R. v. Ravelo-Corvo

2020 BCSC 2130 R. v. Ravelo-Corvo

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: R. v. Ravelo-Corvo, 2020 BCSC 2130 Date: 20201029 Docket: 27730‑2 Registry: Vancouver Regina v. Renert Alexander Ravelo‑Corvo Restriction on Publication: Pursuant to 278.95 C.C.C. & 486.4 C.C.C. Section 16(4) Sex Offender Information and Registration Act ("SOIRA"): This section provides that no person shall disclose any information that is collected pursuant to an order under SOIRA or the fact that information relating to a person is collected under SOIRA Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Sharma Oral Reasons for Sentence Counsel for the Crown appearing by teleconference: A.C.L. Ip Counsel for the Accused, appearing by teleconference: D.M. Turko, Q.C. Place and Date of Trial/Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. October 29, 2020 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. October 29, 2020 I. INTRODUCTION [1] On March 6, 2020, I convicted Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo on two counts: committing sexual assault contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 and unlawful confinement contrary to s. 279(2) of the Criminal Code. [2] These are my reasons with regard to his sentence. [3] I start by noting that sentencing is a highly contextualized and nuanced process. The goals of a fit sentence are to encourage respect for the law and maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society. In assessing the proper sentence, the court must heed the

sentencing objectives articulated in s. 718 of the Criminal Code: denunciation, deterrence, separating offenders from society where necessary, rehabilitation, reparations, and promoting a sense of responsibility in the offender. [4] The ultimate goal in sentencing is to arrive at a sentence that is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. This is a highly individualized exercise tailored to the gravity of the offence, looking both to the blameworthiness of the offender and the harm caused by the crime. [5] The Crown's position is that a fit sentence in this case would be four years for the sexual assault and 18 months for unlawful confinement, served concurrently. Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo's position is that a fit sentence would be in the range of 18 months to two years less a day for both offences. [6] The circumstances of the offence are set out in full in the judgment relating to conviction indexed at 2020 BCSC 358 [Trial Decision]; I need not repeat those paragraphs. The Crown referred to paragraphs 34 to 61, which contains my description and discussion of the evidence. [7] By way of a brief overview, I note the following portions of the Trial Decision. At paras. 131-135, I was satisfied the Crown proved the actus reus of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, namely that L.T. did not consent to Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo touching her

vagina or to the two instances of intercourse. At paras. 136-151, I discussed and dismissed his position that he had an honest but mistaken belief that L.T. had consented. Specifically, I did not accept his testimony that they had engaged in mutual kissing in the apartment, while I accepted L.T.'s testimony that she told him multiple times that she did not want to have sex with him and that she wanted to leave. II. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER [8] Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo is currently 29 years old. He was 25 at the time of the offence. He does enjoy the support of family and friends. Two letters of support provided by his friends were read into the record at the hearing. They refer to him as an honest, friendly person who displays a sense of responsibility and who is kind and caring. [9] The presentence report notes that Mr. Ravelo-Corvo's sister supports him and apparently has contact with him on a weekly basis. The report also notes another friend of Mr. Ravelo-Corvo, in addition to the two that wrote letters of support. [10] Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo is an immigrant from Venezuela. His family fled Venezuela in 2009 because of personal and economical turmoil and went to the United States, where they were accepted as political refugees and are now citizens. Such an experience must have been very disruptive to Mr. Ravelo-Corvo's youth. [11] Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo immigrated to Canada the following

year, in 2010, originally as a student. He completed a course of education. He is now here on a working visa and, according to his counsel, has been working since he arrived. He is not, however, a permanent resident of Canada. He has made an application for refugee status, which apparently is being held in abeyance pending this proceeding. [12] His immigration status is relevant because both parties agree that it is highly likely he will be deported after serving his sentence, depending on the length of the sentence. In particular, defence counsel did not disagree with Crown's articulation of portions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 [IRPA], which I understand was obtained by counsel speaking with someone at Canadian Border Services. [13] Specifically, under s. 101(2)(a) of IRPA, Mr. Ravelo-Corvo appears to be ineligible to claim refugee status because of his conviction. He also appears to not have a right to appeal that ineligibility under s. 110 of IRPA, as his application would not even be referred to the Refugee Protection Division. A removal order could be issued against him as a matter of course, putting him at risk of being returned to Venezuela. It is unclear to me whether he would even undergo a risk assessment before his return. It is also unclear to me whether there are other remedies that might be available to him. [14] I have no other

details about his status. The Supreme Court of Canada has made it clear that potential immigration consequences could be a relevant factor to take into account in sentencing. I address that below. [15] Mr. Ravelo-Corvo has been on bail for over four years and there are no indications he has breached any of his conditions. He has been gainfully employed in Canada. He has positive and supportive relationships with his family and friends and is currently living with his girlfriend. III. IMPACT OF THE OFFENCE ON THE VICTIM [16] Another important factor in sentencing is the impact of the offence on the victim. L.T. read a victim impact statement and a written copy of that has been filed as an exhibit. Under s. 722 of the Criminal Code, I am obliged to consider her statement with regard to the physical and emotional harm caused to her, as well as and any economic loss. However, I am required to disregard any irrelevant portions of the statement: Criminal Code, s. 722(8). [17] I find that this offence has had a profound impact on L.T. I agree with the Crown that L.T. has been traumatized and has suffered significantly from what happened. It has had a negative impact on her education and so has delayed her entry into her chosen career. This, in turn, has negatively impacted her financial status. [18] These negative impacts are manifestations of the significant emotional toll this

ordeal has had on her. She suffered night terrors nightly for weeks after the assault, which only reduced in frequency because of medication she was forced to take. She described in detail certain panic attacks she experienced during the practical training portion of her education. These panic attacks were made all the more difficult because she was not willing to reveal the source of the panic attack, namely her experience of being sexually assaulted. [19] More generally, L.T. suffers from heightened anxiety and depression, for which she takes medication. She gave a very detailed and moving description of how her anxiety is the direct result of the sexual assault and unlawful confinement, and I have taken that into account. [20] She reports being paranoid and distrustful of men in general. I agree with Crown counsel that it is important to consider this. [21] L.T's description of the psychological harm she has suffered comports with Justice Cory's discussion of the common impacts on victims of sexual assault in R. v. McCraw, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72 at 83-85. [22] L.T. spoke eloquently and insightfully about her own sense of self‑blame, shame, and loss of self‑esteem. Her words were important and profound. She gave voice to the insidious effects of sexual assault on victims that are a direct result of the continuation in our society of myths and stereotypes surrounding sexual

assault victims. [23] L.T. is not at all to blame for what happened to her. Despite that, like many sexual assault victims, she is haunted by questions of what she could have done, what she should have done, and what she should not have done. She delayed telling her mother and her siblings. She kept this to herself at a considerable cost, including experiencing panic attacks for which she was not able to explain why. These are profound effects and are common to sexual assault victims. [24] They have a particular resonance in this case and it is relevant here. I refer to some of my findings from the Trial Decision: [51] She told [Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo] she wanted to leave. He was walking towards her so she backed up; he was telling her to stay and why it was OK to have sex even though she was interested in R. She said no, and again stated she wanted to leave. She was backed up close to the bed, so she decided to sit on the bed and say something like "see, even sitting on the bed doesn't change anything and the answer is still no". When asked why she sat on the bed, she said she now felt it was a stupid thing to do, but that it never occurred to her that he would sexually assault her. She thought at the time that by actually sitting on the bed and saying she had not changed her mind, maybe he would stop trying to convince her to have sex. [52] She stood up, but testified that the

accused pushed her onto the bed (onto her back) and got on top of her. He straddled her. She again said she wanted to leave and did not want to have sex. He was telling her that it was OK for them to have sex, he kept trying to convince her and was "shushing" her. [ ] [75] The accused was asked several times during cross-examination what made him believe L.T. wanted to engage in sexual activity with him. His consistent answer was she was "kissing him back". He specifically agreed that L.T. did nothing else and said nothing else to indicate that she wanted the accused to touch her vagina or have intercourse. He agreed she did not use her hands to touch him. [76] The accused agreed that in his mind, at the very least, L.T. was not sure about having sex with him. When asked if it crossed his mind that he should confirm if she was sure about engaging in sexual activity, the accused responded with words to the effect that "when things like that happen, things happen naturally, you're not asking should I do this or that, it happens naturally". [77] On another occasion during cross-examination, when the accused was asked what L.T. did to indicate she wanted intercourse, the accused answered it was because "she did not reject". . . . [78] He also answered "that's right" to the following: "you were going to keep going until she said no". He gave the same answer to this statement: if a

woman is kissing you, you can go as far as sexual intercourse as long as she doesn't say no. [ ] [168] On the whole of the evidence, I find that he demonstrated a continued and sustained effort to persuade L.T. to have sex with him, notwithstanding what I find to be her consistent refusals. [169] I find the accused's pursuit of having sex with L.T. escalated when they got to his apartment. Rather than accepting her rejections, [Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo's] behaviour simply became progressively more aggressive. His testimony revealed a mindset consistent with recklessness about consent, including his beliefs that women change their mind about sex easily, that there is no requirement to check-in whether a woman wants to engage in more intimate sexual activity and his admission that he knew L.T. was at least unsure in her mind about having sex with him . [25] I also note the absolutely remarkable evidence that L.T. went to the point of saying words such as, "the only way I will have sex with you is if you rape me". [26] And so he did. [27] This is extremely important and significant with regard to how I approach sentencing in this case because of the impact on L.T. During the events forming the subject matter of the offences, Mr. Ravelo-Corvo was espousing the very myths and stereotypes that Parliament has gone to great lengths to try and mitigate in our legal system. Despite those

measures and the conviction, L.T. still, to some degree, questioned her own behaviour. In my view, this heightens the legal significance of impact on L.T. and is serious and relevant. IV. ANALYSIS [28] With regard to the appropriate range in this case, the case law is clear that the range for sexual assault where there has been instances of intercourse is two years to six years: see R. v. G.M., 2015 BCCA 165 at para. 22 and R. v. L.I., 2017 BCSC 444 at para. 20. [29] Defence submits that the range is two years less a day to six years. I disagree. In G.M., the Court of Appeal was clear that its imposition of a sentence of 18 months in a case that involved sexual intercourse did not reflect an appropriate range, but was based on the Crown's position (at paras. 33-35). The Court of Appeal therefore was restrained from being able to impose a higher sentence. [30] With regard to aggravating circumstances, I agree with the Crown that the serious impact this has had on L.T. is aggravating: Criminal Code, s. 718.2(iii.1). [31] With regard to mitigating circumstances, I also agree with the Crown that there are none. Mr. Ravelo-Corvo's adherence to his bail conditions and lack of a criminal record are not, as defence submits, mitigating factors. Rather, according to the case law, they are neutral factors. They are only relevant in considering Mr. Ravelo-Corvo's personal circumstances and

the relevance of cases with similar fact patterns. A. General Sentencing Principles [32] As for the general sentencing principles, the case law is uniform in saying that denunciation and deterrence are the primary principles in considering the appropriate and fit sentence for someone convicted of a serious sexual assault. Specifically, it is not an error to have those principles take primary role over rehabilitation: G.M. at para. 17. [33] The Crown relies on the discussion of sentencing principles in McCraw at 83-85 and R v. Arcand, 2010 ABCA 363 at paras. 169-181, both of which concern serious sexual assault cases. Those comments are applicable here, specifically as they discuss society's interest in enforcing denunciation and deterrence for crimes of serious sexual assault. [34] Although it is not a primary consideration, rehabilitation is still relevant in serious sexual assault cases. Nevertheless, the Crown submits that this principle should not be relied upon here to reduce Mr. Ravelo-Corvo's sentence or to find at the lower end of the range because, given the facts of this case, it is unlikely he would benefit from rehabilitative services. In support of this, the Crown relies on my findings in the Trial Decision quoted above (at para. 24), specifically my findings regarding Mr. Ravelo-Corvo's attitude towards L.T. at the time of the offence: see the Trial Decision at

paras. 168-169. [35] The Crown also refers to the presentence report where the author said that Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo maintains he did not commit an offence. While this is not an aggravating factor, the Crown submits it is relevant to the consideration of whether rehabilitation could possibly be successful for Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo. [36] While I accept that Mr. Ravelo-Corvo's denial of guilt is relevant, I do not find that comment to be particularly important in the overall context of this case. Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo did take the opportunity to apologize to the court for the harm he caused to L.T. and that attenuates the comment in the presentence report. B. Impact of COVID-19 [37] Defence counsel seeks provincial time, that is, a sentence of two years less a day. Defence cites the COVID-19 pandemic and related issues as supporting such a sentence. In addition to the obvious health concerns of being in prison during a pandemic, defence counsel notes there is reduced access to rehabilitative programs in federal institutions due to the pandemic. Defence relied on the following cases for this position. [38] R. v. Hearns, 2020 ONSC 2365 is a sentencing decision delivered in April 2020, at the height of the early days of the pandemic, before anyone had much information about how the pandemic works or what measures would be successful. The judge in that case took judicial notice of the COVID-19

pandemic, which of course is reasonable. The provincial health officer of British Columbia has issued a notice about the pandemic and it is appropriate that I also take it into account. [39] However, in Hearns, the judicial notice of the pandemic was made in the context of a joint submission, which case law dictates courts must have a very good reason to depart from in determining a sentence. The offender in that case had already served close to two years in pretrial custody, equating to 33 months of time served. In taking judicial notice, the court referred specifically to the risk of infection being higher in the prison population. [40] The Ontario Supreme Court confirmed that while the COVID-19 pandemic does not do away with established principles of sentencing, it may soften the impact of certain precedents as applied to the particular circumstances of the case. This, in turn, could possibly affect the concept of the fitness of a sentence and so might justify a change in the applicable range of sentences: Hearns at paras. 15-24. [41] The other cases that counsel referred to were Ontario cases that followed upon Hearns. I do not find those to be particularly helpful beyond their following the general statements in Hearns. [42] Hearns is also cited in R v. Costello, 2020 BCSC 1206. That case on the facts is very different because it specifically referred to what the defense

counsel in that case called a "COVID credit", that is, a credit intended to take into account the fact that the offenders spent time in the prison population exposing themselves to higher risk of infection before they were found guilty. That concern does not arise in this case. [43] The Crown does accept that it is relevant for this Court to be aware of the impact of the global pandemic, but its position is that it does not constitute a reason that could justify a more lenient sentence or a sentence below the applicable range. [44] I agree that the COVID-19 pandemic is relevant, but I do not agree that it should be taken into account in a way that would justify a sentence below the range. Specifically, there is no evidence in front of me of any material difference in the risk of exposure to COVID-19 in a federal facility compared to a provincial facility. Likewise, I do not find that there is evidence of a material difference in the ability to access rehabilitative programs. On the material before me, both federal and provincial institutions have programs aimed at sex offenders. The delivery of those programs may be impacted by COVID-19, but I do not understand that there is a difference; presumably any impact would affect both types of institutions equally. The continuing impact of the pandemic s not something that anybody has any control over and, in my respectful view, it is

not something that I can rely on in order to justify a lighter sentence in this case. C. Immigration Consequences [45] I now turn to the possible immigration consequences. In L.I., which is very instructive on this issue, the offender argued that the trial judge erred in not taking into account his immigration consequences as a mitigating factor. The Court of Appeal confirmed that under s. 36(1)(a) of IRPA, a permanent resident (or a foreign national) "becomes inadmissible and therefore subject to removal from Canada on the ground of 'serious criminality' if convicted of a federal offence punishable by maximum imprisonment of at least 10 years or if sentenced to more than six months' imprisonment" (at para. 15). Both conditions would apply in this case because both parties in front of me have indicated a fit sentence will be more than six months, and the maximum possible sentence is 10 years. [46] Immigration consequences may be relevant in determining an appropriate sentence, but they cannot be relied upon to impose an unfit sentence: L.I. at para. 16, quoting from R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15 at paras. 13-16. In L.I., Justice Frankel found that the loss of the offender's right to appeal his removal order resulting from the length of his sentence was not a relevant consideration in the circumstances of that case, as a sentence of less than six months would not be proportionate to

the gravity of the offences (at para. 17). [47] Similarly, in this case, the negative immigration consequences arising from a sentence longer than six months is not a relevant consideration because, as noted above, there is no possibility of a sentence of less than six months for the offences Mr. Ravelo-Corvo has been convicted of. [48] Crown counsel cites a few other cases in the event that he was mistaken in his submission regarding the relevance of immigration consequences. In R. v. McKenzie, 2017 ONCA 128, the court rejected the offender's argument that the trial judge erred in how he considered the potential immigration consequences of the offender's sentence. The offender argued that the trial judge should have taken them into account at the outset as part of his determination of a fit sentence, rather than afterwards, as a potential reduction to an already determined fit sentence. [49] The Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's two-step approach to considering immigration consequences, referring to Pham as support. The Court noted that while there is no prescribed methodology for considering potential immigration consequences, they are not to be considered as aggravating or mitigating factors, as those relate to the gravity of the offence. Rather, potential immigration consequences may only be considered in relation to the personal circumstances of the

offender: McKenzie at para. 26, quoting Pham at paras. 11, 14, and 16. Immigration consequences thus might be relevant to the principle of rehabilitation in the sense that if two possible sentences are both appropriate, the most suitable one would be the one that better contributes to rehabilitation. [50] I note, however, that all of the above cases concern permanent residents. Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo is not a permanent resident of Canada. Given the greater rights they have, the immigration consequences for a permanent resident are clearly more serious. This is not the situation in the case at bar. [51] Although Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo is here on a work visa and has applied for refugee status, he is not a permanent resident. I find this to be relevant because it distinguishes some of the cases. Indeed, it strengthens my conclusion, based on L.I., that the potential immigration consequences for Mr. Ravelo-Corvo is not a relevant factor to take into account in this particular case. [52] I note that it was up to Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo to bring forward evidence or submissions regarding anything about his immigration status that was remarkably different from the cases cited to me, and he did not do so. All I know is that at some point he applied for refugee status; I do not know when. I do not have any other details about his application or immigration status. [53] For all of those reasons, I am

satisfied that the potential immigration consequences are not relevant in this case. D. Cases Cited by the Crown [54] I now refer to some of the cases that counsel referred me to as being helpful to determine a fit sentence in this case. Both counsel referred to the case of R. v. G.M., which contains many helpful comments, particularly at paras. 17-19 and 29. The court said at para. 29: While a party is under no obligation to admit an offence, a continued denial is a material factor to be considered in determining whether a party is likely to re-offend. . . . [55] I understand the Crown's reference to this paragraph to be in relation to the comment in the presentence report about Mr. Ravelo-Corvo's apparent denial of guilt. However, the relevant sentence in the report is a bit vague. It states he is not convinced he committed an offence. Nevertheless, as noted, I am prepared to find that is tempered by the apology that he offered to the court. [56] With regard to taking into account the risk to reoffend, I understood defence counsel to say that ought to be addressed in a risk assessment conducted by a psychologist. However, I note that in G.M., it was not an error when the court did not rely on such a risk assessment. I take that to mean it is not necessary for the court to have one before it in assessing the risk to reoffend. I repeat that in G.M, the Court of Appeal was careful to emphasize that the 18 month sentence was not representative of the appropriate range. [57] The Crown also referred to R. v. Crumly (1995), 64 B.C.A.C 197 and R. v. Kerr (1992) 13 B.C.A.C.

165. These cases are only relevant to the extent that they involve convictions for both unlawful confinement and sexual assault. [58] Both cases involved more egregious conduct by the offender in relation to the sexual assaults. Of course, it is always difficult to try and suggest that there is some range or spectrum of offending behaviour in sexual assault cases. Nevertheless, Crumly involved multiple incidents of sexual assault of a 15‑year‑old complainant, who was picked up while hitchhiking. The trial judge sentenced the offender to four years for the sexual assaults concurrent with two years for unlawful confinement. The Court of Appeal increased the sentence to five years for the sexual assaults, concurrent with the unlawful confinement. [59] Kerr likewise concerned conduct more serious. In that case, the complainant accepted a ride home from the offender, whom she recognized as a bouncer she had seen at a nightclub. Rather than driving her home, the offender drove her to an isolated area where he beat and sexually assaulted her. When she attempted to escape, he caught her and forced her back to the vehicle. The offender was sentenced to five years for the sexual assault concurrent with one year for the unlawful confinement. The Court of Appeal rejected the idea that the facts leading to the conviction for unlawful confinement overlapped with the sexual assault such that

the Kienapple principle should apply. [60] The Crown also referred to R. v. Hume, 2016 BCCA 230, particularly at paras. 37-40 and 52, which I agree is relevant to the case at bar. The Crown relied on the Court of Appeal's finding that despite the absence of intercourse, the offence constituted a serious sexual assault. The offender invited the victim, a vulnerable person, to his place for a drink, after which the victim passed out. When the victim awoke, he found himself naked, with the offender shaving the area underneath his testicles and various other parts of his body (that being the sexual nature of the offence). Although it did not involve penetration or anything more physically harmful or invasive, the Court of Appeal held that was a serious sexual assault. E. Cases Cited by Defence [61] Defence counsel referred to G.M. as being a similar case, particularly in support of the argument that the range ought not to be considered as being two to six years, but rather could be less than two years. As noted above, I do not find that to be the proper reading of that case. [62] Moreover, G.M. is distinguishable from this case on its facts. In G.M., the offender and the victim had previously been in a romantic relationship and had engaged in consensual sexual activity on the night in question prior to the sexual assault taking place. In this case, L.T. at no point indicated her

willingness to engage in sexual activity with Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo. [63] I likewise do not find R. v. Dhillon, 2018 BCSC 807 to be particularly helpful as it also involved a joint submission. As well, it was a jury trial and so it is difficult to tease out the facts that are relevant. [64] R. v. Tompouba, 2020 BCSC 308 is also not very instructive for this case. Although Justice Marchand gave significant consideration to the immigration consequences of a lengthy sentence, it was largely motivated by his concern for the offender's children in Canada who would be raised without a father (at para. 21). Justice Marchand also noted the negative economic consequences of the offender being deported, notably that it would reduce the amount of financial support he would be able to provide his children in Canada, as well as his sister in Cameroon. These concerns are absent in this case. F. Conclusion [65] That brings me to what should happen in this particular case. As noted above, the appropriate range is two to six years for the sexual assault. There is an absence of mitigating factors in this case. The significance of the impact on the victim is an aggravating circumstance. [66] As is clear from my reasons on conviction, it is not possible to say that there was any kind of confusion about what Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo was doing. Mr. Ravelo-Corvo forced intercourse with L.T. on two instances and

also touched L.T.'s vagina without her consent. He persisted in this conduct despite L.T. repeatedly saying no and demonstrating by her words and actions that she did not consent. As I have already said and I say again, it is absolutely remarkable that here was a young woman who was saying no consistently and who actually said to him, "The only way you will have sex with me is if you rape me." Notwithstanding that, he sexually assaulted her. This is extremely significant. [67] Deterrence and denunciation require this Court to impose a sentence that reinforces the message that one must obtain express consent before engaging in sexual activity. It is not a woman's responsibility to take extraordinary measures to accompany her saying no. It is simply not acceptable to continue to push against a woman until she gives in to have sex. [68] While I take into account Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo's apology and I appreciate that he has done so, it is important to take all of the factors I have referred to into account in imposing sentence, and I find a sentence of three years is appropriate for the sexual assault. [69] The unlawful confinement led to and facilitated the sexual assault. She was clear in her words and actions that she wanted to leave and he prevented her which allowed him to commit the offence. Crown sought 18 months for the unlawful confinement concurrent with its position of four

year for the sexual assault. I find a fit and proper sentence for the unlawful confinement is one year, to be served concurrently. [70] I will ask you to stand, please, Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo. [71] Mr. Ravelo‑Corvo, as you know, I convicted you of two counts in March 2020 of committing sexual assault against L.T. and of unlawfully confining her. I find it appropriate that you be sentenced to three years' imprisonment for the sexual assault, and one year for the unlawful confinement, to be served concurrently. [72] In addition, as is mandatory, there will be a SOIRA order for 20 years. [73] There is also a DNA order that I must impose and a mandatory firearms prohibition. [74] Although not mandatory, Crown did seek a non‑communication order with L.T. for a period while you are in custody and I also impose that. "Sharma J."