R. v. C.L.

R. v. C.L. Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2026-01-16 Neutral citation 2026 ONCA 18 Docket numbers COA-22-CR-0159 Judges Lauwers, Peter D.; Sossin, Lorne; Pomerance, Renee M. Subject Criminal Decision Content

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO CITATION: R. v. C.L., 2026 ONCA 18[1] DATE: 20260116 DOCKET: COA-22-CR-0159 Lauwers, Sossin and Pomerance JJ.A.

BETWEEN His Majesty the King Respondent and C.L. Appellant C.L., appearing in person Sonya Shikman, appearing as duty counsel Kevin Rawluk, for the respondent Heard: January 9, 2026 On appeal from the convictions entered by Justice Marlyse Dumel of the Ontario Court of Justice, on July 15, 2022.

REASONS FOR DECISION [1] The appellant was convicted of sexual assault of a woman he had known for a short period of time. The assault took place in her home. [2] The appellant argues that the trial judge misapprehended some aspects of the evidence, disregarded other evidence, and failed to adequately engage with inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony. [3] We disagree. [4] It is well settled that a trial judge is not required to refer to every item of evidence in reasons. The question is whether the reasons, read in context and as a whole, in light of the live issues at trial, explain what the trial judge decided and why: R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, [2021] 1 S.C.R. 801, at para.

69. It is also well settled that appellate courts are not to hunt for errors in trial reasons. Appellate review is guided by a functional and contextual approach, with deference paid to the trial judge’s findings of fact and credibility: G.F., at paras. 5, 69, and 81. [5] Applying this approach, we see no basis for appellate intervention in this case. [6] First, we note, by way of context, that defence counsel at trial asked various impermissible questions of the complainant during cross-examination. To cite just two examples, he asked the complainant if she was wearing underwear, and how she could expect that there would be no sexual activity when she invited the appellant into her room. [7] The trial judge correctly observed that these inquiries were rooted in harmful myths and stereotypes that have no place in a Canadian courtroom. The trial judge also noted that the objectionable cross-examination might have contributed to the complainant’s apparent frustration while testifying. The trial judge was uniquely situated to evaluate the tone of the trial and its impact on the complainant’s demeanour. [8] The trial judge was also uniquely situated to evaluate the evidence and make findings of credibility. We are satisfied that she considered the substance of the issues. She adequately addressed the inconsistencies and contradictions presented in the evidence. Ultimately, the

trial judge accepted the complainant’s testimony, including the complainant’s explanations for inconsistencies, finding that she was unshaken in her evidence about the core allegations. Applying the principles in R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, the trial judge explained why she rejected the appellant’s testimony and why it did not raise a reasonable doubt. [9] The appellant argues that the trial judge should have considered the fact that the complainant did not confront the appellant with details of the assault in the text message that she sent after the incident. The complainant told the appellant in that message that he had scared her, and that she did not want to see him again. The fact that the complainant did not recite the details of the allegations is not relevant. Nor does any weight attach to the complainant’s failure to tell her friend the details of the assault in a telephone call. There is no obligation on a complainant to publicly complain after an offence of sexual violence. R. v. D.D., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275, at para.

61. We see no merit to this ground of appeal. [10] Similarly, it was open to the trial judge to reject the appellant’s testimony about how his DNA ended up on a tissue found in the garbage can. The complainant testified that she wiped herself with the tissue after the assault and threw it in the garbage can. The appellant testified that he had wiped sweat from his brow and then thrown it in the garbage pail when the complainant was not in the room. The trial judge explained why she rejected the appellant’s account, and why the DNA on the tissue confirmed the complainant’s account. Among other things, the trial judge explained that, according to the appellant, the complainant was not present when he threw the tissue in the garbage. Yet the complainant knew that the tissue was there and directed police investigators to the garbage can. The analysis of this issue is not tainted by any palpable and overriding error. [11] The trial judge also properly considered the complainant’s post-offence conduct and demeanour. The evidence established that the complainant exhibited signs of emotional distress. The appellant says that the trial judge failed to consider alternate explanations for the complainant’s reaction. We do not agree. Viewing the evidence a whole, the complainant’s emotional distress was capable of confirming her account of the assault. The fact that she was able to send

coherent messages to the appellant at that time did not detract from the evidence of her apparent distress and upset. [12] Finally, it was argued on appeal that the trial judge should have been more skeptical of the complainant’s evidence that she urinated on the mattress and then lay down to sleep on it. The appellant pointed to various photographs to demonstrate that neither the mattress nor the floor appeared to be stained by urine. Again, this is not persuasive. The photos of the bed are not conclusive of whether a stain was present. The trial judge considered the complainant’s evidence that she urinated herself, including evidence of urine on the carpet. The trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence that she lay back on the mattress even though she had urinated on it, noting that conduct following a sexual assault may not always make perfect sense. [13] In short, it was for the trial judge to evaluate the whole of the evidence and arrive at findings of fact and credibility. The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the factual findings flowed from a misapprehension of the evidence or are the product of palpable and overriding error. The trial judge evaluated the evidence in accordance with the principles in R. v. W.(D.). The arguments on appeal amount to an attempt to retry the case, a task that this court does not perform. [14] For all of these reasons, the appeal is dismissed. “P. Lauwers J.A.” “L. Sossin J.A.” “R. Pomerance J.A.” [1] This appeal is subject to a publication ban pursuant to s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.