Galena VRANISKOSKA v the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - 30844/06 [2011] ECHR 753 (12 April 2011 )

judgment (see Marie-Louise Loyen and Bruneel v. France , no. 55929/00, § 29, 5 July 2005), the Court accepted the application from the victim’s wife concerning the fairness and length of proceedings under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. In contrast, in the Fairfield case (see Fairfield v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 24790/04, 8 March 2005), the Court ruled that the victim’s daughter did not have the requisite standing to bring Article 9 complaints of her late father before it. The Court decided similarly in the Dimitrovska case (see Dimitrovska v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 21466/03, 30 September 2008), which concerned Article 6 complaints (length and fairness) in respect of civil proceedings in which the applicant’s late husband was a party. The same decision was reached in the Ivanovski and Others case (see Ivanovski and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , no. 34188/03, §§ 2 and 16, 26 November 2009). In the present case, the Court notes that Mr Argil Vraniškoski was a party to the impugned proceedings, as was the applicant. Apparently, they built the structures jointly. Mr Argil Vraniškoski died on 30 October 2005. On 12 July 2006 the applicant, his wife, lodged the application in her name and on behalf of her late husband. She complained that the demolition of the structures had violated their rights under several Articles of the Convention. In such circumstances, the Court does not consider that the applicant has the requisite standing to bring the application on behalf of her late husband. The case does not raise an issue of general interest that transcends the applicant’s late husband. In addition, the applicant is a direct victim of the alleged violations and can therefore pursue the application in her name. It follows that the application, in the part concerning Mr Argil Vraniškoski, is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4. The applicant’s complaint under Article 6 of the Convention a) The parties’ submissions The Government submitted that the applicant had not been denied the right to present her arguments and to propose evidence relevant to the case in adversarial proceedings. The Commission had indeed failed to address explicitly her arguments that the demolition order had never been served on her. However, that had been irrelevant given the fact that its decisions had post-dated the applicant’s appeal to the Supreme Court of 3 March 2005, which had been lodged under the assumption that the Commission had implicitly dismissed her appeals. The Supreme Court had explicitly stated that it had examined the applicant’s complaints, but that the latter could not alter its decision. By stating that “the service had been carried out in accordance with the Act”, the Supreme Court had clearly specified the reasons for its decision. Any further insistence on more detailed reasoning, given the circumstances of the case, would be unnecessary or unsubstantiated. The applicant submitted that the domestic authorities had not addressed the core arguments of her appeals, namely, that the demolition order had been enforced unlawfully. Apart from a statement to the effect that it had examined her arguments, the Supreme Court had failed to provide any explanation for its decision. She reaffirmed that the demolition and enforcement orders had not been served on her. b) The Court’s assessment The Court reiterates that its established case-law on matters linked to the proper administration of justice requires that the judgments of courts and tribunals should adequately state the reasons on which they are based (see Atanasovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , no. 36815/03, § 36, 14 January 2010). Article 6 § 1 of the Convention obliges courts to give reasons for their judgments, but it cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument (see Pronina v. Ukraine , no. 63566/00, § 23, 18 July 2006). The extent to which this duty to give reasons applies may vary according to the nature of the decision. The question of whether a court has failed to fulfil the obligation to state reasons, deriving from Article 6 of the Convention, can only be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case (see Hiro Balani v. Spain , 9 December 1994, § 27, Series A no. 303-B; Suominen v. Finland , no. 37801/97, § 34, 1 July 2003; and Tatishvili v. Russia , no. 1509/02, § 58, ECHR 2007-III). In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant’s main source of grievance was whether the demolition order had been enforced lawfully. In this connection she complained of improper service of the order. These complaints were clearly relevant for the outcome of the case. The Commission found that they were “unsubstantiated and without any legal effect”. The Supreme Court stated that “the service (of the demolition order) was carried out in accordance with the Act”. This explanation was provided on the basis of the case file, to which the Supreme Court referred in its decision, which included copies of the receipts that the Government submitted to the Court in the course of the proceedings before it (see “The Facts” above). In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant’s arguments regarding the service of the demolition order were examined by the competent authorities. Although it would have been desirable for the Supreme Court to provide a more substantial statement of reasons, rather than a mere reference to the Act, the Court does not consider that the reasoning provided by the highest court was so short that would be incompatible with the requirements of a fair trial. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. The applicant further complained that the demolition of the structures had violated her right to peaceful enjoyment of her possessions contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads: “ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” a) The parties’ submissions The Government submitted that the structures could not be regarded as “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. They had not been “existing possessions”, nor could the applicant have had a legitimate expectation that she would obtain the right of peaceful enjoyment to them given the fact that they had been constructed without a building permit. That reasoning was in compliance with section 121 of the Property Act (see “Relevant domestic law” above). They further maintained that the structures had been demolished after the demolition and enforcement orders had been served on the applicant on two occasions, namely on 8 and 14 October 2004 respectively, as evident from the receipts. In this connection they stated that the service had been based on sections 84 and 86 of the Act (see “Relevant domestic law” above). Despite the fact that the minister had refused to identify himself, he had not opposed that the orders be served on him. Given the fact that the applicant’s son had been a bishop in the Macedonian Orthodox Church until February 2002 and continued acting, since then, as a priest of another church, the applicant’s apartment served as a temporary place of residence of his supporters. Consequently, the minister to whom the orders had been served could be regarded a recipient under section 84 of the Act. Furthermore, the demolition had been carried out in compliance with section 39 of the Construction Act and it had aimed at ensuring compliance with the building regulations. In this respect, they referred to the high number of unlawfully erected buildings at the time. The applicant reiterated that the structures had been unlawfully demolished since she had been never served with the demolition and enforcement orders. Assuming that on 8 and 14 October 2004 respectively there had been attempts at delivery, as argued by the Government, it had not been effected properly since it had not involved any of the recipients specified in section 84 of the Act nor had the alleged minister consented to the service, as evidenced by the fact that he had not signed the receipts. She further reiterated the arguments that she had raised in the appeal of 6 December 2004. Since the structures had been built for religious purposes, they should not have been treated equally to other unlawfully erected buildings, of which only limited number had been demolished. She maintained that the demolition had not been justified and proportionate. b) The Court’s assessment The Court observes that the structures were constructed on the applicant’s property. However, t hey did not have the necessary planning permission. The Government suggested that a n issue would arise as to whether or not the structures may be regarded as “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The Court need not resolve this matter since the applicant’s complaints under this head are in any event inadmissible for the following reasons. It is not disputed that the structures were erected without a building permit and therefore in violation of the domestic building regulations. The demolition order rested on section 39 § 1 of the Construction Act, under which a demolition would be immediately ordered regarding a structure erected without a building permit. The demolition order was enforced in compliance with the Act. In this connection the Court relies on the assessment of facts and law made by the domestic authorities and the Government’s arguments (see above), since no material has been adduced before it, which could call into question their findings (see Klaas v. Germany , 22 September 1993, § 30, Series A no. 269). For the reasons advanced by the Government (see above), the Court considers that the demolition pursued a legitimate aim and was not disproportionate. The demolition was accordingly lawful and justified and does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see also Saliba v. Malta , no. 4251/02, §§ 44-47, 8 November 2005). It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. The applicant finally complained that the demolition had violated her rights under Articles 3, 8, 9, 13 and 14 of the Convention. The Court has examined these complaints. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court unanimously Declares the application inadmissible. André Wampach Nina Vajić Deputy Registrar President BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII