24, line 18 to p. 25, line 33; and p. 40, line 23 to p. 45, line 10. 43 For example, the following documents report police corruption in Nigeria: NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 1.4: EASO Country of Origin Information Report: Nigeria. Country Focus. European Union. European Asylum Support Office. June 2017, at pp. 30-31, section 3.2.2; item 1.22: Country Policy and Information Note. Nigeria: Actors of protection. Version 1.0. United Kingdom. Home Office. March 2019, at pp. 14-15, section 5.2; and

item 1.11: EASO Country of Origin Information Report. Nigeria: Actors of Protection. European Union. European Asylum Support Office. November 2018, at section 3.3.1. 44 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 65, paras 66-67. 45 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 65, para 66. 46 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at p. 8, para 28. 47 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at p. 11, paras 46-49. 48 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 66, para 69 to p. 69, para 77. 49 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 66, para 72 to p. 68, para 74. 50 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 12.6: Treatment of Christians who relocate from northern parts of Nigeria by people in Port Harcourt [Rivers State]; whether they face linguistic, economic and social difficulties (2012-November 2013). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. NGA104679.E; and item 13.1: Role of indigeneship in obtaining employment, housing and social services; how indigeneship is established and identified; ability of non-indigenes to relocate to Abuja, Lagos or Port Harcourt; assistance available to those who relocate (2017-October 2019). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 30 October 2019. NGA106361.E. 51 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 13.1: Role of indigeneship in obtaining employment, housing and social services; how indigeneship is established and identified; ability of non-indigenes to

relocate to Abuja, Lagos or Port Harcourt; assistance available to those who relocate (2017-October 2019). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 30 October 2019. NGA106361.E, at section 5.1. 52 Ibid., item 12.6. 53 Ibid., item 13.1. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at pp. 29-30. 57 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 68, para 75 to p. 69, para 77. 58 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, at p. 30. 59 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at p. 8, para 32 to p. 9, para 38. 60 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 1, at p. 80. 61 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, Temporary Resident Visa documentation, Letter of introduction from the Principal Appellant's husband's employer, at p. 305; and Transcript of January 3, 2020 RPD Hearing, at p. 38, lines 17-27; and p. 53, line 47 to p. 54, line 6. 62 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, Temporary Resident Visa documentation, Letter of introduction from the Principal Appellant's husband's employer, at p. 305; and Family Information form IMM 5645, at p. 360, section A. 63 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, Temporary Resident Visa documentation, Letter of introduction from the Principal Appellant's husband's employer, at p. 305 and at pp. 314-325. 64 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 1, Schedule A - Background/Declaration IMM 5669, at p. 90. 65 NDP for Nigeria (30 November 2020), item 5.29, ?2018 Statistical

Report on Women and Men in Nigeria. Nigeria. National Bureau of Statistics, May 2019, at p. 20, Figure 3.3. 66 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 13.1: Role of indigeneship in obtaining employment, housing and social services; how indigeneship is established and identified; ability of non-indigenes to relocate to Abuja, Lagos or Port Harcourt; assistance available to those who relocate (2017-October 2019). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 30 October 2019. NGA106361.E, at section 5.1. 67 Exhibit P-3, Response to Member's Direction, February 21, 2021, at pp. 1-3. 68 Exhibit P-3, Response to Member's Direction, February 21, 2021, at pp. 4-44, including "Nigerian economy at risk of 'unravelling', warns World Bank", December 10, 2020, at pp. 22-24; "Nigeria slips into recession blamed on COVID-19 and oil prices", November 21, 2020, at pp. 28-30. 69 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at p. 8, paras 30-31. 70 Transcript of January 3, 2020 RPD Hearing, at p. 37, lines 9-28. 71 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at p. 8, para 30. 72 Transcript of January 3, 2020 RPD Hearing, at p. 47, lines 12-46. 73 Exhibit P-3, Response to Member's Direction, February 21, 2021, "Nigeria's children: COVID-19 and broken dreams", December 8, 2020, at pp. 25-27. 74 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at p. 8, paras 28-29. 75 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 13.1: Role

of indigeneship in obtaining employment, housing and social services; how indigeneship is established and identified; ability of non-indigenes to relocate to Abuja, Lagos or Port Harcourt; assistance available to those who relocate (2017-October 2019). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 30 October 2019. NGA106361.E, at section 5.1. 76 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at p. 9, para 39 to p. 10, para 41. 77 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 1.17: Country Policy and Information Note. Nigeria: Internal relocation. Version 1.0. United Kingdom. Home Office. March 2019, at section 3.4. 78 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 12.6: Treatment of Christians who relocate from northern parts of Nigeria by people in Port Harcourt [Rivers State]; whether they face linguistic, economic and social difficulties (2012-November 2013). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 6 December 2013. NGA104679.E. 79 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at p. 10, paras 42-43. 80 NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 13.1: Role of indigeneship in obtaining employment, housing and social services; how indigeneship is established and identified; ability of non-indigenes to relocate to Abuja, Lagos or Port Harcourt; assistance available to those who relocate (2017-October 2019). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 30 October 2019. NGA106361.E, at section 5.2.1. 81 Exhibit

RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at p. 10, paras 44-45. 82 Transcript of January 3, 2020 RPD Hearing, at p. 37, line 34 to p. 38, line 10. 83 Exhibit P-3, Response to Member's Direction, February 21, 2021, at pp. 1-3. 84 Exhibit P-3, Response to Member's Direction, February 21, 2021, at pp. 4-44, including "Women 'abused' by police enforcing COVID-19 rules in Nigeria", September 9, 2020, at pp. 31-35; "Abuse of women in Port Harcourt City by Security Operates during Covid-19 Pandemic Lockdown", May 22, 2020, at pp. 43-44; "Nigerian Security Response to Covid is Deadlier Than the Disease", July 5, 2020, at pp. 40-42. 85 Exhibit P-3, Response to Member's Direction, February 21, 2021, "COVID-19 in Nigeria", February 2, 2021, at pp. 4-7. 86 Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 988. 87 Ibid. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TC0-08543 TC0-08544 / TC0-08545 / TC0-08546 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français

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Rasaratnam v. Canada, [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.)

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Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada, 1993 CanLII 3011 (FCA)

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Ranganathan v. Canada, 2000 CanLII 16789 (FCA)

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Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93

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Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145

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Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 988

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Jurisprudential Guide TB7-19851 (revoked)

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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, subsection 110(4)

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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, paragraph 111(1)(a)

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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, section 97

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Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, Rule 29

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