Pangli v. Pangli

2009 BCSC 1070 Pangli v. Pangli

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Pangli v. Pangli, 2009 BCSC 1070 Date: 20090327 Docket: S086089 Registry: Vancouver Between: Haripal Singh Pangli and Dalvir Kaur Pangli Plaintiffs And Sarbjeetpal Singh Pangli, Balbir Singh Boparai and Sunbir Kaur Boparai Defendants Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Martinson Oral Reasons for Judgment In Chambers March 27, 2009 Counsel for Plaintiffs R. J. Morton Counsel for Defendants S. Grewal Date and Place of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. February 26, 2009 Date and Place of Judgment: New Westminster, B.C. March 27, 2009 Nature of the Application [1] I have been asked to decide whether British Columbia or Punjab, India is the most appropriate forum to hear this claim filed in British Columbia. It is a claim for breach of contract, constructive trust, and fraudulent conveyance filed in this court on August 27, 2008. Section 11 of the Court Jurisdiction Proceedings Transfer Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 28 [CJPTA], applies. I will explain what it says and how I think it applies in this case, after discussing the nature of the dispute, the allegations and the arguments advanced. Nature of the Dispute [2] This case involves a dispute among family members who reside in British Columbia. One plaintiff, Haripal Singh Pangli, is the uncle of the defendant Sarbjeetpal Singh Pangli. The second plaintiff, Dalvir Kaur Pangli, is the uncle's wife.

The other defendants are the nephew's wife, Sunbir Kaur Boparai, and her father, Balbir Singh Boparai. Because of the surname that is shared by the parties, I will at times use given names, but not out of disrespect. The facts are somewhat unusual; the uncle and the nephew have entirely different views about what happened and why it happened. The Allegations [3] Haripal says that he and his nephew Sarbjeetpal entered into an oral agreement whereby he and his wife agreed to loan his nephew $10,000 towards the purchase of a property in Abbottsford, British Columbia (the "B.C. Property") on terms to be discussed. [4] The completion date for the purchase was March 30, 2007. On that date, Haripal says he and his wife loaned a further $97,400 to his nephew for the purchase of the property on the nephew's agreement to repay the total amount loaned within seven days after the completion of the purchase of the property. [5] They say that Sarbjeetpal and his wife Sunbir purchased the B.C. Property using the loan funds, but in breach of the alleged contract he refused or neglected to repay the loan. [6] Haripal alleges that on or about May 14, 2008, Sarbjeetpal and Sunbir transferred title to the B.C. Property to Sunbir's father, Mr. Boparai. They continue to reside in the property but the father does not. Haripal says that the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance and that the nephew and

his wife have been unjustly enriched. [7] Sarbjeetpal alleges that a property in the Punjab--which should, by Indian law, have evolved to him by virtue of natural succession on his father's death in 2003, as a result of the interest of his grandfather--was fraudulently conveyed into the name of Haripal on February 1, 2005. The Punjab property--two acres of prime land--is worth about $450,000 CAD. He alleges that the property was transferred through the creation and execution of a false power of attorney. This was done with the assistance of his uncle. He provides documentary evidence to support that claim. [8] Sarbjeetpal says that the money paid was not a loan at all, but paid as a result of an agreement he made with his uncle to compensate him for the wrongful transfer of the land that was meant for him. [9] Sarbjeetpal relies on the following evidence. [10] He says that Haripal began collecting lease payments on the Indian property after his father's death. Around October 6, 2006, he asked Haripal for those payments and he stated that at first Haripal agreed but then refused, saying he had contributed most of the money for the purchase of the original property, owned by the grandfather, purchased some 30 years earlier. He notes that other portions of the property went directly to Haripal and to Parvitar Pangli, another one of his uncles. [11] He says that Haripal ultimately

admitted to the fraud. [12] He claims Haripal said he would give him $230,000 CAD for the land and asked him how much he wanted. He said he learned its true worth was about $450,000 CAD, and he learned that Haripal had sold the topsoil off the land for the equivalent of $25,000 CAD. [13] Sarbjeetpal says he told Haripal that he could either pay him $450,000 or give the land back. He says Haripal agreed; Haripal thought it was better for him to keep the land as its value would increase and it is frontage to his own property. [14] He claims Haripal advised him to use the money to purchase a house and gave him $10,000 for the deposit and a further $97,400. Haripal then requested six months to raise the rest of the money and said if he could not raise the money, then he would cancel the sale deed regarding the land. He also requested that he make payments and Sarbjeetpal says he agreed because Haripal is his uncle and he wished to resolve this issue as amicably as possible and within the family. He says that in August 2007, he called Haripal to ask for the rest of the money he had agreed to pay. Haripal asked for a few more months to raise the money, as he was in the process of selling a hotel on Vancouver Island and he had not received the purchase money yet, but would pay as soon as he received it. In October 2007, Sarbjeetpal again contacted Haripal who then reneged, stating

that the $107,400 already paid was more than enough money for the land and he was not going to give Sarbjeetpal any more. [15] Sarbjeetpal says in his affidavit that "I told Haripal Pangli that he could have his money back and that I wanted the Land back. He said he didn't have to give the Land back to me because he was a legitimate purchaser and he could also sue me for the money he'd given me by saying it was just a loan." [16] Sarbjeetpal says that he told his uncle that he was going to India to report him to the Indian authorities and get the land back. Sarbjeetpal says Haripal said he would teach him a lesson for challenging his authority and was going to start a lawsuit against him. His uncle said that the land had been sold to him by Nirmal Singh. He said that Nirmal Singh had a general power of attorney from his father. [17] Sarbjeetpal has presented evidence that Pavittar Pangli had impersonated his father and then falsely executed a power of attorney to Nirmal Singh and then Nirmal Singh had used the false document to sell his father's land to Haripal. The land was sold for about $15,000 CAD, approximately two to three percent of its value. Nirmal Singh (a different Nirmal Singh than the man alleged to have acted as the Power of Attorney, another uncle who has been assisting Sarbjeetpal and his sisters) says that, through his relatives and friends, Haripal is "giving

me threats that I do not provide any help of son of Dharamapal Singh, otherwise they would implicate me in a false case or murdered me or after giving a false report regarding me in Immigration make trouble in my case, so I fail to go abroad. If any action taken against me, Haripal is responsible for that." [18] Haripal and Nirmal Singh are now charged with forgery, criminal conspiracy, cheating, and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. There is a warrant in India for Haripal's arrest. [19] Sarbjeetpal and his sisters have filed a civil suit against Haripal under the Indian Code of Civil Procedure to challenge the validity of the sale of land. They obtained a permanent injunction restraining Haripal from dealing with the land in any way whatsoever. [20] In spite of Haripal's evidence that he has two brothers named Dharampal S. Pangli, there is compelling evidence that there was only one and he died before the property was transferred. Summary of the Parties' Positions Sarbjeetpal Panglis' Submissions [21] Sarbjeetpal argues that all of the criteria in the CJPTA favour Punjab, India, except juridical advantage. Notwithstanding that the statement of claim has cast this as a breach of a loan agreement, there is, he submits, enough material before the Court to cause it to question the actual nature of the transaction that underlies this action. Relying on Liu v. Huang, 2008

BCSC 288, 59 C.P.C. (6th) 1, he says that this court must question whether these proceedings are actually about an illegality that has been committed in Punjab, India, and whether this Court is now being asked to unwittingly participate in an illegality. He notes that the agreement alleged by Haripal is an oral agreement, and he has no documentary evidence upon which to rely. [22] Sarbjeetpal emphasizes that though the discussions were in British Columbia, these discussions were by Indian citizens about Indian land among an Indian family. All the parties have strong ties to India. He says Indian law applies. There will be considerable cost-savings associated with not having to prove Indian law and not needing to have documents translated into English. The Indian authorities have conducted an investigation and the evidence is that the Indian courts have a proceeding specifically designed for dealing with this type of transaction. [23] He says most of the essential witnesses and most of the documents are in India; the documents are in Punjabi. He says there has been an admission that the money was paid by Haripal to him and the only dispute is whether it was a loan or related to the fraudulent transfer of the Indian land. The Plaintiffs' Submissions [24] They say that what happened in India looks suspicious at best and the question about the transfer of the Indian land should be

decided in India. [25] However, they say that this has nothing to do with this case. This is an action about an alleged loan and the alleged fraudulent conveyance of the B.C. Property. The parties live here and the agreement was made here. [26] They say it is noteworthy that the matter of the Indian property was not raised until after Haripal demanded the loan back. [27] They also argue that the statement quoted above where Sarbjeetpal said he would give the money back is an admission. Now he "wants his cake and to eat it too" in that he wants to keep the money and get the Indian land. They point to all of the evidence indicating that the money was paid, that Sarbjeetpal and his wife became the owners and live in the house. It also shows that the property was transferred to her father, and he does not live in the house. [28] Haripal says in his affidavit that some time in 2005 or 2006 he purchased some land in Mehlon Village in India from one of his brothers named Dharampal Singh through dealings with a man named Nirmal Singh under a power of attorney from Dharampal. He says, "I had two brothers named Dharampal, one of which is Sarbjeetpal's father and is now deceased". He denies the discussion alleged by Sarbjeetpal. [29] No matter what the Court finds here, there would not be inconsistent findings. [30] They argue that some of the evidence relied upon is hearsay and hearsay

is inadmissible as this would be a final order. [31] He relies on the comments of Sopinka J. in Amchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897, cited in Kvaerner U.S. Inc. v. Amec E&C Services Ltd., 2004 BCSC 635 at para 18. [32] In applying the s. 11 factors they submit that: (a) all of the parties reside in the Greater Vancouver area; (b) the cause of action arose here; (c) there is a juridical advantage to all parties to have the proceedings here in British Columbia since all of the witnesses live here and the transactions took place here; (d) in terms of inconvenience to witnesses, and the cost of litigation, it would obviously be inconvenient for the plaintiffs and the defendants to have to travel to India to assert and defend a claim which has very little connection with that jurisdiction; (e) in terms of substantive law, British Columbia law governs all of the transactions which are in dispute. The alleged money for land agreement was made here in British Columbia. The payment of the $107, 400, either as a loan or under that agreement, and the purchase and subsequent transfer of the B.C. Property are all governed by B.C. law; and (f) in terms of parallel proceedings, any action in India would deal with the alleged fraudulent transfer of land from Sarbjeetpal's father name to Haripal's name. There is no parallel proceeding

where by the plaintiff is trying to recover the $107,400 claimed in this action in India. Analysis Should British Columbia decline to exercise its jurisdiction because Punjab, India is a more appropriate forum to hear the proceeding? [33] Section 11 of the CJPTA is a complete codification of the common law test for forum non conveniens: Teck Cominco Metals Ltd. v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 2009 SCC 11 at para.

22. There are no exceptions to the application of s. 11 of the CJPTA; in every case all the relevant factors listed in s. 11 must be considered: Teck Cominco at paras. 21-22. The Court is to take a holistic approach to the analysis and no one factor overrides the others: Teck Cominco at para. 25 and 30. Chief Justice McLachlin summarized the objective of the test in Teck Cominco at para. 38, "the objective of the forum non conveniens analysis is 'to ensure, if possible, that the action is tried in the jurisdiction that has the closest connection with the action and the parties' (Amchem, at p. 912)." [34] Specifically, s. 11 provides: (1) After considering the interests of the parties to a proceeding and the ends of justice, a court may decline to exercise its territorial competence in the proceeding on the ground that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum in which to hear the proceeding. (2) A court, in deciding the question of whether it or a court outside British Columbia is the more appropriate forum in which to hear a proceeding, must consider the circumstances relevant to the proceeding, including (a) the comparative convenience and expense for the parties to the proceeding and for their witnesses, in litigating in the court or in any alternative forum, (b) the law to be applied to issues in the proceeding, (c) the desirability of avoiding multiplicity of

legal proceedings, (d) the desirability of avoiding conflicting decisions in different courts, (e) the enforcement of an eventual judgment, and (f) the fair and efficient working of the Canadian legal system as a whole. [35] In this case, the Court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if it decides that Punjab, India is the more appropriate forum to hear the proceeding. In making my decision on whether India is a more appropriate forum to hear the action, I must consider the listed factors in s. 11(2). The Court, under s. 11(1), must also consider the interests of the parties and the ends of justice in deciding whether or not to decline to exercise its jurisdiction. [36] Although not discussed in Teck Cominco, the B.C. Court of Appeal in Purple Echo Productions, Inc. v. KCTS Television, 2008 BCCA 85, 253 B.C.A.C. 134, found at para. 59 that the weight to be given to each the factors is a matter for the discretion of the chambers judge. [37] The Supreme Court of Canada in Teck Cominco also did not discuss the burden on the applicant. In Purple Echo, the B.C. Court of Appeal at para. 59 relied on Amchem where the Supreme Court of Canada found that the existence of a more appropriate forum must be clearly established by the applicant. Factors under s. 11 of the CJPTA s. 11(1) Interests of the parties and ends of justice [38] The interests of the plaintiffs clearly favour B.C.

If the action is stayed here, it is possible that the plaintiffs will be left with no recourse. The Indian court will only decide the ownership of the Indian land. If the action is stayed here, the plaintiffs will lose their claim to the $107,400 given to Sarbjeetpal and could also lose ownership of the Indian property in the Indian lawsuit, leaving the plaintiffs without the Indian property and without the $107,400. [39] On the other hand, the interests of the defendants favour India because they can pursue their claim to the Indian property there. [40] In my opinion, this factor, the ends of justice, favours B.C. retaining jurisdiction as the more appropriate forum to hear this matter. The plaintiffs risk losing out twice if the action here is stayed, whereas, if the action here continues, the defendants can still seek ownership of the Indian property in Indian court. The defendants can also still maintain their defence to the action here that the nature of the agreement between Haripal and Sarbjeetpal was not a loan but a settlement. s. 11(2)(a) The comparative convenience and expense for the parties to a proceeding and for their witnesses, in litigating in the court or in any alternative forum [41] The defendants say that this favours India as most of the essential witnesses reside in India. They also point out that all the parties in this action are Indian citizens and

have strong ties to that country. [42] The plaintiffs argue that all the parties reside in the Greater Vancouver area. The property is located here, the transfer occurred here, and the money was paid from a B.C. bank account. They say that it would be inconvenient for the parties to have to travel to India to assert or defend a claim which, they argue, has very little connection to India. [43] This factor does not favour either forum as the more appropriate. On the one hand, in order for the defendants to prove their defence that the agreement between Haripal and Sarbjeetpal was a settlement and not a loan, they will need to present evidence about events that allegedly occurred in India, evidence of Indian law, and bring witnesses to B.C. who live in India. Having an Indian law expert testify, the cost of travel for witnesses, and the costs of translation will be very high for the defendants. It may also be relevant, under this factor, that Haripal and Sarbjeetpal will likely have to travel to India in relation to the civil suit commenced there so the cost of travel for those two parties may not weigh towards B.C. declining jurisdiction. [44] On the other hand, the parties to the B.C. action all live here. The agreement between Haripal and Sarbjeetpal was made in B.C. and the money was transferred here so there are also witnesses in B.C. who will likely be called. If B.C.

declined jurisdiction the plaintiffs would incur significant expenses and inconvenience pursuing their claims in India. [45] In either jurisdiction there will be costs and inconvenience associated with travel of parties and witnesses and proof of events that occurred in another country. s. 11(2)(b) The law to be applied to issues in the proceeding [46] The defendants argue that the law to be applied to the situation is Indian law because this action is really about the fraudulent conveyance of land in India. [47] The plaintiffs claim that B.C. law will apply because this action is about a loan to purchase the B.C. property, an agreement which was reached in B.C. The plaintiffs say that the defendants will be required to prove the alleged settlement agreement, which was made in B.C., under B.C. law, and although determining if the land was fraudulently transferred in India is probative to determine the nature of the agreement between Haripal and Sarbjeetpal, it is a separate matter. [48] This factor favours B.C. as the most appropriate forum. If Haripal is found to be correct and he did loan money to Sarbjeetpal, that contract was formed in B.C. All of the negotiations were made here and the money was transferred here. B.C. law will apply to the determination of whether there was a loan and whether it was repaid. Also, B.C. law will apply to determine whether there is a

constructive trust. [49] Indian law will only apply to the determination of whether the land in India was fraudulently conveyed to the plaintiff. However, that is not the central issue before the court here to decide. The court here is being asked to determine if there was a loan, if the loan was repaid, and if there is now a constructive trust on the B.C. Property. As part of that determination, the court will have to look at the nature of the agreement between Haripal and Sarbjeetpal when the money was transferred. From what I understand of the affidavits, the negotiations for the alleged settlement agreement were also made in B.C.; so, again, B.C. law would apply to a determination of whether a settlement agreement exists and its terms. [50] The defendants' allegation that the agreement between Haripal and Sarbjeetpal was a settlement agreement is unfounded unless the defendants can point to the evidence of the fraudulent conveyance, and Indian law does apply to the Indian land. But, the British Columbia court does not need to decide if there, in fact, was a fraudulent conveyance of land in India. Rather, at the most, it will have to determine if the parties thought that there was a fraudulent conveyance and therefore reached a settlement agreement. Evidence from India will need to be adduced to show that the parties thought that there was a fraudulent conveyance, but the

B.C. court will not be required to make any final determinations about the application of Indian law and the ownership of the Indian lands. [51] It is also important to note that Indian law cannot apply to the B.C. Property. Furthermore, the Indian court, in Sarbjeetpal's civil suit, and the Indian authorities, in their criminal investigation, are not being asked to make any decisions about the nature of the agreement between Haripal and Sarbjeetpal reached in B.C. They are being asked to decide who is the owner of the Indian property and if there was a fraudulent conveyance. Even if Sarbjeetpal did ask the Indian court to make a determination about the nature of the agreement to transfer the money here, I do not think that a decision in India could be enforced against the immovable B.C. Property. [52] The law of British Columbia applies to the majority of the determinations the court will be required to make. Even though Indian law is relevant to the determination of the nature of the agreement between the parties, it is not sufficient to make India the more appropriate forum. Therefore this factor favours British Columbia as the more appropriate forum. s. 11(2)(c) The desirability of avoiding multiplicity of legal proceedings [53] The defendants argue that there are already proceedings underway in India. The Indian authorities have already investigated the transaction

involving the land in India, and Sarbjeetpal has commenced a civil suit in an Indian court. [54] The plaintiffs say that there is no risk of having a parallel proceeding because any action in India would only deal with the alleged fraudulent transfer of land in India, whereas, here Haripal is only trying to recover the money he loaned. [55] In Teck Cominco, McLachlin C.J.C. said the following about the desirability of avoiding parallel proceedings at para. 38: [38] While I am sympathetic to the difficulties presented by parallel proceedings, the desire to avoid them cannot overshadow the objective of the forum non conveniens analysis, which is "to ensure, if possible, that the action is tried in the jurisdiction that has the closest connection with the action and the parties" (Amchem, at p. 912). [56] Chief Justice McLachlin also found in Teck Cominco that the existence of a foreign proceeding in the same matter must only be treated as one factor among many that are to be considered under s. 11, and it is not in itself determinative of the most appropriate forum. [57] The Indian proceeding is not parallel to the proceeding in British Columbia. Sarbjeetpal has asked the Indian court to determine if the Indian land was fraudulently conveyed to the plaintiff. He has not asked the court to determine anything about the agreement and exchange of money that occurred here. There is no

evidence that the Indian court, in determining ownership of the Indian land, will take into account the money that Haripal has paid Sarbjeetpal here and whether he would be required to return that money. There is a concern, as I have said, that if B.C. declines jurisdiction, the defendants would end up with the property in India, the B.C. Property, and the $107,400. The plaintiffs will be left with no recourse. s. 11(2)(d) The desirability of avoiding conflicting decisions in different courts [58] I agree with the plaintiffs that there is no risk of conflicting decisions if B.C. retains jurisdiction over the matter. The B.C. court's decision will either be that the nature of the agreement between Haripal and Sarbjeetpal was a loan, or it was not a loan. On the other hand, in India, the court will decide who owns the Indian property. The decisions each court is being asked to make are capable of coexisting. For example, the court here could order that Sarbjeetpal repay the loan and the Indian court could give him ownership of the Indian property. [59] Therefore this factor favours B.C. retaining jurisdiction. s. 11(2)(e) The enforcement of an eventual judgment [60] This factor clearly favours B.C. as only a B.C. court can enforce a constructive trust on a property here. The court here is not being asked to decide who owns the Indian property, so it will not be making a judgment

that will need to be enforced in India. s. 11(2)(f) The fair and efficient working of the Canadian legal system as a whole [61] The defendants say that there is enough material before the Court to question the nature of the transaction that underlies this action. Specifically, they argue that the Court must question whether these proceedings are actually about an illegality that was committed in India and whether the Court is being asked to participate in an illegality, based on Liu. [62] In my opinion there is no risk that the Court will participate in an illegality, as argued by the defendants. The court will not blindly apply a potentially illegal loan. The B.C. court will determine, based on the evidence, if the agreement was a loan or a settlement. If the defendants are found to be correct and there was a settlement agreement, then Sarbjeetpal will not have to repay the money and there will be no finding that the B.C. property is held in trust for the plaintiffs. [63] Also, the B.C. court will not make any final determination about the ownership of the Indian land and so there is no risk that it will further the alleged illegality that has occurred there. [64] I have, of course, considered the cases relied upon on behalf of the defendants. It is argued, as I have said, that this case is analogous to Liu. Although I agree that this case is similar in the sense that in both

cases the British Columbia court is being asked to determine the true nature of a loan agreement, in my opinion, this case is not analogous to that case. Here, the agreement was made in British Columbia, it relates to immovable property in British Columbia, the parties are in British Columbia, and British Columbia law applies to the main issues. In Liu, the agreement was made in Taiwan, Taiwan law would apply, and some of the key witnesses and possibly the defendant lived in Taiwan. In Liu, unlike this case, there was evidence that the court in Taiwan would be able to decide the issues and enforce an eventual judgment. [65] In Formula Contractors Ltd. v. Lafarge Canada Inc., 2009 BCSC 105, a judge of this court found that Alberta was clearly the more appropriate forum as all the parties were residents of Alberta, the contract was formed in Alberta, the cause of action arose in Alberta, the law of Alberta would apply to the issues, and most of the witnesses were resident in Alberta. [66] Here, the parties are residents of British Columbia, the contract was formed in British Columbia, and the law of British Columbia will apply. [67] I also find that the facts in Blackedge Strategic Capital and Consulting Ltd. v. Spelliscy, 2008 BCSC 1217, are distinguishable. [68] In England v. Research Capital Corporation, 2008 BCSC 580, again, the court found there was no real and substantial

connection to British Columbia, and only as an alternative considered forums non conveniens, a judge of the court found that Alberta was the more appropriate forum as there was no additional cost associated with that jurisdiction and it was the laws of Alberta that applied. [69] Finally, the defendants rely on O'Connor v. Chapman, 2007 BCSC 657. In that case, the motor vehicle accident happened in British Columbia but liability was admitted and the only issue was damages. A judge of the court found that Alberta was the more appropriate forum because the plaintiff was a resident of Alberta, all the medical witnesses were in Alberta, and the plaintiff had been previously injured in an accident in Alberta. [70] Again, in this case, the parties all live in British Columbia and the agreement, whatever its nature, was formed in British Columbia. Conclusion [71] British Columbia is the more appropriate forum to decide this claim. The agreement in issue was made in B.C. and so the law of B.C. will apply. There is no risk of parallel proceedings or conflicting decisions. B.C. has the closest connection to the parties (who are all resident of B.C.) and the subject matter (the agreement was reached in B.C. and it relates to property in B.C.). Although the B.C. court's decision about the nature of the agreement will have to be informed by what happened in India, the court is not being

asked to make any final determination about the ownership of the Indian land or to apply Indian law. [72] My conclusion is based in part on the fact that I am concerned that if B.C. declines jurisdiction, the plaintiffs will be left without any legal recourse to collect the money they claim they are owed or to claim an interest in the B.C. Property. If B.C. declines jurisdiction, it is possible that Sarbjeetpal will end up being able to keep the $107,400 and be given ownership of the Indian land if B.C. declines jurisdiction, a result that I do not think is just. [73] I asked counsel whether I have authority to direct that no further steps be taken until the proceedings have concluded in India, and if I do, whether I should exercise that authority in favour of doing that. Are counsel in a position to speak to that issue now? [74] [SUBMISSIONS] [75] Thank you. I know I invited these submissions. I am, however, persuaded by the arguments that Mr. Morton has made that doing what I suggested I might be able to do would, in fact, undermine the decision that I have made here today. So I will not make a direction that this matter shall not proceed until the matters have been dealt with in India. [76] The plaintiffs are entitled to costs in the cause at scale B. "Martinson J."