Canada Judgment

Supreme Court of British Columbia

Prevost v. Vetter et al

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Source document

01

Holding and result

The court concluded the Vetters owed a duty of care because the impairment originated on their premises and harm to third parties was reasonably foreseeable, and they breached that duty by failing to take reasonable steps to prevent the impaired person from causing harm; accordingly the Rule 18A application to dismiss was denied.

Court disposition

Application under Rule 18A by Gregory and Shari Vetter to dismiss the action denied; court finds they owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and breached it.

Orders

  • Application under Rule 18A by Gregory and Shari Vetter to dismiss the action denied

02

Material facts

Parties

Adam Prevost

Plaintiff Counsel: Robert A. Clarke

Linda Prevost

Committee/plaintiff

Edward Prevost

Committee/plaintiff

Desiree Nicole Vetter

Defendant

Gregory Adam Vetter

Defendant/third Party Counsel: Darren G. Blois

Shari Irene Vetter

Defendant/third Party Counsel: Darren G. Blois

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada

Defendant/third Party

Attorney General of British Columbia

Defendant/third Party

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Negligence (personal Injury) / Interlocutory Application Under Rule 18 a to Dismiss; Decision on Application Reserved and Rendered

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The applicants (Gregory and Shari Vetter) argued there was no duty of care to prevent harm off their premises caused by a third party who became impaired on their premises and that the application under Rule 18A to dismiss should succeed for lack of duty/proximity/foreseeability.
Respondent
The plaintiff argued the Vetters owed a duty of care because the impairment occurred on their premises and harm to third parties was foreseeable, and that the Vetters breached the requisite standard by failing to take reasonable steps to prevent the impaired person from causing harm.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Common law negligence principles (foreseeability/proximity/policy)

    Duty of care in negligence requires foreseeability, proximity and consideration of policy factors.

  2. 02

    Common law principles regarding social host/premises liability

    A person who causes or allows impairment on their premises may owe a duty to third parties harmed off-premises if harm is reasonably foreseeable and reasonable preventative steps were not taken.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The court concluded the Vetters owed a duty of care because the impairment originated on their premises and harm to third parties was reasonably foreseeable, and they breached that duty by failing to take reasonable steps to prevent the impaired person from causing harm; accordingly the Rule 18A application to dismiss was denied.

Court disposition

Application under Rule 18A by Gregory and Shari Vetter to dismiss the action denied; court finds they owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and breached it.

  • Application under Rule 18A by Gregory and Shari Vetter to dismiss the action denied

Source and reliance status

Supreme Court of British Columbia · 22 February 2001

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Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

Supreme Court of British Columbia

Judgment· 22 February 2001

2001 BCSC 297

2001BCSC0297 Citation: Prevost v. Vetter et al Date: 20010222 2001 BCSC 297 Docket: 23047 Registry: Vernon

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA BETWEEN: ADAM PREVOST, A PERSON UNDER A DISABILITY BY HIS COMMITTEE, LINDA PREVOST AND

EDWARD PREVOST

PLAINTIFF AND: DESIREE NICOLE VETTER, GREGORY ADAM VETTER, SHARI IRENE VETTER, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

DEFENDANTS AND: GREGORY ADAM VETTER, SHARI IRENE VETTER,

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA AND

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

THIRD PARTIES

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

OF THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE COULTAS (IN CHAMBERS) Counsel for the Plaintiff: Robert A. Clarke Counsel for Greg and Shari Vetter: Darren G. Blois Date and Place of Hearing: February 7,8,9, 2001 Vernon, BC [1] On February 9, 2001 at Vernon, British Columbia, I reserved my decision on an application brought by the defendants, Gregory and Shari Vetter, under Rule 18A of the Rules of Court to dismiss the action against them. There are two issues for determination: 1. Did Gregory and Shari Vetter owe the plaintiff a duty of care to prevent him from coming to harm while off their premises, at the hands of a person who became impaired on their premises?

2. If so, did the Vetters breach the requisite standard of care? [2] Because the trial date is imminent, I now give cryptic Reasons and shall hand down more extensive Reasons, later. [3] I find Gregory and Shari Vetter did owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, Adam Prevost, and that they breached that duty. "G.R.B. Coultas, J." The Honourable Mr. Justice G.R.B. Coultas

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