PODBIELSKI v. POLAND - 27916/95 [1998] ECHR 105 (30 October 1998)

judgment [5] . FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT 26. The applicant in his memorial requested the Court to find that the facts of the case disclosed a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and to award him just satisfaction under Article 50. 27. The Government for their part requested the Court in their memorial to find that Article 6 § 1 was not violated in the case at issue. AS TO THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 28. The applicant contended that the civil proceedings in his case were not concluded within a reasonable time, contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which in so far as relevant provides: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations …, everyone is entitled to a … hearing within a reasonable time by [a] … tribunal…” 29. The Commission agreed with the applicant’s arguments whereas the Government contended that the facts of the case disclosed no breach of that provision. A. Period to be taken into consideration 30. The Court notes that the period to be taken into consideration for the purpose of assessing the length of the proceedings from the angle of the “reasonable time” requirement under Article 6 § 1 began not on 25 May 1992, when the applicant initiated civil proceedings before the Wałbrzych Regional Court, but on 1 May 1993, when the declaration whereby Poland recognised the right of individual petition for the purposes of Article 25 of the Convention took effect. Contrary to the Government’s contention that the period to be taken into consideration ended on 23 October 1996 when the Wałbrzych Regional Court delivered the final judgment on the merits of the case, the Court notes that the proceedings in the applicant’s case are still pending since the final decision on his appeal in cassation has not yet been delivered. Accordingly, the proceedings have lasted so far over six years and five months, out of which five years, five months and twenty-nine days are taken into consideration by the Court (see paragraphs 8, 18 and 23 above). 31. In order to determine the reasonableness of the length of time in question the Court will have regard to the state of the case on 1 May 1993 (see, among other authorities, the Proszak v. Poland judgment of 16 December 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII, p. 2772, § 31). B. Reasonableness of the length of the proceedings 1. Arguments before the Court 32. The applicant maintained that the issues raised by his action were not complex since they concerned a simple contract. He criticised the conduct of the courts, which in his opinion contributed to the length of the proceedings by delivering erroneous judgments. The case could have been decided as early as 1992 when the first hearing before the trial court had been held and certainly in 1994 at the latest when the Supreme Court gave binding guidelines as to the further course of the proceedings (see paragraphs 8 and 12 above). The applicant invited the Court to conclude that the excessive length of the proceedings had to be imputed to the conduct of the judicial authorities and to find that he was on that account a victim of a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 33. The Government disagreed with this analysis. They submitted that the length of the proceedings was reasonable having regard to the absence of any requirement on the part of the national authorities to act with special diligence and to the conduct of the parties to the proceedings. The Government considered that the case was particularly complex for reasons such as the volume of evidence, the need to obtain expert evidence, the legal nature of the issues raised by the applicant’s action and the introduction of amendments to the domestic legislation. Furthermore, they contended that, although the applicant could not be held responsible for the totality of the delays in the proceedings, he had substantially contributed to their length by making extensive use of his procedural rights. The Government also disagreed with the applicant’s and the Commission’s contention that the trial court contributed to the length by failing to comply with the Supreme Court’s guidelines of 28 January 1994. In particular, referring to domestic law, they disputed the binding nature of these guidelines (see paragraph 12 above). For these reasons in particular the Government maintained that there had been no breach of Article 6 § 1. 34. The Commission assessed the reasonableness of the length of the proceedings in the light of the particular circumstances of the case having regard to its complexity and to the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities. It considered that the case was not particularly complex since it concerned the interpretation of a contract and the assessment of the claims resulting from its breach. Also, the length of the proceedings could not be explained by the applicant’s conduct since he could not be said to have delayed them substantially. Furthermore, the Commission was of the opinion that the principal legal issues in the case had been resolved by the Supreme Court’s judgment and binding guidelines delivered on 28 January 1994 (see paragraph 12 above). It concluded that the national authorities, in particular the Wałbrzych Regional Court, substantially contributed to the length of the proceedings by failing to follow the binding instructions of the Supreme Court. On that account the Commission found a violation of Article 6 § 1. 2. The Court’s assessment 35. The Court recalls that the proceedings in issue have so far lasted over six years and five months (see paragraphs 30–31 above). The applicant and the Government have discussed the reasons for the length of this period with reference to the criteria which it has established for assessing the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, namely the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and of the authorities. The Court will assess the reasonableness of the length of the impugned proceedings on the basis of the same criteria, taking as its point of departure the particular circumstances of the instant case and having regard also to what was at stake for the applicant (see, among other authorities, the Süßmann v. Germany judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV, pp. 1172–73, § 48). It observes in this respect that the applicant had a strong economic interest at a time of rampant inflation in the respondent State in securing a definitive adjudication of his claim against the municipality within a reasonable period of time. (a) Complexity of the case 36. The Court considers that the subject matter of the litigation was not particularly complex, being concerned with the enforcement of rights and obligations under a straightforward contract. While it is true that the interpretation of the penalty clauses in the contract was rendered complex on account of the evolving nature of the domestic legal system at the relevant time and the uncertainty about the correct approach to be adopted by the courts to this case, it is to be noted that the principal legal issues were clarified by the Supreme Court on 28 January 1994 (see paragraph 12 above). Therefore, the complexity of the subject matter of the case cannot justify the length of the proceedings. (b) Conduct of the applicant 37. The Court would observe that, although the applicant may have contributed to some extent to the delay in the proceedings by his conduct, for example by continuously pressing his claim to be exempted from the payment of court fees (see paragraphs 13, 16, 18–22 above), this cannot justify the overall length of the proceedings. (c) Conduct of the national authorities 38. The Court notes that the civil action initiated by the applicant on 25 May 1992 has still not been the subject of a final judgment (see paragraphs 8 and 23 above). It observes that the delay in the delivery of a final decision on the applicant’s action has been caused to a large extent by the legislative changes resulting from the requirements of the transition from a state-controlled to a free-market system and by the complexity of the procedures which surrounded the litigation and which prevented an expeditious decision on the applicant’s claim. The Court recalls in this respect that Article 6 § 1 imposes on Contracting States the duty to organise their judicial systems in such a way that their courts can meet each of its requirements, including the obligation to decide cases within a reasonable time (see, among other authorities, the Duclos v. France judgment of 17 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, pp. 2180–81, § 55 in fine ). Therefore the delay in the proceedings must be mainly attributed to the national authorities. (d) Conclusion 39. The Court considers that, in the particular circumstances of the instant case, a period of over six years and five months, out of which five years, five months and twenty-nine days are taken into consideration by the Court, without any final decision having been reached yet, exceeds a reasonable time. There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1. II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 50 OF THE CONVENTION 40. The applicant claimed just satisfaction under Article 50 of the Convention which provides as follows: “If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations arising from the … Convention, and if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Pecuniary damage 41. The applicant sought an award of 17,403,624 US dollars to compensate him for the financial loss he suffered on account of the unreasonable length of the proceedings at issue. He explained that his company had intended to start the production of small tractors. It had invested in manufacturing facilities and had incurred marketing costs. However, as a result of the protracted court proceedings, the company was deprived of its expected revenues which ultimately led to its insolvency. In consequence, a part of its property was taken over by creditors and it lost opportunities in the growing small tractor market. 42. The Government considered that the amount claimed by the applicant was inordinately excessive. They asked the Court to rule that a finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction. In the alternative they requested the Court to assess the amount of just satisfaction to be awarded on the basis of its case-law in civil cases in which normal diligence was required. 43. The Delegate of the Commission also considered that the applicant’s claim was grossly excessive. He submitted that the amount of compensation could not be calculated by speculating on the outcome of the proceedings. 44. The Court notes that the applicant’s claim for pecuniary damage is mostly based on lost business opportunities which are speculative in nature. It cannot inquire into what the outcome would have been if the applicant had obtained a final decision on his action within a reasonable time. The Court accordingly dismisses the claim. B. Non-pecuniary damage 45. The applicant also sought an award of non-pecuniary damage. He maintained that as a result of the violation of his rights he had suffered financial hardship and his business name had been discredited since he had defaulted on his debts. He left the amount of an award to the discretion of the Court. 46. The Government asked the Court to rule that a finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction. In the alternative they requested the Court to assess the amount of just satisfaction to be awarded on the basis of its case-law in civil cases in which normal diligence was required. 47. The Delegate of the Commission submitted that a sum of 20,000 zlotys (PLN) might be awarded under this head. 48. In the circumstances of the instant case and making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant PLN 20,000. C. Costs and expenses 49. The applicant also claimed PLN 133,000 by way of legal costs and expenses incurred in the preparation and defence of his case. 50. The Government considered that the applicant’s claim was excessive and asked the Court not to allow it in the full amount. 51. The Delegate of the Commission submitted that an amount of PLN 5,000 might be awarded to the applicant under this head. 52. According to the Court’s established case-law, an award can be made in respect of costs and expenses incurred by the applicant only in so far as they have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. However, the Court notes in this respect that the applicant did not submit any specifications of the costs claimed by him. His claims must, therefore, be rejected (see, mutatis mutandis , the Belziuk v. Poland judgment of 25 March 1998, Reports 1998-II, p. 573, § 49). D. Default interest 53. According to the information available to the Court, the statutory rate of interest applicable in Poland at the date of adoption of the present judgment is 33% per annum. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY 1. Holds that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention has been violated; 2. Holds (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, 20,000 (twenty thousand) zlotys in respect of non-pecuniary damage; (b) that simple interest at an annual rate of 33% shall be payable from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement; 3. Dismisses the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction. Done in English and French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 30 October 1998. Signed : Rudolf BERNHARDT President Signed : Herbert PETZOLD Registrar [1] . This summary by the registry does not bind the Court. Notes by the Registrar 2. The case is numbered 12/1998/915/1127. The first number is the case’s position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the case’s position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission. [3] . Rules of Court B, which came into force on 2 October 1994, apply to all cases concerning States bound by Protocol No. 9. [4] . Case no. 9/1998/912/1124. [5] . Note by the Registrar . For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (in Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998), but a copy of the Commission’s report is obtainable from the registry. BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII