Sharifi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)
- Citation
- 2020 FC 556
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Court
- Federal Court
- Decision
- 27 April 2020
- Posture
- Judicial Review of Refugee Protection Division Decision Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act / Federal Court Judgment on Application for Judicial Review
- Language
- English
More details
- Court
- Federal Court
- Decision
- 27 April 2020
- Posture
- Judicial Review of Refugee Protection Division Decision Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act / Federal Court Judgment on Application for Judicial Review
- Language
- English
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The RPD reasonably applied the Zeng framework to the evidence and correctly concluded that the Male Applicant and his son had status or access to status in Italy (EU Residency Permit and Subsidiary Protection Residency Permit) substantially similar to nationals, and that the Female Applicant could derive status through family ties, thereby excluding them under s.98/Article 1E; the Federal Court dismissed the judicial review as the RPD's decision was reasonable under Vavilov/Dunsmuir.
Court disposition
Application for judicial review dismissed.
Orders
- Application for judicial review dismissed
- No question for certification arises
02
Material facts
Parties
Victorya Sharifi
Applicant Counsel: Djawid TaheriWaleed Noori
Applicant Counsel: Djawid TaheriAahil Aaria Noori
Applicant Counsel: Djawid TaheriThe Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
Respondent Counsel: Emma Arenson03
Procedural history
Posture
Judicial Review of Refugee Protection Division Decision Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act / Federal Court Judgment on Application for Judicial Review
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the applicants are excluded from protection under section 98 of the IRPA as persons described in Article 1E of the 1951 Refugee Convention
- 02
Whether the EU long term residency permit or Subsidiary Protection Residency Permit confers status substantially similar to that of nationals in Italy
- 03
Whether the RPD's decision was reasonable under the applicable standard of review
Party arguments
- Applicant
- Applicants argued the RPD erred in finding exclusion under Article 1E/section 98 because their EU residency could be revoked and they did not have status substantially similar to nationals; the Female Applicant no longer held a family residency permit and had left Italy voluntarily.
- Respondent
- Respondent argued the RPD reasonably found exclusion under section 98/Article 1E because the Male Applicant and son held an EU long-term residency permit and Subsidiary Protection Residency Permit that conferred return rights and status substantially similar to nationals, and the Female Applicant derived status through family ties.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
1951 Refugee Convention Article 1E
Article 1E excludes from the Convention a person recognized by competent authorities of the country of residence as having rights and obligations attached to nationality
- 02
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s.98
Section 98 excludes persons referred to in Article 1E from being Convention refugees or persons in need of protection
- 03
Zeng v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2011] 4 F.C.R. 3 (F.C.A.)
Zeng test: assess whether claimant has status substantially similar to nationals in the third country, or previously had or had access to such status; if access or prior status existed, balance factors including reason for loss, ability to return, risk and international obligations
- 04
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65; Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190
Reasonableness standard requires that a decision be justifiable, transparent and intelligible and fall within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes defensible on law and facts
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The RPD reasonably applied the Zeng framework to the evidence and correctly concluded that the Male Applicant and his son had status or access to status in Italy (EU Residency Permit and Subsidiary Protection Residency Permit) substantially similar to nationals, and that the Female Applicant could derive status through family ties, thereby excluding them under s.98/Article 1E; the Federal Court dismissed the judicial review as the RPD's decision was reasonable under Vavilov/Dunsmuir.
Obiter and limits
- Revocation of the EU Residency Permit under Italian law is discretionary rather than automatic after a 12-month absence.
- The Female Applicant had voluntarily left Italy and lost her family permit but could qualify for family status through the Male Applicant.
- There is no question for certification arising.
Court disposition
Application for judicial review dismissed.
- Application for judicial review dismissed
- No question for certification arises
Source and reliance status
Federal Court · 27 April 2020
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Federal Court
Judgment· 27 April 2020
Sharifi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) Court (s) Database Federal Court Decisions Date 2020-04-27 Neutral citation 2020 FC 556 File numbers IMM-4571-19 Decision Content Date: 20200427 Docket: IMM-4571-19 Citation: 2020 FC 556 Ottawa, Ontario, April 27, 2020 PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Heneghan BETWEEN:
VICTORYA SHARIFI
WALEED NOORI
AAHIL AARIA NOORI Applicants and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION Respondent
JUDGMENT AND REASONS [1] Ms. Victorya Sharifi (the “Female Applicant”), her husband Mr. Waleed Noori (the “Male Applicant”) and their son Aahil Aaria Noori (collectively the “Applicants”) seek judicial review of the decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Protection Division (the “RPD”), dismissing their claim for protection as Convention refugees or persons in need of protection within the meaning of section 96 and subsection 97 (1), respectively, of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the “Act”). [2] The Female and Male Applicants are citizens of Afghanistan; their son was born in Italy. [3] The Male Applicant entered Italy in 2008 and sought refugee protection. Although his claim was denied, he was granted “Subsidiary Protection Status,” together with a Residency Permit called “Subsidiary Protection Residency Permit.” According to the Immigration and Refugee Board Research Directorate Request for Information Responses, a holder of this Permit is eligible to apply for Italian citizenship after residency in Italy for 10 years. [4] In 2015, the Male Applicant obtained a European Union Long Term Residency Permit (“EU Residency Permit”). [5] In 2014, the Male and Female Applicants married in Afghanistan. The Female Applicant travelled to Italy in 2015 on a family visa. In 2017, she acquired a family residence permit that allowed her to
work. This permit expired in 2019. [6] The minor Applicant was born in Italy in July 2016. He was added to the Male Applicant’s EU Term Residency Permit, as a dependent, in 2017. [7] The EU Residency Permit in Italy is governed by Article 9 of Legislative Decree n. 286 (the “Legislative Decree”). The Legislative Decree provides that an EU Residency Permit can be revoked in certain circumstances, including when the permit holder has been “absent from EU territory for 12 consecutive months.” [8] The RPD found that revocation of the EU Residency Permit is not automatic but subject to discretion. [9] The RPD determined that the Applicants were excluded from protection pursuant to section 98 of the Act since they are persons described in Article 1E of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, [1969] Can. T.S. No. 6 (the “Convention”). [10] Section 98 of the Act provides as follows: Exclusion — Refugee Convention Exclusion par application de la Convention sur les réfugiés 98 A person referred to in section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. 98 La personne visée aux sections E ou F de l’article premier de la Convention sur les réfugiés ne peut avoir la qualité de réfugié ni de personne à protéger. [11] Article 1E of the Convention provides as follows: E This Convention
shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country. E Cette Convention ne sera pas applicable à une personne considérée par les autorités compétentes du pays dans lequel cette personne a établi sa résidence comme ayant les droits et les obligations attachés à la possession de la nationalité de ce pays [12] The RPD found that the Male Applicant and his son were excluded because they hold an EU Residency Permit, which carries the right to return to Italy. The RPD also found that even if the EU Residency Permit were revoked, the Male Applicant and his son could return to Italy under the Male Applicant’s Subsidiary Protection Residency Permit. [13] The RPD found that the Female Applicant could return to Italy, on the basis of the Male Applicant’s residency status. It noted that she no longer held the family residency permit and had left Italy voluntarily. [14] In its decision, the RPD referred to various documents including the National Documentation Package for Italy (“NDP”), Request for Information Responses provided by the Immigration and Refugee Board Research Directorate, and the unofficial translation of the Legislative Decree provided by the Applicants. [15] The RPD applied the test in Zeng v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2011] 4 F.C.R. 3 (F.C.A) about the application of the section 98 exclusion. That test considers whether a claimant has status substantially similar to that of its nationals in the applicable country, if a claimant had previously held such status and lost it, or if a claimant had access to such status and failed to acquire it. [16] In Zeng, supra, the Court said the following at paragraph 28: [28] Considering all relevant factors to the date of the hearing, does the claimant have status, substantially similar to that of its nationals, in the third country? If the answer is yes, the claimant is excluded. If the answer is no, the next question is whether the claimant previously had such status and lost it, or had access to such status and failed to acquire it. If the answer is no, the claimant is not excluded under Article 1E. If the answer is yes, the RPD must consider and balance various factors. These include, but are not limited to, the reason for the loss of status (voluntary or involuntary), whether the claimant could return to the third country, the risk the claimant would face in the home country, Canada’s international obligations, and any other relevant facts. [17] The first issue for consideration is the applicable standard of review. The Applicants did not address this issue; the Respondent submits that the decision is
reviewable on the standard of reasonableness. [18] I agree with the position of the Respondent, that the decision of the RPD is reviewable on the standard or reasonableness; see the decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at paragraph 10. [19] In Vavilov, supra, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the content of the reasonableness standard as set out in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190. [20] According to the decision in Dunsmuir, supra, the standard of reasonableness requires that a decision be justifiable, transparent and intelligible, falling within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes that are defensible on the law and the facts. [21] The RPD addressed the interpretation of Article 9 of the Legislative Decree and considered whether the Male Applicant and his son would automatically lose their status in Italy, as the result of their absence from that country for more than 12 months. [22] Upon considering the unofficial translation of the Legislative Decree provided by the Applicants, the NDP for Italy and Request for Information Responses relative to the Legislative Decree, the RPD found that status was not automatically revoked after a 12-month absence, but was subject to the exercise of discretion by the Italian authorities. [23] The RPD also found that even if the Male Applicant lost his status pursuant to
the EU Residency Permit, he and his son still enjoyed status pursuant to the Subsidiary Protection Residency Permit. [24] The RPD found that the Female Applicant had lost her status but would still qualify for family status, due to the status of the Male Applicant. [25] I am satisfied that the RPD reasonably assessed the evidence before it, including relevant documents. It considered and applied relevant jurisprudence, that is the decision in Zeng, supra. Its factual findings are supported by the evidence. I am satisfied that the decision of the RPD is reasonable, within the meaning of Dunsmuir, supra and there is no basis for judicial intervention. [26] In the result, the application for judicial review is dismissed. [27] There is no question for certification arising. JUDGMENT in IMM-4571-19 THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the application for judicial review is dismissed. There is no question for certification arising. "E. Heneghan" Judge
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-4571-19 STYLE OF CAUSE: VICTORYA SHARIFI, WALEED NOORI, AAHIL AARIA NOORI v. THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: MARCH 5, 2020 JUDGMENT AND REASONS: HENEGHAN J. DATED: april 27, 2020 APPEARANCES: Djawid Taheri For The ApplicantS Emma Arenson For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Taheri Law Office Barrister and Solicitor Toronto, Ontario For The ApplicantS Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent
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