Electricity & Water Authority of the Government of Bahrain and Others (Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters - judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters - Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters - Judgment) [2026] EUECJ C-672/23 (16 April 2026)

Judgment These requests for a preliminary ruling concern the interpretation of Article 8(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1). The requests have been made in two sets of proceedings between, on the one hand, the Electricity & Water Authority of the Government of Bahrain, the GCC Interconnection Authority, the Kuwait Ministry of Electricity and Water and Oman Electricity Transmission Company SAOC (together, 'EWAGB and Others') against Prysmian Netherlands BV, Draka Holding BV, Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi Srl, Pirelli & C SpA, Prysmian SpA, The Goldman Sachs Group Inc., ABB BV, ABB Holdings BV, ABB AB, ABB Ltd., Nexans Nederland BV, Nexans Cabling Solutions BV, Nexans Participations SA, Nexans SA and Nexans France SAS (together, 'Draka and Others'), and, on the other hand, Smurfit Kappa Europe BV, Smurfit International BV, Smurfit Kappa Italia SpA, DS Smith Italy BV, DS Smith plc, DS Smith Packaging Italia SpA, DS Smith Holding Italia SpA and Toscana Ondulati SpA (together, 'Smurfit Kappa and Others') against Unilever Europe BV, Unilever Supply Chain Company AG and Unilever Italy Holdings Srl (together, 'Unilever and Others'), concerning the determination of the court with territorial jurisdiction to hear actions seeking to establish the joint and several liability of Draka and Others and Smurfit Kappa and Others and to order them to pay compensation for damages resulting from an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992 (OJ 1994 L 1, p. 3) ('the EEA Agreement'). The legal framework Regulation No 1 215/2012 Recitals 15, 16 and 21 of Regulation No 1215/2012 state: '(15) The rules of jurisdiction should be highly predictable and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant's domicile. Jurisdiction should always be available on this ground save in a few well-defined situations in which the subject matter of the dispute or the autonomy of the parties warrants a different connecting factor. The domicile of a legal person must be defined autonomously so as to make the common rules more transparent and avoid conflicts of jurisdiction. (16) In addition to the defendant's domicile, there should be alternative grounds of jurisdiction based on a close connection between the court and the action or in order to facilitate the sound administration of justice. The existence of a close connection should ensure legal certainty and avoid the possibility of the defendant being sued in a court of a Member State which he could not reasonably have foreseen. This is important, particularly in disputes concerning non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation. … (21) In the interests of the harmonious administration of justice it is necessary to minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings and to ensure that irreconcilable judgments will not be given in different Member States. There should be a clear and effective mechanism for resolving cases of lis pendens and related actions, and for obviating problems flowing from national differences as to the determination of the time when a case is regarded as pending. For the purposes of this Regulation, that time should be defined autonomously.' Chapter II of that regulation, entitled 'Jurisdiction', comprises ten sections. Section 1 of that chapter, entitled 'General Provisions', contains Articles 4 to 6 of that regulation. Under Article 4(1) of that regulation: 'Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.' Article 5(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 provides: 'Persons domiciled in a Member State may be sued in the courts of another Member State only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 7 of this Chapter.' Article 8(1) of that regulation, which appears in Section 2 of Chapter II, entitled 'Special jurisdiction', provides: 'A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: (1) where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings'. Under Article 63(1) of that regulation: 'For the purposes of this Regulation, a company or other legal person or association of natural or legal persons is domiciled at the place where it has its: (a) statutory seat; (b) central administration; or (c) principal place of business.' Directive 2014/104/EU According to recital 1 of Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union (OJ 2014 L 349, p. 1): 'Articles 101 and 102 [TFEU] are a matter of public policy and should be applied effectively throughout the [European] Union in order to ensure that competition in the internal market is not distorted.' Article 1 of that directive, entitled 'Subject matter and scope', provides in paragraph 2: 'This Directive sets out rules coordinating the enforcement of the competition rules by competition authorities and the enforcement of those rules in damages actions before national courts.' Article 2 of that directive, entitled 'Definitions', provides in points 2, 3 and 6: 'For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions apply: … (2) “infringer” means an undertaking or association of undertakings which has committed an infringement of competition law; (3) “national competition law” means provisions of national law that predominantly pursue the same objective as Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and that are applied to the same case and in parallel to Union competition law pursuant to Article 3(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 [of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1)], excluding provisions of national law which impose criminal penalties on natural persons, except to the extent that such criminal penalties are the means whereby competition rules applying to undertakings are enforced; … (6) “injured party” means a person that has suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition law'. Under Article 3 of that directive, entitled 'Right to full compensation': '1. Member States shall ensure that any natural or legal person who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition law is able to claim and to obtain full compensation for that harm. 2. Full compensation shall place a person who has suffered harm in the position in which that person would have been had the infringement of competition law not been committed. It shall therefore cover the right to compensation for actual loss and for loss of profit, plus the payment of interest. 3. Full compensation under this Directive shall not lead to overcompensation, whether by means of punitive, multiple or other types of damages.' Article 9 of Directive 2014/104, entitled 'Effect of national decisions', provides: '1. Member States shall ensure that an infringement of competition law found by a final decision of a national competition authority or by a review court is deemed to be irrefutably established for the purposes of an action for damages brought before their national courts under Article 101 or 102 TFEU or under national competition law. 2. Member States shall ensure that where a final decision referred to in paragraph 1 is taken in another Member State, that final decision may, in accordance with national law, be presented before their national courts as at least prima facie evidence that an infringement of competition law has occurred and, as appropriate, may be assessed along with any other evidence adduced by the parties. 3. This Article is without prejudice to the rights and obligations of national courts under Article 267 TFEU.' Article 11 of that directive, entitled 'Joint and several liability', provides in paragraph 1: 'Member States shall ensure that undertakings which have infringed competition law through joint behaviour are jointly and severally liable for the harm caused by the infringement of competition law; with the effect that each of those undertakings is bound to compensate for the harm in full, and the injured party has the right to require full compensation from any of them until he has been fully compensated.' The disputes in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling Case C ‑ /23 By Decision C(2014) 2139 final of 2 April 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39610; 'Power Cables'), the European Commission found that there had been a quasi-global cartel on the markets for submarine and underground power cables involving 26 legal persons, namely: – Nexans and Nexans France, established in France, – Prysmian SpA and Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, established in Italy, and their former parent companies, Pirelli & C and The Goldman Sachs Group, – J-Power Systems Corporation and its joint venture parent companies, Hitachi Metals Ltd and Sumitomo Electric Industries Ltd, – VISCAS Corporation and its joint venture parent companies, Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd and Fujikura Ltd, – ABB AB (formerly), whose rights were succeeded by ABB AB, established in Sweden, and ABB Ltd, as the parent company of ABB AB, established in Switzerland, – Brugg Kabel AG and Kabelwerke Brugg AG Holding, – Silec Cable SAS, its current parent company, General Cable Corporation, and its former parent company, Safran SA, – EXSYM Corporation and the joint venture parent companies, SWCC Showa Holdings Co. Ltd and Mitsubishi Cable Industries Ltd., – LS Cable & System Ltd, – Taihan Electric Wire Co. Ltd and, – nkt cables GmbH and NKT Holding A/S. It found that, during the period from 18 February 1999 to 29 January 2009, those companies had participated in a network of multilateral and bilateral meetings and contacts with a view to sharing markets and customers for underground and submarine power cable projects in specific territories. It found that those collusive practices constituted a continuing infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. The Electricity & Water Authority of the Government of Bahrain, the Kuwait Ministry of Electricity and Water and Oman Electricity Transmission Company are public companies responsible for the development, operation and maintenance of high-voltage networks located in Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman, respectively. GCC Interconnection Authority owns and operates an interconnection infrastructure linking the national electricity networks of the States parties to the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, namely the State of the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait. EWAGB and Others brought an action for a declaratory judgment before the rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam, Netherlands), seeking, first, a declaration that Draka and Others are jointly and severally liable to them on account of their participation in the cartel in question and, second, an order that those companies be jointly and severally liable to pay compensation, the amount of which is to be determined at a later date, to make good the damage which they claim to have suffered outside the European Economic Area (EEA) as a result of that cartel. That declaratory action is brought against several defendant companies belonging to the Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, ABB AB (formerly) and Nexans groups. Some are established in the Netherlands, but outside the jurisdiction of the rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam), while others are established outside the Netherlands. All are, directly or indirectly, wholly owned subsidiaries of the undertakings which the Commission decided to hold liable for participation in the cartel in question. In its decision, the Commission found that Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, ABB AB (formerly) and Nexans France had participated in the cartel and held Prysmian, Pirelli & C, The Goldman Sachs Group, ABB Ltd and Nexans liable as the (indirect) parent companies of the aforementioned participants in the cartel. Nexans Participations, as well as Prysmian Netherlands, Draka Holding, ABB BV, ABB Holdings, Nexans Nederland and Nexans Cabling Solutions, companies established in the Netherlands, were not addressed by that decision. Those defendant companies incorporated under Dutch law are all subsidiaries, directly or indirectly wholly owned by Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, ABB Ltd and Nexans, respectively. Draka Holding, established in Amsterdam, is the only defendant company with its registered office within the jurisdiction of the rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam) and is therefore the defendant that serves as the anchor for establishing the jurisdiction of the court seised ('the anchor defendant'). That company is a subsidiary of Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi, which also holds the entire share capital of Prysmian Netherlands. Neither Draka Holdings nor the other defendant companies established in the Netherlands were addressees of the Commission's decision of 2 April 2014. In a declaratory judgment, the rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam) declared itself competent, on the basis of Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, to hear actions brought against all the defendant companies established in the Netherlands. By contrast, it declared that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the actions brought against the defendant companies established outside the Netherlands, considering that no international jurisdiction could be inferred from point 1 of Article 8 of Regulation No 1215/2012 or from any other legal basis. It considered that there was not a sufficiently close connection between the actions brought against the companies established in the Netherlands and those brought against the companies established outside the Netherlands to justify them all being heard by the same court in order to avoid irreconcilable decisions. EWAGB and Others appealed against that judgment to the Gerechtshof Amsterdam (Court of Appeal, Amsterdam, Netherlands), the referring court in the present case. That court points out that the defendant companies established in the Netherlands did not challenge the decision of the rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam) recognising its internal territorial jurisdiction to hear the action not only against Draka Holding, established within the territorial jurisdiction of that court, but also against all the companies named established in the Netherlands but outside the territorial jurisdiction of that court. That court then states that, in accordance with national procedural rules, decisions on internal territorial jurisdiction are not subject to appeal and that it is therefore required to consider that the rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam) has internal territorial jurisdiction over all the defendant companies established in the Netherlands. However, the referring court questions whether there is a sufficiently close connection, within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, between, on the one hand, the action brought against Draka Holding or other defendant companies established in the Netherlands and, on the other hand, the actions brought against the defendant companies established outside the Netherlands. In those circumstances, the Gerechtshof Amsterdam (Court of Appeal, Amsterdam) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: '(1) (a) Is there a close connection within the meaning of Article 8(1) of [Regulation No 1215/2012] between: (i) on the one hand, a claim against a lead defendant (also known as: anchor defendant) that is not an addressee of a Commission cartel decision but, as an entity alleged to belong to the undertaking within the meaning of European competition law …, is held liable downstream for the established infringement of the prohibition on cartels under EU law and, (ii) on the other hand, a claim against: – a co-defendant who is an addressee of that decision, and/or – a co-defendant who is not an addressee of the decision in respect of which it is alleged that, as a legal entity, it belongs to an [u]ndertaking which has been held publicly liable in the decision for the infringement of the prohibition on cartels under EU law? In that regard, does it matter: [1.] whether the anchor defendant being held liable downstream merely held and managed shares during the cartel period; [2.] if Question 4[(a)] is answered in the affirmative – whether the anchor defendant being held liable downstream was involved in producing, distributing, selling and/or supplying cartelised products and/or providing cartelised services; [3.] whether the co-defendant who is an addressee of the decision has been designated in the order as (i) an actual cartel participant – in the sense that it actually participated in the infringing agreement(s) and/or concerted practice(s) found or (ii) as a legal entity forming part of the [u]ndertaking which has been held publicly liable for the infringement of the prohibition on cartels under EU law; [4.] whether the co-defendant who is not an addressee of the decision actually produced, distributed, sold and/or supplied cartelised products and/or services; [5.] whether or not the anchor defendant and the co-defendant belong to the same [u]ndertaking, [6.] the [claimants] have directly or indirectly purchased or received products and/or services from the anchor defendant and/or the co-defendant? (b) Is it relevant to the answer to Question 1[(a)] whether or not it is foreseeable that the relevant co-defendant will be sued in the court of that anchor defendant? If so, is that foreseeability a separate criterion when applying Article 8(1) of [Regulation No 1215/2012]? Is that foreseeability given in principle in the light of the Sumal judgment of 6 October 2021 (C‑882/19, EU:C:2021:800 )? To what extent do the circumstances mentioned in [points 1 to 6 of] Question l[(a)] above make it foreseeable here that the co-defendant would be sued in the court of the anchor defendant? (2) In determining jurisdiction, should consideration be given also to the admissibility of the claim against the anchor defendant? If so, is it sufficient for that assessment that it cannot be excluded in advance that the claim will be upheld? (3) (a) Does the right under EU law of any person to damages following an established breach of the prohibition on cartels under EU law include the right to claim damages suffered outside the EEA? (b) Must – or can – the presumption accepted in competition law of decisive influence by the (fined) parent companies over the economic activity of the subsidiaries … be applied in (civil) cartel damages cases? (c) Does an intermediate holding company which merely manages and holds shares meet the second Sumal criterion (engagement in an economic activity which has a specific link to the subject matter of the infringement for which the parent company has been held responsible)? (4) (a) When applying Article 8(1) of [Regulation No 1215/2012] can different defendants domiciled in the same Member State be anchor defendants (together)? (b) Does Article 8(1) of [Regulation No 1215/2012] directly and immediately designate the relative competent court, overruling national law? (c) If Question 4[(a)] is answered in the negative – such that only one defendant can be an anchor defendant – and Question 4[(b)] is answered in the affirmative – such that Article 8(1) of [Regulation No 1215/2012], overruling national law, directly designates the relative competent court: [w]hen applying [that provision], is there scope for internal reference to the court of the defendant's domicile in the same Member State?' Case C ‑ /23 On 17 July 2019, the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (Italian Competition and Market Authority) ('the AGCM') adopted a decision in which it found that several companies, including Smurfit Kappa Italia and Toscana Ondulati, had committed two separate infringements of Article 101 TFEU and Articles 15 and 31 of the Italian Competition Law. By that decision, the AGCM found, first, that between 2 February 2004 and 30 March 2017, those undertakings had participated in a cartel on the Italian corrugated cardboard market with a view to influencing the sale prices of that product and encouraging other undertakings to participate in that cartel. It also found that, between 7 September 2005 and 30 March 2017, the main producers of cardboard packaging had participated in a cartel concerning packaging materials, with the aim of distorting competition on the Italian market for packaging cardboard. The AGCM also noted that that second agreement served to support the agreement relating to corrugated cardboard. Smurfit Kappa Italia, established in Milan (Italy), DS Smith Holding Italia, established in Vimercate (Italy), and Toscana Ondulati, established in Capannori (Italy), were the addressees of that decision, which found that Smurfit Kappa Italia and Toscana Ondulati had participated in the cartel. DS Smith Holding Italia is also held liable upstream for that cartel as an indirect parent company. The other applicants in the main proceedings, which are part of the Smurfit Kappa Italia and Toscana Ondulati groups, were not, by contrast, addressees of that decision. Unilever and Others, which are part of the Unilever group, purchased raw materials, packaging materials and corrugated cardboard packaging for Unilever's European production facilities from companies that were party to the agreements during the periods of infringement. Unilever and Others consider that they suffered damage as a result of the price increases for products purchased from companies that were parties to the cartel, as well as the maintenance of artificially high price levels ('umbrella pricing') and the residual effects of the cartel on the market. They then brought an action for a declaratory judgment before the rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam), seeking a ruling that Smurfit Kappa and Others were jointly and severally liable to them on account of their participation in the cartel in question. They also sought an order that those companies be jointly and severally liable to pay compensation, the amount of which was to be determined at a later date, for the damage they claimed to have suffered as a result of that cartel. Smurfit Kappa International is the only defendant company with its registered office within the jurisdiction of the rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam) and is regarded as the anchor defendant. That company was not an addressee of the AGCM's decision of 17 July 2019. It is an intermediate holding company, a subsidiary of Smurfit Kappa Group, a company established in Ireland which is not involved in the main proceedings, and the parent company of Smurfit Kappa Europe. The latter holds the entire share capital of Smurfit Kappa Italia, one of the companies to which the AGCM's decision of 17 July 2019 was addressed. By a declaratory judgment, the rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam) declared that it had territorial jurisdiction, both domestically and internationally, to hear cases brought against companies established in the Netherlands, but also against those established outside the Netherlands. First, it considered that it had jurisdiction to hear the action brought against Smurfit International, the only defendant company before it established in Amsterdam (Netherlands) and therefore within its territorial jurisdiction, but also to hear the actions brought against all the companies established in the Netherlands, on the ground that there was a connection between all those actions which justified their being dealt with together for reasons of efficiency. Secondly, it considered that there was a sufficiently close connection between the actions brought against all the companies established in the Netherlands and those brought against companies established outside the Netherlands to justify the judgment being delivered by the same court in order to avoid irreconcilable decisions. Smurfit Kappa and Others appealed against that judgment to the Gerechtshof Amsterdam (Court of Appeal, Amsterdam), the referring court in the present case. That court points out that the companies established in the Netherlands did not challenge the jurisdiction of the rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam) at first instance and that, in accordance with national procedural rules, decisions on internal territorial jurisdiction are not subject to appeal before it. It states that it is therefore required to consider that that court has internal territorial jurisdiction to hear not only the action brought against Smurfit International – the only company in the present case established within its jurisdiction and which, although not the addressee of the AGCM's decision, becomes the anchor defendant in view of its place of establishment – but also of the actions brought against all the defendant companies established in the Netherlands before it. By contrast, that court has doubts as to the international jurisdiction of that court in relation to actions brought against companies established outside the Netherlands. It questions, in essence, whether there is a sufficiently close connection, within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, between, first, the action brought against Smurfit International and/or other companies established in the Netherlands and, secondly, the actions brought against companies established outside the Netherlands. In those circumstances, the Gerechtshof Amsterdam (Court of Appeal, Amsterdam) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: '(1) (a) Is there a close connection within the meaning of Article 8(1) of [Regulation No 1215/2012] between: (i) on the one hand, a claim against a lead defendant (also known as: anchor defendant) that is not an addressee of a cartel decision of a national competition authority but, as an entity alleged to belong to the undertaking within the meaning of European competition law …, is held liable upstream for the established infringement of the Union law cartel prohibition and, (ii) on the other hand, a claim against: – a co-defendant who is an addressee of that decision, and/or – a co-defendant who is not an addressee of the decision in respect of which it is alleged that, as a legal entity, it belongs to an [u]ndertaking which has been held publicly liable in the decision for the infringement of the prohibition on cartels under EU law? In that regard, does it matter: [1.] whether the anchor defendant being held liable upstream merely held and managed shares during the cartel period; [2.] if Question 4[(a)] is answered in the affirmative – whether the anchor defendant being held liable upstream was involved in producing, distributing, selling and/or supplying cartelised products and/or providing cartelised services; [3.] whether or not the anchor defendant resides in the Member State where the national competition authority has found (only) an infringement of the prohibition on cartels under EU law on the national market; [4.] whether the co-defendant who is an addressee of the decision has been designated in the order as[:] (i) an actual cartel participant – in the sense that it actually participated in the infringing agreement(s) and/or concerted practice(s) found or (ii) as a legal entity forming part of the [u]ndertaking which has been held publicly liable for the infringement of the Union law prohibition on cartels; [5.] whether the co-defendant who is not an addressee of the decision actually produced, distributed, sold and/or supplied cartelised products and/or services; [6.] whether or not the anchor defendant and the co-defendant belong to the same [u]ndertaking, [7.] the [claimants] have directly or indirectly purchased products and/or … received services from the anchor defendant and/or the co-defendant? (b) Is it relevant to the answer to Question 1[(a)] whether or not it is foreseeable that the relevant co-defendant will be sued in the court of that anchor defendant? If so, is that foreseeability a separate criterion when applying Article 8(1) of [Regulation No 1215/2012]? Is that foreseeability given in principle in the light of the Sumal judgment of 6 October 2021 (C‑882/19, EU:C:2021:800 )? To what extent do the circumstances mentioned in [points 1 to 6 of] Question 1[(a)] above make it foreseeable here that the co-defendant would be sued in the court of the anchor defendant? (2) In determining jurisdiction, should consideration be given also to the assignability of the claim against the anchor defendant? If so, is it sufficient for that assessment that it cannot be excluded in advance that the claim will be upheld? (3) Must – or can – the presumption accepted in competition law of decisive influence by the (fined) parent companies over the economic activity of the subsidiaries … be applied in (civil) cartel damages cases? (4) (a) When applying Article 8(1) of [Regulation No 1215/2012], can different defendants domiciled in the same Member State be anchor defendants (together)? (b) Does Article 8(1) of [Regulation No 1215/2012] directly and immediately designate the relative competent court, overruling national law? (c) If Question 4[(a)] is answered in the negative – such that only one defendant can be an anchor defendant – and Question 4[(b)] is answered in the affirmative – such that Article 8(1) of [Regulation No 1215/2012], overruling national law, directly designates the relative competent court: [w]hen applying Article 8(1) of [Regulation No 1215/2012], is there scope for internal reference to the court of the defendant's domicile in the same Member State?' The procedure before the Court By order of the President of the Court of 18 January 2024, Cases C‑672/23 and C‑673/23 were joined for the purposes of the oral proceedings and the decision closing the proceedings, in accordance with Article 54 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. Consideration of the questions referred P oint (a) of the first questions As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, under the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU, providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (judgment of 15 July 2021, Ministrstvo za obrambo , C‑742/19, EU:C:2021:597 , paragraph 31). In the present case, it is apparent from the orders for reference that, in point (a) of its first questions, which are worded in essentially similar terms in Cases C‑672/23 and C‑673/23, the referring court asks whether certain circumstances specific to those cases are such as to establish the existence of a sufficiently close connection, within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, between, first, an action brought against an anchor defendant who is not the addressee of the decision of the national or EU competition authority concerned, but who, as an entity alleged to belong to the undertaking held liable by that decision for the infringement of EU competition law, is also held liable upstream or downstream for the infringement found, and, secondly, actions brought against co-defendants, whether or not they are addressees of that decision, a relationship which would be such as to establish the international jurisdiction of the rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam) to hear the case. The referring court questions, in particular, the relevance, for the purposes of assessing the existence of such a relationship, of circumstances such as, first, the mere holding and management of shares by the anchor defendant; secondly, its possible involvement in the production, distribution, sale and/or delivery of products or the provision of services covered by the cartel; thirdly, whether or not that anchor defendant is established in the Member State in which the infringement of competition law was found; fourthly, the classification of the co-defendant to whom the decision in question is addressed as a participant in the infringement or as an entity forming part of the undertaking held liable for the infringement; fifthly, the fact that the co-defendant to whom the decision is not addressed actually produced, distributed, sold and/or delivered products or provided services giving rise to the cartel; sixthly, the fact that the anchor defendant and the co-defendant belong to the same undertaking; and seventhly, the fact that the claimants directly or indirectly purchased products or received services from the anchor defendant and/or the co-defendant, or had them delivered to them. In those circumstances, it must be considered that, by point (a) of its first questions, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that there may be a close connection, within the meaning of that provision, between, on the one hand, an action brought against an anchor defendant who has not been identified as liable for an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement found by the Commission or a national competition authority and, on the other hand, actions brought against companies in respect of which there are serious indications that they belong to undertakings, within the meaning of EU competition law, to which that infringement has been attributed. First of all, it should be noted that, since Regulation No 1215/2012 repealed and replaced Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1), which itself replaced the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 1972 L 299, p. 32), as amended by the successive conventions on the accession of new Member States to that convention, the interpretation given by the Court of Justice to the provisions of those earlier legal instruments also applies to Regulation No 1215/2012 whenever those provisions may be regarded as 'equivalent' (judgment of 15 July 2021, Volvo and Others , C‑30/20, EU:C:2021:604 , paragraph 28 and the case-law cited). That is the case, first, with regard to Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 and, secondly, with regard to Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, which are worded in essentially similar terms, so that those provisions may be regarded as 'equivalent', within the meaning of the case-law referred to in the previous paragraph of this judgment (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 July 2021, Volvo and Others , C‑30/20, EU:C:2021:604 , paragraph 29, and of 13 February 2025, Athenian Brewery and Heineken , C‑393/23, EU:C:2025:85 , paragraph 24). Under Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, persons domiciled in the territory of a Member State are to be sued in the courts of that Member State. Article 63(1) of that regulation provides that, for the purposes of that regulation, companies and legal persons are domiciled at the place where their registered office, central administration or principal place of business is situated. However, that rule conferring jurisdiction on the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled is laid down in Article 4(1) 'subject to' the other provisions of Regulation No 1215/2012. Whilst that rule on jurisdiction constitutes, in accordance with recital 15 thereof, a rule of principle, that regulation provides for a number of exceptions (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 February 2025, BSH Hausgeräte , C‑339/22, EU:C:2025:108 , paragraphs 29 and 30). Among those, Article 8 of that regulation provides for exceptions to that rule of principle in respect of related claims. In that regard, Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 provides that a person domiciled in the territory of a Member State may, if there are several defendants, be sued in the courts of the place where one of them is domiciled, provided that the claims are 'so closely connected' such that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings. It is settled case-law that the provisions of that regulation must be interpreted independently, by reference to its scheme and purpose (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 June 2023, BNP Paribas , C‑567/21, EU:C:2023:452 , paragraph 43). The rule on special jurisdiction set out in Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 is intended, as is apparent from recitals 16 and 21 of that regulation, to promote the proper administration of justice, to minimise the risk of parallel proceedings and to prevent the adoption of irreconcilable decisions in different Member States if the cases were to be heard separately (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 September 2023, Beverage City Polska , C‑832/21, EU:C:2023:635 , paragraph 34 and the case-law cited). That rule of special jurisdiction, because it derogates from the principle set out in Article 4(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 that jurisdiction be based on the defendant's domicile, must be given a strict interpretation that does not go beyond the cases expressly envisaged by that regulation (judgment of 7 September 2023, Beverage City Polska , C‑832/21, EU:C:2023:635 , paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). In the context of the application of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, it must be ascertained whether there is, between the various claims brought by the same claimant against different defendants, such a connection that there is an interest in examining them together in order to avoid decisions that might be irreconcilable if those claims were adjudicated separately. The existence of such a connection must be assessed in the light of all the circumstances of the case, in particular the risk of irreconcilable decisions. In that regard, for decisions to be regarded as irreconcilable, it is not sufficient that they lead to divergent outcomes, that divergence must also arise within the context of the same factual and legal situation (judgment of 21 May 2015, CDC Hydrogen Peroxide , C‑352/13, EU:C:2015:335 , paragraph 20 and the case-law cited). However, the Court has held that the rule laid down in Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 cannot be interpreted as allowing an applicant to make a claim against a number of defendants for the sole purpose of removing one of them from the jurisdiction of the courts of the State in which that defendant is domiciled and, thus, of circumventing the rule of jurisdiction contained in that provision by artificially creating or maintaining the conditions for the application of that provision (judgment of 7 September 2023, Beverage City Polska , C‑832/21, EU:C:2023:635 , paragraphs 43 and the case-law cited). It is therefore for the referring court to assess whether the same legal and factual situation exists, taking into account all the relevant facts of the case before it, in relation to the claims brought against the various defendants in the main proceedings at first instance, and to ensure that the claims brought against the sole co-defendant whose domicile justifies the jurisdiction of the court seised are not intended to artificially satisfy the conditions for the application of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 September 2023, Beverage City Polska , C‑832/21, EU:C:2023:635 , paragraphs 42 and 45). In that regard, it should be noted, in the first place, that the condition relating to the existence of the same factual and legal situation is satisfied, in particular, where several undertakings that have participated in a single and continuous infringement of the competition rules of EU law, as established in a Commission decision, are brought before the courts in respect of their participation in that infringement, even though their involvement in the commission of that infringement varies according to the periods or geographical areas concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 May 2015, CDC Hydrogen Peroxide , C‑352/13, EU:C:2015:335 , paragraph 21). The Court has also held that the fact that the joint and several liability of the parent company and its subsidiary for the infringement of the competition rules of EU law has not been established in a final decision of the Commission does not preclude the application of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 to such claims (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 February 2025, Athenian Brewery and Heineken , C‑393/23, EU:C:2025:85 , paragraph 30). The Court has held that Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 applies in the case of claims brought against both a parent company and its subsidiary, with which the former forms an economic unit, and based on the latter's participation in an infringement of the competition rules of EU law, as established in a decision of a national competition authority (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 February 2025, Athenian Brewery and Heineken , C‑393/23, EU:C:2025:85 , paragraph 33). In the second place, it is important to note that it is also settled case-law that, where it is established that a parent company and its subsidiary form part of the same economic unit and, consequently, constitute a single undertaking within the meaning of the competition rules of EU law, it is the very existence of that economic unit which committed the infringement that decisively determines the liability of either of the companies comprising the undertaking for the latter's anti-competitive conduct. On that basis, the concept of an 'undertaking' and, through it, that of an 'economic unit' automatically entail the application of joint and several liability amongst the entities of which the economic unit is made up at the time that the infringement was committed (judgment of 13 February 2025, Athenian Brewery and Heineken , C‑393/23, EU:C:2025:85 , paragraph 29 and the case-law cited). In the third place, according to the Court's case-law, legally separate entities organised as a group constitute a single undertaking where they do not determine their conduct on the relevant market independently, but, having regard in particular to the economic, organisational and legal links binding them to a parent company, are subject to the effects of the effective exercise, by that single management, of decisive influence (judgment of 12 May 2022, Servizio Elettrico Nazionale and Others , C‑377/20, EU:C:2022:379 , paragraph 108 and the case-law cited). In that regard, it should be noted that, in the specific case where a parent company directly or indirectly holds all or almost all of the capital in a subsidiary that has committed an infringement of the competition rules, there is a rebuttable presumption that that parent company does in fact exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary (judgment of 26 October 2017, Global Steel Wire and Others v Commission , C‑457/16 P and C‑459/16 P to C‑461/16 P, EU:C:2017:819 , paragraph 84 and the case-law cited). It is not the holding of all or virtually all of the subsidiary's share capital that gives rise to the presumption of the effective exercise of a decisive influence, but rather the degree of control that the parent company exercises over its subsidiary as a result of that holding (judgment of 27 January 2021, The Goldman Sachs Group v Commission , C‑595/18 P, EU:C:2021:73 , paragraph 35). That said, although the fact that one company holds almost all the capital of another is highly indicative that such control is held, that does not make it possible to rule out with certainty the possibility that another person or other persons may hold, alone or together, decision-making power, since, inter alia, ownership of the capital may have been dissociated from voting rights (judgment of 12 May 2022, Servizio Elettrico Nazionale and Others , C‑377/20, EU:C:2022:379 , paragraph 110). In order to form a single undertaking with its subsidiary, a parent company must exercise control over the subsidiary's conduct; this can be demonstrated by establishing either that the parent company has the capacity to exercise a decisive influence over the subsidiary's conduct and has, moreover, actually exercised that influence, or that the subsidiary does not determine its market conduct independently, but that it essentially follows the instructions given to it by the parent company, having regard in particular to the economic, organisational and legal links between those two legal entities (judgment of 12 May 2022, Servizio Elettrico Nazionale and Others , C‑377/20, EU:C:2022:379 , paragraph 111). The Court has also held that Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as not precluding, in the case of claims seeking a joint and several order against a parent company and its subsidiary to compensate for damage suffered as a result of the subsidiary's infringement of competition rules, the court of the parent company's domicile hearing those claims may, in order to establish its international jurisdiction, rely on the presumption that, where a parent company holds, directly or indirectly, all or virtually all of the capital of a subsidiary which has committed an infringement of competition rules, it exercises a decisive influence over that subsidiary, provided that the defendants are not deprived of the opportunity to rely on probative evidence suggesting either that the parent company did not hold, directly or indirectly, all or virtually all of the capital of the said subsidiary, or that that presumption should nevertheless be rebutted (judgment of 13 February 2025, Athenian Brewery and Heineken , C‑393/23, EU:C:2025:85 , paragraph 47). In the fourth place, it is clear from the Court's case-law that, as regards the liability of a subsidiary for an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU established against a parent company, the victim of that infringement is free to seek to hold a subsidiary of that parent company liable in civil law rather than the parent company itself. However, that subsidiary can be held liable only if the victim proves, either by relying on a decision previously adopted by the Commission or the national competition authority, or by any other means, first, that that subsidiary did not determine autonomously, at the time the infringement was committed, its conduct on the market, but essentially followed the instructions of its parent company, having regard to the economic, organisational and legal links between those two entities, such that they form a single economic unit and, consequently, a single undertaking within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU, which is the perpetrator of the infringing conduct, and, secondly, that there was a concrete link between the economic activity of that subsidiary and the subject matter of the infringement for which the parent company was held liable (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2021, Sumal , C‑882/19, EU:C:2021:800 , paragraph 51). It should be added that the concept of 'undertaking' within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU is a functional concept, and the economic unit constituting it must be identified in the light of the subject matter of the infringing conduct in question. Subsequent restructuring, disposals or other legal or organisational changes are, in that regard, irrelevant (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 March 2019, Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others , C‑724/17, EU:C:2019:204 , paragraph 46, and of 6 October 2021, Sumal , C‑882/19, EU:C:2021:800 , paragraph 46). Consequently, a single parent company may form part of several economic units comprising, depending on the economic activity in question, the parent company itself and various combinations of its subsidiaries, all of which belong to the same group of companies. If that were not the case, a subsidiary within such a group could be held liable for infringements committed in the context of economic activities entirely unconnected to its own activity and in which they were in no way involved, even indirectly (judgment of 6 October 2021, Sumal , C‑882/19, EU:C:2021:800 , paragraph 47). In that regard, although the Court has held that the entities liable to make good the damage caused by a cartel or a practice prohibited by Article 101 TFEU are the undertakings which, within the meaning of that provision, have participated in that cartel or practice, the right of a victim of an anti-competitive practice to bring an action for damages against a subsidiary rather than the parent company cannot automatically be exercised against any subsidiary of the parent company (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 March 2019, Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others , C‑724/17, EU:C:2019:204 , paragraph 32, and of 6 October 2021, Sumal , C‑882/19, EU:C:2021:800 , paragraph 46). Thus, in order to establish the existence of an economic unity between a parent company and one of its subsidiaries, it is incumbent upon the applicant, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 64 of the present judgment, to demonstrate not only the existence of economic, organisational and legal links between those companies, but also a concrete link between the economic activity of that subsidiary and the subject matter of the infringement for which the parent company has been held liable. As the Advocate General noted in point 74 of her Opinion, that is particularly the case where the anti-competitive agreement concluded by the parent company or the 'grandparent' company relates to the same products as those marketed by the subsidiary or sub-subsidiary, or where that subsidiary or sub-subsidiary is responsible for the production, sale, delivery or distribution of those products, as well as the provision of the services covered by the cartel. Where the infringing conduct has not been established in a decision adopted by the Commission or by a national competition authority pursuant to Article 101 TFEU, the subsidiary of a parent company against which an infringement is alleged is entitled to challenge both its inclusion within the same undertaking as that parent company and the very existence of the alleged infringement (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2021, Sumal , C‑882/19, EU:C:2021:800 , paragraph 60). The fact that the anchor defendant is domiciled, or not, in the Member State in which the national competition authority has found an infringement of the prohibition of cartels under EU law on the national market is, in itself, irrelevant to the question of whether the action brought against that defendant and those brought against the other defendants are 'so closely connected', within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012. Furthermore, as the Advocate General noted in point 75 of her Opinion, the other circumstances referred to by the referring court, in particular the designation of the companies concerned in decisions of the Commission or of a national competition authority as 'participants in the cartel', do not relate to the criterion of the existence of a close link between the claims as such, but are relevant only as evidence of the existence of such a link. In view of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to point (a) of the first questions is that Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that, on the one hand, an action brought against an anchor defendant who has not been identified as liable for an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement found by the Commission or a national competition authority and, on the other hand, actions brought against companies in respect of which there are serious indications that they belong to undertakings, within the meaning of EU competition law, to which that infringement has been attributed, may be 'so closely connected' for the purposes of that provision. Point (b) of the first questions By point (b) of its first questions, which are worded identically in Cases C‑672/23 and C‑673/23, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to assess whether the claims brought against several defendants are 'so closely connected' within the meaning of that provision, it is necessary to take into account, as an independent criterion, whether it was foreseeable for the co-defendant to be sued before the court of the anchor defendant's domicile. In that regard, it should be noted that the wording of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 does not make the predictability, for the co-defendant, of being sued in the court of the anchor defendant's domicile an independent criterion of jurisdiction. That provision merely makes its application subject to the fact that the claims that there is an interest in hearing and determining them together are 'so closely connected'. However, it is apparent from recitals 15 and 16 of Regulation No 1215/2012 that the predictability of the jurisdiction of the courts is one of the objectives of the rules on jurisdiction, in that it must enable both the applicant to easily identify the court before which he or she may bring proceedings and the defendant to reasonably predict the court before which he or she may be sued. The predictability sought in this way serves the objective of legal certainty, which consists in strengthening the legal protection of persons established in the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2024, FTI Touristik (International element) , C‑774/22, EU:C:2024:646 , paragraph 33). It is also clear from the Court's case-law that the requirement of foreseeability does not constitute an independent criterion to be added to the conditions laid down in Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012. That requirement is satisfied where it was foreseeable for the defendants that they might be sued in the Member State in which at least one of them is domiciled (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 December 2011, Painer , C‑145/10, EU:C:2011:798 , paragraph 81 and the case-law cited). The principle of legal certainty requires, in particular, that the special rules on jurisdiction be interpreted in such a way as to enable a normally well-informed defendant reasonably to foresee before which courts, other than those of the State in which he or she is domiciled, he or she may be sued (judgment of 13 July 2006, Reisch Montage , C‑103/05, EU:C:2006:471, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited). As the Advocate General stated in essence in points 81 to 84 of her Opinion, predictability is a general principle governing the rules of jurisdiction, which is given concrete expression by the criteria to be taken into account in assessing the existence of a close connection within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012. The concepts used in that regulation cannot, therefore, be interpreted in a manner that disregards that principle. That principle is complied with, in particular, where the situations which are 'so closely connected' are, in general, foreseeable for a defendant. In that regard, it is sufficient that a well-informed and circumspect defendant can foresee before which courts other than those of the State of his or her domicile he or she could be sued. With regard more specifically to actions for damages based on competition law, that is the case where a defendant has participated in a single infringement of Article 101 TFEU as part of an undertaking. By virtue of that participation, he or she must be regarded as having created a close relationship with the other participants and as being able to reasonably foresee that he or she may be sued before the court of the place of establishment of another member of that undertaking. In view of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to point (b) of the first questions is that Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to assess whether the claims brought against several defendants are 'so closely connected' within the meaning of that provision, the predictability for the co-defendant of being sued in the court of the anchor defendant does not constitute an independent criterion, but must be taken into consideration, as a general principle, in the application of the special rule on jurisdiction laid down in that provision. The second questions in Cases C ‑ /23 and C ‑ /23, p oints (a) to (c) of the third question in Case C ‑ /23 and the third question in Case C ‑ /23 By its second questions in Cases C‑672/23 and C‑673/23, as well as points (a) to (c) of its third question in Case C‑672/23 and its third question in Case C‑673/23, the referring court asks the Court, in essence, to what extent it is appropriate, for the purposes of applying Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, to take into account certain factors relating to the merits of the main proceedings. It asks, in particular, whether the chances of success of the claim against the anchor defendant should be taken into account, especially where that claim seeks compensation for damage suffered outside the EEA, and whether, for that purpose, the following factors may be taken into account as evidence: the application of the presumption of decisive influence of parent companies, accepted in competition law, and the fact that an intermediate holding company, which merely holds and manages shareholdings, satisfies the criterion relating to the existence of a concrete connection between its economic activity and the subject matter of the infringement for which the parent company has been held liable. Since the referring court has referred a question concerning international jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, the questions referred to in the previous paragraph of the present judgment are relevant to the resolution of those disputes only in so far as they concern the determination of that jurisdiction. In that regard, it is for the Court, in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 39 of the present judgment, to reformulate the questions referred to it. In those circumstances, it must be held that, by the second questions in Cases C‑672/23 and C‑673/23 and points (a) to (c) of the third question in Case C‑672/23 and the third question in Case C‑673/23, which should be examined together, the referring court is essentially asking whether Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to assess whether the claims brought against several defendants are 'so closely connected' within the meaning of that provision, it is important to take into account the prospects of success of the claim against the anchor defendant, in particular where that claim seeks compensation for damage suffered outside the EEA, as an indication that the claimant has not artificially created the conditions for the application of that provision. In the first place, it should be noted that, when determining its international jurisdiction, the court before which the action is brought does not examine either the admissibility or the merits of the claim, but merely identifies the connecting factors with the State of the forum which are capable of establishing its jurisdiction under Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 (judgment of 13 February 2025, Athenian Brewery and Heineken , C‑393/23, EU:C:2025:85 , paragraph 41). The objective of legal certainty requires that the court before which the case is brought be able to rule on its own jurisdiction without being compelled to examine the merits of the case (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 January 2015, Kolassa , C‑375/13, EU:C:2015:37 , paragraph 61, and of 29 July 2024, FTI Touristik (International element) , C‑774/22, EU:C:2024:646 , paragraph 33 and the case-law cited). In the second place, it should be noted that the Court nevertheless held that Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 cannot be interpreted as allowing an applicant to sue several defendants for the sole purpose of removing one of them from the jurisdiction of the Member State of his or her domicile and, thereby, circumventing the rule of jurisdiction laid down in that provision by artificially creating or maintaining the conditions for its application (judgment of 7 September 2023, Beverage City Polska , C‑832/21, EU:C:2023:635 , paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). In that regard, the Court has held that that scenario of an abuse of the rules of jurisdiction is ruled out where, at the time the proceedings were brought, a close connection between the claims brought against each of the defendants, in that there is an interest in hearing and determining them together in order to avoid decisions which might be irreconcilable if the cases were decided separately (see, by analogy, judgments of 11 October 2007, Freeport , C‑98/06, EU:C:2007:595, paragraphs 52 and 54; of 21 May 2015, CDC Hydrogen Peroxide , C‑352/13, EU:C:2015:335 , paragraph 28; and of 7 September 2023, Beverage City Polska , C‑832/21, EU:C:2023:635 , paragraph 44 and the case-law cited). It follows that, where related claims, within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, are brought before the same court, that court may find that there has been a circumvention or abuse of that rule of jurisdiction only if there is convincing evidence enabling it to conclude that the claimant has artificially created or maintained the conditions for the application of that provision (see, by analogy, judgment of 21 May 2015, CDC Hydrogen Peroxide , C‑352/13, EU:C:2015:335 , paragraph 29). To that end, it is not sufficient that the action brought against the anchor defendant appears to be unfounded. At the time it is brought, such an action must be manifestly unfounded or artificial, or devoid of any real interest to the claimant (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2006, Reisch Montage , C‑103/05, EU:C:2006:471, paragraphs 31 and 32). As the Advocate General noted, in essence, in point 39 of her Opinion, the manifestly unfounded nature of the action brought against the anchor defendant may constitute an indication that the applicant has artificially created the conditions for the application of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012. In the third place, as regards the question of whether the likelihood of success of the claim against the anchor defendant may be taken into account, as an indicator, in assessing whether the claimant intended to circumvent the rule on jurisdiction laid down in Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, it should be noted, first, that in accordance with Article 1(1), Article 2(6) and Article 3(1) of Directive 2014/104, any natural or legal person who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition law within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU must be able to claim and obtain full compensation for that harm, where there is a causal link between that harm and a cartel or a practice prohibited by that Article 101 (see, in particular, judgment of 12 December 2019, Otis Gesellschaft and Others , C‑435/18, EU:C:2019:1069 , paragraphs 22, 23 and 30 and the case-law cited). Once a cartel has been implemented within the internal market, the European Union's competence to apply its competition rules to such conduct is covered by the principle of territoriality, which is generally recognised in international law (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 September 1988, Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v Commission , 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85 and 125/85 to 129/85, EU:C:1988:447, paragraphs 17 and 18). In that regard, the effective application of EU competition law throughout the internal market is, as stated in recital 1 of Directive 2014/104, necessary to prevent competition from being distorted within that market. Actions for damages before national courts can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the European Union (judgment of 14 June 2011, Pfleiderer , C‑360/09, EU:C:2011:389 , paragraph 29 and the case-law cited). It is irrelevant that the damage for which compensation is sought occurred outside the territory of the European Union, provided that it has a causal link with the anti-competitive conduct in question. Consequently, the fact that the damage relied on in support of an action for compensation for damage caused by a cartel, brought before a court of a Member State, occurred outside the EEA does not, in itself, allow that action to be regarded as manifestly unfounded at the stage of verifying the international jurisdiction of the court seised. Secondly, it should be noted that, as regards the application of the presumption that a parent company exercises a decisive influence over the economic activity of its subsidiary, it is clear from the Court's case-law that the concept of 'undertaking', within the meaning of the EU competition rules, cannot have a different scope depending on whether the matter concerns the imposition of fines or the bringing of actions for damages for infringement of those rules (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 March 2019, Skanska Industrial Solutions and Others , C‑724/17, EU:C:2019:204 , paragraph 47). The enforcement of EU competition rules by public authorities ('public enforcement'), on the one hand, and actions for damages for breach of those rules ('private enforcement'), on the other, form part of a single system for the enforcement of those rules, which is designed to penalise anti-competitive conduct by undertakings and to deter them from engaging in such conduct (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2021, Sumal , C‑882/19, EU:C:2021:800 , paragraph 37). It is also clear from settled case-law that the presumption of decisive influence and liability on the part of the parent company, developed in the context of challenges to Commission decisions adopted on the basis of Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, may also apply in the case of an action brought by a natural or legal person claiming to have suffered harm as a result of a company's participation in an infringement of EU competition rules, directed against another company which holds all or virtually all of the former's capital (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 February 2025, Athenian Brewery and Heineken , C‑393/23, EU:C:2025:85 , paragraph 39). It follows that the rebuttable presumption that a parent company which directly or indirectly holds all or virtually all of the capital of its subsidiary exercises a decisive influence over that subsidiary may be applied in actions for damages for infringement of EU competition rules. For the sole purpose of determining international jurisdiction under Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, it is sufficient for the national court to find that it cannot be ruled out that, at the time the action for damages was brought, the defendants concerned formed part of the same undertaking within the meaning of competition law. Thirdly, it should be noted, with regard to the existence of a genuine connection between the economic activity of an intermediate holding company, which merely manages and holds shareholdings, and the purpose of the offence committed by a 'grandparent' company, that, as the Advocate General points out in point 62 of her Opinion, such a holding company, taken in isolation, merely holds and manages shares and does not, as such, intervene in the market. However, the mere fact that the person to whom the subsidiary's conduct is attributed takes the form of a holding company does not preclude such attribution (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 July 2013, Commission v Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje , C‑440/11 P, EU:C:2013:514, paragraph 43, and of 18 July 2013, Schindler Holding and Others v Commission , C‑501/11 P, EU:C:2013:522 , paragraphs 101 to 116). As is apparent from paragraphs 57 to 63 of the present judgment, the economic activity of a subsidiary may be attributed to an intermediate holding company where, despite its own legal personality, that subsidiary does not determine its conduct on the market independently, but essentially follows the guidelines laid down by its parent company. That is particularly the case where a subsidiary of the intermediate holding company, over which the latter exercises a decisive influence, carries on an economic activity that has a concrete link with the subject matter of the offence committed by the 'grandparent' company. In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the second questions in Cases C‑672/23 and C‑673/23, to points (a) to (c) of the third question in Case C‑672/23 and to the third question in Case C‑673/23 is that Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to assess whether the claims brought against several defendants are 'so closely connected' within the meaning of that provision, the prospects of success of the claim against the anchor defendant should not be taken into account. However, it may be taken into account as an indication that the claimant has not artificially created the conditions for the application of that provision. The fact that the damage alleged in a claim for damages for cartel infringement before a court of a Member State occurred outside the EEA does not, in itself, imply, in the context of verifying the international jurisdiction of that court, that the claim must be classified as manifestly unfounded. P oint (b) of the fourth questions By point (b) of its fourth questions, which are worded identically in Cases C‑672/23 and C‑673/23, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as determining both the international jurisdiction and the territorial jurisdiction of the court of a Member State in whose jurisdiction the anchor defendant is domiciled. Under Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, 'a person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued[,] where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings'. That provision thus refers to the court of the domicile of one of the defendants, as identified by the law of the Member State concerned. The Court held that the reference to the 'courts for the place' where a party is domiciled must be understood, first, as designating the Member State whose courts have jurisdiction and, second, as conferring directly and immediately both international and territorial jurisdiction on the court of the place where the damage occurred (see, to that effect, judgments of 3 May 2007, Color Drack , C‑386/05, EU:C:2007:262 , paragraph 30; of 15 July 2021, Volvo and Others , C‑30/20, EU:C:2021:604 , paragraph 33; of 30 June 2022, Allianz Elementar Versicherung , C‑652/20, EU:C:2022:514 , paragraphs 37, 38 and 42; and of 29 July 2024, FTI Touristik (International element) , C‑774/22, EU:C:2024:646 , paragraph 42). By contrast, where Regulation No 1215/2012 refers to the 'courts of a Member State', in particular in Article 4(1), Article 7(6) or Article 11(1)(a) of Regulation No 1215/2012, that expression concerns only the international jurisdiction of the courts of that Member State (see, to that effect, judgments of 30 June 2022, Allianz Elementar Versicherung , C‑652/20, EU:C:2022:514 , paragraphs 37, 38 and 42, and of 29 July 2024, FTI Touristik (International element) , C‑774/22, EU:C:2024:646 , paragraph 42). With regard to the question of which court within the Member State thus identified has jurisdiction, it is clear from the wording of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, as interpreted by the Court, that that provision directly and immediately confers both international jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction on the court of the place where one of the defendants is domiciled. As the Advocate General noted in point 92 of her Opinion, that interpretation is supported by the report on the Convention of 27 September 1968, drawn up by Mr P. Jenard (OJ 1979 C 59, p. 44), from which it is apparent, with regard to Article 6(1) of that convention, which corresponds to Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, that the rule of jurisdiction laid down therein must be understood as designating, as the competent court, the court of the place where one of the defendants is domiciled. Such an interpretation also meets the requirements of the proper administration of justice in that it allows for the efficient procedural management of the dispute, the handling and assessment of evidence by a single court, and the prevention of the risk of conflicting decisions (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 December 2025, Stichting Right to Consumer Justice and Stichting App Stores Claims , C‑34/24, EU:C:2025:936 , paragraph 73). It should be noted that, given the specific nature of cases falling within the scope of competition law and, in particular, the fact that bringing actions for damages for an infringement of that law generally requires a complex factual and economic analysis, the consolidation of individual claims is likely to facilitate both the exercise of the right to compensation by the injured parties and the task of the court seised of the case. In the context of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012, the technical complexity of the rules governing actions for damages for infringements of competition law provisions may thus justify a concentration of jurisdiction (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 December 2025, Stichting Right to Consumer Justice and Stichting App Stores Claims , C‑34/24, EU:C:2025:936 , paragraph 74 and the case-law cited). In view of the foregoing, the answer to point (b) of the fourth questions is that Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as determining both the international jurisdiction and the territorial jurisdiction of the court of a Member State in whose jurisdiction the anchor defendant is domiciled. P oint (c) of the fourth questions By point (c) of its fourth questions, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as precluding a court of a Member State, initially seised on the basis of that provision, but which considers itself to lack territorial jurisdiction to hear the action brought against the anchor defendant, to decline jurisdiction in favour of another court in the same Member State designated as having territorial jurisdiction under national law. The referring court states in that regard that it is unlikely that Draka Holding and Smurfit Kappa International are the anchor defendants in the cases pending before it. In its view, that status applies to other defendants established in the Netherlands but located outside the jurisdiction of the rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam). In that regard, it should be noted that Regulation No 1215/2012 aims, in the field of cooperation in civil and commercial matters, to strengthen the simplified and effective system for rules of conflict, recognition and enforcement of judgments, in order to facilitate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the attainment of the objective set for the European Union of becoming an area of freedom, security and justice, and has as its basis the high level of trust which must exist between the Member States (judgment of 6 October 2021, TOTO and Vianini Lavori , C‑581/20, EU:C:2021:808 , paragraph 67). There is nothing in that regulation to prevent a court of a Member State from declining jurisdiction in favour of another court of the same Member State. The purpose of that regulation is not to harmonise the internal procedural rules of the Member States, but to allocate jurisdiction for the resolution of civil and commercial disputes in relations between Member States (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2021, TOTO and Vianini Lavori , C‑581/20, EU:C:2021:808 , paragraph 68). It is also settled case-law that, as regards procedural rules, reference must be made to the national procedural rules applicable before the court seised, provided that their application does not undermine the effectiveness of Regulation No 1215/2012 (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 March 1995, Shevill and Others , C‑68/93, EU:C:1995:61, paragraph 36). It follows, as the Advocate General noted in point 97 of her Opinion, that a court which considers that it lacks jurisdiction under national rules on internal territorial jurisdiction may, under those rules, decline jurisdiction in favour of the court which it considers to have jurisdiction, provided that such a transfer does not have the effect of compromising the effective application of Regulation No 1215/2012, in particular as regards the rule of special jurisdiction laid down in Article 8(1) thereof. In view of the foregoing, the answer to point (c) of the fourth questions is that Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as not precluding a court of a Member State, initially seised on the basis of that provision, but which considers that it does not have territorial jurisdiction to hear the action brought against the anchor defendant, to decline jurisdiction in favour of another court of the same Member State with jurisdiction to hear the action, provided that such a decline of jurisdiction is in accordance with national rules of procedure and does not undermine the effectiveness of that regulation. P oint (a) of the fourth questions By point (a) of its fourth questions, which are worded identically in Cases C‑672/23 and C‑673/23, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that several defendants established in the same Member State may, jointly, be regarded as constituting the anchor defendant for the purposes of applying that provision. In that regard, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the justification for making a request for a preliminary ruling is not for advisory opinions to be delivered on general or hypothetical questions, but rather that it is necessary for the effective resolution of a dispute concerning EU law (judgment of 3 October 2019, A and Others , C‑70/18, EU:C:2019:823 , paragraph 73). The territorial jurisdiction of the rechtbank Amsterdam (District Court, Amsterdam) in the main proceedings is not dependent on whether several defendants established in the same Member State can be regarded jointly as the anchor defendant within the meaning of Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012. The answer to point (a) of the fourth questions is therefore unlikely to have any influence on the outcome of the main proceedings and must therefore be regarded as manifestly irrelevant to their resolution. Consequently, there is no need to answer point (a) of the fourth questions. Costs Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules: 1. Article 8(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, must be interpreted as meaning that, on the one hand, an action brought against a defendant who serves as the anchor for establishing the jurisdiction of the court seised and who has not been identified as liable for an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992 found by the European Commission or a national competition authority and, on the other hand, actions brought against companies in respect of which there are serious indications that they belong to undertakings, within the meaning of EU competition law, to which that infringement has been attributed, may be 'so closely connected' for the purposes of that provision. 2. Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to assess whether the claims brought against several defendants are 'so closely connected' within the meaning of that provision, the predictability for the co-defendant of being sued in the court of the defendant who serves as the anchor for establishing the jurisdiction of the court seised does not constitute an independent criterion, but must be taken into consideration, as a general principle, in the application of the special rule on jurisdiction laid down in that provision. 3. Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to assess whether the claims brought against several defendants are 'so closely connected' within the meaning of that provision, the prospects of success of the claim against the defendant who serves as the anchor for establishing the jurisdiction of the court seised should not be taken into account. However, it may be taken into account as an indication that the claimant has not artificially created the conditions for the application of that provision. The fact that the damage alleged in a claim for damages for cartel infringement before a court of a Member State occurred outside the EEA does not, in itself, imply, in the context of verifying the international jurisdiction of that court, that the claim must be classified as manifestly unfounded. 4. Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as meaning that it determines both the international jurisdiction and the territorial jurisdiction of the court of a Member State in whose jurisdiction the defendant who serves as the anchor for establishing the jurisdiction of the court seised is domiciled. 5. Article 8(1) of Regulation No 1215/2012 must be interpreted as not precluding a court of a Member State, initially seised on the basis of that provision, but which considers that it does not have territorial jurisdiction to hear the action brought against the defendant who serves as the anchor for establishing the jurisdiction of the court seised, to decline jurisdiction in favour of another court of the same Member State with jurisdiction to hear the action, provided that such a decline of jurisdiction is in accordance with national rules of procedure and does not undermine the effectiveness of that regulation. [Signatures] * Language of the case: Dutch. © European Union The source of this judgment is the Europa web site. The information on this site is subject to a information found here: Important legal notice . This electronic version is not authentic and is subject to amendment. BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII