A. H. M v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/77983/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS Heard at Birmingham On 22 September 2026 Before FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE C TAYLOR Between A. H. M (ANONYMITY ORDER MADE) and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT Appellant Respondent Representation: For the Appellant: For the Respondent: Mr H Malik, Counsel Mr Swaby, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS 1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 22 November 2024. Anonymity 2. In making this decision I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the discharge of the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice. © CROWN COPYRIGHT 2026 Appeal number: PA/77983/2024 Background 3.

4. The appellant, a national of Nigeria, has four daughters. The respondent accepts that the appellant’s daughters are at risk of FGM in Nigeria, that she has been subjected to verbal and physical harassment from her husband’s family and that her husband’s family started to perform FGM on one of her daughters. The respondent accepted in the review that sufficient protection is not available in Nigeria but asserted that internal relocation is reasonable and not unduly harsh. The Hearing 5. 6. 7.

8. The hearing took place face to face. It was recorded. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing. The appellant uploaded 22 pages of evidence the day before the hearing. The respondent did not object to this evidence which was relevant. In those circumstances, I allowed the documents into evidence. The appellant confirmed at the hearing that she no longer wished for her husband to be dependent upon her asylum claim. There are protective orders in place against him in respect of the appellant and her daughters. In those circumstances it is entirely appropriate that the husband is no longer dependent upon the appellant’s claim. It is her claim and her decision as to the dependents upon the claim. There was no objection from the respondent to this approach. The appeal shall proceed without the appellant’s husband as a dependent. The appellant was treated as a vulnerable witness throughout the hearing in accordance with the Joint Presidential Guidance note 2 of 2010. The appellant was offered breaks whenever needed, questions were put to her sensitively and there were no questions about the accepted history. The appellant was reminded that she was not obliged to listen to the representative’s submissions in full or at all. The appellant chose not to remain in the hearing for the submissions and her representative was given time to discuss this with her. I am also mindful of the guidance in this note in respect of my assessment of the evidence.

9. The respondent did not consider that the change in circumstances since the application was a new matter but confirmed that, if it was, consent was given for the Tribunal to consider the matter. Issues 10. The parties agreed that the issues the Tribunal must decide are: (a) Whether the husband’s family could locate the appellant and the children anywhere in Nigeria. If this is found the appellant succeeds without more. (b) Is it reasonably likely that the Appellant could not internally relocate? (c) Does the Appellant face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of return? Appeal number: PA/77983/2024 (d) Does the appellant face very significant obstacles to integration in the country of return? (e) Would the appellant's removal give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences such that it is disproportionate and therefore unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998? Evidence 11. I had before me a bundle of 529 pages and 22 pages of supplementary documents. I heard evidence from the appellant. I have considered all of the evidence but I will not rehearse all of it in this decision for two reasons. Firstly, it is not necessary to do so and secondly the utmost caution must be exercised in order to preserve the anonymity of the appellant and the children. Legal Framework 12. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a

well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, in considering whether the appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities: (a) Taking the appellant's claim at its highest, is there a convention reason? (b) Does the appellant fear persecution for that convention reason?

13. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that: (a) The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason; (b) There would not be sufficient protection available; and (c) The appellant could not internally relocate.

14. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.

15. The relevant provisions of the Immigration Rules in this appeal are: Appendix PL.

16. In so far as they rely on article 8 outside the Rules it is for the appellant to show that article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged and if so, it is for the respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the 2002 Act are relevant to any assessment under article 8 of the ECHR outside the Rules.

17. My approach to assessing credibility comes from KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended Appeal number: PA/77983/2024 consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. I consider any documents along with all the evidence in the round. I am also conscious that just because a person has lied about one thing does not mean he has lied about another. Facts 18. I find it is in the children’s best interests to remain in the UK with their mother where they are protected by the protective orders in place and can be sufficiently protected by the state. In the UK the children have been able to attend school regularly, receive support from Children’s Services where required, and to settle in one place.

19. The only factual issue in dispute is whether the appellant’s husband’s family could find her and the children throughout Nigeria.

20. There is a wealth of evidence before me from proceedings in the family court. The children are subject to protective orders until 2037 which reflects the seriousness of the risk to them. That risk was thoroughly assessed by Children’s Services and accepted by the Family Court. Whilst the respondent submits that I am not bound by orders of the Family Court I do give significant weight to the Family Court’s assessment of the risk to the children which takes into account expert social worker evidence and opinion. The Family Court’s position also reinforces the appellant’s credibility.

21. The appellant’s evidence was that, over a period of around 15 years, she and the children moved around various locations in Nigeria and her husband’s family always found them. During this time the children were not able to routinely attend school and the appellant could not work. The appellant’s evidence was that the family survived in hiding rather than actually living a life.

22. The appellant has set out the specific locations within her evidence and has given details in her oral evidence of what has happened when the family has previously been located. I do not set that evidence out in full so as to preserve anonymity. I do accept that consistent and detailed evidence.

23. I accept the appellant’s evidence. She has been entirely consistent both in these proceedings and before the family court. The respondent has accepted all other aspects of her evidence. The respondent’s main challenge in respect of internal relocation was the length of time the appellant was able to evade actual harm coming to the children whilst in Nigeria. This is explained by the frequent moves and living in hiding. The appellant has explained that her uncles, as family elders, were able to assist and that there have been dangerous altercations. Whilst in Nigeria, the appellant also had the staunch support of her husband who was against FGM. He remained in work allowing the appellant to move with and care for the children. Despite this, the family has been found numerous times.

24. The appellant’s circumstances now are different to when she was in Nigeria. Her husband is no longer a protective factor and her uncles, who have assisted her previously, have both passed away. The pressure from the husband’s family has also increased due to their escalating actions. The husband’s evidence before the family court, which was confirmed by the appellant, was that his brother was killed by the wider family for opposing FGM and his mother’s whereabouts are unknown. The pressure led him to conclude that the only solution was to take the children to Nigeria Appeal number: PA/77983/2024 to be subjected to FGM, and the eldest to a forced marriage. The husband’s stance has changed from that of a protector to an agent of the persecutor. This significantly increases the risk. The appellant gave oral evidence that the husband’s family are humiliated and angry that they have not been able to force the children to undergo FGM.

25. Whilst no harm, other than the start of the FGM process to the eldest daughter, came to the children in Nigeria, the husband’s family pursued them for 15 years. The children have lived almost their entire lives under threat. The threat continued in the UK with the actions taken against the husband’s brother and the disappearance of his mother.

26. I accept the appellant’s submission that internal relocation has been tested as a protective measure, and it has failed. Determination of the Issues 27. I find on the balance of probabilities that the husband’s family have repeatedly located the appellant throughout Nigeria. It follows that there is a reasonable likelihood that they would locate her again. In those circumstances internal relocation is neither a safe nor a reasonable option. Given the accepted risk of FGM to the children, the absence of sufficient protection and the failure of internal relocation, the appellant has established a well-founded fear of persecution. Notice of Decision 28. The appeal succeeds on asylum grounds.

ANONYMITY ORDER 29. Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant To rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant [and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified], is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. To the Respondent – Fee Award 30. I have decided to make no fee award. The respondent’s position at the time of the hearing was not unreasonable. Signature Signed Judge C Taylor First-tier Tribunal Judge C Taylor Date 30 September 2026