Metz v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship)

Metz v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship) Court (s) Database Federal Court Decisions Date 2025-12-19 Neutral citation 2025 FC 2006 File numbers IMM-17674-25 Decision Content Date: 20251219 Docket: IMM-17674-25 Citation: 2025 FC 2006 Ottawa, Ontario, December 19, 2025 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Roy BETWEEN:

ZACHARY IAN METZ Applicant and THE MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND CITIZENSHIP Respondent

JUDGMENT AND REASONS [1] The Applicant, Zachary Ian Metz, is a resident of Texas, in the United States of America. On this motion, he is a litigant-in-person. He makes this motion in writing, pursuant to Rule 369 of the Federal Courts Rules (SOR/98-106). The Applicant notes his use of artificial intelligence in drafting portions of documents. He does not specify which portions were actually assisted by that technology. [2] Mr. Metz, although not a party to a matter decided by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) on June 4, 2025, wants to be authorized, pursuant to section 72 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA), to launch a judicial review application concerning that RPD decision. Context [3] Some context is necessary to have some understanding of what this matter is about. [4] First, it appears that this Applicant was identified as the agent of persecution in the refugee protection application made before the RPD. His two children and their mother were granted refugee status in Canada. Although the Applicant confirms that he learned about the RPD decision on June 10, it is only on August 8 that he filed his judicial review application against the decision. [5] Second, the Applicant concedes that he was not a party to the proceedings: thus, it is unknown how the Applicant claims standing in this matter. As we shall see, the Respondent argues

that Mr. Metz has failed establish he has any standing. [6] Third, not only does the Applicant seek the required authorization to launch a judicial review, but he also seeks “a stay of the decision of the RPD”. [7] Fourth, it seems that the Applicant takes issue with the RPD having found that he is the “agent of persecution” from whom the children and their mother seek protection by coming to Canada. [8] Fifth, we learn of proceedings before the Ontario courts the purpose of which is said to involve the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Very little is known of proceedings which fall in a different bailiwick than that which is of a federal jurisdiction. [9] In the end, the RPD found that persons who sought Canada’s protection were refugees pursuant to the IRPA. Some findings are said to be raised in one fashion or another. [10] The Respondent opposed these proceedings on the basis that the Applicant has no standing to challenge the RPD decision to grant refugee status. Of course, if there is no standing to launch a judicial review application, the standing to be granted a stay is also nullified, Mr. Metz not being a party to any proceedings before this Court. Standing [11] In essence, the Applicant seeks the quashing of the RPD decision because he was not asked to participate in the proceedings before the RPD. According to the Application

for Leave and for Judicial Review, the Applicant invokes subsections 170(c) and (h) of the IRPA, as well as the Common Law duty of procedural fairness. Hence he argues that he should have been allowed to participate, including having the right to cross-examine witnesses, presumably so that the refugee status would be denied. He does not explain how he would be prevented from participating in the proceedings before the Ontario courts where he has a direct interest in the outcome of the case. The Respondent argues that the Applicant did not have direct interest in the proceedings before the RPD where the only issue is whether the refugee status should be granted, a matter that does not involve the Applicant directly. [12] Thus, the Respondent brings a motion to strike the Applicant’s attempt to challenge the RPD decision. The Respondent argues that not only the Applicant was not a party to the proceedings, but no obligations are imposed on him by the decision and the relief obtained does not directly prejudice him. In effect, the Applicant is not directly affected by the proceedings and no judicial review application of such decision should be entertained. [13] The test for such motion was established in David Bull Laboratories (Canada) Inc. v Pharmacia Inc., [1995] 1 FC 588 where the Court of Appeal found that a motion to strike a notice of motion for prohibition required that

the notice of motion for the judicial review (prohibition) “is so clearly improper as to be bereft of any possibility of success” (p. 600). I note that the Court of Appeal acknowledges that the Court has jurisdiction to grant the motion to strike, although the argument should generally be made before the Court hearing the judicial review on its merits. I also note that, arguably, the David Bull Laboratories test is even stricter than the traditional test for motions to strike out an action for want of a reasonable claim or cause of action: it must be plain and obvious that the statement of claim discloses no reasonable claim (Hunt v Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 SCR 959). [14] Considering what is here the real essence and essential character of the proceedings launched by this Applicant, the Respondent argues that the standing requirement is completely lacking. The Respondent finds support in Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association v Canada (Health), 2011 FC 465, 2001 FCA 357 where our Court found that in cases where an applicant has no standing, that constitutes circumstances in which a motion to strike concerning a judicial review application is appropriate and apposite. We read at paragraph 35 of the Federal Court decision: [35] That being said, there are exceptions to that general rule, and one of them is where the Applicant has no standing to bring the application: see

Apotex Inc v Canada (Governor in Council), 2007 FC 232, at para 33; Canwest Mediaworks Inc v Canada (Minister of Health), 2007 FC 752, at para 10, aff’d 2008 FCA 207. The Supreme Court of Canada accepted that an issue of standing may be properly determined as a preliminary matter where the Court has sufficient information before it for a proper understanding of the interest asserted: Finlay v Canada (Minister of Finance), 1986 CanLII 6 (SCC), [1986] 2 SCR 607, at para 16. In the case at bar, I am satisfied that the record before me is sufficient to allow me to make a final determination with respect to the issue of standing. The Court of Appeal agreed (para 3). [15] In the two cases, the Courts agreed that someone who is not directly affected by the judicial review will be lacking standing to challenge the decision. [16] Following in the footsteps of Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association, the Respondent contends that subsection 18.1(1) of the Federal Courts Act, which provides who can seek judicial review of an administrative decision, is controlling: it is the person “directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought” who can seek judicial review. Already our Court had found in 2011 that “the matter at issue must be one which would adversely affect its legal rights, impose legal obligations on it, or prejudicially affect it directly”. The test was

asserted again in Forest Ethics Advocacy Association v Canada (National Energy Board), 2013 FCA 236, at paragraph 20. [17] If there is an impact on Mr. Metz, the Respondent pleads that it is no more than indirect and, in fact, it remains unknown. The interest in the outcome of the proceedings in Ontario courts does not suffice to satisfy the “directly affected test” (Soprema Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FC 732, para 29-30). Indeed, the parties to refugee proceedings are the refugee claimant and the Minister. It is the rights of the refugee seeking person that are in play. [18] Not being a party to the proceedings, there are no legal obligations imposed on this Applicant. Whatever proceedings may occur in the Ontario courts will not be determined by the RPD decision. That matter will be determined on the basis of the evidence before the Ontario courts; surely the Applicant will be able to offer whatever evidence is relevant and admissible (Kirby v Woods, 2024 ONCA 601, para 78). [19] For good measure, the Respondent adds that the Applicant cannot claim some public interest standing. It is clear that the essence of the issue involving the Applicant is a family law issue: the Ontario Court is seized of the matter. The Ontario Court is the most reasonable, efficient and effective way to have the family law matter properly litigated: it is certainly not by seeking the

judicial review of an immigration matter before the Federal Court. [20] Thus, says the Respondent, there is no right that is directly affected. In the result, the Applicant lacks any standing to seek the judicial review of a decision to which he was not even a participant. [21] The Applicant replied. He contends that the “family court cannot supply the administrative law remedies at issue”. It “cannot review or set aside the RPD decision, cannot compel Rule 317 production of the unredacted reasons/record, and cannot overcome IRPA s. 115” (para 4). He also made it clear he was not seeking public interest standing. With respect, that appears to be beside the point. Obviously, the Ontario Court cannot grant a remedy on judicial review. Rather, the point of the matter is whether this Applicant has the proper standing to challenge a decision granting refugee status in Canada. Analysis [22] The Applicant faces the hurdle of establishing that he has the standing required to launch a judicial review application of a RPD decision the effect of which was to grant his children and their mother refugee status in this country. Section 18 of the Federal Courts Act provides this Court with the exclusive jurisdiction to decide judicial review applications concerning a federal board, commission or other tribunal. That includes of course the Refugee Board and its two divisions. Moreover, section

18.1 specifies who can make an application for judicial review. Subsection 18.1(1) reads: “An application for judicial review may be made by the Attorney General of Canada or anyone directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought”. [23] It does not suffice that someone may feel affected by a decision rendered by a federal board, commission or other tribunal. The person must be directly affected, and that person must also by directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought. [24] The case before the RPD is one where applicants have sought refugee status. This is not a family law matter. The relief sought is one in public law where a federal statute applies to grant successful applicants status in Canada. [25] Accordingly, it is the burden of the Applicant to establish he has the standing to seek a relief concerning someone else’s refugee status. The notion of “directly affected” has a particular meaning which has been acknowledged for many years by the Federal Courts. Paragraph 20 of Forest Ethics Advocacy Association (supra) provides an encapsulated expression of what constitutes being “directly affected” for the purpose of having standing to launch a judicial review application: [20] A party has a “direct interest” under subsection 18.1(1) of the Federal Courts Act when its legal rights are affected, legal obligations are imposed upon

it, or it is prejudicially affected in some direct way: League for Human Rights of B'Nai Brith Canada v. Odynsky, 2010 FCA 307 at paragraphs 57-58; Rothmans of Pall Mall Canada Ltd. v. Canada (M.N.R.), 1976 CanLII 2258 (FCA), [1976] 2 F.C. 500 (C.A.); Irving Shipbuilding Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), 2009 FCA 116. (my emphasis) [26] As the Court of Appeal puts it at paragraph 21, “the question is whether the relief sought in the application for judicial review will affect a party’s legal rights, impose legal obligations upon it, or prejudicially affect it in some direct way”. In that case, the issue was whether the Association should be added as respondents. That is not even remotely the case in the matter at hand. It would not have been possible to add the Applicant as a respondent: that is simply not what immigration cases are about (see Kirby v Woods (supra), para 57 to 66). The relief sought in the immigration matter, that is the refugee status granted, will not affect the legal rights, impose legal obligations or cause prejudice in a direct way to Mr. Metz. [27] The Applicant did not establish that he has legal rights affected by the relief sought, that is the refugee claim. There are no legal obligations imposed on him through the attempt by the parties to the immigration case to be granted protection as refugees. The Applicant is not prejudiced in a direct way by the decision

made to grant refugee status. To paraphrase DeMontigny J., then of this Court, in Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association (supra), it can hardly be contended that the Applicant is directly affected by the RPD decision to grant refugee status. Mr. Metz is simply not directly affected by that decision. His true concern appears to be no more than the impact the immigration case of his children and their mother may have on the litigation before the Ontario Court (about which very little is known) in what appears to be a family law related matter. In fact, the Applicant states in his motion for a stay of the legal effect of the RPD decision that the “decision foreseeably imposes serious collateral consequences on a non-party” (grounds for the motion dated September 3, 2025). We are not in the realm of rights being directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought. As the Applicant puts it in both his stay motion and his application for judicial review, his real concern is the use made in completely different proceedings before a different court about his parental interest and the prejudice his reputation may have suffered in the Federal Court. That is not being directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought, that is the refugee protection granted. If the Applicant cannot be considered to be directly affected by the granting of refugee

status, he has then no status to challenge that decision. [28] If the Applicant does not have standing to challenge the refugee granting decision, it follows that his application is “so clearly improper as to be bereft of any possibility of success”. That is because the most fundamental requirement continues to be that a litigant has standing before a court. Parliament has decided that in order to challenge an administrative decision, the litigant must have been directly affected by the matter: that is not the case here. As found in Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association (supra), if it is possible to determine the issue of standing before a judicial review application proceeds any further, that would constitute the kind of matter which may be decided before it goes to the merits (para 35). Such is the case here. [29] The Applicant has not submitted any argument, let alone evidence, that would tend to show that he has standing to challenge a decision about the refugee status granted in a case he was not a party to. [30] As a result, the Application for Leave and for Judicial Review is stricken out. It follows that the motion for a stay of “the legal effect and enforcement of the Refugee Protection decision dated June 4, 2025, pending final determination of this Application for Leave and Judicial Review” is without an object (s. 18.2 of the Federal Courts Act). [31] The Respondent did not seek their costs. None are granted. THE COURT ORDERS: The Applicant does not have standing to challenge on judicial review the decision of the Refugee Protection decision of June 4, 2025. The Application for Authorization and Judicial is stricken out. There are no costs granted. Blank “Yvan Roy” Blank Judge

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-17674-25 STYLE OF CAUSE: ZACHARY IAN METZ v THE MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES & CITIZENSHIP PLACE OF HEARING: OTTAWA (oNTARIO) MOTION IN WRITING CONSIDERED AT OTTAWA, ONTARIO PURSUANT TO RULE 369 OF THE FEDERAL COURTS RULES JUDGMENT AND REASONS: ROY J. DATED: December 19, 2025 SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Zachary Ian Metz Antonietta Ravigle Attorney General of Ontario

OTTAWA ON SELF-REPRESENTED For The Respondent