SJ v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/50128/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS Heard at The Priory Courts, Birmingham On 28 September 2026 Before FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LE GRYS Between SJ (ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE) and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT Representation: For the Appellant: Represented himself For the Respondent: Mr K. Kola, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

DECISION 1. The appeal is dismissed.

REASONS Appellant Respondent 2. The Appellant, who claims to be a citizen of The Gambia, appeals under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision dated 27 July 2023 to refuse his protection claim made on 4 July 2021.

ANONYMITY DIRECTION 3. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because this is a protection appeal and the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom (“UK”) under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice in the particular circumstances of the case. © CROWN COPYRIGHT 2026 Appeal Number: PA/50128/2024

BACKGROUND 4. 5.

6. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained on myHMCTS, and includes a stitched bundle (the “SB”) of 87 pages. Any references in this decision to page numbers will be to the PDF page. The Respondent’s decision summarises the Appellant’s immigration history and asylum claim. In short, the Appellant states that, while living in Gambia in early 2018, he was accused by his older brothers of raping his younger sister. He claims to have been tied to a tree and beaten. He states that he was able to escape with the help of a friend, and says that if he was returned to Gambia he will be killed by his family. The Respondent largely accepts the Appellant’s account of events in Gambia, but stated that no risk arises because he is a national of Guinea and will be returned there.

HEARING Preliminary issues 7. 8.

9. The Appellant was assisted throughout the hearing by a Mandinka interpreter, although largely chose to give his evidence in English. Both confirmed that they fully understood each other and no issues were raised in respect of the interpretation. The Appellant was not represented, having previously explained to Judge Elliott, at a case management review hearing of 19 February 2026, that he would be representing himself. He confirmed before me that this remained his intention. I took into account the Senior President of the Tribunal’s Practice Direction of 1 November 2024 and followed the guidance provided in the Equal Treatment Bench Book. I explained in detail the hearing procedure and the issues before me in a manner that I was satisfied that he understood. Before Judge Elliott, the Appellant had sought to additionally rely on his claimed family life with his daughter. This was not something that had previously been considered by the Respondent, and the Presenting Officer stated that consent would not be granted for its consideration in this appeal. Mr Kola confirmed today that this remained the Respondent’s position. I accordingly found that I did not have jurisdiction to consider this as a new matter.

10. In response to Judge Elliott’s directions, the Appellant had submitted a single page from his refusal decision, as well as a WhatsApp message, said to be from his sister. While this WhatsApp referred to the sister making a video statement, this was not before the Tribunal. The Appellant stated that he had made efforts, with help from Tribunal staff, to upload this video, but they had been unsuccessful. He said that he had now had to change his phone and the video was no longer available.

11. At the outset of the hearing I understood there to be no written statement from the Appellant, and the parties confirmed that the extent of the evidence was the stitched bundle and the additional documents I have referred to. On further reviewing Judge Elliott’s case management order (“CMO”) while drafting this decision, however, I noticed that reference was made to a letter from the Appellant being supplied during Appeal Number: PA/50128/2024 that earlier hearing, which Judge Elliott had asked his clerk to upload. I have now located that short letter, as well as a birth certificate for the Appellant’s daughter. It remains unclear as to why these documents were not in the stitched bundle, nor listed on the online platform as evidence served after the stitched bundle had been created. Furthermore, when discussing the absence of a statement with the Appellant, he did not suggest that he had prepared such an account, and instead said that he was not very good at writing and intended to tell everything to me. I was therefore unaware of the letter during the hearing itself.

12. As it transpired, I subsequently granted the Appellant permission to give additional evidence-in-chief in any event, and the evidence he gave was in line with both the letter and his earlier interview answers. He was then cross-examined on those matters. I am therefore satisfied that no unfairness or prejudice resulted to either party from the fact that this letter was not identified during the hearing, as the Appellant nevertheless gave his full account, and the Respondent was able to question him about it. Issues in dispute 13. Having discussed matters with the parties, the following was agreed: (a) The Appellant was accused of rape by his older brothers while he resided in Gambia. (b) One of his older brothers is a state actor who works for the military. (c) There would not be sufficiency of protection in Gambia, and the Appellant could not internally relocate. (d) In many respects the Respondent’s review had sought to depart from the concessions above. While Mr Kola suggested that he wanted to proceed in line with the review, I highlighted that no application to withdraw the earlier concessions had been made, in circumstances where Judge Elliott’s case management order was clear that the case would continue to be considered by reference to the position in the refusal letter. No application was made before me. I therefore indicated that the Respondent could rely on the position set out in the review only insofar as this did not contradict the earlier concessions. (e) The Respondent does not grant consent for a consideration of claimed family life with the Appellant’s daughter as a new matter.

14. The following issues are in dispute: (a) Whether the Appellant’s claim engages a Convention reason. (b) Whether the Appellant is a national of Gambia. (c) If not, whether the Appellant is a national of Guinea. (d) If the Appellant is a national of Guinea, whether he would face very significant obstacles to integration in that country. Appeal Number: PA/50128/2024 (e) Outside the immigration rules, whether the refusal decision amounts to a disproportionate interference with any Article 8 rights found to be engaged. Evidence 15.

16. In the apparent absence of a witness statement from the Appellant, I granted permission for him to give oral evidence-in-chief, and asked him some neutral questions to assist him in explaining the nature of his claim. In summary, the Appellant stated that his father had died and his brothers had accused him of a rape he did not commit. He now believes that these false allegations were connected to property that his father had left behind. He stated that he had previously been told that he was from Guinea, but did not recall ever living in the country, and did not have any documentation from there. He now believes that he is Gambian because his sister has told him that what his brothers previously told him was all lies, in order to get his father’s possessions. When asked whether he would have any difficulties in Guinea if he was returned there, he said that he did not know anyone there, and had never been there.

17. The Appellant was then cross and reserved my decision.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK examined. I heard closing submissions from both parties - 18. To succeed on asylum grounds, an Appellant must show a well founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion). - 19. A claim for humanitarian protection may be granted where the person is not a refugee but substantial grounds have been shown for believing that, if returned to their country of origin, they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm; that they are unable, or owing to such risk unwilling, to avail themselves of the protection of that country; that internal relocation is not available; and that they are not excluded from humanitarian protection.

20. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. The standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood, which can also be expressed as a reasonable chance or serious possibility.

21. In respect of Article 3, the burden is on the Appellant to show to the lower standard of proof that there is a reasonable likelihood, or real risk, of a breach. Ill treatment must attain a minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3. In accordance with Bouyid v Belgium (Application no. 23380/09) at [86-89] and AA (Morocco) [2025] EWCA Civ 144 at [30], this assessment depends on all the circumstances. If the Appellant establishes substantial grounds for believing that expulsion would violate Article 3, the burden shifts to the Respondent to dispel any serious doubts. - 22. In MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 it was restated that there is no requirement for an Appellant to adduce corroborative evidence. However, the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value. Supporting documentary evidence is not required where the requirements of Appeal Number: PA/50128/2024 paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules are met. Where those requirements are not met, a judge may take into account the absence of supporting documentary evidence which might reasonably be expected.

23. In respect of Article 8, the Appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the relevant requirements are met. In accordance with TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1109, satisfaction of the relevant Rule is ordinarily determinative of proportionality, because the Secretary of State has already struck the balance between individual rights and the public interest when formulating the Rules.

24. Under paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) of the Rules, now largely replicated in PL 5.1 of Appendix Private Life, an adult applicant who has lived in the UK for less than 20 years must show that “there would be very significant obstacles to the applicant’s integration into the country to which he would have to go if required to leave the UK.” 25. The concept of integration involves a broad evaluative assessment of whether the applicant will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society of return is carried on, with the capacity to participate in it, such that they have a day basis, and to build reasonable opportunity to be accepted, to function on a day within a reasonable period the human relationships necessary to give substance to their private or family life. to - - 26. If the Appellant does not meet the Rules, the public interest normally lies in refusing leave. The exception is where refusal would produce consequences of such gravity for the Appellant or a family member as to render the decision disproportionate. In assessing proportionality I have regard to section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and balance the public interest against the matters relied upon by the Appellant.

FINDINGS 27. I have taken account of everything I have heard and considered all the documentary evidence I have been referred to by the parties. I have carefully considered all the evidence in the round. I shall refer to the evidence and submissions so far as necessary to explain my findings and reasons. Appeal on asylum grounds 28. The Respondent did not accept that the claim engaged a Convention reason, nor was there any obvious basis on which the Tribunal could infer that what was essentially said to be a private family dispute engaged such a reason. The Appellant made no submissions on the point. I accordingly do not find that a Convention reason has been established. If I am wrong in that conclusion, however, and in any event in order to consider the position in respect of humanitarian protection and Article 3, I consider the remainder of the Appellant’s claim.

29. I take into account the extensive concessions made by the Respondent as to the Appellant’s account of events in Gambia, and do not go behind these. I find that the fact that the Appellant is accepted to have spent some time in Gambia, and to have family members there who hold senior public positions, is potentially supportive of his claim to be Gambian. Appeal Number: PA/50128/2024 30. Nevertheless, there is very little further evidence that might suggest, even to the lower standard, that the Appellant is a citizen of that country, as opposed to a resident. A number of factors instead point away from such a conclusion.

31. Most notably, the Appellant had previously always claimed to be a national of Guinea. This is the nationality he gave in his screening interview (Q1.5, SB38) and maintained throughout his asylum interview. While he now asserts that it is simply something he had been told, his earlier answers did not suggest uncertainty, and the context of any references to possible Gambian nationality was that this might be in addition to, rather than instead of, his unambiguous claim to be a citizen of Guinea. Other answers then suggest circumstances consistent with that nationality; for example, that his father was from Guinea (Q13; SB58), and that he was himself born there (for example, Q22). In this respect, the Appellant had previously presented his nationality essentially as a matter of fact.

32. Furthermore, the evidence on which the Appellant now relies to assert his Gambian nationality is itself no more than a belief, based on something he claims to have been told by his sister. I pause at this stage to note that no further evidence was provided as to the circumstances in which the WhatsApp message from the sister was received, or establishing the identity of the sender. In any event, even taken at its highest, the sister’s evidence about the key issue is no more than the briefest of assertions, at the very end of what is itself a brief message. She does not explain how she discovered this information or why she believes it to be true, and instead largely focuses on a claimed force marriage. While she states that the Appellant is Gambian, she does not address the question of whether he may also be a citizen of Guinea.

33. The Appellant was then unable to satisfactorily explain why his younger sister might know his true nationality, when he himself did not. When asked, he simply stated that she knew everything that was going on. This does not address, however, obvious alternative possibilities such as simple mistake, or that there might be an ulterior motive in telling the Appellant this information, noting that the very nature of his claim is that family members are making up false details and allegations about him as a result of a bitter dispute. In this respect, even if the Appellant honestly believes his sister, this falls some way short of establishing that what he has been told is accurate.

34. In short, the Appellant’s claim to be a national of Gambia is little more than his present belief, based on what he claims to have been told by a relative, in circumstances where his own account is that what relatives have told him in the past about the subject has not been true.

35. The Appellant has then made no effort to confirm his nationality, either with the authorities of Gambia or Guinea. He claimed in cross-examination not to have even realised that the Respondent was asserting that he was from Guinea, and might be returned there. He was, however, repeatedly asked about such a possibility during his asylum interview, and there were also repeated references to it in the refusal letter. For example, it states “you could relocate to Guinea as you are a national of the country” (SB31); “you are a national of Guinea” (SB32); and “should you be removed, it will be to Guinea (Conakry)” (SB34). While the Appellant stated that he did not read past the fact that the letter said it was a refusal, such an error on his part does not change the burden on him to prove his claim to the required standard. I accordingly take into account the absence of any enquiries being made with the relevant authorities, in Appeal Number: PA/50128/2024 circumstances where no basis was advanced as to why this might not reasonably be possible.

36. When the Appellant was therefore asked whether he had any documents at all which might confirm he is a citizen of Gambia, he referred only to his daughter’s birth certificate. This records his place of birth as The Gambia. I place no weight on this, however; place of birth is not the same as nationality, and in any event this information will have been solely based on what the Appellant himself reported. It therefore does not independently corroborate his claim.

37. I decline, however, to treat as adverse to the Appellant the reference to a Guinea ID card, which is recorded in the screening interview (Q1.2, SB38, and Q1.7). The Appellant denied ever having referred to such a card and, if one had in fact been presented, it was unclear as to why a copy was not kept and evidenced by the Respondent. I therefore accept the possibility that this is simply an error in the transcript, and confusion over the fact that the Appellant did refer to a Gambian identity document. Such a conclusion is consistent with the fact that there was no suggestion of a document from Guinea during the later substantive interview, and the Appellant is instead asked how he came “to have an ID card from Gambia” (Q63, SB67).

38. Finally, I have regard to section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 when assessing the Appellant’s belated claim to be solely a national of Gambia. He did not claim asylum in Italy or France; when asked why not, he referred to not speaking either language and said that it would accordingly be very difficult for him to have the life he wanted there. In all the circumstances I do not find this to be a good reason not to claim asylum earlier, and treat this as damaging to his overall credibility.

39. Taken together and considered in the round, I do not find the Appellant to have shown that he is a Gambian national. Such a claim was made late, and after the Respondent had accepted his nationality and asserted that no risk arises because he can be returned to Guinea. It is inconsistent with his earlier unambiguous account that he is a national of that country. His credibility in respect of his claimed nationality is also damaged to some extent by a failure to claim asylum earlier, albeit I accept that the weight that attaches to this is limited in circumstances where his account of past persecution has been accepted, and the Appellant instead claims to have changed his understanding of his own situation.

40. Perhaps most importantly, however, is that, even taken at its highest, the Appellant’s claim to be solely a national of Gambia, and not a national of Guinea, is no more than his current belief. It is unsupported by any documents or enquiries with the authorities, and is instead based on comments from a witness who herself makes only the briefest of references to it, in circumstances where it has not been adequately explained how and why she would know this information, or why her account should be treated as reliable.

41. I accordingly do not find that he has shown, even to the lower standard, that he is a citizen of Gambia. I am instead satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that he is a citizen of Guinea, given his earlier unambiguous account to that effect, along with his other answers consistent with that claim, such as that he was born there, to a parent of that nationality. Appeal Number: PA/50128/2024 42. As such, the Appellant has not established a well-founded fear of persecution in Gambia, as this is not the country to which he would be returned. He did not advance a claim as to why he might instead be at risk in Guinea, beyond saying that he does not know anyone there. The concessions regarding sufficiency of protection and internal relocation were made in relation to The Gambia, and in light of my findings those issues do not arise. In all the circumstances, the asylum appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appeal on humanitarian protection grounds 43. As set out above, I have not accepted the Appellant’s account to be a national of Gambia. I therefore find that he has not established substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk of suffering serious harm on return. Appeal on human rights grounds 44. For the same reasons, I do not accept that there are substantial grounds for believing that the Appellant would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. 45.

46. In respect of Article 8, I am satisfied that Article 8(1) is engaged, based on the reasonable inference that the Appellant will have established some elements of a private life in the UK, given the length of time that he has now resided here. I do not, however, find it to be engaged in respect of family life, consent having been refused for a consideration of that issue and the Appellant not previously having relied on any family relationships for the purpose of his claim. I do not find that the Appellant has shown that he would face very significant obstacles to integration in Guinea. I make clear in this respect that the issue of return remains a matter for the Respondent, and it can accordingly be inferred that the Appellant would not be returned without some form of documentation. The Appellant then relies on nothing beyond an unfamiliarity with the country as a barrier to integration. He is, however, a healthy man of working age, who speaks a local language. In such circumstances there is no reasonable basis to conclude that he would be unable to establish himself there within a reasonable time. Overall, therefore, even accepting that the Appellant has spent little or no time in Guinea as an adult, this would not, on the evidence before me, amount to a very significant obstacle to integration.

47. Outside the Immigration Rules, and to strike a fair balance between the competing public and individual interests involved, I adopt a balance sheet approach. I weigh the following public interest factors against the Appellant: (a) The public interest lies in the maintenance of effective immigration controls.

48. The following public interest factors are neutral: (a) The Appellant speaks English. (b) I heard no evidence as to the Appellant’s financial independence.

49. I weigh the following private life factors in the Appellant’s favour: Appeal Number: PA/50128/2024 (a) Removal will interfere with the private life connections the Appellant has formed in the UK. I have regard, however, to the absence of any evidence of such connections, beyond the inference I have drawn from his period of residence. I also remind myself that any such connections that do exist will have been formed at a time that the Appellant was aware that he had no long term right to remain. In all the circumstances, I give little weight to this factor. (b) The difficulties the Appellant will face in establishing himself in Guinea, albeit remaining mindful of my findings that it has not been shown that these would amount to very significant difficulties.

50. I find that the factors raised by the Appellant do not outweigh the public interest. There is only limited evidence of a private life in the UK, and the essential elements of such private life that may exist can be replicated in Guinea; that is not to say that it will be the same, but the Appellant will be able to live, work, and form friendships there, just as here. Furthermore, the Appellant will have been aware, when establishing any private life in the UK, that he could have no legitimate expectation that it would be able to continue in the long term. Taken together, the factors relied upon by the Appellant do not outweigh the clear public interest in effective immigration control, and the decision is proportionate.

NOTICE OF DECISION The appeal is dismissed on asylum grounds. The appeal is dismissed on humanitarian protection grounds. The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

ANONYMITY DIRECTION Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

TO THE RESPONDENT

FEE AWARD I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award. Signed: J Le Grys First-tier Tribunal Judge Le Grys Date: 30 September 2026 9