ANGHEL v. ROMANIA - 76328/16 (Judgment : No Prohibition of torture : Fourth Section Committee) [2021] ECHR 548 (22 June 2021)

JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 22 June 2021 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Anghel v. Romania, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, President, Iulia Antoanella Motoc, Pere Pastor Vilanova, judges, and Ilse Freiwirth, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no. 76328/16 ) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Romanian national, Mr Alexandru Anghel (“the applicant”), on 2 December 2016; the decision to give notice to the Romanian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints of ill-treatment by the police and the ineffective investigation thereof ; the parties’ observations; the decision to dismiss the Government’s objection to the examination of the application by a Committee; Having deliberated in private on 1 June 2021, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: INTRODUCTION 1. The application concerns allegations raised under Article 3 of the Convention in relation to the excessive use of force by the police against the applicant upon his refusal to present identity papers, as well as of the ineffective investigation into the incident . THE FACTS 2. The applicant was born in 1939. He passed away on 10 February 2017 and his heirs - his wife Ms Elisabeta Anghel and his daughters, Ms Adriana Georgeta Anghel and Ms Claudia Maria Anghel – expressed the wish to pursue the case in his stead . They were represented by Mrs A. Pantazi , a lawyer practising in Bucharest. 3. The Government were represented by their Agent, most recently Ms O. Ezer, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. I. Incident of 12 June 2015 5. In the morning of 12 June 2015 the emergency services were contacted in relation to the fact that a certain C.-C. A. had climbed on top of the Casa Radio (a high building in Bucharest), where he was waving the national flag, allegedly as a form of protest against the President of the High Court of Cassation and Justice at the time. 6. A police unit consisting of officer S. I. and officer D. T. went to the place indicated and found C.-C. A., who was known to have already participated in several protests in Bucharest in the past, on the roof of the building. 7. A few hours later, C.-C. A. agreed to climb down from the roof of the Casa Radio. A medical unit, which had earlier been called to the location, started to give him the required assistance, as he had been in the sun for more than six hours, and, according to his own account, he had been on hunger strike for several days. A nurse recommended that the patient be taken to the Obregia Psychiatry Hospital in Bucharest. 8. Before being taken to the hospital, C.-C. A. was fined by the police for disturbing public order. A. The applicant’s version of events 9. While the report concerning the fine was drafted, the applicant, accompanied by another man, later identified as M. M., approached the police unit and enquired about the state of C.-C. A., claiming that he was a friend of M. M. 10. The applicant alleged that he had only attempted to prevent the abuse committed by the police and medical authorities which had decided to send C.-C. A. to the psychiatric hospital. 11. In his submissions before the Court, the applicant stated that following his repeated refusal to present his identification papers to the police officers, he had been physically attacked. In particular, he had been punched in the eye and the door of the police car had been slammed on his legs; trying to avoid being hit further, he had hidden himself between the police car seats. While he was in the car, one police officer, who could not reach him so as to hit him, grabbed and pulled him by his genitals. He was verbally abused and constantly insulted in the car and at the police station. B. Police report on the use of force against the applicant 12. The police version of the events, as presented in a report “on the use of force” drawn up on 16 June 2015, noted that the applicant had attempted to prevent police officer D. T. from helping the medical unit to get C.-C. A. into the ambulance, by pushing him and blocking his hands; in spite of D. T.’s repeated requests to see his ID, the applicant refused to show any identification papers, claiming he could not be forced to comply, if no justification for the request had been provided. Consequently, and in view of the fact that the police officers also needed to deal with C.-C. A., they requested that another unit be sent as reinforcements. 13. The report further mentioned that two police officers, B. M. and L. B., arrived and after identifying themselves, ordered the applicant to state his name. The applicant refused, arguing that he used to be a judge and therefore he knew his rights very well, and that the police were abusing their powers in his case. 14. The report made also reference to the fact that C.-C. A. was filming this dialogue with his mobile phone (see paragraph 18 below), until the moment when he was put in the ambulance. 15. The two police officers immobilised the applicant by taking hold of his hands, and tried to take him to the police car. Because the applicant refused to get into the car, and was struggling to remain standing, they had to force him into it. These circumstances were observed and confirmed by D. T., who in the meantime had succeeded in putting C.-C. A. in the ambulance and sending him to Obregia Hospital with S. I. and the medical unit. 16. The applicant was taken to the police station; twenty minutes later, he was identified and a report was drawn up concerning the fine, stating that he had obstructed the police in the performance of their duties, and that he had refused to identify himself. He had to pay a fine of 3,100 Romanian lei (approximately 700 euros). The applicant did not sign the report, claiming he had Parkinson’s disease. 17. D. T. declared that while at the police station, he had noted that the applicant had a minor bruise on his forearm; he had enquired whether the applicant needed medical assistance and offered to call an ambulance, but the applicant had refused vehemently and left the station. C. Video footage 18. Video footage, apparently the footage referred to in the police report (see paragraph 14 above), was submitted to the Court; it showed a dialogue of a few minutes between two police officers and the applicant, in which the officers, who spoke in a calm voice, asked the applicant several times to identify himself, but the applicant refused each time, raising his voice progressively and stating that there was no justification for such requests. At one point, the applicant tried to escape and ran away, but he was promptly caught by one of the officers and held by one arm, and then taken to a police car. The camera then started to shake, not focusing on any particular image; somebody, possibly C.-C. A., started screaming “don’t put me in the ambulance”. The video footage stopped at that point, no further incidents being recorded. D. Medical certificate 19. On 13 June 2015 the applicant went to the Mina Minovici Forensic Medicine Institute where he was examined by a forensic doctor. The doctor drafted a medical report which noted that t he applicant had a violet bruise near his right eye; two red bruises on his chin; two larger violet bruises on his right arm and one more hidden on his right forearm; one small red bruise on his left elbow; four larger vertical bruises on his left leg and one brownish bruise on his right leg; and one superficial bruise on his scrotum. The injuries could have been the consequence of being hit by a hard object and being scratched, which could have dated from 12 June 2015; the injuries had needed four to five days of medical care. II. Criminal proceedings into the incident of 12 June 2015 A. Complaint lodged by the applicant 20. On 15 August 2015 (and registered with the prosecutor on 24 September 2015 ) the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the police officers who had intervened in the incident which took place on 12 June 2015 at the Casa Radio. He accused the police officers, without identifying them by name, of abusive behaviour and abuse of position, while also stating that he had been ill-treated, threatened and unlawfully taken to the police station. The applicant stated that on that occasion, he had tried to help his friend C.-C. A. by convincing the medical unit not to send the latter to the hospital, as he himself would take good care of his friend; however, the police had forced him to identify himself even though he had not done anything wrong, then physically attacked him by hitting him in the eye and slamming the door of the police car on his legs, then taken him to the police station and fined him without justification. While in the police car, where he was lying on the floor between the seats, he had been constantly insulted, and he had been hit by one of the officers. He further mentioned that he had not been hit by the police in his scrotal area, but that the officer had wanted to grab him by his genitals. However, because the applicant had been wearing very tight jeans, the police officer could not reach that region, which made him very annoyed. The applicant requested that two witnesses, C.-C. A. and M. M., be heard. 21. On 17 September 2015 the applicant lodged a supplementary complaint against the head of the police station and the head of the Bucharest Police Department, accusing them, in a rather vague manner, of having coordinated the unlawful actions of the two police units which had intervened on 12 June 2015. B. Proceedings before the prosecutor 22. On 15 October 2015 the prosecutor started criminal investigations in rem into the incident of 12 June 2015. During those investigations, several witnesses were heard. 23. C.-C. A. declared that he had called the applicant to come to the Casa Radio because he had wanted to give him a document; when the applicant had seen that C.-C. A. was about to be sent to Obregia Hospital, he had tried to convince the medical unit that that measure was unnecessary. The applicant had argued that he, as a friend, could take care of him, and that in any event, it was unlawful to hospitalise somebody against their will. At that stage, the police had arrived and had tried to identify the applicant, who asked for the justification for that measure. The police had replied that it was their right to identify anyone; the applicant had told them that that right could be exercised only if someone had committed an offence or a crime, and that they were abusing their powers. A second police unit had arrived, “which behaved even more aggressively, asking vehemently that the applicant identify himself”. The applicant had replied that the police were committing an abuse of power. At that stage C.-C. A. had been put in the ambulance and taken to the hospital; thus, he did not have any knowledge of the further alleged incidents. 24. M. M. stated that he had been present during the relevant events because he had been called by C.-C. A. and told to come to the Casa Radio to see him protest. When M. M. had arrived there, he had seen that a nurse had insisted on sending C.-C. A. to the hospital against his will. M. M. and the applicant had tried in vain to convince the medical unit to place C.-C. A. in their care. M. M. confirmed that the applicant had refused several times to identify himself at the request of the police, and that as a consequence he had been pushed and taken by force and put into the police car, after which the door had been slammed. The witness had heard the applicant yelling: “Don’t kill me”. He had left that place and had soon met some other protesters, together with whom he had gone to the police station to try to see the applicant. He had not been allowed to enter, but about 15-20 minutes later, he had seen the applicant leaving the police station; his legs were bleeding and his left eye was blue and swollen. M. M. stated that the applicant had confessed to having been beaten at the location of the incident, in the police car and on the road. The witness further stated that he himself had not seen the applicant physically attacking the police officers. 25. D. T. declared that while he was trying to give assistance to the medical unit, who had decided to send C.-C. A. to Obregia Hospital for further medical investigations, two persons, later identified as the applicant and M. M., had approached him. The applicant had pushed him and pulled his hand, trying to stop him from putting C.-C. A. in the ambulance, claiming that the police had no right to take his friend by force and that he could be entrusted with taking care of him. Following the applicant’s successive refusals to present his identification papers, D. T. had informed the applicant that his refusal, as well as his attempts to prevent him from placing C.-C. A. in the ambulance, were offences for which he could be fined. He had then asked for reinforcements, because he had had to assist the medical unit to put C.-C. A. in the ambulance. He had later seen the two police officers who had arrived immobilising the applicant by taking hold of his hands and trying to take him to the police car. As the applicant had refused to get in, by grabbing the car with his hands and keeping his feet stiff so as not to be moved, physical force had been used against him to place him in the car, where he had been laid down on the back seats. 26. D. T.’s statements were confirmed by the other police officers, S. I. - for the events up to the time when the ambulance left - and L. B., and B. M. 27. The police officers declared that they had not attacked the applicant, on the contrary, they had tried to remain calm and as protective as possible, in view of the applicant’s advanced age. They further stated that the applicant’s bruises might have been caused while they were immobilising him, because the applicant had struggled constantly and moved himself around to try to escape. 28. The police officers also stated that while he was at the Casa Radio and the police station, the applicant had not had any bruises on his eyes. They indicated that several other police officers who were in the station at the relevant time could confirm their allegation. 29. The head of the police station, G. P., and V. P., the chief police officer, were also heard. However, they declared that they had been present only while C.-C. A. was on the roof of the Casa Radio, and not when the incident with the applicant had occurred. They had not seen the applicant while he was at the police station. 30. Police officer D. D., who had also been present mainly while C.-C. A. was protesting on the roof, mentioned that he had seen the applicant talking to the police and had then left; later on when he was at the police station, he had again seen the applicant, who had not shown any signs of violent acts having been committed against him. 31. The nurse who had assisted C.-C. A. gave her statement before the prosecutor, confirming that it had been her decision to send the protester to the hospital for further investigation, the police unit having only had a supporting role, in implementing that decision. The ambulance driver, O. R., declared that he had remained in the ambulance the whole time and had not seen anything relevant concerning the applicant. 32. On 8 January 2016 the prosecutor decided to terminate ( clasare ) the criminal proceedings started in rem . Based on the evidence in the case file, he held that there was no indication of any intention by the police officers to hurt the applicant, and that his bruises had most probably been caused during the immobilisation manoeuvres, which were lawful in accordance with Articles 31 § 1 (b) and 34 § 1 of Law no. 218/2002 on the organisation and functioning of the Romanian police (see paragraph below). 33. The applicant challenged the above-mentioned decision. He complained that not all the chiefs of police involved in the incident had been heard. He also requested that some other defence witnesses be heard, namely, people who had been present with M. M. when he had left the police station (see paragraph 24 above). 34. Without admitting any further evidence, the chief prosecutor decided on 24 March 2016 that the complaint was ill-founded, in so far as the applicant’s allegations were not corroborated by the evidence in the case file. C. Proceedings before the domestic court 35. The applicant lodged a complaint against that latter decision before the court, complaining that the testimonial evidence that he had requested before the prosecutor (see paragraph 33 above) had not been adduced in the case, without any explanation. He also argued that there was no explanation in the case file concerning all of his bruises, as they had been identified by the forensic expert. He referred to a video recording (see paragraph 18 above) taken at the location of the incident, and to some photographs showing his bruises, arguing that those were sufficient to prove his allegations. He reiterated that while in the car, he had been thrown on to the floor, and not on to the back seats, as contended by the police officers (see paragraph 25 above). 36. On 6 June 2016 the Bucharest District Court decided to dismiss the applicant’s complaint against the prosecutors’ decisions, which were upheld as well-founded. The court essentially reiterated that the applicant’s version of facts was not supported by the evidence in the case file. Although there was no other evidence to corroborate the applicant’s allegations, it was true that the photographs indicated by the applicant confirmed the existence of the bruises already mentioned in the medical certificate; however, those bruises could have very well have resulted from the police officers’ forcing the applicant into the police car, because he had vehemently resisted that measure. Furthermore, the applicant had not produced any other evidence to support his case; hence, any potential ambiguity which might have existed in the case, if unsupported by evidence, had to be interpreted in favour of the accused ( in dubio pro reo ). The police officers had acted within the limits of their powers, as prescribed by the relevant legal provisions, which had been indicated and explained exhaustively by the prosecutor in his decision. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE 37. Article 31 of Law no. 218/2002 on the organisation and functioning of the Romanian police provides that police officers have, inter alia , a duty to: “(b) escort to the police station anyone who, by his or her actions, poses a danger to others, to public order or other social values, as well as anyone suspected of having committed a criminal act and whose identity cannot be verified in accordance with the law; ... the situation of such a person must be verified and legal measures taken, if necessary, within twenty-four hours, as an administrative measure;” ... Article 34 provides that: (1) “In order to deter, prevent and neutralise aggressive behaviour by people who disturb public order, which cannot be brought to an end by any other means, police can use protective shields, helmets, rubber truncheons, ... rubber bullet guns and handcuffs, dogs and other means of restraint which do not endanger life or cause serious bodily harm. . Article 1349 of the Civil Code provides that a person with discernment is liable for all damage caused by his actions or inactions and is bound to make full reparation. THE LAW I. LOCUS STANDI of the applicant’s heirs 39. The applicant died while the case was pending before the Court. On 3 February 2020 his heirs informed the Court that they wished to pursue the application in his stead (see also paragraph above). . The Government submitted that the complaints concerning the applicant’s ill-treatment and the ineffective investigation thereto were personal in nature and thus non-transferable; furthermore, the alleged violation was not closely linked to the applicant’s death. Hence, the applicant’s wife and two daughters could not be considered as indirect victims and lacked a legitimate interest in pursuing this case. . The Court reiterates that in a number of cases in which, just like in the present case, an applicant has died in the course of proceedings, it has taken into account statements of the applicant’s heirs or close family members expressing the wish to pursue the proceedings before the Court. It has done so often in cases which primarily involved pecuniary and, for this reason, transferable claims. However, the question of whether such claims are transferable to persons seeking to pursue an application is not the exclusive criterion. In fact, human rights cases before the Court generally also have a moral dimension, and persons close to an applicant may have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that justice is done even after the applicant’s death (see, among many other authorities, Karner v. Austria , no. 40016/98 , § 22, ECHR 2003‑IX). 42. The Court therefore normally permits the next of kin to pursue an application, provided he or she has a legitimate interest, where the original applicant has died after lodging the application with the Court (see Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 10511/10 , § 79, 26 April 2016). 43. Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the Court accepts that the applicant’s daughters and wife have a legitimate interest in pursuing the application in the late applicant’s stead. It will therefore continue dealing with the case at their request. However, reference will still be made to the applicant throughout the text. 44. To the extent that the Government’s remarks are to be understood as a preliminary objection concerning the locus standi of the applicant’s heirs, the Court accordingly dismisses that objection. II. Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention 45. The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by the police on 12 June 2015 and that the investigation of his complaint had not been effective as required by Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” A. Admissibility 46. The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies, since he had failed to take every legal action available under Romanian law in order to complain about his ill-treatment. In this connection, they averred that the applicant could have lodged a civil action for damages on the basis of Article 1349 of the Civil Code (see paragraph above). They submitted that such a remedy was not only sufficiently certain in theory and practice but was also effective and accessible . 47. The applicant did not submit any comments on this matter. 48. The Court notes that it has already considered at length and dismissed the same objection concerning the requirement that the applicant make use of the remedy indicated by the Government in circumstances such as those revealed by the present case, where the applicant alleges a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see, for instance, Archip v. Romania , no. 49608/08 , §§ 32-34, 27 September 2011, and Dinu v. Romania , no. 64356/14 , §§ 54‑55, 7 February 2017). . The Court finds that in the instant case the Government have not put forward any new fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion as to the admissibility of this complaint. The Government’s objection in this regard must therefore be dismissed. 50. Noting further that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention, and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds, the Court concludes that it must be declared admissible . B. Merits 1. The parties’ submissions 51. The applicant submitted that the investigative authorities had had no interest in finding the truth in the case, because those who were responsible for his ill-treatment were State agents. The authorities’ reasoning in dismissing his case had relied exclusively on the police officers’ statements, even if those statements did not clarify all aspects relating to the bruises the applicant had on his legs, on his eye and on his scrotum. Furthermore, the court had refused to hear further defence witnesses (see paragraph 36 above) or fundamentally to accord appropriate relevance to the statement made by M. M., who had seen him coming out of the police station bruised and bleeding. 52. The Government argued that the alleged ill-treatment suffered by the applicant was a consequence of his own obstructive and recalcitrant behaviour vis- à-vis the police officers who were trying to do their job and to provide support to the medical team which had assisted C.-C. A. The evidence in the case file proved that there had been no ill-treatment committed by the police against the applicant and that the bruises and wounds confirmed by the medical certificate could have been the result of the immobilisation manoeuvres, which were necessary and lawful measures in view of the particular circumstances of the incident in question. 53. Concerning the procedural aspect of the complaint, the Government submitted that the applicant had been actively involved throughout the criminal proceedings, which had been conducted speedily, as they had been completed in less than a year. Also, the evidence he proposed had been allowed by the courts; however, the alleged ill-treatment by the police had not been confirmed by the evidence in the case file, and, in particular, not even by the defence witnesses. The investigative bodies were impartial and had conducted an effective investigation. 2. The Court’s assessment (a) General principles 54. The general principles in respect of the substantive and the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention have been set out in Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380/09 , §§ 81-90 and 114-23, ECHR 2015). 55. Regarding the establishment of the facts, the Court pointed out in El‑Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ([GC], no. 39630/09 , § 155, ECHR 2012) that, although it recognised that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact where this was not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case, it had to apply a “particularly thorough scrutiny” where allegations were made under Article 3 of the Convention, even if certain domestic proceedings and investigations had already taken place. In other words, in such a context the Court is prepared to conduct a thorough examination of the findings of the national courts. In examining them it may take account of the quality of the domestic proceedings and any possible flaws in the decision-making process (see Mîţu v. the Republic of Moldova , no. 23524/14 , § 29, 30 June 2020, and all the references cited therein). 56. The Court also reiterates that in respect of a person who is deprived of his or her liberty, or, more generally, is confronted with law-enforcement officers, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his or her own conduct diminishes human dignity and is an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see, Bouyid , cited above, §§ 100-01). (b) Application of these principles to the present case 57. The Court observes that the applicant’s complaints concern both the substantive and the procedural aspects of Article 3 of the Convention. As regards the former aspect, the Court notes that the parties disagreed as to whether some of the applicant’s injuries had been caused during the immobilisation manoeuvres only, or also while the applicant was in the police car, and whether they had been the result of the necessary use of proportionate force. 58. The Court therefore considers it appropriate to firstly examine whether the applicant’s complaint of ill-treatment was adequately investigated by the authorities (see, for example, Dzhulay v. Ukraine , no. 24439/06 , § 69, 3 April 2014; Chinez v. Romania , no. 2040/12 , § 57, 17 March 2015; and Chatzistavrou v. Greece , no. 49582/14 , § 45, 1 March 2018). It will then turn to the question of whether the alleged ill‑treatment took place, bearing in mind the relevant domestic findings. (i) Adequacy of the investigation 59. The Court observes that, following the applicant’s complaint, which was registered with the prosecutor on 24 September 2015 , the domestic authorities started an inquiry into his allegations of ill-treatment on 15 October 2015 (see paragraph 22 above). 60. The Court notes that the investigation was initiated promptly and was conducted speedily, as it was completed in less than a year, and, in accordance with statutory requirements, was carried out under the authority of a prosecutor, whose decision was subsequently reviewed by a criminal court (see paragraph 35 above). The Court concludes that the prompt and speedy investigation into the alleged events was conducted under the control of an independent authority. 61. Furthermore, throughout the investigation, the applicant was constantly and actively involved in the proceedings; he was allowed to propose and to refute evidence, to bring arguments and to present his case as he considered appropriate (see paragraphs 20 in fine and 36 above). 62. All those who had been involved in the incident were heard by the prosecutor (see paragraphs 25-31 above), including the main defence witnesses proposed by the applicant (see paragraphs 23 and 24 above and, by way of contrast, Vasile Victor Stanciu v. Romania , no. 70040/13 , § 49, 9 January 2018). The photographs referred to by the applicant were considered by the court to corroborate the police officers’ statements and the findings of the medical certificate, in the sense that the injuries inflicted on the applicant were the result of immobilisation manoeuvres carried out while the applicant was putting up a strong resistance (see paragraph 36 above). 63. The applicant claimed that certain aspects of his case had not been elucidated, and that the video footage had not been taken into consideration by the court; he pointed out that no explanation had been given for the injury inflicted on his scrotal area. However, the Court notes that the applicant himself gave varying versions of how the events happened, including with reference to that particular body part and to the exact location in which he was beaten while under police control (see paragraphs 11, 20, 24 and 35 above). 64. In support of his claims, the applicant submitted to the Court the video footage taken during the incident in question (see paragraph 18 above), the authenticity of which was not disputed by the Government. The same video footage had also been made available to the domestic court (see paragraphs 35 above), even if the domestic court does not appear to have admitted it to the case file. The Court notes, however, that the footage shows discussions between the police officers who were trying, in a calm tone, to obtain identification papers from the applicant, and the applicant, who vehemently opposed them, insisting that there was no justification for that request. The footage also shows the applicant’s attempt to run away from the police, and how he was handled when caught, namely without any signs of violence. The footage stops before any immobilisation manoeuvres were applied by the police. 65. As regards further arguments that the applicant raised in his observations (see paragraph 51 above) - namely that the domestic authorities should have questioned other witnesses, who had allegedly been present when he left the police station, the Court notes that the domestic court considered that there was already sufficient evidence to prove the existence of the injuries (see paragraph 36 above). The Court does not see any reason to depart from that conclusion, especially since the existence of the injuries was not contested by the Government, or by the domestic authorities. 66. In view of the foregoing elements (see paragraphs 62-65 above), the Court does not consider that the authorities’ refusal to take evidence from the remaining witnesses called on by the applicants, or from the video footage relied on by the applicant in his defence, adversely affected the establishment of the circumstances in which the applicant’s injuries appeared (see Dziunikowski v. Poland [Committee], no. 65970/12 , § 61, 26 September 2019). 67. Having regard to the above elements, the Court considers that the investigation into the applicant’s complaints can be considered to have been thorough and effective. It follows that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb. (ii) The use of force against the applicant 68. The Court reiterates that in the instant case, the Government relied in their submissions on the findings of the domestic authorities. Consequently, they did not dispute that on 12 June 2015 the applicant had been under the control of State agents at the time of the incident or that the injuries suffered by the applicant, as recorded by the available medical evidence, had been the result of the police officers’ intervention. 69. However, the parties disagreed about the context in which the applicant was injured. The Government submitted that the injuries were inflicted during immobilisation of the applicant as a result of his resistance, while the applicant argued that they had been sustained as a result of ill-treatment by the police during his immobilisation but also after he had been put in the police car and taken to the police station (see paragraph 11 above). 70. The Court has previously stated that where the events at issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the victim (see Bouyid , cited above, §§ 83-84 and 98). 71. This notwithstanding, in the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court does not deem it necessary to determine the exact timing of the applicant’s injuries. Instead, and taking note also of the applicant’s varying statements on the issue (see paragraph 63 above), it will proceed to assess whether, assuming that the injuries occurred as submitted by the Government - namely at the point of the applicant’s apprehension - the justification given for the force used by the police was sufficient and convincing. 72. Accordingly, the Court considers it established that the applicant sustained the above-mentioned injuries at the hands of the police, and thus that it is incumbent on the Government to provide a plausible explanation for the cause of those injuries (see, among many other authorities, Yusiv v. Lithuania , no. 55894/13 , § 59, 4 October 2016, and the references cited therein). It emphasises that any use of physical force by the police which had not been made strictly necessary by the applicant’s own conduct will be incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention. . In the present case, the domestic investigation concluded that while being immobilised for the purposes of being put in the police car and taken to the police station, because of having obstructed the police to place C.‑C. A. in an ambulance and then having refused to present his identity papers (see paragraph above), the applicant had attempted to avoid being apprehended by putting up resistance (see paragraphs and above). Although the applicant denied resisting the officers in any significant way, and claimed that he had been assaulted in the police car, the domestic authorities considered that his allegations had been refuted by the consistent statements of the police officers and those of the eyewitnesses. 74. In this connection the Court notes that the forensic doctor concluded that the applicant had sustained some injuries which could have been caused by being hit with a hard object and being scratched (see paragraph 19 above); the domestic investigative authorities considered that such injuries could very well have been the result of immobilisation manoeuvres, as described by the police officers (see paragraph 36 above); and the police officers’ statements have not in any way been contradicted by any of the defence witnesses, who did not directly witness any act of violence against the applicant (see paragraphs 23-24 and 25-31 above). In their detailed reasoning the authorities found that the use of force against the applicant, in the particular circumstances of the incident, had been lawful as being in compliance with the relevant legal provisions allowing police officers to act accordingly, but also necessary, as it had been prompted by the applicant’s own recalcitrant conduct (see paragraphs and above ). 75. Given its conclusion above concerning the thoroughness of the domestic investigation (see paragraph 67 above) and taking into consideration the findings made by the domestic authorities, the Court considers that these have sufficiently and convincingly shown that, in the particular circumstances of the present case, the force employed by the police officers against the applicant has been made strictly necessary by his own conduct. Furthermore, the evidence before it does not enable it to find it beyond all reasonable doubt that the applicant was subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see for instance Chatzistavrou , cited above, §§ 64-65). 76. It follows that in the present case there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive head. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, 1. Declares the application admissible; 2. Holds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention. Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 June 2021, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. {signature_p_2} Ilse Freiwirth Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer Deputy Registrar President BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII