Rose et al. v. Correctional Service of Canada

Rose et al. v. Correctional Service of Canada Collection Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Date 2026-03-18 Neutral citation 2026 CHRT 25 File number(s) HR-DP-3054-24 Decision-maker(s) Pickel, Jo-Anne Decision type Ruling Grounds National or Ethnic Origin Race Religion Decision Content Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Tribunal canadien des droits de la personne Citation: 2026 CHRT 25 Date: March 18, 2026 File No.: HR-DP-3054-24 Between: Kevin Rose, Chris Desjarlais, James Dahnke, Peter Ashton, Robert Sand, Kyle Scott, and William Elliott Complainants - and - Canadian Human Rights Commission Commission - and - Correctional Service of Canada Respondent Ruling Member: Jo-Anne Pickel Table of Contents I. Overview 1 II. Decision 2 III. Issues 2 IV. Analysis 2 A. Background to the issue of providing individualized particulars regarding alleged victims 2 B. Monetary remedies requested do not exceed the scope of the Complaint 4 C. Amendments to SOP 7 V. Orders 7 I. Overview [1] The Respondent filed a motion requesting an order that any monetary remedies requested for individuals other than the Complainants are beyond the scope of this Complaint. I agree with most of the arguments made by the Respondent in its motion. However, as I explain below, I find that the remedial requests do not exceed the scope of the Complaint. [2] The Complainant, Kevin Rose, is an Indigenous inmate incarcerated at

Matsqui Institution (Matsqui). In May 2022, Mr. Rose filed a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”) against the Correctional Service of Canada (the “Respondent”). In the Complaint, he alleged that the Respondent discriminated against him and other inmates based on race, national or ethnic origin, and religion, contrary to section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. H-6 (the CHRA). In the Complaint, Mr. Rose alleged that the Respondent discriminated against him and other Indigenous inmates at Matsqui in numerous ways, including by denying them timely access to programs, by adversely affecting their access to positive outcomes at parole hearings, by denying access to timely release back to Indigenous communities, and by marking inmates for artificially high security classifications that prevented them from cascading down to minimum security in a timely way. [3] The Complaint lists ten individuals who indicated that they consented to having Mr. Rose represent them in this proceeding. However, Mr. Rose stated in the Complaint that he was filing it on behalf of all Indigenous inmates at Matsqui. He later expanded this to include all Indigenous inmates who had been incarcerated at Matsqui since 2018. The Commission accepted the Complaint as having been filed on behalf of 77 Indigenous inmates at Matsqui and referred it to the Tribunal

as a representative complaint. [4] In response to my direction that the Complainants’ counsel clarify the identity of the Complainants in the case, they filed an amended SOP naming the following six individuals as Complainants, along with Mr. Rose: Chris Desjarlais, James Dahnke, Peter Ashton, Robert Sand, Kyle Scott, and William Elliott. I refer to Mr. Rose and these six individuals as “the Complainants” in this ruling. I refer to the other Indigenous inmates on behalf of whom the Complainants have filed the Complaint as “the alleged victims.” [5] In this ruling, I address the Respondent’s motion for an order that any monetary remedies sought on behalf of the alleged victims are beyond the scope of the Complaint. I also confirm certain amendments to the Complainants’ amended Statement of Particulars (SOP) that the parties wish to make on consent. I am reserving my decision on certain redactions requested by the Respondent until I obtain more information from the parties in my upcoming CMCC with them. II. Decision [6] I deny the Respondent’s motion. III. Issues [7] The main issue I address in this ruling is whether the Complainants’ request for monetary remedies for alleged victims exceeds the scope of the Complaint. IV. Analysis A. Background to the issue of providing individualized particulars regarding alleged victims [8] The CHRA provides that a complainant may bring a

complaint on behalf of another person (see sections 40(1) and 40(2)). Section 53(2)(e) of the CHRA also provides authority to order compensation for pain and suffering to a “victim” of a discriminatory practice that has been substantiated. [9] In their amended SOP, the Complainants seek monetary remedies for themselves, as well as the following: “damages of $40 000.00 for all victims for suffering, loss of dignity, and [willful] and reckless discrimination, with interest, in accordance with [section] 53(2)(e), 53(3) and 53(4) of the CHRA.” (emphasis added) [10] The Complainants did not specifically identify, in the Complaint or their amended SOP, the alleged victims on whose behalf they are seeking financial compensation. The Complainants amended the witness list in their SOP to list all of the Complainants, but they did not list any of the alleged victims for whom they are seeking compensation. [11] Essentially, the Complainants are seeking what could total more than three million dollars in financial compensation for the alleged victims, in the absence of any particulars of their personal circumstances, and of how these personal circumstances would fulfill the constituent elements for discrimination under section 5 of the CHRA. Furthermore, they have made no commitment to presenting evidence at the hearing that would prove the existence of these circumstances regarding the

alleged victims. [12] For over a year, I have raised with the Complainants’ counsel the necessity of identifying the alleged victims of the discrimination in this case, and of the need for particulars regarding their personal circumstances. The Complainants’ counsel has consistently maintained that issues concerning the alleged victims relate strictly to remedies rather than the establishment of discrimination. The Complainants’ counsel has asserted that they will seek to extrapolate any findings of “systemic” discrimination to all of the alleged victims. The Complainants’ counsel further stated that they only intend to present evidence from the alleged victims as part of a remedial process that they would be requesting if their allegations of discrimination are found to be substantiated. [13] The Respondent has requested that the Complainants “provide particulars of ‘all victims’ including their names and when and how they became victims within the context of the within Complaints.” The Complainants responded that the names of the alleged victims were listed in a group grievance filed by Mr. Rose prior to filing the Complaint, although they have not provided the names of these alleged victims in their amended SOP. They also stated that “the particulars of how they are victims are particularized in the systemic discrimination section of the amended statement of particulars,

from paragraphs 111-179.” [14] In a CMCC I held with the parties in December 2025, the Respondent once again raised concerns about a lack of particulars from the Complainants regarding the alleged victims. I provided the parties with time to resolve the Respondent’s concerns, failing which the Respondent would file a formal motion. B. Monetary remedies requested do not exceed the scope of the Complaint [15] The Respondent requested an order that any monetary remedies for individuals other than the Complainants are beyond the scope of the Complaint. I agree that the Complainants’ amended SOP is lacking particulars regarding the alleged victims, but I do not agree that the above remedial request exceeds the scope of the Complaint. [16] The Complainants and the Commission argued that the Respondent’s motion was premature. The Commission also argued that the remedial request does not exceed the scope of the Complaint because it was referred as a representative complaint. [17] As noted by the Commission, it referred the Complaint to the Tribunal as a representative complaint filed on behalf of Indigenous inmates at Matsqui. In my view, the issue with the Complainants’ request for financial compensation for alleged victims is not that it exceeds the scope of the Complaint. It is instead that it is being made in the absence of individualized particulars or a commitment to calling

evidence about the personal circumstances of the alleged victims which would allow for a finding as to whether they have been subjected to a discriminatory practice within the meaning of section 5 of the CHRA. [18] I should note that, in their response to the Respondent’s request that preceded this motion, the Complainants proposed adding a paragraph to their amended SOP seeking an additional remedy in the form of a proposed adjudication and compensation framework for alleged victims to seek monetary damages if I were to make a finding of systemic discrimination. The Complainants proposed a process whereby individuals could seek monetary compensation by filing an affidavit affirming their membership in the affected group, exposure to the discriminatory practice, and personal harm. [19] There are several problems with the Complainant’s proposal, which I do need to address for the purposes of this ruling. It suffices to say that the adjudication and compensation framework proposed by the Complainants is not a substitute for individualized particulars and evidence on the threshold question of liability under section 5 of the CHRA. The Tribunal typically cannot make findings of discrimination in a case such as this one based on generalized evidence or expert evidence. The scheme of sections 50 and 53 of the CHRA do not contemplate extrapolating from the personal circumstances of

some individuals to make findings of discrimination regarding others. I find persuasive the Respondent’s argument that merely being an Indigenous inmate at Matsqui does not establish that one has been subject to discrimination, even if the Tribunal were to make a finding of “systemic discrimination” in this case. While the Federal Court has recognized that in some cases, the Tribunal may compensate alleged victims for pain and suffering without hearing direct evidence from all of them, any remedy must necessarily flow from a finding of liability (see CFNAD v. Canada, 2025 CHRT 115 at paras 39, 44, and 45 [CFNAD]; and Moore v. British Columbia, 2012 SCC 61 at para 64 [Moore]). [20] The Respondent has set out various arguments for why the Complainants will not be able to extrapolate from their own experiences to those of others due to the individualized nature of the discrimination at issue. As pointed out by the Respondent, the Complainants themselves have each had distinct experiences. Moreover, the correctional plans of inmates are highly individualized, a fact that has not been disputed by the Complainants. Even if all of the alleged victims are Indigenous, there are many questions of fact on which the Complainants will need to provide evidence to establish that the alleged victims were subject to discrimination based on their Indigeneity. For example, factors such as the

following will need to be addressed: whether the non-participating inmates identified themselves as being Indigenous to their case management team; if not, why not?; whether they requested Indigenous correctional services; if so, which?; whether they were denied Indigenous correctional services; if so, which?; and whether they were offered reasonable accommodations. [21] I find these arguments persuasive. However, they do not cause the monetary remedies sought on behalf of alleged victims to exceed the scope of the Complaint. The issue of scope speaks to whether a possible remedy for the alleged victims is properly before the Tribunal. That is clearly the case, as the involvement of approximately 70 or more alleged victims in the Complaint was endorsed by the Commission prior to referral. What is not clear is how these 70 or more individuals were allegedly victimized. However, the answer to that question has nothing to do with the ambit of the referral. It is a matter of sufficiency of particulars and evidence. The Complainants have had several opportunities to particularize the Respondent’s alleged liability in respect of the 70 or more alleged victims and have chosen not to do so. Given the principle that “the remedy must flow from the claim” (see Moore, supra) the Complainants will have to contend with the potential ramifications of that choice. However, the remedy they seek

does not exceed the scope of the referral. [22] The Respondent sought to rely upon Woodgate v. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2026 CHRT 15 [Woodgate]. However, I agree with the Commission that that decision is distinguishable as the Tribunal did not deny the broad request for monetary remedies sought for the alleged victims on the basis that it exceeded the scope of the Complaint. Rather, it denied the broader request because the evidence and submissions before it did not support a finding of adverse treatment or denial of a service regarding a broader group of individuals. In Woodgate, the Tribunal noted that it had the authority to remedy only the specific discriminatory practices established in the evidence that was put before it (see Woodgate at para 493). It also denied the request after conducting a full merits hearing. At most, the Woodgate case supports the proposition that findings of discrimination must be based on actual individualized evidence (see also CFNAD at paras 48–53). [23] For all the above reasons, I do not find that the impugned remedial request exceeds the scope of the Complaint. [24] The Complainants are obviously intent on pursuing a particular litigation strategy that they believe will be successful. That is their right. What is important for the parties to realize is that this case is not in its early stages, as the Complainants have suggested. It has

taken a full year to obtain clarification of the identities of the Complainants and the particulars of their personal circumstances. The next steps will be for the Respondent to finalize its SOP and disclosure, to set hearing dates for this case, and to expeditiously move through any other issues that must be dealt with before the hearing. C. Amendments to SOP [25] Both parties consent to the amendments to the Complainants’ SOP set out in the Appendix to this decision. I have reviewed the amendments and agree that they are appropriate. V. Orders [26] For the reasons set out above, the Respondent’s motion is denied. I will discuss next steps with the parties in my upcoming CMCC with them, including the need to move through the next steps in this case in an expeditious and efficient manner. Signed by Jo-Anne Pickel Tribunal Member Ottawa, Ontario March 18, 2026 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Parties of Record File Nos. : HR-DP-3054-24 Style of Cause: Kevin Rose et al. v. Correctional Service of Canada Ruling of the Tribunal Dated: March 18, 2026 Motion dealt with in writing without appearance of parties Written representations by: David Wu, for the Complainant Edward Burnet, Charmaine de los Reyes, Crystal Choi, and Devi Ramachandran, for the Respondent Julie Hudson, for the Commission Appendix Paragraphs from the Complainant’s Amended SOP Amendments Paragraph 133 CSC’s failure

to provide adequate Elder services at Matsqui systemically disadvantages Indigenous prisoners in many ways. The lack of Elder resources undermines the availability of Indigenous programs, reduces access to Escorted Temporary Absences for cultural purposes that may be seen as a prerequisite to transfer to lower security, reduces access to spiritual services and counselling for personal and rehabilitative purposes, and fosters inconsistent reporting to case management to ensure that CSC decision-makers are aware of an Indigenous prisoner’s healing path progress. Without sufficient Elder staffing the rehabilitative pathways CSC claims are available to Indigenous prisoners break down or become elusive. The lack of Elder resources has also caused significant physical, emotional, spiritual, and mental pain and suffering. Paragraph 177 CSC also discriminates against Indigenous prisoners at Matsqui by requiring them to sign up and undergo a screening process before participating in spiritual practices such as sweats. Non-Indigenous prisoners in Federal custody are not subject to a comparable screening process to participate in spiritual practices. Paragraph 178 As a result of CSC’s conduct, Indigenous prisoners at Matsqui have suffered a reduced ability to practice their culture and religious or spiritual beliefs. This includes loss of culture; lost opportunity to practice

culture, loss of ability to act in accordance with religious or spiritual beliefs or practice; unnecessary restraints on of liberty; physical, emotional, spiritual, and mental pain and suffering. Injury to dignity and self-respect. Paragraph 179 In addition to denying Indigenous prisoners at Matsqui their ability to practice their culture and spirituality CSC often holds this lack of engagement against Indigenous prisoners in security classification decisions and parole recommendations. Paragraph 180(3) CSC’s discrimination against Indigenous prisoners, generally, at Matsqui and specifically including the Complainants, has been willful and reckless. CSC’s systemic discrimination against Indigenous prisoners – in the various forms detailed above – is not a secret, but has been the subject of numerous high-profile reports, audits and calls to action. CSC has long been aware of the fact that its failure to adequately and equitably resource Indigenous rehabilitative programs and services disadvantages Indigenous prisoners and contributes to the notorious gap in correctional outcomes, and that this increases Indigenous over-incarceration, and CSC has chosen to allow this systemic discrimination to persist rather than take effective action to end it.