Thong v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)
- Citation
- 2020 FC 124
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Court
- Federal Court
- Decision
- 24 January 2020
- Posture
- Immigration Judicial Review / Judgment and Reasons (federal Court)
- Language
- English
More details
- Court
- Federal Court
- Decision
- 24 January 2020
- Posture
- Immigration Judicial Review / Judgment and Reasons (federal Court)
- Language
- English
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The IAD's decision was unreasonable because it failed to meaningfully engage with the best interests of the applicant's child and unreasonably emphasized the child's ability to adjust outside Canada; accordingly the IAD decision was set aside and the matter remitted for redetermination by a differently constituted panel.
Court disposition
Application for judicial review allowed; the IAD decision is set aside and the matter is remitted to a differently constituted panel of the IAD for redetermination.
Orders
- Application for judicial review allowed.
- Decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board, Immigration Appeal Division is set aside.
- Matter remitted to a differently constituted panel of the Immigration Appeal Division for redetermination.
- No question for certification arising.
02
Material facts
Parties
The Minh Banh Thong
Applicant Counsel: Raj SharmaThe Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
Respondent Counsel: Emera NguyenAmounts and remedies
- Days Short of Residency Requirement: 119
- Required Residency Days for Permanent Residents: 730
03
Procedural history
Posture
Immigration Judicial Review / Judgment and Reasons (federal Court)
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the IAD erred in applying H and C relief under s.25(1) of the IRPA
- 02
Whether the IAD failed to consider the best interests of the applicant's Canadian-born child
- 03
Whether the IAD's decision met the reasonableness standard
- 04
Whether the applicant complied with residency obligations under s.28(2) of the IRPA
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The IAD failed to consider all evidence and did not properly engage with the best interests of the child in assessing H and C relief; the IAD's focus on the child's ability to adjust outside Canada was unreasonable.
- Respondent
- The IAD reasonably assessed H and C factors, found the applicant's absence from Canada was moderate (119 days short), and concluded there were insufficient H and C considerations to excuse non‑compliance with residency requirements.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s.28(2)
Residency obligations for permanent residents are governed by subsection 28(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
- 02
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s.25(1)
Humanitarian and compassionate relief may be granted under subsection 25(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act where sufficient H and C considerations exist.
- 03
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190
Administrative decisions are reviewed on a reasonableness standard requiring decisions to be justifiable, transparent and intelligible.
- 04
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65
Presumptive standard of review for administrative decisions is reasonableness unless legislative intent or rule of law requires otherwise.
- 05
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s.25(1) and related jurisprudence
The best interests of the child are a relevant consideration in H and C assessments affecting a Canadian‑born child.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The IAD's decision was unreasonable because it failed to meaningfully engage with the best interests of the applicant's child and unreasonably emphasized the child's ability to adjust outside Canada; accordingly the IAD decision was set aside and the matter remitted for redetermination by a differently constituted panel.
Obiter and limits
- The IAD characterized the applicant's absence as 'moderate', being 119 days short of the required 730 days.
- Vavilov confirms that the presumptive standard of review for administrative decisions is reasonableness.
- No question for certification arises.
Court disposition
Application for judicial review allowed; the IAD decision is set aside and the matter is remitted to a differently constituted panel of the IAD for redetermination.
- Application for judicial review allowed.
- Decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board, Immigration Appeal Division is set aside.
- Matter remitted to a differently constituted panel of the Immigration Appeal Division for redetermination.
- No question for certification arising.
Source and reliance status
Federal Court · 24 January 2020
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Federal Court
Judgment· 24 January 2020
Thong v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) Court (s) Database Federal Court Decisions Date 2020-01-24 Neutral citation 2020 FC 124 File numbers IMM-4077-19 Decision Content Date: 20200124 Docket: IMM-4077-19 Citation: 2020 FC 124 Ottawa, Ontario, January 24, 2020 PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Heneghan BETWEEN:
THE MINH BANH THONG Applicant and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION Respondent
JUDGMENT AND REASONS [1] Ms. The Minh Banh Thong (the “Applicant”) seeks judicial review of the decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board, Immigration Appeal Division (the “IAD”), dismissing her appeal made on Humanitarian and Compassionate (“H and C”) grounds in respect of her failure to meet the residency requirements for permanent residence status, pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the “Act”). [2] The Applicant acquired permanent residence status in Canada in 2007, following her recognition as a Convention refugee. In 2008, she married an American citizen and divided her residence between Canada and the United States of America. [3] In 2012, the Applicant gave birth to a child in Canada. [4] The Applicant applied for a Permanent Resident Travel Document in December 2017. On February 21, 2018, her application was refused for her failure to comply with the residency obligations under subsection 28(2) of the Act. [5] The IAD reviewed H and C factors, including the Applicant’s establishment in Canada, the reasons for her stay abroad, and the best interests of her child. It noted that the Applicant has a Canadian born child and family members in Canada, including her parents. It observed that the Applicant’s absence from Canada was “moderate,” that is 119 days short of the required 730 days. However, the IAD said it was not satisfied
that there were sufficient H and C considerations to warrant relief pursuant to subsection 25(1) of the Act. [6] The decision of the IAD is reviewable on the standard of reasonableness; see the decision in Islam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 80. [7] In its recent decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, the Supreme Court of Canada revisited the standard of review of administrative decisions. It said that, presumptively, such decisions are reviewable on the standard of reasonableness, with two exceptions: where legislative intent or the rule of law requires otherwise. Neither exception applies in this case. [8] In Vavilov, supra, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the content of the reasonableness standard as set out in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190. [9] According to the decision in Dunsmuir, supra, the standard of reasonableness requires that a decision be justifiable, transparent and intelligible, falling within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes that are defensible on the law and the facts. [10] The Applicant argues that the IAD erred in considering the best interests of her child and failed to consider all the evidence. [11] In my opinion, the decision does not meet the standard of reasonableness as discussed in Dunsmuir, supra. The IAD failed to engage with the best interests of the
child and unreasonably focused on the ability of the Applicant’s child to adjust to life outside Canada. [12] In the result, the application for judicial review is allowed, the decision of the IAD is set aside and the matter is remitted to a differently constituted panel of the IAD for redetermination. [13] There is no question for certification arising. JUDGMENT in IMM-4077-19 THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the application for judicial review is allowed, the decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board, Immigration Appeal Division is set aside and the matter is remitted to a differently constituted panel of the Immigration Appeal Division for redetermination. There is no question for certification arising. "E. Heneghan" Judge
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-4077-19 STYLE OF CAUSE: THE MINH BANH THONG v. THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: CALGARY, ALBERTA DATE OF HEARING: JANUARY 15, 2020 JUDGMENT AND REASONS: HENEGHAN J. DATED: JANUARY 24, 2020 APPEARANCES: Raj Sharma For The Applicant Emera Nguyen For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Stewart Sharma Harsanyi Barrister and Solicitor Calgary, Alberta For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Calgary, Alberta For The Respondent
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