Campo Ebro Industrial SA, Levantina Agricola Industrial SA (LAISA); and Cerestar Iberica SA v Council of the European Union. [1997] EUECJ C-138/95P (17 April 1997)

Judgment 1 By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 2 May 1995, Campo Ebro Industrial SA, Levantina Agrícola Industrial SA (LAISA) and Cerestar Ibérica SA, three companies governed by Spanish law, brought an appeal under Article 49 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice against the judgment of 21 February 1995 in Case T-472/93 Campo Ebro and Others v Council [1995] ECR II-421 (`the contested judgment'), in which the Court of First Instance dismissed their application as inadmissible in so far as it sought the annulment of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3814/92 of 28 December 1992 amending Regulation (EEC) No 1785/81 and introducing application in Spain of the sugar sector prices provided for by that regulation (OJ 1992 L 387, p. 7), and as unfounded in so far as it sought an award of damages for the loss incurred as a result of the adoption of that regulation. 2 The common organization of the markets in the sugar sector is governed by the basic regulation, Council Regulation (EEC) No 1785/81 of 30 June 1981 (OJ 1981 L 177, p. 4), as subsequently amended on numerous occasions. 3 Article 70(3)(a) of the Act concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and Portugal, annexed to the Treaty concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and Portugal to the European Economic Community, signed on 12 June 1985 (OJ 1985 L 302, p. 9, `the Act of Accession'), which by virtue of Article 108 is applicable to sugar and isoglucose, provides that where the price of an agricultural product in Spain is higher at the date of accession than the common price, the higher price applicable in Spain is to be maintained at that level, movement towards price alignment to be the result of the development of common prices during the seven years following accession. If, at the end of the fourth year following accession, the price in Spain of an agricultural product is significantly higher than the common price, the Council is required, under Article 70(3)(b) of the Act of Accession, to carry out an analysis of the development of moves towards price alignment, on the basis of an opinion from the Commission, accompanied, where appropriate, by suitable proposals. The second subparagraph of Article 70(3)(b) specifies that the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may in particular prolong the period for moves towards price alignment within the limits of the maximum duration of the period of application of the transitional measures and decide on other methods of accelerated moves towards price alignment. 4 Since the price alignment envisaged by the Act of Accession did not take place, the Council carried out an examination of prices after the first five years and adopted Regulation (EEC) No 1716/91 of 13 June 1991 concerning the alignment of the sugar and beet prices applicable in Spain on the common prices (OJ 1991 L 162, p. 18). 5 The Council decided, first, to prolong the period for moving towards price alignment until 1 July 1995 and, second, to introduce alignment in two stages. Article 2 of Regulation No 1716/91 thus provides as follows: `The period for moves towards price alignment in Spain shall be prolonged until 1 July 1995 inclusive. The moves towards alignment referred to in Article 1 shall be carried out in two stages, the first stage covering the 1991/92 and 1992/93 marketing years and the second stage the 1993/94, 1994/95 and 1995/96 marketing years.' 6 Article 1 of Regulation No 3814/92 provides for full alignment of prices from 1 January 1993 with a view to achieving the single market, and Article 2 provides for temporary degressive aid for beet and sugar-cane growers in Spain. In addition, the regulation grants sugar producers aid for their products subject to quotas and held in stock on 31 December 1992. Finally, Article 3 authorizes Spain to grant adjustment aid, in connection with restructuring plans for rationalizing the Spanish sugar industry, during the 1993/94 to 1995/96 marketing years to undertakings producing sugar. 7 It is apparent from the contested judgment that the appellants are the only producers of isoglucose in Spain. They challenge Regulation No 3814/92 inasmuch as it did not provide for any Community aid for them. 8 On 23 March 1993 they brought an action before the Court of Justice seeking the annulment of Regulation No 3814/92 and an order requiring the Council to compensate them for the damage which they had allegedly suffered as a result of its adoption. 9 The Court referred the case to the Court of First Instance by order of 27 September 1993 pursuant to Council Decision 93/350/Euratom, ECSC, EEC of 8 June 1993 amending Council Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom establishing a Court of First Instance of the European Communities (OJ 1993 L 144, p. 21). The contested judgment 10 By the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance dismissed the claim for annulment as being inadmissible on the ground that Regulation No 3814/92 was a measure of general application that did not concern the appellants directly and individually. 11 The Court of First Instance dismissed the claim for damages as being unfounded since it found no serious breach by the Council of a superior rule of law for the protection of individuals, with the result that it did not consider it necessary to examine the issue of damage. 12 The appellants argued before the Court of First Instance that the Council had acted in breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and the principle of non-discrimination. 13 With regard to the plea alleging breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, the Court of First Instance considered, after reviewing the case-law of the Court of Justice in paragraph 52 of the contested judgment, whether the legislation prior to Regulation No 3814/92 could have given rise to legitimate expectations on the part of traders in the sector concerned. 14 The Court of First Instance examined Article 70(3)(a) and (b) of the Act of Accession in paragraphs 54 to 56 of the contested judgment and concluded that the Council had the power, after the seventh move towards alignment following accession, to carry out a complete alignment of sugar prices with the result that the appellants could not entertain legitimate expectations that the transitional period of alignment would remain guaranteed beyond the start of the 1992/93 marketing year. 15 The Court of First Instance also considered that the adoption of Regulation No 1716/91 could not have given rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the appellants either. First, it noted in paragraph 59 of the contested judgment that the fourth and fifth recitals in the preamble to that regulation provided for the period for moves towards price alignment to be prolonged until 1 July 1995 in order, on the one hand, to prevent farmers in particular from being affected by too swift a drop in beet prices and, on the other, to take account of the extremely difficult situation in the Spanish sugar sector as shown by the analysis carried out at that time. It went on to state in paragraph 60 of the contested judgment that the regulation made it clear that the Council had taken those matters into account by providing for the grant of aid under Regulation No 3814/92, which was justified by the achievement of the single market and the desirability of removing barriers to trade. Finally, it noted in paragraphs 61 and 62 that the decision to discontinue the alignment period had been a legitimate choice of economic policy and the grant of aid had been based on considerations which did not exceed the limits of the wide discretionary power which, according to the case-law, the Community institutions have in matters relating to the common agricultural policy. 16 Moreover, in paragraphs 63 to 65 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance considered that prudent and well-informed traders ought to have anticipated an early alignment of prices in order to achieve the single market, in view of the need to abolish the system of `accession' compensatory amounts and a fortiori of the fact that the Commission's proposals to that effect had received close attention in the Spanish press as early as July 1992. 17 Finally, the Court of First Instance found in paragraph 66 that the conditions for the second stage in the move towards price alignment had not been laid down in Regulation No 1716/91, which fact alone precluded any legitimate expectation regarding the conditions of that alignment. 18 The Court of First Instance accordingly dismissed the plea alleging breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. 19 Furthermore, in paragraphs 79 to 81 of its judgment, the Court of First Instance rejected the argument that Regulation No 3814/92 contained an inadequate statement of the reasons on which it was based since the regulation could not be required to indicate why no transitional measures for producers who might be indirectly affected were provided for. 20 With regard to the plea alleging breach of the principle of non-discrimination, the Court of First Instance first examined, in paragraphs 83 and 84, the close competitive relationship between sugar and isoglucose, as evidenced by the second and third recitals in the preamble to Regulation No 1785/81 and the judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases 103/77 and 145/77 Royal Scholten-Honig and Another v Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce [1978] ECR 2037 . In paragraph 85, however, it considered that it could not be ruled out that there might be circumstances particular to the production of sugar which might in some cases justify treating sugar producers differently from producers of isoglucose. 21 In paragraph 86, the Court of First Instance went on to examine whether there was in the case in point any difference in treatment between sugar producers and isoglucose producers and, if so, whether such a difference in treatment was justified. In that regard, it found in paragraph 87 that the appellants had not refuted the Council's arguments that isoglucose producers were not faced with structural problems comparable to those faced by sugar producers and concluded that, by authorizing national aid for sugar-producing undertakings as part of restructuring plans to rationalize the sugar industry, the Council had not disregarded the limits on the exercise of its powers. 22 As regards aid for sugar held in stock, the Court of First Instance found in paragraphs 88 and 89 that the appellants' situation could not be compared with that of sugar producers since the latter on 31 December 1992 held in stock the total amount of sugar to be sold during the remainder of the 1992/93 marketing year, whereas the appellants held only a limited proportion of their produce in stock; moreover, by its very nature, production of isoglucose did not necessarily entail formation of stocks of the finished product and, unlike sugar, isoglucose was not suitable, by reason of its characteristics, for long-term storage. 23 Finally, the Court of First Instance noted in paragraphs 90 and 91 that sugar producers and isoglucose producers used different raw materials which they obtained in different circumstances. Sugar producers were obliged to pay a minimum price fixed by the Community for their raw materials, whereas isoglucose producers had paid a price determined by market conditions and could, in some cases, profit from any improvements in conditions on the cereals market. 24 The Court of First Instance accordingly concluded in paragraphs 92 and 93 that it had not been shown that the Council, by not adopting similar transitional measures in favour of isoglucose producers, had manifestly and seriously disregarded the limits on the exercise of its powers, since the appellants were in a situation which was objectively different from that of sugar producers, with the result that the plea in law alleging breach of the principle of non-discrimination also had to be dismissed. The appeal 25 The appellants claim that the Court should: (1) set aside the contested judgment in so far as the Court of First Instance rejected the claim for damages; and (2) order the Community to make good the damage suffered by them as a result of the regulation and assess the damages at ECU 3 444 403 for Campo Ebro Industrial SA, ECU 1 305 169 for Levantina Agrícola Industrial SA (LAISA) and ECU 2 132 421 for Cerestar Ibérica SA, or at such other amounts as the Court considers appropriate, increased by interest at 8% per annum from the date of the application to the Court of First Instance until the date of payment; or (3) refer the case back to the Court of First Instance; and (4) order the Council to pay the appellants' costs in these proceedings and in the proceedings before the Court of First Instance. 26 The Council, supported by the Commission, contends that the Court should: (1) dismiss the appeal; (2) order the appellants to pay the costs. Consideration of the grounds of appeal 27 The appellants put forward nine grounds of appeal against the contested judgment: (1) breach of Article 70(3)(b) of the Act of Accession, the principle of protection of legitimate expectations and Article 190 of the EC Treaty, in finding that the appellants could not derive any legitimate expectation from the Act of Accession (paragraph 56 of the contested judgment); (2) misinterpretation of Regulation No 1716/91 and breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and Article 190 of the EC Treaty in finding that Regulation No 1716/91 could not have given rise to any legitimate expectation on the part of the appellants (paragraph 59); (3) failure to take into consideration Article 28 of the Single European Act and breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and Article 190 of the EC Treaty in finding that prudent and well-informed traders ought to have realized that achievement of the single market might lead to an early alignment of the intervention price of sugar (paragraph 63); (4) misinterpretation of Regulation No 1716/91 and breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and Article 190 of the EC Treaty in finding that the appellants could not have had a legitimate expectation worthy of protection in the conditions under which price alignment was to be carried out with effect from the 1993/94 marketing year (paragraph 66); (5) breach of various principles and provisions of Community law in dismissing the appellants' plea alleging breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations; (6) misinterpretation of the appellants' arguments and breach of the principle of non-discrimination and Article 190 of the EC Treaty (paragraph 81); (7) mistake in law and breach of the principle of non-discrimination and Article 190 of the EC Treaty in inferring, from the fact that production of isoglucose, unlike that of sugar, does not necessarily entail formation of stocks, that the appellants were in a situation different from that of sugar producers and that the different treatment as regards aid paid to those producers for sugar held in stock on 31 December 1992 was justified; (8) failure to take into consideration the judgment in Royal Scholten-Honig, cited above, as well as the common organization of the markets in the sugar sector and breach of the principle of non-discrimination and Article 190 of the EC Treaty in finding that the appellants were in a situation different from that of sugar producers and could be treated differently because they were not obliged to pay a minimum price fixed by the Community for their raw materials; (9) breach of various principles and provisions of Community law in dismissing the appellants' plea alleging breach of the principle of non-discrimination. 28 It is appropriate to arrange the various grounds of appeal in groups, according to whether the appellants plead breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations or breach of the principle of non-discrimination. The grounds of appeal concerning breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations 29 In their first ground of appeal, the appellants maintain that in paragraph 56 of the contested judgment the Court of First Instance infringed Article 70(3)(b) of the Act of Accession, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and Article 190 of the EC Treaty, in finding that the appellants could not derive any legitimate expectation from the Act of Accession. They consider that, having regard to the fact that Spanish sugar prices were significantly higher than the common prices, they could legitimately expect that the period of price alignment would be extended beyond the seventh move towards alignment following accession. 30 The second subparagraph of Article 70(3)(b) of the Act of Accession provides that the Council `may, in particular (...) decide on other methods of accelerated moves towards price alignment'. 31 The Court of First Instance was therefore correct in interpreting that provision as authorizing the Council to adopt a method of aligning prices and even to bring about - at least after the seventh move towards alignment following accession - the complete alignment of sugar prices by means of regulations. It was also correct in concluding that the appellants could not have derived any legitimate expectation from the Act of Accession that the transitional period of alignment would remain guaranteed beyond the start of the 1992/93 marketing year. 32 Consequently, the first ground of appeal is unfounded. 33 In their second ground of appeal, the appellants argue that the Court of First Instance misinterpreted Regulation No 1716/91 and infringed the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and Article 190 of the Treaty in finding that that regulation could not have given rise to any legitimate expectation on their part. Instead, a close analysis of the preamble to that regulation shows that the period for moves towards price alignment was prolonged because of the substantial variation between the Spanish prices and the common prices and not, as the Court of First Instance pointed out in paragraph 59 of the contested judgment, having regard to the interests referred to in the fourth and fifth recitals in the preamble to Regulation No 1716/91. Furthermore, in their submission, the case-law relating to traders' legitimate expectations referred to by the Court of First Instance in paragraph 61 of the contested judgment is not relevant to the present case since Regulation No 3814/92 was not adopted in order to take account of changes in economic circumstances, but with a view to achieving the single market. 34 The fourth recital in the preamble to Regulation No 1716/91 states that it is necessary to allow price variations to be absorbed over a period of five marketing years, `a sufficiently long period to prevent farmers, in particular, [from] being affected by too swift a drop in beet prices'. According to the fifth recital, analysis of the development of prices `clearly shows that Spain is currently in an extremely difficult situation in the sugar sector owing to the structural constraints weighing on the sector in which restructuring measures are in progress'. 35 While it is true that the general cause of the extension of the period of price alignment was the substantial variation between the Spanish prices and the common prices, the only sensible interpretation of the fourth and fifth recitals is that, in extending the period of price alignment, the Council took particular account of the interests referred to in those recitals, namely those of farmers and sugar producers. 36 Moreover, the Court of First Instance correctly noted in paragraph 61 of the contested judgment that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, traders cannot entertain legitimate expectations that an existing situation will be maintained, particularly since the Community institutions have a wide discretionary power to alter it, as is the case in matters relating to the common agricultural policy. In this regard, there is no evidence to support the appellants' argument that the objective of achieving the single market had the effect of reducing the Community institutions' powers to assess economic circumstances. 37 Accordingly, it was on the basis of a correct interpretation of Regulation No 1716/91 and the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice that the Court of First Instance concluded that the regulation could not have given rise to any legitimate expectation on the part of the appellants. 38 The second ground of appeal must therefore be rejected. 39 In their third ground of appeal, the appellants maintain that the Court of First Instance disregarded Article 28 of the Single European Act and infringed the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and Article 190 of the Treaty in finding that prudent and well-informed traders ought to have realized that achievement of the single market might lead to an early alignment of the intervention price of sugar. Article 28 of the Single European Act provides that `the provisions of this Act shall be without prejudice to the provisions of the Instruments of Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European Communities'. The appellants accordingly had no reason to anticipate an early alignment of sugar prices, especially as the objectives of the Single European Act could be attained while maintaining the system introduced by the Act of Accession, including the `accession' compensatory amounts. In addition, they argue, Regulation No 1716/91 was adopted long after the entry into force of the Single European Act, a fact which the Court of First Instance failed to take into consideration in paragraph 63 of the contested judgment. Finally, it is in their submission irrelevant that a Commission proposal was noted as early as July 1992, since the Council alone had the power to change the method of price alignment. 40 As stated in paragraph 31 of this judgment, the Court of First Instance was correct in its interpretation of the provisions of the Act of Accession conferring on the Council the power to undertake an early alignment of prices. Furthermore, the Court of First Instance was right, on the basis of clear economic reasoning, to consider in paragraph 63 of the contested judgment that prudent and well-informed traders ought to have realized that achievement of the single market might lead to an early alignment of sugar prices in order to eliminate the barrier to trade between Member States created by the existence of `accession' compensatory amounts. Finally, it is clear from Article 7 of Regulation No 1716/91, which refers to Article 43(2) of the EEC Treaty, that the Council could act only on a proposal from the Commission. While not every Commission proposal is necessarily followed by the Council, the existence of such a proposal was at the very least sufficient to alert traders to the possibility that the situation might change. 41 Consequently, the Court of First Instance was right in not taking account of Article 28 of the Single European Act since it had no bearing on the Council's powers as provided for by the Act of Accession, and in considering that, even though Regulation No 1716/91 was adopted after the entry into force of the Single European Act, traders should have anticipated an early alignment of sugar prices, a fortiori since the proposals for a regulation submitted by the Commission to the Council had received attention in the Spanish press as early as July 1992. In so doing, the Court of First Instance did not infringe the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. 42 The third ground of appeal is therefore unfounded. 43 In their fourth ground of appeal, the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance wrongly interpreted Regulation No 1716/91 and infringed the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and Article 190 of the Treaty in finding that they could not have had a legitimate expectation worthy of protection in the conditions under which price alignment was to be carried out with effect from the 1993/94 marketing year. In paragraph 66 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance denied the existence of a legitimate expectation solely on the ground that the regulation did not specify the conditions for alignment for the period after 1 July 1993, whilst, although the Council had not fixed the moves towards alignment for the previous three marketing years, that was only in order to take account of the new production arrangements which might have been applied as from 1 July 1993 and not because it wished to retain the possibility of reducing Spanish prices to the level of the common prices by the end of the 1992/93 marketing year. 44 Article 7 of Regulation No 1716/91 provides that: `The Council shall, before 1 January 1993, lay down the conditions for the moves towards alignment of the Spanish prices on the common prices for the period covering the 1993/1994, 1994/1995 and 1995/1996 marketing years, in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 43(2) of the Treaty.' 45 The Court of First Instance was therefore correct in concluding, after accurately describing the power reserved to the Council by that provision, that the very existence of such a power made it impossible for the appellants to have entertained a legitimate expectation in the conditions under which price alignment would be carried out with effect from the 1993/94 marketing year. 46 The fourth ground of appeal is therefore unfounded. 47 In their fifth ground of appeal, the appellants maintain that the Court of First Instance infringed various principles and provisions of Community law in dismissing their plea alleging breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. They consider that, even if the discontinuation of the gradual alignment of prices remained within the limits of the Council's discretionary power, the Council should have adopted appropriate transitional measures compensating the appellants for the adverse consequences of early price alignment, just as it did in the case of sugar producers. 48 It should be noted, however, that the adoption of transitional measures in favour of the appellants could have been held to be necessary only in so far as it was acknowledged that they could entertain legitimate expectations regarding the maintenance of a given situation or the development of foreseeable events. Since the Court of First Instance found that the appellants had no legitimate expectations, it was right to conclude that there was no obligation on the Council to adopt transitional measures in their favour. 49 The fifth ground of appeal is therefore unfounded. The grounds of appeal concerning breach of the principle of non-discrimination 50 In their sixth ground of appeal, the appellants claim that in paragraph 81 of the contested judgment the Court of First Instance misconstrued their arguments and infringed the principle of non-discrimination and Article 190 of the Treaty. In their view, the Court of First Instance incorrectly considered that their argument in paragraph 38 of the application for annulment and paragraph 36 of the reply sought the annulment of Regulation No 3814/92 on account of insufficient reasoning, whereas they maintained that, since the regulation did not contain any explanation for the different treatment of the appellants compared with Spanish sugar producers, the conclusion had to be drawn that such treatment was not objectively justified. 51 In connection with their second plea concerning breach of the prohibition of discrimination, the appellants argued before the Court of First Instance that Regulation No 3814/92 contained an inadequate statement of the reasons on which it was based. Consequently, in paragraph 81 of the contested judgment, after analysing the reasons stated for the regulation, the Court of First Instance was right to reject the appellants' argument before proceeding to consider that plea. In so doing, the Court interpreted the appellants' argument correctly. 52 The sixth ground of appeal is therefore unfounded. 53 In their seventh ground of appeal, the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance erred in law and infringed the principle of non-discrimination and Article 190 of the Treaty in inferring, from the fact that the production of isoglucose, unlike the production of sugar, does not necessarily entail formation of stocks, that they were in a situation different from that of sugar producers and that the different treatment as regards the aid paid to those producers for sugar held in stock on 31 December 1992 was justified. 54 It should however be noted that in holding that the appellants' situation differed from that of sugar producers, the Court of First Instance made a number of findings of fact. In so far as the appeal is directed against those findings, it is inadmissible (see the order of 20 March 1991 in Case C-115/90 P Turner v Commission [1991] ECR I-1423, paragraphs 13 and 14). Furthermore, since Regulation No 3814/92 provided for the grant of aid to products held in stock, the Court of First Instance did not infringe the principle of non-discrimination by relying on findings of fact concerning the difference between the situation of sugar producers and that of isoglucose producers as regards products held in stock in reaching the conclusion that they could be treated differently. 55 Accordingly, the seventh ground of appeal is unfounded. 56 In their eighth ground of appeal, the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance disregarded the judgment in Royal Scholten-Honig, cited above, as well as the common organization of the markets in the sugar sector and infringed the principle of non-discrimination and Article 190 of the Treaty, in finding that the appellants were in a situation different from that of sugar producers and could be treated differently because they were not obliged to pay a minimum price fixed by the Community for their raw materials. The minimum price for the raw materials used by them, the appellants maintain, is the intervention price for cereals. Since the judgment in Royal Scholten-Honig, cited above, sugar and isoglucose have always been treated in the same manner under the common organization of the markets in the sugar sector, notwithstanding the difference in the cost of the raw materials. Moreover, in paragraph 91 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance noted that the appellants could profit from any improvements in conditions on the cereals market, even though that was a mere hypothesis which it ought to have checked. 57 It should however be noted that, in so far as it concerns findings of fact made by the Court of First Instance, the appeal is inadmissible (see the order in Turner v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 13 and 14). Pursuant to Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice, assessments such as the finding that the appellants were not obliged to pay a minimum price fixed by the Community for their raw materials or the finding that they could profit from improvements in conditions on the cereals market fall outside the scope of review by the Court of Justice. Furthermore, since Regulation No 3814/92 provided for a reduction in the minimum price of beet, the raw material for sugar production, the Court of First Instance did not infringe the principle of non-discrimination by relying on findings of fact concerning the difference between the situation of sugar producers and that of isoglucose producers as regards the raw materials used in reaching the conclusion that they could be treated differently. 58 The eighth ground of appeal is therefore unfounded. 59 In their ninth ground of appeal, the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance infringed various principles and provisions of Community law in dismissing their plea alleging breach of the principle of non-discrimination. 60 Under Article 51 of the EC Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure, however, an appeal must give a precise indication of the aspects of the judgment appealed against which are complained of, together with the legal arguments put forward in support of the claim that it should be set aside (order of 24 April 1996 in Case C-87/95 P CNPAAP v Council [1996] ECR I-2003, paragraph 29). 61 Since the ninth ground of appeal, if it is regarded as a ground distinct from the others, does not give a precise indication of the aspects of the contested judgment which are complained of and the legal arguments put forward, it does not comply with the requirements laid down in those provisions, with the result that it must be rejected. 62 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety. Costs 63 Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to the appeal procedure by virtue of Article 118, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been asked for in the successful party's pleadings. Since the appellants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay the costs of the appeal. Pursuant to Article 69(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the Commission, which has intervened, is to bear its own costs. On those grounds, THE COURT (First Chamber) hereby: 1. Dismisses the appeal; 2. Orders the appellants to pay the costs and the intervener to bear its own costs. © European Communities, 2001 All rights reserved BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII