Mercy Ofori-Kuma v Victoria Ofori-Kuma and Michaela Fordjor and Karyn Ofori and Delores Ofori (Ofori-Kuma v Ofori (Burial or Cremation))

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2327 (Fam)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY DIVISION Before:

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Between : Mercy Ofori-Kuma - and - Victoria Ofori-Kuma -and- Michaela Fordjor -and- Karyn Ofori -and Delores Ofori - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - All parties appeared in person Hearing dates: 8 September 2026 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Approved Judgment Case No: FD26F00047 Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL Date: 09/09/2026 First Applicant Second Applicant First Respondent Second Respondent Third Respondent This judgment was handed down remotely at 12 noon on 9 September 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives. .............................

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published.

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Mr Justice MacDonald:

INTRODUCTION Ofori-Kuma v Ofori 1. 2. 3. 4.

5. This case concerns a family dispute regarding the funeral arrangements of the late Margaret Ofori-Kuma (hereafter, “Margaret”), who was born on 16 April 1966 and died on 9 June 2026. A disagreement has arisen between Margaret’s daughters and her mother and sister regarding her wishes, the proper arrangement for her body and who should make the funeral arrangements. In Buchanan v Milton [1999] 2 FLR 844, Hale J (as she then was) said as follows with respect to difficult and sad applications of the nature currently before this court: "I accept entirely that the courts should be slow to entertain proceedings such as these. Modern methods of refrigeration may make them possible but they are certainly unseemly. They delay the proper disposal of the body and the normal processes of grieving, while bringing further grief in themselves." Similar comments regarding the tragedy of family arguments regarding the burial or cremation of a deceased loved one have been made in other cases down the years, including in Hartshorne v Gardner [2008] EWHC 3675 (Ch), Anstey v Mundle [2016] EWHC 1073 (Ch) at [3] and Ganoun v Joshi [2020] EWHC 2743 (Ch) at [60]. Those observations are apt in this case. It is plain to this court that the arc of grief that follows the loss of a loved one has been deepened and extended in this case by the dispute that has followed Margaret’s passing. The first

applicant is Mercy Ofori-Kuma, the mother of Margaret (hereafter “Mercy”). She is 90 years old. At a directions hearing on 11 August 2026, Morgan J formed the view that the application was in fact being driven by Mercy’s daughter, Victoria Ofori- Kuma (hereafter, “Victoria”). In the circumstances, Morgan J joined Victoria as the second applicant. The respondents to the application are the daughters of Margaret, Michaela Fordjor, Karyn Ofori and Delores Ofori (hereafter “Michaela”, “Karyn” and “Delores” and, collectively, “the children”). All parties represent themselves. An organisation called Another Ear CIC – Contentious Trusts, Probate and Estates Disputes, a private company based in Tottenham, previously indicated to this court that it was assisting Mercy and Victoria. At the first hearing before Morgan J, the person attending from Another Ear CIC informed the court that they were a qualified solicitor in the employ of Another Ear CIC. At the following hearing, Morgan J was informed that the individual in question was not a solicitor. In her statement, Mercy asserts that Another Ear CIC is not acting as her solicitor and “provides administrative assistance only”. The precise status of Another Ear CIC remains unclear. However, documents from Another Ear CIC tend to reinforce Morgan J’s concerns regarding the extent to which Victoria is the prime driver of the application and the nature of the involvement of ‘Another Ear CIC’ more widely. In a document prepared by Another Ear CIC and signed by Mercy dated 16 July 2026 Mercy states: “I confirm that I support the actions being taken by Ms Victoria Ofori-Kuma and Another Ear CIC in seeking to ensure that Margaret's funeral

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Ofori-Kuma v Ofori 6. 7. 8. 9. arrangements are dealt with lawfully, transparently and with proper regard to the concerns raised by our family.” Whilst a statement from Joycelyn Ochlich of Another Ear CIC contends that neither she or that organisation act as Mercy and Victoria’s solicitor, in letters written by Another Ear CIC to each of the respondent children that run to some forty-seven paragraphs, the organisation appears to hold itself out as the legal representatives of Mercy and the maternal family, who it describes as “our clients”: “1. We act on the instructions of Mrs Mercy Ofori-Kuma, the mother of the late Margaret Ofori-Kuma, acting with the support of members of Margaret's maternal family. Mrs Mercy Ofori-Kuma has authorised Another Ear CIC to correspond and take such preliminary legal and administrative steps as are necessary to preserve the family's position in relation to this dispute.” No representative of Another Ear CIC attended this final hearing and it has not been possible to explore these concerns further. In the circumstances, I make no findings about these matters. However, in light of the concerns of the court regarding the actions of Another Ear CIC, and in circumstances where they appear to have held themselves out to the respondents as legal representatives, I intend to direct that a copy of this judgment be

sent to the Solicitors Regulation Authority. Mercy’s Part 8 Claim was issued on 19 July 2026. Morgan J granted an interim injunction on 11 August 2026, preventing the respondents from making arrangements in respect of Margaret’s body. In circumstances where none of the parties to the proceedings were represented at the hearing, and in circumstances where all are members of the same family, at the outset of the hearing I invited the parties to indicate whether they sought to challenge the evidence of other family members by way of cross-examination or would be content for the court to ask the questions it considered necessary to inform its decision. Having given the parties time to consider this question, all parties were content to proceed on that latter basis. In the circumstances, in addition to the comprehensive statements filed and served by the parties, the court had the benefit of limited oral evidence and short closing submissions from each party. I reserved judgment overnight and I now set out the court’s reasons for dismissing the applications made by Mercy and Victoria, making a limited grant to enable the children to arrange their mother’s funeral and cremation and injuncting Mercy and Victoria from interfering with those arrangements.

BACKGROUND 10. Margaret was born on 16 April 1966. Mercy and Victoria assert that her family is part of the Akyem Royal family of Ghana. Tragically, Margaret passed away suddenly on 9 June 2026. Margaret’s death was not anticipated and therefore there was no time for discussions of the type that might take place when death is foreshadowed by a long illness. As I have set out, Margaret had three daughters, Karyn, Delores and Michaela. From the brief experience the court has had of their advocacy for their mother, Margaret would have been rightly proud of each of them. Karyn, Delores and Michaela are clear that their mother wished to be cremated following her death.

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Ofori-Kuma v Ofori 11. Mercy remains firmly opposed to the cremation of her deceased daughter. She asserts that Margaret “told me privately and unequivocally that she must not be burned (cremated)”. During her short oral evidence, Mercy was not able to recall the date on which Margerat told her that “she must not be burned” (the Part 8 claim form puts the statement as having occurred “approximately two years ago”). Mercy told the court that Margarets apparently unequivocal statement regarding cremation had been made during a conversation about the death of another family member, Esther, to which I shall come. Apart from this alleged single statement related by Mercy, neither Mercy nor Victoria offers any other direct evidence of Margaret’s wishes regarding the arrangements for her body.

12. Mercy concedes in her statement that she is not able to say that Margaret never discussed funeral arrangements with her daughters, and relies solely on what she contends she was told by Margaret. As to the competing accounts of Margaret’s daughters, Mercy contends that their credibility is diminished in circumstances where Margaret had no continuing relationship with Karyn and Delores due to persistent harassment and abusive behaviour towards her and other members of the family. These statements were obviously hurtful for each of the children. As I will come to, I am satisfied that Mercy’s account does not reflect the true position. In her closing submission, Mercy told the court simply that “I want to bury my daughter.” 13.

14. Victoria likewise argues that Margaret should be buried in accordance with her wishes as expressed to Mercy (which Victoria did not witness). By certain elements of her presentation during the hearing, it was evident that Victoria treats the children’s position with some distain. During the course of children’s evidence the court was forced to reprimand Victoria for adopting a smirking, contemptuous demeanour towards that evidence as it was being given. Karyn disputes Mercy’s assertion that she had a poor relationship with her mother and describes in her statement a relationship that was close and which involved regular communication. Karyn states that she and her mother spoke the day before Margaret’s death. Delores likewise speaks in her statement of a close relationship with her mother that involved extensive daily communication. She exhibits to her statement a sample of the messages that she and her mother exchanged. During these communications, Delores contends her mother spoke of tensions between Margaret and Mercy and Victoria. Delores asserts that two days before she died, her mother again communicated about tensions within the maternal family, describing her relatives as being “very manipulative”. Michaela lived with her mother until April 2024 and remained heavily involved with her, seeing her almost everyday. In June 2025, Michaela and her family moved back in with her mother. It was clear to the court from Michaela’s calm and measured evidence that she had a close relationship with her mother and shared a significant emotional bond with her.

15. With respect to funeral arrangements, Delores contends that she and her sisters understood that, as her surviving adult children, they were entitled to deal with her funeral arrangements and proceeded on that understanding. As to Margaret’s wishes regarding her funeral arrangements, Delores relies on a statement her mother made to her in which she expressed a wish to be cremated and contends that her wishes should be honoured. Delores contends that her mother said “never leave me” during discussions regarding cremation. In the context of those discussion, Delores understood her mother to be saying she did not want to be left behind in a grave.

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Ofori-Kuma v Ofori 16. Karyn relates a conversation with her mother on 27 September 2023, following the funeral of another family member, Esther. Her statement reads as follows: “21. During that conversation my mother remarked, in substance, that the family liked to 'bury and forget' people and that this would not happen to her. She referred to a deceased relative and asked words to the effect of, 'Who visits Uncle Kofi?' 22. My mother then spoke to me in Twi and said words which I clearly understood to mean: 'For me, never. You can cremate me and bring me home.' I understood her to mean that she did not want to be buried and left in a grave, and that she wanted her daughters to cremate her and bring her remains home.

23. I remember the conversation because of the strength of her reaction to Esther's funeral and because it concerned what my own mother wanted for herself. She was not seriously ill and neither of us believed her death was imminent. There was no reason to imagine that almost 3 years later I would be required to prove an ordinary private conversation in the High Court, and we therefore did not create a formal written funeral plan.

24. There were later references to cremation of which I was also aware. At no time did my mother personally tell me that she had changed her mind and wished instead to be buried.” 17. Michaela likewise relates conversations with her mother with regard to her wishes after death. As I have noted, Michaela lived with her mother prior to April 2024 and from June 2025 to her death and had a close relationship with her mother. In her statement, Michaela sets out the following account: “17. My mother spoke about death throughout my childhood and adult life. These were not conversations suggesting that she expected to die imminently; death was simply a subject she raised openly and sometimes casually in ordinary family conversation.

18. Over the years she said to me and my sisters words to the effect of: 'If I die, don't bury me', 'The buried are forgotten', and 'Don't leave me behind.' I understood those statements as a clear wish not to be buried and to be cremated so that she could remain close to her children.

19. At no time did my mother personally tell me that she wanted to be buried. She never told me that she had changed her mind from cremation to burial.

20. A later conversation which I remember clearly took place on 21 November 2025. My mother and I had been Christmas shopping and, on the way home, we drove past Heathfield Court Care Home in Erith. I commented on its Christmas lights and said that some care homes appeared to have better standards than the negative examples often reported in the news.

21. My mother misunderstood my comment as a suggestion that I might place her in a care home and became upset. After we bickered for a short time, she

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Ofori-Kuma v Ofori said that in her old age she would come and live with us, her children, whether we liked it or not. That kind of remark was not unusual for her.

22. After an awkward silence she spoke in Twi and said words to the effect that, when Akua was married, she would stay at Akua's home, including in connection with her passing. She then told us, her daughters, to make sure there was a spare room for her in our homes. I understood the conversation as another expression of her wish to remain with and close to her daughters rather than be left apart from us.” 18. Later in her statement Michaela relates the following account that I am satisfied is also relevant to the assessment of Margaret’s views in life: “26. On 29 May 2026, I had an in-person conversation with my mother and Delores at my home. We were discussing a longstanding family issue which had recently come to light. During that conversation my mother returned to the events after my grandfather's death and told us how hurt she had been when Victoria caused us to leave the family home and Mercy did not intervene.

27. My mother spoke in Twi. My best translation of what she said is: 'Grandma has always been passive when it comes to conflicts among the children. That day, I was hurt. If I don't say it, I'd be lying.' 28. During the same conversation my mother said that we should focus on our immediate family and reminded us that, even in her passing, it was us, her children, that she wanted to remain close to because she felt she could not rely on people outside us.

29. That conversation occurred only eleven days before my mother died. For me it was consistent with the same theme I had heard over many years: she wanted her daughters to remain the people closest to her and involved in her arrangements, she did not want to be left behind, and she wanted to remain close to us after her death.” 19. In her first statement, Mercy contends that Michaela was heard by a person called Jacklin Agyemang to have said that her mother would not want to be created and that a statement would be provided from Ms Agyemang. That statement appears to corroborate Mercy’s account of Margaret’s position. Michaela is clear in her witness statement, however, and was clear in oral evidence that her mother had never told her that she had reversed that wish and that neither of her sisters ever told her she had done so. Delores and Karyn corroborated this account during their oral evidence. In particular, with respect to Mercy’s contention that Margaret had stated a firm wish not to be cremated, Michaela states that: “[49] A change from cremation to burial would have been a significant change. Given how closely I lived with and cared for my mother, and how regularly my sisters and I discussed important matters concerning her, I would have expected such a change to have been communicated to us. It was not.”

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Ofori-Kuma v Ofori 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. The parties agree that there were at least two occasions following Margaret’s death when the subject of arrangements for Margaret were discussed. In her witness statement, Michaela recalls that on 11 June 2026 a member of the maternal family visited and that, during that visit, Margaret’s wish to be cremated was discussed openly. Michaela does not recall any objection being raised. Delores likewise recalls this visit and asserts that when cremation was discussed on that date in the presence of members of the wider family, no objection was raised upon an explanation being given that this was her mother’s wish. Karyn likewise recollects this discussion, stating that cremation was discussed at Michaela’s home on 11 June 2026, that Margaret’s wishes were related and no objection to cremation was raised. Whilst both Mercy and Victoria contended that cremation was not discussed at the first of the two meetings that they recalled had taken place, it was not clear whether they were referring to the discussions at Michaela’s property on 11 June 2026. It is apparent from the evidence that tensions increased in the weeks following Margaret’s death, exacerbated by Victoria seeking to imply fault on the part of the children regarding their mother’s death. However, all parties accept that a family meeting took place on 10 July 2026. That meeting was organised by a member of the paternal

extended family, Samuel Afari, in order to settle the arrangements for the funeral. The children’s evidence is that, on the strength of what had occurred prior to this date, they had already contacted the funeral director and commenced arrangements for a cremation. The meeting on 10 July 2026 involved twenty members of the extended family, both maternal and paternal. The children joined by telephone in an apparent indication of the level of tension that had arisen by this time. Victoria told the court that the purpose of the meeting was to decide the issue of cremation. In her witness statement, Karyn recalls that at the meeting on 10 July 2026 Samuel Afari indicated that Victoria was the person objecting to cremation. At the meeting the children were questioned by a male member of the extended maternal family regarding their mother’s stated wishes and reiterated Margaret’s statements indicating she wished to be cremated. Mercy and Victoria each corroborated the evidence that the children related to the meeting that Margaret’s wish was to be cremated. The children assert that Mercy made no mention at this meeting of a private conversation with Margaret regarding objection to cremation or burial and neither Mercy nor Victoria seek to assert that Mercy mentioned that alleged conversation. In her witness statement Delores relates that her recollection is that by the end of

the meeting it had been agreed that Margaret’s wishes would be respected and the cremation would proceed. Michaela likewise states in her witness statement that “At the end of the meeting my understanding was that the family had agreed that my mother's wishes should be respected and that cremation would proceed.” In their oral evidence, Michaela and Karyn corroborated this account. In their oral evidence, both Mercy and Victoria were noticeably reticent about providing a direct answer as to the outcome of the meeting. Mercy avoided answering questions from the court aimed at understanding whether an agreement had been reached. Victoria responded to those questions with an involved answer that sought to justify her having left the meeting and gone upstairs during much of the exchange that took place between the children and the family members. She was clear, however, that a decision had been taken at the end of the meeting by a show of hands. However, she asserted that the decision was to speak

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Ofori-Kuma v Ofori further to the children. Mercy denies consenting to cremation or authorising anyone to consent for her.

25. Following the meeting on 10 July 2026, the children assert that Samuel Afari began to make arrangements in accordance with the agreement that the children considered they had reached at that meeting that Margaret would be cremated. In consequence, they sent out a ‘Save the Date’ notice and booked funeral vehicles, contending they would not have taken these steps unless they considered agreement had been reached. The children contend that Samuel Afari paid approximately £6,000 towards the funeral ceremony and cremation. Following the funeral director pausing those arrangements following a letter from ‘Another Ear CIC’, Samuel Afari wrote directly to CPJ Field Funeral Directors on 30 July 2026 stating that he had personally attended the 10 July meeting, that the maternal side had agreed to support cremation and that no objections had been raised. Karyn exhibits the email from Samuel Afari to CPJ Field Funeral Directors dated 30 July 2026, which reads as follows: “I am writing to you as the silent contract holder alongside next of kin to the deceased and the individual who has paid the £6,000 non-refundable deposit for the funeral and cremation of my sister, Margaret Ofori-Kuma. “I am deeply concerned that your company has unilaterally paused these arrangements based on an informal, non-legal letter from an unaccredited mediation service ("Another Ear"). This document contains

fundamental errors, including an incorrect date of birth, and carries absolutely no legal authority in the United Kingdom. Please be aware of the following critical facts: 1. Contractual and Financial Liability: I have a binding contract with you and have paid a deposit close to £6,000. If your company refuses to perform the contracted services by Friday based on an unverified, non-legal document, I will hold your firm entirely liable for the financial loss of that deposit, as well as any additional storage or handling fees incurred due to this delay.

2. Prior Consultation and Agreement: The claims made in that document are false. On 10th July 2026, I personally attended a family meeting (recorded on audio) where the maternal side explicitly agreed to support my sister's wishes to be cremated. No objections were raised. Their sudden reversal through an unaccredited third party is a bad-faith stalling tactic.

3. Heritage Claims: The cultural claims raised in their letter are legally irrelevant and factually incorrect. The deceased’s paternal family—who actually hold the heritage in question—fully support and stand behind this cremation.

4. Lack of Legal Standing: Under UK intestacy rules, the deceased's children are the lawful next of kin. Neither a sibling, a mother, nor a voluntary mediation board has the legal right to override the children's instructions.” 26. Mercy and Victoria also rely on evidence of what they contend is an established maternal burial custom arising from Margaret’s maternal line being part of the Akyem

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Ofori-Kuma v Ofori Royal family of Ghana. Their evidence concerns what are said to be the customary burial practices of the Akyem/Akim Abuakwa maternal royal lineage, rather than a universal Ghanaian funeral practice. In her statement of 9 August 2026 Mercy states as follows: “11. Margaret was born into our Ghanaian royal family. My family identifies with the Akyim Abuakwa royal tradition, and Margaret’s royal lineage was part of her identity. Within the customs and traditions by which our maternal family has been raised, cremation of a member of the royal family is regarded as a grave taboo. Burial is the customary practice. I give this evidence as Margaret’s mother and as a senior member of the family.

12. For us this is not simply a preference between two forms of funeral. The taboo is understood to have serious and lasting customary and spiritual consequences for the deceased, the family and the lineage. Traditional accounts within the family describe the consequences of violating such a taboo in the gravest terms, including death, what is traditionally described as madness or serious mental affliction, and disownment or exclusion from the family. I state this as the sincerely held customary belief of our family, not as a medical or scientific proposition.” 27. 28. 29.

30. Victoria also invites the court to consider the evidence of customary Royal practice as part of the deceased’s identity, family background and likely wishes. In her closing submissions, Victoria argued that as traditional women, Margaret’s body should “be handed over to my mother so she can be buried in honour of her wishes.” The court has before it statements from Mr Robert Adu-Amoako, who is said to be Margaret’s maternal uncle and a respected elder of the Akyem Abuakwa Royal Family resident in Ghana and Alfred Kwabena Ofori-Kuma Owusu Afari, who is said to be a senior family member in Ghana. They contend that under the Akan customary system observed by the maternal family, responsibility for the deceased’s body and funeral and burial rites rests with the wider lineage or abusua acting through the Abusuapanin, elders and, where applicable, traditional leadership. He also explains that applicable customary law is recognised within Ghana’s legal system, that children participate but do not thereby acquire exclusive customary authority to act contrary to the wider family and that proper burial rites preserve the deceased’s dignity and place within the lineage. This evidence is relied on by Mercy and Victoria as context for the deceased’s own words to Mercy and her conduct, and as evidence of the surviving family’s profound cultural and spiritual concerns. In circumstances

where no application has been made under Part 25 of the FPR 2010, this evidence does not have the status of expert evidence. Mr Kwabena Ofori-Kuma Owusu Afari makes clear that he is not an expert in Ghanaian law. The children argue that the position in relation to maternal custom is not definitive in circumstances where they assert that Margaret’s paternal family, including relatives in Ghana and members of her father's family, fully support honouring their mother's wish to be cremated. In her statement, Michaela contends that her mother did not follow traditions automatically or simply because other family members expected her to do so. She made important personal decisions for herself and gives a number of examples. These assertions are corroborated by Delores and Karyn, who each describe their

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Ofori-Kuma v Ofori 31.

32. LAW 33. mother as a person not beholden to tradition. In this context, Michaela asserts that a general proposition about Ghanaian, family or Christian custom is not a reliable substitute for evidence of what their mother personally said she wanted by way of funeral arrangements. Accordingly, the children contend that this is not a case that can be properly characterised as one in which customary law or tradition mandate a burial for Margaret. Finally, on 8 October 2025, Margaret signed a Statutory Declaration, witnessed by Mr Kofi Fynn, with respect to a family grave plot. Mercy relies on this document as evidence that Margaret participated in arrangements regarding the family grave. The document concerns transfer or renunciation of rights in grave 23752, plot 17, Camberwell New Cemetery. All parties accept that the document is not a binding will or a statement of wishes and that nothing in that document records any statement by Margaret that she wished to be buried, in that grave or otherwise, or that she preferred burial to cremation. Further, material parts of the document appear incomplete. The proposed new leaseholder/declaration material is blank. On the page bearing Margaret’s name and signature dated 8 October 2025, neither the box indicating agreement to renounce her rights nor the box indicating objection to renouncing those rights has been selected. The later

assignee/signature/witnessing sections also appear incomplete. I am satisfied that this documentary evidence does not assist the court in making its decision. Prior to the last hearing before Morgan J, no party had made application for a grant of representation or letters of administration so as to be able to make funeral arrangements. However, the children have now of applied for Letters of Administration, Morgan J’s order requiring any such application to have been made by 4 September 2026. In their witness statements, neither Mercy nor Victoria seek to claim an existing grant or greater rank than Margaret’s children under an intestacy. Rather, they invite the court to make an order under the inherent jurisdiction which authorises them to make the funeral arrangements for Margaret. There are two distinct jurisdictional bases by which the court may grant relief in a dispute of this nature. One is the statutory jurisdiction founded on s.116 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (hereafter “the 1981 Act”). This permits the appointment of a personal representative who would not otherwise be entitled to such a grant. This grant may be limited, for example to dealing with the disposal of the deceased's body. The other jurisdictional basis is the court’s inherent jurisdiction. As Peel J noted recently in Bains v Arsalan [2026] EWHC 1597 (Fam) the court should first have recourse to s.116

as the statutory provision, holding as follows at [36]: “[36] It also appears from the authorities that the court has an inherent jurisdiction to grant the relief sought in cases of this nature (see, for example, the dicta of Peter Jackson J (as he was) in Re JS ( supra) and Hayden J in Re K (supra)), although it seems to me that the court should normally first reach to s116 and only invoke the inherent jurisdiction if s116, or other applicable legislative and procedural rules, are not available. In this case, it seems to me that s116 governs my approach because of the direct issue by reference to the rules and s116 as to whether Harleen’s mother or paternal grandmother (both of whom are listed in rule 22 off the NCPR 1987) should be granted letters

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Ofori-Kuma v Ofori of administration. By contrast, for example, in Re JS (supra) the issue before the court was whether an order should be made for a local authority (which does not feature in rule 22) to be authorised to make the funeral arrangements any event. Inevitably, whether the inherent jurisdiction should be invoked will depend on the facts of each case.” The Statutory Jurisdiction 34. It has been very long established in English law that “the law recognises no property in a corpse” (see R v Sharpe (1857) 21 JP 86). However, a number of people may be entitled to physical possession of the body pending its proper disposal. Hale J (as she then was) said in Buchanan v Milton [1999] 2 FLR 844 at 845H: “There is no right of ownership in a dead body. However, there is a duty at common law to arrange for its proper disposal. This duty falls primarily upon the personal representatives of the deceased (see Williams v Williams (1881) 20 Ch. 659; Rees v Hughes [1946] KB 517). An executor appointed by will is entitled to obtain possession of the body for that purpose (see Sharp v Lush (1879) 10 Ch. 468 at 472; Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority [1997] 1 WLR 596 at 600 obiter), even before there has been a grant of Probate. Where there is no executor that same duty falls upon the administrators of the estate, but they may not be able to obtain an injunction for delivery of the body before the grant of letters of administration (see Dobson)” 35.

36. In this context, the ordinary rule is that the deceased's executors or administrators have both a right and a duty to make arrangements for the proper disposal of the deceased's body (Buchanan v Milton [1999] 2 FLR 844 [at 845-846]). As such, the law is clear as to the right of the deceased's personal representatives to physical possession of the body for the purposes of the funeral. Such personal representatives will include those entitled to a grant of administration (see Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority, Buchanan v Milton, Burrows v HM Coroner for Preston [2008] EWHC 1387 (Admin), [2008] 2 FLR 1225 and Ibuna v Arroyo [2012] EWHC 428 (Ch)). In cases of intestacy, the right to apply for a Grant of Letters of Administration follows a strict legal order of priority. That order of is set out in r.22(1) of the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987: “Order of priority for grant in case of intestacy 22.—(1) Where the deceased died on or after 1 January 1926, wholly intestate, the person or persons having a beneficial interest in the estate shall be entitled to a grant of administration in the following classes in order of priority, namely— (a) the surviving spouse or civil partner; (b) the children of the deceased and the issue of any deceased child who died before the deceased; (c) the father and mother of the deceased;

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Ofori-Kuma v Ofori (d) brothers and sisters of the whole blood and the issue of any deceased brother or sister of the whole blood who died before the deceased; (e) brothers and sisters of the half blood and the issue of any deceased brother or sister of the half blood who died before the deceased; (f) grandparents; (g) uncles and aunts of the whole blood and the issue of any deceased uncle or aunt of the whole blood who died before the deceased; (h) uncles and aunts of the half blood and the issue of any deceased uncle or aunt of the half blood who died before the deceased. (2) In default of any person having a beneficial interest in the estate, the Treasury Solicitor shall be entitled to a grant if he claims bona vacantia on behalf of the Crown. (3) If all persons entitled to a grant under the foregoing provisions of this rule have been cleared off, a grant may be made to a creditor of the deceased or to any person who, notwithstanding that he has no immediate beneficial interest in the estate, may have a beneficial interest in the event of an accretion thereto. (4) Subject to paragraph (5) of rule 27, the personal representative of a person in any of the classes mentioned in paragraph (1) of this rule or the personal representative of a creditor of the deceased shall have the same right to a grant as the person whom he represents

provided that the persons mentioned in sub-paragraphs (b) to (h) of paragraph (1) above shall be preferred to the personal representative of a spouse or a civil partner who has died without taking a beneficial interest in the whole estate of the deceased as ascertained at the time of the application for the grant.” 37. The order of priority for a Grant of Letters of Administration is subject to the power of the court under section 116 of the 1981 Act: “Section 116 (1) If by reason of any special circumstances it appears to the High Court to be necessary or expedient to appoint as administrator some person other than the person who but for this section would in accordance with probate rules have been entitled to the grant the court may in its discretion appoint as administrator such person as it thinks expedient. (2) Any grant of administration under this section may be limited in any way the court thinks fit”.

38. In Scotching v Birch [2008] EWHC 844 (Ch), Patton J (as he then was) accepted that jurisdiction under s.116 of the 1981 Act is capable of being engaged on issues of disputed burial arrangements. Where s.116 is engaged, the court must determine whether it is necessary or expedient to appoint an administrator other than the person

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Ofori-Kuma v Ofori who would, in accordance with probate rules, have been entitled to the grant as a result of the existence of special circumstances.

39. In Bains v Arsalan [2026] EWHC 1597 (Fam), Peel J utilised s.116 in a case where the person convicted of the murder of the deceased sought a say in the burial arrangements for the deceased. As to the correct approach under s.116, I can do not better than the exposition provided by Peel J in that case: “30. The authorities (for example, Burrows v HM Coroner for Preston [2008] EWHC 1387 (QB)) suggest that there is a two stage process: i) First, to identify any special circumstances that might displace the r22 order; and ii) To decide whether, in the light of such special circumstances weighing in favour of varying the order of priority, it is necessary or expedient for the court to vary the order.

31. The court has the power to appoint as administrator a person lower down the priority list, such as in Burrows v HM Coroner for Preston (supra) where an uncle replaced the mother. The court may appoint a person not on the list, and with no familial connection, as in Oldham MBC v Makin [2017] EWHC 2543 (Ch).

32. Special circumstances are not limited to circumstances in connection with the estate itself or its administration, but can extend to any other circumstances which the court thinks relevant: Re Clore [1982] Fam 113, per Ewbank J. at p.117. This was adopted by Hale J in Buchanan v Milton (supra), who took what she described at 855C as a “broad view of special circumstances”. Examples of factors relevant in this balancing exercise include the wishes of the deceased, the place with which the deceased had the closest connection and the reasonable wishes and requirements of the deceased’s family and friends: Hartshorne v Gardner [2008] 2 FLR 1681. Ultimately, as Hale J said in Buchanan v Milton (supra) at 854G: “This must in the end be a question of fact depending upon the nature of the alleged circumstances and the context in which they are raised.” 33. In Re H (A Child) [2023] EWCA Civ 995, the burial issue lay between two parents where their child had died of natural causes. The Court of Appeal described the test at paragraph 32 as a balancing exercise, specific to the deceased’s circumstances during life. They referred to the mother’s parental responsibility and biological link, but made clear that these were not determinative factors. The child had, for some years, been in the care of her father, and then paternal grandparents. The court, when upholding the first instance

judge’s order which found in favour of the paternal family, held that “ This court must address the balance of interests which is fact specific to H's circumstances during her life…”. On the facts of that case, the “predominant force” was the “well-articulated and genuinely held devout religious views of those with the real closest relationship” to the child, and their wish to support what they believed to be her afterlife, indicating the importance of family and religion.

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Ofori-Kuma v Ofori 34. Closest to this case on its facts, is Re E (A Child: Burial Arrangements) [2019] EWHC 3639 (Fam), in which the mother had been convicted for culpability in connection with her child's death which had been perpetrated by her then partner. The judge decided to grant the child’s father letters of administration under s.116 to arrange the funeral over the mother's objection. Other cases on burial disputes, all of course specific to their facts, include Re JS [2017] 4 WLR 1, Re K [2018] 1 FLR 96 and ND v LD [2019] EWHC 3639.

35. This survey of the jurisprudence demonstrates to my satisfaction the breadth of circumstances to which the court may have regard where no one factor automatically takes precedence over another. The test is not one of welfare under the Children Act 1989 as the child is no longer alive. Biological connection and parental responsibility are factors (in the right case, powerful factors), but they do not confer automatic priority. The court must undertake an evaluation of all relevant circumstances by reference to s116.” 40.

41. As noted in Buchanan v Milton, in a case of intestacy the question of who has the duty to arrange for the disposal of the body will often arise before a grant of administration has been made. As such, in Williams, Mortimer and Sunnucks on Executors, Administrators and Probate at [38-02] n.6 it is recognised that it may be necessary for there to be a limited grant for the purposes of obtaining the body for burial. As to the consequence of a limited grant, in Anstey v Mundle [2016] EWHC 1073 (Ch) at [47], Henderson J considered that the court can direct who has the power and duty to bury the deceased but cannot determine or direct where or how the deceased is to be buried. This position was confirmed by Peel J in Bains v Arsalan, in which Peel J observed at [37] that: “The court has the power to determine or direct who has the power to make the arrangements, but does not have the power to direct where or how it should take place: Anstey v Mundle [2016] EWHC 10173 (Ch), although the court inevitably must have regard to how and where it is proposed by competing parties to take place in order to determine who should have the power to make the arrangements.” The Inherent Jurisdiction 42.

43. As I have noted, there is a second basis on which the court can intercede to resolve a dispute regarding the burial arrangements of the deceased, namely under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. It is on this jurisdiction that Mercy and Victoria primarily rely. The powers of the executors are also subject to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The extent of this inherent jurisdiction was explored by Sir Geoffrey Vos, C (as he then was), in Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council v Makin [2018] Ch 543. This was a case concerning the funeral arrangements to be made in respect of the body of Ian Brady, the notorious "Moors murderer" of the 1960s. After considering relevant authorities, he said:

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Ofori-Kuma v Ofori “80. In my judgment, the court does have an inherent jurisdiction to direct how the body of a deceased person should be disposed of. The court will normally, as I have said, be deciding between the competing wishes of different sets of relatives, and will only need to decide who should be responsible for disposal rather than what method of disposal should be employed. I cannot see, however, why the court's inherent jurisdiction over estates is not sufficiently extensive to allow it, in a proper case, to give directions as to the method by which a deceased's body should be disposed of. In my view, it is. Moreover, I am, for the reasons I have given in relation to section 116, prepared to exercise that jurisdiction in this case”. 44.

45. Finally in relation to the law, there are two cases that illuminate the issues and the difficulties thrown up by applications of this nature, one a Commonwealth authority and one a domestic authority. In Calma v Sesar [1992] NTSC 17 Martin J, sitting in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia, had to deal with a case in which the adult son of estranged parents died following an incident in which he suffered head injuries. Martin J eloquently articulated the difficulties as follows: "13. The right to possession of a dead body runs with the duty to dispose of it. Each parent in this case had that duty, or at least accepted it, and attempted to carry it into effect, thus claiming that right. Their respective legal claims were subsumed by deep emotion emanating from, and affecting not only them, but other members of the deceased's extended family as well. Questions relating to cultural values and customs interceded. To state that the Court was asked to make a decision taking into account matters relating to burial in a homeland and the profession of the Roman Catholic faith demonstrates just some of the imponderables. Further, issues such as these could take a long time to resolve if they were to be properly tested by evidence in an adversary situation. A legal solution must be found; not one based on competing emotions and the wishes of the living, except in so far as they reflected a legal duty or right. That solution will not embrace the resolution of possibly competing spiritual or cultural values.

14. The conscience of the community would regard fights over the disposal of human remains such as this as unseemly. It requires that the Court resolve the argument in a practical way paying due regard to the need to have a dead body disposed of without unreasonable delay, but with all proper respect and decency.” 46. In the English case of Hartshorne v Gardner [2008] EWHC B3 (Ch) a similar situation arose. In that case Sonia Proudman KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court judge said: “9. The most important consideration is that the body be disposed of with all proper respect and decency and, if possible, without further delay. Subject to that overriding consideration, it seems to me that there are two types of factor that are relevant in the present case. First, those that do or might be expected to reflect the wishes of the deceased himself. Secondly, those that reflect the reasonable wishes and requirements of family and friends who are left.".

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment

DISCUSSION Ofori-Kuma v Ofori 47. Having listened carefully to the representations made by the parties in this case, I am satisfied that: i) ii) iii) Mercy and Victoria’s claims must be dismissed, with the effect that the priority given to the children by r. 22(1)(b) of the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987 will remain in place. In circumstances where a full grant of administration has been applied for but not yet been made, I am further satisfied that it is necessary for there to be a limited grant to the children for the purposes of obtaining the body for cremation in accordance with the wishes that I am satisfied their mother expressed to them. Finally, given the level of conflict in this case, I am satisfied that the injunctive relief presently in place should be varied so as to prevent anyone but the children from making funeral arrangements for Margaret. My reasons for so deciding are as follows. By their Part 8 Claim, Mercy and Victoria seek declaratory relief under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. The Skeleton Argument relied on by Mercy and Victoria concludes by seeking orders under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court entrusting Mercy with responsibility for making the funeral arrangements. In the alternative, they invite the court to make a limited grant to Mercy under s.116 of the 1981 Act if the court considers it necessary to do so. As made

clear by Peel J in Bains v Arsalan, the court should normally look first to s.116 of the 1981 Act and only rely on the inherent jurisdiction if s.116 of the Act, or other applicable legislative and procedural rules, are not available to it. The starting point in this case under r.22(1(b) of the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987 is that the children are entitled to a grant of administration and take priority for a grant over Mercy, as Margaret’s parent, and Victoria, as Margaret’s sister. In this case therefore, given the relationship of the applicants and the respondents to the deceased the essential question for the court is whether to displace the children’s priority in favour of Mercy or Victoria. That is a question that falls squarely within s.116 of the 1981 Act, which accordingly provides the appropriate legal framework for determining the dispute between the parties. In this case, pursuant to s.116 of the 1981 Act, the court must determine whether it is necessary or expedient, as a result of the existence of special circumstances, to appoint Mercy or Victoria as administrator in place of the children who are, in accordance with probate rules, entitled to take priority. Once again, as recognised in Anstey v Mundle and Bains v Arsalan, the court is concerned with the question of who has the power to make the arrangements, and not the question of where or how the funeral should take place, albeit the court’s decision will necessarily impact on those arrangements in circumstances where the court is required to take into account the competing positions of the parties in order to determine who should have the power to make the arrangements. 48. 49. 50.

51.

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Ofori-Kuma v Ofori 52. 53. 54.

55. In deciding whether special circumstances exist pursuant to s.116 of the 1981 Act to justify the appointment of Mercy or Victoria in place of the children the court needs to take a broad view. The existence or not of special circumstances is a question of fact depending upon the alleged circumstances and the context in which they are raised. On the evidence before the court, I am satisfied that there are no special circumstances in this case that justify passing over the priority accorded to the children by r.22(1(b) of the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987. The law concerning the significance of the wishes and feelings of the deceased is not entirely settled. However, it is tolerably clear from the authorities that the wishes of the deceased can be taken into account when the court is considering whether there are special circumstances for the purposes of s.116 of the 1981 Act where there is no executor (see Ibuna v Arroyo at [50]-[53]) but are not determinative (see Re JS (Disposal of Body at [47]– [48]). I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Margaret expressed to her children a wish to be cremated. I accept the accounts provided by the children of their conversations with their mother regarding this issue. In particular, I accept Michaela’s evidence that her mother said to her words to the effect that “If I die, don't bury me”, “The buried are forgotten”,

and “Don't leave me behind.” I am satisfied that Michaela’s evidence on this issue was compelling when viewed in the context of what I am satisfied was a close relationship and enduring relationship with her mother which provided ample opportunity for deeper conversations to take place between them. In my judgment it is likely that Margaret would have confided her wishes to Michaela and would also have discussed them with Karyn and Delores. I also take into account that a consistent theme emerged from the children’s account of their mother’s wishes, centred as they were on the ideas of not being “left behind” in the ground and “forgotten”, of not being apart from her daughters and of continuing to belong. In addition, and as I shall come to, I am satisfied that the children’s account of their mother’s wishes was sufficiently compelling to persuade the family meeting that took place on 10 July 2026 to agree by a majority to honour those wishes. By contrast, I am not able to accept the evidence of Mercy and Victoria regarding Margaret’s wishes. Mercy concedes in her statement that she is not able to say that Margaret never discussed funeral arrangements with her daughters, and relies solely on what she contends she was told by Margaret. By contrast to the children’s evidence, Mercy’s account comprises a single, isolated statement by Margaret. Whilst it is placed in some limited

context, I cannot ignore the fact that Mercy’s account is simply a repeat of the children’s account with the outcome changed. I am further satisfied that if Margaret had made this statement to Mercy as representing her clear views, she would also have communicated those views to Michaela, particularly having regard to the force with which Mercy contends the statement was made. There is no evidence that she did so. The credibility of Mercy’s account is further undermined by her unattractive attempt to present a broken relationship between Margaret and her daughters. Finally, had Margaret made the statement alleged by Mercy, I am satisfied it would have been referred to at the meeting on 10 July 2026 when Margaret’s wishes were being discussed. Neither Mercy nor Victoria give an account of the meeting being informed of the statement Mercy alleges. In the foregoing circumstances, I am likewise satisfied that the evidence of Jacklin Agyemang is not reliable.

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Ofori-Kuma v Ofori 56.

57. Having regard to the totality of the evidence before the court, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Margaret did not make that statement to Mercy and that the children’s account reflects accurately Margaret’s wishes regarding her funeral arrangements. There is, accordingly, no basis for concluding that Margaret’s wishes and feelings constitute a special circumstance justifying passing over the children’s priority under the probate rules. I am further satisfied that the customary matters relied on by Mercy and Victoria do not constitute special circumstances for the purposes of s.116 of the 1981 Act. Whilst the court should have regard to the place with which the deceased had the closest connection and will always accord appropriate respect to the customs and traditions of the parties, the determination of the narrow issue that is before this court is governed by the domestic law of England and Wales. As Martin J observed in Calma v Sesar, the court is tasked with finding a legal solution, in which it is difficult to resolve competing spiritual or cultural values. That difficulty is apparent in this case in circumstances where it is clear on the evidence that there is no agreement between the parties as to the proper customary approach.

58. Whilst Mercy and Victoria rely on the maternal customary rituals of the Akyem Abuakwa Royal Family, I am satisfied that the paternal family wished to prioritise Margarets wishes as I have found them to be. There is thus no consensus between the maternal and the paternal families regarding the need to proceed under customary law and the court is not equipped to determine that issue. Further, I accept the evidence of Michaela that her mother did not follow traditions automatically or simply because other family members expected her to do so and that, accordingly, general propositions about Ghanaian, Akyem Abuakwa Royal Family or Christian custom should not take precedence over what Margaret wished personally way of funeral arrangements. Michaela’s statement encapsulates point as follows: “[50] I also do not accept that a general assertion about Ghanaian, family or Christian custom proves that my mother wanted burial. My own experience was that she did not live by tradition in a strict or automatic way. She made her own decisions and was clear about matters that were important to her.” 59.

60. In any event, I am satisfied on the evidence that the meeting on 10 July 2026 between twenty members of the maternal and paternal families resolved to proceed on the basis of Margaret’s wishes. For the reasons I have given, I am satisfied children would have represented their mother’s wishes with clarity and force at the meeting on 10 July 2026. In the context of neither Mercy nor Victoria contending they had told the meeting about Margaret’s alleged statement to Mercy, and the reluctance of Mercy and Victoria to engage with questions regarding the outcome of the meeting, I prefer the evidence of the children that the meeting concluded that Margaret’s wish to be cremated should be honoured. This conclusion is amply corroborated by the email sent by Samuel Afari on 30 July 2026 in response to ‘Another Ear CIC’ sending a letter to the funeral director that resulted in the arrangements being paused. It is clear from that email that Samuel Afari’s understanding was that at the meeting on 10 July 2026 the maternal family explicitly agreed to support Margaret’s wish to be cremated and no objections were raised. In so far as Mercy and Victoria now seek to portray Samuel Afari as giving a

MR JUSTICE MACDONALD Approved Judgment Ofori-Kuma v Ofori different account, I am satisfied that his email of 30 July 2025 is the best evidence of his understanding of the position.

61. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the customary law relied on by Mercy and Victoria does not constitute a special circumstance for the purposes of s.116 of the 1981 Act justifying passing over the priority of the children under r.22 of the Non- Contentious Probate Rules 1987.

CONCLUSION 62. Having regard to the mattes set out above, and stepping back to consider the evidence as a whole, pursuant to s.116 of the 1981 Act, I am wholly satisfied that there are no special circumstances in this case which justify the court passing over the priority of the children under r.22 of the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987 by making a limited grant to either Mercy or Victoria. There is no proper basis in this case to displace the children’s priority.

63. In such circumstances, I am satisfied that the following orders should be made by the court: i) ii) iii) iv) The applications made by Mercy and Victoria are dismissed. In circumstances where a full grant of administration has been applied for but not yet been made, there will be a limited grant to Michaela Fordjor, Karyn Ofori and Delores Ofori for the purposes of obtaining the body of Margaret and arranging for funeral rights and cremation in accordance with her wishes. The current injunction will be varied so as to prevent anyone but Michaela Fordjor, Karyn Ofori and Delores Ofori from making funeral arrangements for Margaret. There will be an order that the applicant’s pay the costs of the respondents, to be summarily assessed if not agreed.

64. The effect of these orders is that the children may proceed to make arrangements for the funeral and cremation of their mother without interference by other members of the family. It is the hope of the court that the maternal and paternal family will now come together to celebrate and commemorate the life of a much loved mother, daughter and sister.