R. v. Anand

2013 BCCAQ 303 R. v. Anand

COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: R. v. Anand, 2013 BCCA 303 Date: 20130618 Docket: CA040080 Between: Regina Respondent And Ramesh Anand Appellant Restriction on Publication: A publication ban has been mandatorily imposed under s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code restricting the publication, broadcasting or transmission in any way of evidence that could identify a complainant or witness. This publication ban applies indefinitely unless otherwise ordered. Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Levine The Honourable Madam Justice A. MacKenzie The Honourable Madam Justice Stromberg-Stein On appeal from: Provincial Court of British Columbia, March 6, 2012 (R. v. Anand, Surrey Docket No. 186558) Oral Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Appellant: W. Jessop and P.E. Del Rossi Counsel for the Respondent: B.A. MacLean Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, British Columbia June 18, 2013 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, British Columbia June 18, 2013 [1] LEVINE J.A.: The appellant, Ramesh Anand, appeals from his conviction in Provincial Court of sexual assault and assault with a knife. [2] At trial, the appellant and complainant testified. The Crown witnesses included five police officers. Admissions of fact were also filed. [3] The appellant and complainant described two different versions of the events that led to the complainant suffering a stab wound. The complainant said

he was sexually assaulted by the appellant and when he threw the appellant off him, the appellant got a knife and stabbed him. The appellant said it was the other way around: the complainant sexually assaulted him and then grabbed a knife and attacked him, stabbing himself in the process. [4] The trial judge instructed himself that, given the nature of the appellant's evidence, credibility was the key issue, citing (at para. 27) the principles of R. v. W.D., [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742 and R. v. H.C.W. (1991), 68 C.C.C.(3d) 146 at 155 (B.C.C.A.). He concluded that he did not accept the evidence of the appellant, and accepted that of the complainant, finding the appellant guilty on both counts. [5] The appellant claims the trial judge erred in applying the principles from R. v. W.D. by applying a stricter standard of credibility and reliability to the appellant's evidence and reversing the onus of proof by failing to deal with inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence. He also claims the trial judge misapprehended evidence material to his reasoning process. He seeks an order quashing the conviction and entering an acquittal, or alternatively, a new trial. [6] This was a case where the trial judge had to determine, on the whole of the evidence, whether he had a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the appellant. He had to deal with inconsistencies and gaps in the evidence of both the

appellant and complainant. He had to attempt to make some logical sense out of conflicting descriptions of the events in question. In my opinion, the appellant has not shown that the trial judge made any palpable and overriding error in assessing the facts or drawing inferences from them. The trial judge did the job trial judges are to do: he assessed the evidence of each of the appellant and complainant, and, in the context of the legal principles about which he correctly instructed himself, drew conclusions about their credibility and reliability. He concluded that the Crown had proved the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. [7] The appellant's counsel has said all that can be said on behalf of his client. I can find no reason, however, for this Court to interfere with the result, and would dismiss the appeal. [8] A. MACKENZIE J.A.: I agree. [9] STROMBERG-STEIN J.A.: I agree. [10] LEVINE J.A.: The appeal is dismissed. "The Honourable Madam Justice Levine"