Knol Estate (Re)

2024 BCSC 2513 Knol Estate (Re)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Knol Estate (Re), 2024 BCSC 2513 Date: 20241205 Docket: S225814 Registry: Vancouver In the Matter of the Estate of Lucas Knol, Deceased Before: The Honourable Mr Justice Crerar Oral Reasons for Judgment In Chambers Counsel for the Petitioner/Application Respondent, Emiko Imafuku: K. Alkin Counsel for the Respondents/Applicants, Frederik Knol and Rensje Knol: D.A. Hobbs E. Chang, Articled Student Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver December 5, 2024 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver December 5, 2024 [1] THE COURT: These are my oral reasons for judgment in this matter. I make the usual reservation to expand or edit them if a transcript is ordered or for any other reason. [2] Mr. Lucas Knol died in October 2021 in Surrey, British Columbia, spawning the complicated factual and legal issues that the Court is presented with today. [3] Mr. Knol himself was a complicated individual. He was a Dutch national who lived roughly half of each year in Canada, split between British Columbia and Yukon, and half in the Netherlands. [4] He held bank accounts as well as vehicles and other personal property here. He held gold claims in the Yukon. He also held accounts, vehicles, personal property and an interest in a farmhouse in the Netherlands. [5] The value of his estate is not entirely clear. The known value of accounts and whatnot in

British Columbia is less than $100,000. The gold stakes in the Yukon--of which I understand there are several--are a significant mystery. They could be worthless. There was evidence before the Court that there was at least an assertion that they were worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Certainly, it would not be the first time that an aspiring gold miner made an exaggerated claim. Suffice to say, the value of his estate in Canada, let alone around the world, remains a significant mystery. [6] The proceeding on which the present applications are based is a petition filed in 2022 by Emiko Imafuku. Ms. Imafuku claims that for roughly 15 years, she was engaged in a common‑law spousal relationship with Mr. Knol. When Mr. Knol was in town, he lived with her in the condominium that she owned in New Westminster. Ms. Imafuku seeks through this petition to have the Court use the curative provisions of s. 58 of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, SBC 2009, c. 13 ("WESA"), to elevate to the status of an enforceable testamentary instrument a document--entitled "Last Will and Testament"--that was found in electronic form on Mr. Knol's computer, as well as in a print-out form (the "putative will"). Both documents are identical. [7] The theory, which is supported to some extent by contemporaneous documentary evidence, is as follows. Around July 2020, Mr. Knol, who was facing medical

investigations into his ongoing heart troubles, set his mind to drafting a will. Apart from his own brush with mortality, one of the supposed motivations to draft a will was the outbreak of litigation with his siblings over their mother's estate. That litigation was in the Netherlands. The relationship between Mr. Knol and his siblings deteriorated to the point of litigation. The concept is that Mr. Knol wished to ensure that his siblings did not receive anything from his estate. [8] Ms. Imafuku provides further corroborative evidence with respect to the legitimacy of the putative will, as the binding, fixed intention of Mr. Knol, in her own affidavit, as well as the affidavit of a Dutch lawyer named Erik Schriemer. Mr. Schriemer is not only a lawyer, but also long‑time friend of Mr. Knol. Mr. Schriemer attaches emails to his affidavit that indicate that he assisted Mr. Knol in preparing the putative will. [9] Both Mr. Schriemer and Ms. Imafuku are set out as the executors in the putative will: Ms. Imafuku for his estate in Canada, and Mr. Schriemer for his estate in the Netherlands. The document also names those two individuals as the primary beneficiaries of the estate's assets in their respective jurisdictions. Those individuals are not, however, the only beneficiaries. There are other smaller bequests made to certain named individuals. [10] With respect to her relationship

with Mr. Knol, Ms. Imafuku asserts that they were a romantic couple. She attaches various photographs to her affidavit showing them engaged in activities together. Similarly, she attaches the Christmas cards that she says they sent out, as a couple, to friends and family. Those Christmas cards consist largely of collections of small‑sized photographs on the face of the cards showing the couple engaged in a variety of activities. Certainly, based on this evidence, it would appear that Ms. Imafuku would have a strong case that they were engaged in a relationship tantamount to spousal. That all said, the petition does not seek a specific declaration of their spousal relationship. [11] The intention of Ms. Imafuku is to proceed with the hearing of the petition in the ordinary course: that is, on a summary basis, based upon affidavits, with no right of discovery or oral examination. [12] The siblings of the late Mr. Knol also bring an application today. Those siblings are his brother, Frederik Knol, and his sister, Rensje Knol. These are the same siblings that were earlier referred to as engaged in litigation and disputes with the late Mr. Knol about their mother's estate. [13] The siblings seek an adjournment to gather further information about the circumstances of the will, and more generally, about the circumstances of Mr. Knol himself, such as to inform a jurisdictional

challenge under the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SBC 2003, c. 28 ("CJPTA") with respect to the administration of Mr. Knol's estate. Specifically, the siblings seek an order, relying upon Cepuran v. Carlton, 2022 BCCA 76, for the imposition of, in effect, a hybrid proceeding on this petition that would allow a discovery process, as well as a cross‑examination of Ms. Imafuku. [14] Specifically, the siblings seek the following orders: 1. Within fourteen (14) days of receipt of an entered copy of this order, the Petitioner shall: a) prepare and deliver to counsel for the Applicants all documents and information available to her relating to the late Lucas Knol (the "Deceased"), including: i. the Deceased's tax returns for last five years prior to his death; ii. the Deceased' s Dutch passport, whether current or expired, from 2007 to the year of his death; iii. all the Deceased's papers and documents in the possession of the Petitioner; and iv. the contents of the Deceased's wallet at the date of his death; b) the Deceased's computer where his alleged electronic will was found (the "Computer") be made available for inspection by counsel for the Applicants.

2. After thirty (30) days following the delivery of the documents listed in paragraph 1 a) of this order and the inspection by the Applicants' counsel of the Computer, counsel for the Petitioner and counsel for the Applicants shall arrange for a date for the cross‑examination of the Petitioner by counsel for the Applicants; 3. The hearing of the Petition is adjourned until the actions described in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this order are completed; 4. In the alternative, this proceeding is referred to the trial list for any or all issues in the matter . [emphasis in original] [15] The siblings argue that there are many mysteries surrounding the facts set out in the petition that go beyond the inherently unusual circumstances of the putative will, in electronic and paper form. The siblings question whether the putative will should be considered to be the fixed intention of Mr. Knol. A year and a half passed between its putative drafting and Mr. Knol's death. It would have been a simple enough matter for Mr. Knol to have at least signed the document, if not taken the minimal further step of properly having the will notarised, and having it comply with all of the formal requirements. [16] More broadly, the siblings cite affidavits from themselves as well as from other purported friends of Mr. Knol that contradict Ms. Imafuku's presentation of herself as the common‑law spouse of the

deceased. For example, several old friends, as well as the siblings themselves, state that at no time did Mr. Knol mention Ms. Imafuku at all. Other affiants say that Mr. Knol described Ms. Imafuku merely as a girlfriend, a housemate, or a business partner. [17] The affidavits filed in support of the siblings' application note that Mr. Knol had an international peripatetic lifestyle, where he would often live with housemates, and that he would often claim a lack of financial resources as a basis for so doing. They note that in the Netherlands, in some of the years leading to his death, Mr. Knol cohabited with another woman. They have not determined on the evidence whether there was a romantic element to that relationship. [18] They point to court decisions in Canada as well as litigation filings in the Netherlands to argue that there appear to be potential credibility issues with respect to Lucas Knol. At a minimum, Mr. Knol may have said certain things to some people and different things on the same subject to other people. The siblings note that much of what Ms. Imafuku asserts is based upon what she says Mr. Knol told her, and that such information may indeed be unreliable. [19] Finally, amongst other unusual aspects, the siblings point to the role of the Dutch lawyer, Eric Schriemer. They argue that it is prima facie suspicious that Mr. Schriemer, who, on one hand is

representing Mr. Knol and acting as his lawyer, is also a beneficiary under the putative will at the centre of this case. [20] The siblings also point to some mysterious aspects of the record that would inform, not only the issues surrounding the will and the relationship with Ms. Imafuku, but also their jurisdictional challenge. For example, the first line of the putative will distinguishes between his "residence", in Whitehorse, Yukon; and the condominium, that Ms. Imafuku asserts he shared with her in New Westminster, which is expressly designated as a mere mailing address: I, Lucas Knol of residence of 30 Balsam Crescent Whitehorse Yukon Territory Y1A 4V. Mailing address; 206-624 Agnes Street New Westminster BC V3M 1G8 [spelling, formatting and punctuation as in original] [21] The siblings provide an illustration of a discrepancy between Ms. Imafuku's evidence and the siblings' evidence, possibly flowing from an inaccurate statement by Lucas Knol to Ms. Imafuku. Ms. Imafuku asserts that Mr. Knol had told her that he had not seen his siblings for over 20 years. In contrast, Mr. Knol's sister avers in her affidavit that when her brother was visiting in the Netherlands, she would see him weekly for a few hours at their mother's house: a profound difference in evidence. [22] Ms. Imafuku argues that the petition should be heard in the ordinary course, without any orders for

hybrid discovery. She also argues that it should be heard at the same time as the jurisdictional challenge. She argues that there is no serious controversy on the facts, and that the siblings present no affidavits raising disputes on the material facts and issues with respect to the petition. [23] She notes that generally, cross‑examination will not be ordered on an affidavit unless the applicant seeking such cross‑examination affirmatively puts forward facts that contradict the initial affidavit on material points, citing Royal Bank of Canada v Jones, 2000 BCSC 520. [24] She also argues that the discovery process will prolong the proceeding in a manner antithetical to the presumptive summary procedure for a WESA, s. 58 application concerning a testamentary instrument. She cites Rule 1‑3 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, arguing that discovery processes will stymie the efficient, cost‑effective, and just resolution of this matter on its merits. In sum, she argues that there are no issues on which the Court would be assisted by any hybrid discovery orders. [25] I am satisfied that the Court has broad powers in the wake of Cepuran to order hybrid discovery procedures where it would be just for the proper adjudication of the matters in dispute before the court. Cepuran endorsed the Boffo Developments (Jewel 2) Ltd. v Pinnacle International (Wilson) Plaza Inc., 2009 BCSC 1701

factors that will guide the court in determining whether to order that a petition be converted into an action. By extension, those principles also guide the court in considering whether a hybrid trial with associated discovery processes should be ordered. [26] The Boffo factors are set out at para 51: (a) the undesirability of multiple proceedings; (b) the desirability of avoiding unnecessary costs and delay; (c) whether the particular issues involved require an assessment of the credibility of witnesses; and (d) the need for the Court to have a full grasp of all the evidence; and (e) whether it is in the interests of justice that there be pleadings and discovery in the usual way to resolve the dispute. [27] Further, while the parties were unable to provide any case authority illuminating the bare language of Rule 21‑8(4), I am also satisfied that that subrule provides the court with broad discretion to give directions for the conduct of the proceeding, as well as to give directions for the conduct of a jurisdictional challenge such as that anticipated in the present proceeding. That subrule reads: Powers of court pending resolution (4) If an application is brought under subrule (1)(a) or (b) or (3) or an issue is raised by an allegation in a pleading or a response to petition referred to in subrule (1)(c), the court may, on the application of a party of record, before deciding

the first‑mentioned application or issue, (a) stay the proceeding, (b) give directions for the conduct of the first‑mentioned application, (c) give directions for the conduct of the proceeding, and (d) discharge any order previously made in the proceeding. [28] I also note the decision of Madam Justice Lyster in Ross Estate (Re), 2024 BCSC 1739, which provides some procedural parallels and precedents. That decision focuses on the issue of jurisdiction in that estate dispute. In the course of that decision, however, Justice Lyster does provide a procedural background. It appears from that case that there were extensive oral and documentary discovery provisions, at least in Alberta, leading to that jurisdictional hearing in the context of an estate dispute. [29] I am satisfied, given the inherent mystery of the purported will and the many mysteries surrounding Mr. Knol, both with respect to his assets and with respect to other facts informing the jurisdictional inquiry, that there should be discovery orders issued in this case. I am also satisfied that we should proceed in the ordinary course and have the jurisdictional hearing in advance of the substantive hearing of the petition with respect to the WESA s. 58 application. [30] I turn to the second ruling. [31] In the ordinary course, the jurisdictional challenge will be heard first. If this Court finds that the Netherlands, as

a matter of jurisdiction simpliciter, has jurisdiction over the estate of the Dutch national deceased, Mr. Knol, or, if this Court, under the second jurisdictional consideration of forum conveniens, decides that that issue is more appropriately adjudicated in the Netherlands, there is no need to consider the petition here in British Columbia at all, with the attendant risk of wasting the resources of the parties and court. [32] I do appreciate the petitioner's first argument, that the siblings have delayed somewhat in bringing forward this jurisdictional challenge. The siblings filed their initial pleading, which raised a jurisdictional challenge, but then were silent for roughly two years before seeking a hybrid procedure and document and oral discovery. That is regrettable. But the matter is complex. The facts arise on two continents. There was a change of counsel. Mr. Hobbs has moved relatively swiftly in bringing this issue to the Court. I am satisfied that that delay should not be an impediment to this ruling. [33] I have already alluded to many of the bases for making this decision. I will briefly expand on some of the bases for this second ruling. [34] First, the circumstances of the purported will--the beneficiaries, and the fact that it was not signed for a year and a half--in themselves raise particular issues that require analysis not only of credibility but also of

reliability, insofar as many of Ms. Imafuku's assertions are based upon what Mr. Knol told her. [35] Second, there is a significant knowledge imbalance, not only with respect to the purported will but also with respect to the comings and goings and assets of Mr. Knol. On Ms. Imafuku's own affidavit evidence, she better knew this information vis à vis the siblings, whom she asserts, from her understanding, were fully estranged from Mr. Knol (although we have heard the sister's evidence in that regard to the contrary). Ms. Imafuku is effectively acknowledging this knowledge imbalance, which imbalance further indicates the need for discovery. [36] I am satisfied that some degree of discovery is necessary for the parties, and ultimately the Court, to properly assess a foundational issue of jurisdiction, including the issue of domicile of Mr. Knol. The domicile determination will inform many aspects of the jurisdictional inquiry. The domicile of Mr. Knol will inform to some extent whether this Court or a Dutch court has jurisdiction over a dispute involving his estate. His domicile will inform the issue of prima facie jurisdiction simpliciter, as set out under s. 10, whether, for example, he was ordinarily resident in British Columbia. Even on Ms. Imafuku's evidence, there is some confusion, in that he split his half year in Canada between Yukon and British Columbia. Indeed, as quoted above, Mr. Knol himself appeared to claim that he was a resident not of British Columbia, but of Yukon. [37] The domicile and other information that may be garnered through discovery processes will also inform the issue of forum conveniens under CJPTA, s.

11. All of the s. 11(2) sub-considerations could be informed by the discovery process with respect to Mr. Knol's papers in the possession of Ms. Imafuku: (2) A court, in deciding the question of whether it or a court outside British Columbia is the more appropriate forum in which to hear a proceeding, must consider the circumstances relevant to the proceeding, including (a) the comparative convenience and expense for the parties to the proceeding and for their witnesses, in litigating in the court or in any alternative forum, (b) the law to be applied to issues in the proceeding, (c) the desirability of avoiding multiplicity of legal proceedings, (d) the desirability of avoiding conflicting decisions in different courts, (e) the enforcement of an eventual judgment, and (f) the fair and efficient working of the Canadian legal system as a whole. [38] Specifically, with respect to 11(1)(a), discovery would inform whether there are witnesses located here, or in the Netherlands, or otherwise. On the witnesses point, it will inform the issue of the nature of the relationship between Ms. Imafuku and Mr. Knol. [39] I appreciate Ms. Imafuku's argument that she is not seeking a declaration as to her spousal status. However, that relationship is a central issue in the s. 58 WESA inquiry, which in part asks itself whether the putative will names as beneficiaries the exact individuals that

would be expected. That issue would be powerfully informed by evidence indicating whether Ms. Imafuku was indeed tantamount to a spouse, as she asserts, or whether she was simply a roommate of convenience or a business partner. [40] With respect to 11(1)(b), again, the issue of domicile is central to the issue of the proper jurisdiction to consider disputes about the will. [41] With respect to 11(1)(c), I understand that no litigation has yet been commenced with respect to Mr. Knol's estate in the Netherlands. That said, the siblings assert an intention to bring such litigation. Thus, it will be desirable to avoid multiple proceedings in multiple jurisdictions. Similarly, with respect to 11(1)(d), discovery will assist in the avoidance of conflicting decisions between the courts. [42] With respect to 11(1)(e), the enforcement of an eventual judgment speaks loudly to the circumstances here today. We do not presently know on the evidence whether a ruling in Ms. Imafuku's favour under s. 58 would be recognized by the Dutch court. It is acknowledged that the siblings could and should have obtained evidence with respect to this issue before today's hearing. That said, it can certainly be anticipated that a judge hearing the jurisdictional application would need to have better evidence on that issue in deciding: a) the jurisdictional issue; and b) if it proceeds to it, the s. 58

petition. [43] The discovery process will also be critical to the proper adjudication of the s. 58 application if the proceeding survives jurisdictional challenge and remains here. [44] As Ms. Imafuku acknowledges, citing Young Estate, 2015 BCSC 182, s. 58 is a factually intensive inquiry. It will be important for the judge hearing the petition to have as much information before him or her in deciding whether to grant the extraordinary remedy set out in s. 58: here, in the context of the inherently unusual circumstances of the putative will, which, again, went unsigned for a year and a half. [45] At paragraph 8 of her application response, Ms. Imafuku sets out the issues raised in her petition: 8. In this petition, the issues that the court needs to decide based on the filed materials are as follows: a. Is the document authentic? b. Does the non‑compliant document represent the deliberate or fixed and final expression of intention at the material time as to the disposal of the Deceased's property on death? c. Does the court have jurisdiction? [46] All of these issues are contested. All of these issues would be informed, to the benefit of the parties and to the benefit of the Court, by discovery along the lines sought by the siblings in the present application. [47] Similarly, at paragraph 21 of her application response, Ms. Imafuku recites the issues raised by the siblings: a.

the ordinary residence of the Deceased, b. testamentary issues, c. assets located in different jurisdictions whether personal, real estate or mining claims, d. alleged common‑law relationship with the Petitioner, e. his alleged will, and f. jurisdiction. [48] Again, these are all very contested issues. They are issues that the Court will have to determine on the jurisdiction challenge application, as well as, for the most part, on the s. 58 application. [49] Apart from the fruits of discovery being germane and critical to the jurisdiction application and the s. 58 application, the information and documentation that will likely be generated by a discovery order will also be critical in dealing with the estate in any case. It will be relevant to the execution of the putative will if it is confirmed or cured as a will in Canada; it will be relevant if the estate is adjudicated and dealt with in the Netherlands; it will be relevant if there are aspects of the estate that have to be dealt with elsewhere, such as in Yukon or in other jurisdiction; and it will be relevant in dealing with Mr. Knol's assets if he is found to have died intestate. [50] The information will also help establish a thorough inventory of all of Mr. Knol's assets. Apart from the assets, he is apparently involved, as per Mr. Schriemer's affidavit, in multiple Dutch lawsuits, apart from that with his siblings.

The administration of the estate will require details with respect to those lawsuits, as intangible assets, but also as going concerns that presumably will have to be dealt with sooner rather than later in the Netherlands. In short, there are all manner of practical reasons indicating that the documents and information sought in the discovery orders should be searched for and produced. [51] As a further practical matter, this dispute may in the end have to be litigated in the Netherlands, even in the face of a British Columbia Supreme Court ruling in favour of the s. 58 petition proceeding. Such a ruling may have no practical effect: not so much for the immediate petitioner Ms. Imafuku, but for the Dutch executor and primary Dutch beneficiary, the lawyer Mr. Schriemer. Even if this Court elevates the purported will to a status tantamount to a properly executed will, at the end of the day, the Dutch court may well refuse to recognize this ruling or recognize the will. Apart from generating a process of inefficient futility, it would also put the Dutch court in the awkward position of being asked to reject an order of this Court, creating a scenario contrary to the spirit of international judicial comity. Allowing discovery procedures reduces the likelihood of such a scenario. [52] I also reach this decision informed by s. 58 jurisprudence cited by the petitioner. In two of those

cases, the computer of the deceased potentially held evidence relating to the will in question: Hubschi Estate (Re), 2019 BCSC 2040, and Rempel Estate v. Dudley, 2020 BCSC 1766. [53] Similarly, here, metadata, communications, and documents may well be revealed through access to the computer, and may inform critical issues in relation to the putative will, such as the timing of its creation and whether it was simply a rumination or draft, or whether it reflects the fixed intention of the deceased. [54] In Yaremkewich Estate (Re), 2015 BCSC 1124, the Court noted the following factors informing the enquiry into the legitimacy of a purported will: a) that there was no evidence to the contrary of suspicious circumstances that indicated the impugned documents did not represent the deceased's testamentary intentions; b) the detailed nature of the wording of the document; c) the circumstances in which the documents were found in an envelope marked "Will of Denise Lynn Bevan Yaremkewich"; and d) the content of the documents, specifically the distributive nature and contemplation of death. [55] Evidence illuminating those issues may well be found on the present computer, or in the personal papers and effects of Mr. Knol. [56] I turn to the specific details of the orders that are sought. [57] I confirm the broad wording of the discovery order sought in 1(a). [58] As we noted in the course

of the hearing, Mr. Knol's tax returns (1(a)(i)) are doubly pertinent to the jurisdictional issue. They will indicate the stated domicile of the deceased: I understand that those tax returns also state his residence to be the Yukon rather than British Columbia. The tax records will also indicate whether the deceased categorized Ms. Imafuku as a spouse, or common‑law spouse, or otherwise. Those documents will not be determinative, but likely can inform the jurisdictional issues. They will also inform the s. 58 issues, as previously indicated. [59] With respect to the Dutch passport (1(a)(ii)), I appreciate that it is generally uncontroversial about how much time the deceased spent in the Netherlands vis à vis Canada. But that passport will nail down with more precision the specific dates spent in the Netherlands, British Columbia, and elsewhere, in a more objective and precise manner than that provided in Ms. Imafuku's affidavit. [60] With respect to the papers and documents (1(a)(iii)), I am satisfied that given the multiple mysteries in the present circumstances. broad discovery is necessary. Discovery will inform the three issues of jurisdiction, s. 58, and the proper administration of the estate of the deceased. [61] With respect to 1(b)--the deceased's computer--I have already confirmed that that computer may well hold important evidence that will inform not only the

jurisdiction issue but the s. 58 issue: namely, the circumstances and timing of the creation of the putative will, and whether or not it was intended to be the fixed and final testamentary intention of the deceased. [62] I also grant the order that there will be a cross‑examination of Ms. Imafuku following the production of those documents. Ordinarily, there would be benefits of having that cross‑examination occur in front of a judge, insofar as it is difficult to assess the credibility of the witness based upon a transcript resulting from a cross‑examination in a boardroom. Are there submissions on that issue? [63] CNSL D. HOBBS: My thought is just to add a sentence to the second paragraph that says the parties are granted leave to make further submissions on whether the cross‑examination would be in open court or in some other setting, or words to that effect. And it ‑‑ I think it'll be a bit informed by the document production and what's in that regard. [64] THE COURT: Mr. Alkin, do you have any submission on that? [65] CNSL K. ALKIN: I agree with my friend. I agree with that language. [66] THE COURT: Yes: that is very good, then. I'd rather leave it up to you two, because it may be highly inefficient and cumbersome if I make an order in advance. The form and venue of the cross-examination may be informed by what comes out of the documents. [67] For example, despite this

broad document production, the siblings may well look at the discovered evidence and say, well, there is nothing here to proceed on. Or maybe there will be such profound evidence in the produced materials that Ms. Imafuku will change her position. There may be no need for cross‑examination. So we will leave it at that. [68] The inspection of the computer will be fully at the cost of the siblings. [69] I will also confirm for greater certainty that the fact that the Court has sanctioned this discovery process is without prejudice to the siblings' position that this Court does not have jurisdiction, or, alternatively should decline jurisdiction in favour of the Dutch courts. [FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH COUNSEL ON DRAFTING OF ORDER] [70] THE COURT: The portions of Ms. Imafuku's tax forms that indicate marital status for the past five years before Mr. Knol's death will also be provided, with everything else redacted. I will leave it to counsel to discuss and draft an order to that effect. [SUBMISSIONS ON COSTS] [71] THE COURT: I agree with Mr. Alkin that costs should be paid for by the estate. We have nothing on the record to indicate that Ms. Imafuku is proceeding in anything other than good faith. Based on the limited evidence that I have seen she does seem to have a reasonably strong claim that she was in a romantic, long‑term relationship with Mr. Knol. It may well be that Mr.

Knol's statements to her misled or confused her, but that would appear not to be her fault. [72] Mr. Hobbs has been successful in receiving unusual orders for discovery in what is presumptively a summary proceeding. It would be reasonable for Ms. Imafuku to oppose those extraordinary requests. [73] In the circumstances, I thus agree that the costs should not be borne by her personally. They should come out of the estate. Costs of this application for the petitioner and respondents will be paid by the estate of Lucas Knol as full indemnity special costs, as per usual. "Crerar J"