Iran Liquefied Natural Gas v Council (Judgment) [2015] EUECJ T-5/13 (18 September 2015)

Judgment Background to the dispute The applicant, Iran Liquefied Natural Gas Co., is an Iranian company formed in 2006 in order to carry out a special project consisting in the construction of a liquefied natural gas production plant in Iran and running it as owner-operator. This case has been brought in connection with the restrictive measures introduced in order to apply pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran to end proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. On 9 June 2010, the United Nations Security Council (‘the Security Council’) adopted resolution 1929 (2010) (‘Resolution 1929’) with the intention of widening the scope of the restrictive measures introduced by Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and introducing additional restrictive measures against Iran. On 17 June 2010, the European Council underlined its deepening concern about Iran’s nuclear programme and welcomed the adoption of Resolution 1929. Recalling its declaration of 11 December 2009, it invited the Council of the European Union to adopt measures implementing those contained in Resolution 1929 as well as accompanying measures, with a view to supporting the resolution of all outstanding concerns regarding Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, through negotiation. The measures in question were to focus on the areas of trade, the financial sector, the Iranian transport sector, key sectors of the gas and oil industry and additional designations, in particular for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. On 26 July 2010, the Council of the European Union adopted Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140/CFSP (OJ 2010 L 195, p. 39), Annex II to which lists the persons and entities — other than those designated by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee created by resolution 1737 (2006), referred to in Annex I - whose assets were to be frozen. Recital 22 in the preamble thereto refers to Resolution 1929 and states that that resolution notes the potential connection between the revenues derived by Iran from its energy sector and the funding of its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. On 23 January 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/35/CFSP amending Decision 2010/413 (OJ 2012 L 19, p. 22). Recital 13 in the preamble thereto states that the restrictions on admission and the freezing of funds and economic resources should be applied to additional persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran allowing it to pursue proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, in particular persons and entities providing financial, logistical or material support to the Government of Iran. Article 1(7)(a)(ii) of Decision 2012/35 added the following point to Article 20(1) of Decision 2010/413, which provides for the freezing of funds belonging to persons and entities: ‘(c) other persons and entities not covered by Annex I that provide support to the Government of Iran, and persons and entities associated with them, as listed in Annex II’. Consequently, within the framework of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, on 23 March 2012 the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 (OJ 2012 L 88, p. 1). In order to implement Article 1(7)(a)(ii) of Decision 2012/35, Article 23(2) of that regulation provides for the freezing of funds of the persons, entities and bodies listed in Annex IX thereto, who have been identified as: ‘(d) being other persons, entities or bodies that provide support, such as material, logistical or financial support, to the Government of Iran, and persons and entities associated with them’. On 15 October 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/635/CFSP amending Decision 2010/413 (OJ 2012 L 282, p. 58; ‘the contested decision’). According to recital 16 in the preamble to that decision, additional persons and entities should be included in the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures as set out in Annex II to Decision 2010/413, in particular Iranian State-owned entities engaged in the oil and gas sector, since they provide a substantial source of revenue for the Iranian Government. Article 1(8)(a) of the contested decision amended Article 20(1)(c) of Decision 2010/413, which thus provides for the imposition of restrictive measures on: ‘(c) other persons and entities not covered by Annex I that provide support to the Government of Iran and entities owned or controlled by them or persons and entities associated with them, as listed in Annex II’. Article 2 of the contested decision placed the applicant’s name in Table I of Annex II to Decision 2010/413, which contains the list of ‘[p]ersons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran’. Consequently, on the same day, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) No 945/2012 implementing Regulation No 267/2012 (OJ 2012 L 282, p. 16; ‘the contested regulation’). Article 1 of the contested regulation placed the applicant’s name in Table I of Annex IX to Regulation No 267/2012, which contains the list of ‘[p]ersons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government of Iran’. The applicant’s name was entered on the lists in Annex II to Decision 2010/413 and Annex IX to Regulation No 267/2012 (‘the lists’) by the contested decision and the contested regulation (together ‘the contested measures’) on the following ground: ‘Subsidiary of National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)’. The Council published a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union on 16 October 2012 for the attention of the persons and entities to which the restrictive measures provided for in the contested measures apply (OJ 2012 C 312, p. 21). It also notified the contested measures to the applicant by letter of the same date. The applicant stated, however, that it had not received that letter of notification. By letter of 19 November 2012, the applicant asked the Council to provide it with a copy of the official letter of notification, together with a statement of its reasons for including the applicant’s name in the lists. The Council acknowledged receipt of that request on 26 November 2012. By letter of 3 December 2012, the Council sent the applicant a copy of the official letter of notification of 16 October 2012, enclosing copies of the contested measures. By letter of 11 December 2012, the Council informed the applicant that any observations concerning the applicant’s inclusion in the lists were to be sent to the Council by 31 January 2013, so that they could be taken into account in the review of that listing. On the same day, the applicant asked the Council to inform it of the reasons for its decision to place the applicant on the lists and to give the applicant access to the documents on which it had relied in adopting its decision. By letter of 20 December 2012, the applicant repeated the request made in its letter of 11 December 2012 and asserted that the Council had infringed the applicant’s rights of defence by not sending it the requested documents. On 4 January 2013, the Council acknowledged receipt of the applicant’s letters of 11 and 20 December 2012 and stated that they were under examination. By letter of 1 February 2013, the applicant informed the Council that, despite its repeated requests, it had not yet had access to the documents in its file, and again asked the Council to send it copies of those documents. By letter of 28 February 2013, the applicant told the Council that the failure to reply to its letters had to be regarded as an unlawful refusal to grant it access to the requested documents. The applicant therefore asked the Council to review that decision and to give it access to those documents; or to inform it that those documents did not exist; or to state the reasons why they could not be disclosed to the applicant. The Council replied by letter of 12 March 2013 to the applicant’s letter of 11 December 2012 and gave it access to the following documents: – the proposals submitted by a Member State for the inclusion of the applicant’s name in the lists; – the report of the meeting of the ‘COMEM’ (Middle East/Gulf) Working Party on 9 October 2012; – the notes of 11 and 12 October 2012 from the Council’s General Secretariat to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper)/Council, and of 12 October 2012 from Coreper to the Council. In that letter of 12 March 2013, the Council stated that it had no other documents or information concerning the applicant. The applicant replied to the Council by letter of 5 April 2013, asserting that the decision to include its name in the lists had been adopted on the basis of a proposal from a Member State, but that the Council had not made certain that the proposal was justified. The applicant also stated that it was not a subsidiary of NIOC and that its name should therefore be removed from the lists. Procedure and forms of order sought By application lodged at the Court Registry on 9 January 2013, the applicant brought the present action. By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 9 January 2013, the applicant lodged a request for an expedited procedure in accordance with Article 154 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. On 4 February 2013, the Council lodged its observations regarding that request. By decision of 8 March 2013, the General Court (Fourth Chamber) refused the request for an expedited procedure. By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 11 July 2013, the applicant applied for interim measures, claiming in essence that the President of the Court should suspend operation of (1) the contested measures, in so far as they concerned the applicant, and (2) Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1263/2012 of 21 December 2012 amending Regulation No 267/2012 (OJ 2012 L 356, p. 34) to the extent that that act wholly frustrates the performance of contracts that the applicant had concluded with partners established in the European Union. By order of 29 August 2013 in Iran Liquefied Natural Gas v Council (T‑5/13 R, EU:T:2013:395), the application for interim measures was refused and the costs reserved. By order of the President of the Fourth Chamber of the General Court of 3 September 2013, the proceedings in the present case were stayed pending delivery of the judgment of the General Court in Case T‑578/12 National Iranian Oil Company v Council . The judgment in National Iranian Oil Company v Council (T‑578/12, EU:T:2014:678 ) was delivered on 16 July 2014 and the proceedings in the present case were resumed. The Court decided to obtain the parties’ observations on the consequences of that judgment in the context of the present action. The parties complied with that request within the prescribed period. Following a change in the composition of the Chambers of the Court, the Judge-Rapporteur was assigned to the Seventh Chamber, to which the present case was accordingly allocated. The applicant claims that the Court should: – annul the contested measures, in so far as they concern the applicant; – order the Council to pay the costs. The Council contends that the Court should: – dismiss the action as inadmissible or, in the alternative, as unfounded; – order the applicant to pay the costs. In the reply, the applicant essentially repeats the claims set out in the application and requests, in addition, that the Court declare Article 1 of Regulation No 1263/2012 inapplicable in so far as it concerns the applicant. However, at the hearing, in response to a question put by the Court, the applicant declared that that request did not constitute a head of claim but was a contextual element to be taken into consideration when assessing the legality of the contested measures. Law Admissibility Without raising a formal plea of inadmissibility, the Council contends that the present action is inadmissible. It claims that the applicant must be regarded as a governmental organisation for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘ECHR’); that article defines the persons who may bring an application before the European Court of Human Rights, and excludes governmental organisations from the protection of that court. The Council argues that the applicant is a public undertaking whose share capital is owned, via its parent company, by the Iranian State. The Council contends that, as an emanation of the Iranian State, the applicant does not have locus standi to bring an action claiming an infringement of the right to protection of property or other fundamental rights. In that regard, the Council distinguishes, on the one hand, certain procedural rights, which States are accepted as having, and, on the other, fundamental rights, such as the right to property, which States cannot enjoy. The Council argues that that plea of inadmissibility applies to all the pleas in law relied on, because the aim of the present action is really to obtain the annulment of the freezing of funds, which is an interference — albeit justified — in the right to property. It is therefore immaterial that not all the pleas in law specifically refer to that right. According to the Council, the ratio legis of Article 34 of the ECHR resides in the very nature of fundamental rights; a State must respect the fundamental rights of natural and legal persons under its jurisdiction for the purposes of the ECHR. A State, or one of its emanations, cannot therefore enjoy fundamental rights, since a sovereign State is not subject to the jurisdiction of another State. In the Council’s view, despite the absence of any express provision of a similar type in the Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union , the principle that a State does not enjoy fundamental rights can be transposed to the European Union’s legal system, both as regards Member States and non-Member States, or emanations thereof. Accordingly, it is not for the European Union courts to settle disputes between the European Union and non-Member States relating to non-Member States’ rights to property. The applicant is of the view that its action and all the pleas in law on which it relies are admissible. It should be recalled in that regard that, in its judgments of 29 January 2013 in Bank Mellat v Council (T‑496/10, ECR, under appeal, EU:T:2013:39) and 5 February 2013 in Bank Saderat Iran v Council (T‑494/10, ECR, under appeal, EU:T:2013:59), the Court has already had the opportunity to reject a similar line of argument, raised by the Council and supported by the Commission, against the pleas put forward by the applicants alleging infringement of fundamental rights, the Council and the Commission claiming that those applicants were emanations of the Iranian State. Moreover, in its judgment of 28 November 2013 in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft (C‑348/12 P, ECR, EU:C:2013:776 ), the Court of Justice rejected the inadmissibility arguments raised by the Council and the Commission according to which, as an emanation of the Iranian State, Kala Naft did not enjoy protection of fundamental rights. In that regard, the Court held that, in so far as the action fell within the scope of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, and in so far as the applicant had locus standi and an interest in bringing proceedings against its listing, that line of argument ‘did not concern the admissibility of the action or even of a plea, but related to the merits of the case’. The Court thus confirmed, in essence, that an entity which is an emanation of a non-Member State is entitled to bring an action for annulment of the restrictive measures adopted against it. In the present case, it should be noted that, unlike its line of argument before the General Court in the cases giving rise to the judgments of 25 April 2012 in Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft v Council (T‑509/10, ECR, EU:T:2012:201), Bank Mellat v Council , cited in paragraph 43 above (EU:T:2013:39), and Bank Saderat Iran v Council , cited in paragraph 43 above (EU:T:2013:59), in which it did not plead that the action as a whole was inadmissible, the Council is not merely challenging ‘[w]hether it is open to the applicant to rely on fundamental rights protection and guarantees’. The Council expressly contends that this action is inadmissible in its entirety. The plea of inadmissibility raised by the Council cannot be accepted. It must be observed that this action falls within the scope of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, in conjunction with the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, inasmuch as it seeks the annulment of the contested decision, which was based on Article 29 TEU. The second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU expressly provides that decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the EU Treaty are subject to review of legality in accordance with the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. The fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU confers on any natural or legal person locus standi to institute proceedings against acts of the EU institutions, provided that the conditions laid down in that provision are met, which is the case here and indeed is not disputed. In the present case, the applicant has locus standi and an interest in bringing legal proceedings against the contested measures in so far as those measures include the applicant in the lists (see, to that effect, judgment in Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft v Council , cited in paragraph 44 above, EU:T:2013:776, paragraph 50). In that regard, it must be recalled that the individual nature of the restrictive measures adopted against a person permits access, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU and the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, to the Courts of the European Union (judgment of 23 April 2013 in Gbagbo and Others v Council , C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P, ECR, EU:C:2013:258 , paragraph 58). Accordingly, in so far as neither the two abovementioned articles nor any other provision of EU primary law excludes non-Member States from that right of action, a legal person which is an emanation of a non-Member State cannot be deprived of the right to bring an action against a fund-freezing measure adopted against it in order to obtain review of the legality of that measure. Such an approach would infringe Article 263 TFEU and the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU and would therefore be contrary to the system of judicial protection established in the FEU Treaty, and to the right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (see, to that effect, Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft , C‑348/12 P, ECR, EU:C:2013:470, point 64). In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Council must be rejected. Substance In support of its action, the applicant puts forward six pleas in law, alleging, respectively: (i) infringement of the right to be heard; (ii) infringement of the obligation to notify; (iii) infringement of the obligation to state reasons; (iv) infringement of the rights of the defence and of the right to effective judicial protection; (v) error of assessment; (vi) breach of the principle of proportionality and infringement of the right to property. It is appropriate to begin by examining the fifth plea. In the context of its fifth plea, the applicant submits that it is not a subsidiary of NIOC and that the Council therefore made an error of assessment in placing its name on the lists for that reason. The Council contends, in essence, that since the members of the board of directors of NIOC also constitute the board of trustees of the applicant’s majority shareholder, the applicant is controlled by NIOC and may consequently be considered a subsidiary of NIOC. It must be observed that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights requires, in particular, that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to list or to maintain the listing of a given person, the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013 in Commission and Others v Kadi , C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, ECR, EU:C:2013:518 , paragraph 119). It is the task of the competent EU authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. It is necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned. If that material is insufficient to allow a finding that a reason is well founded, the Courts of the European Union shall disregard that reason as a possible basis for the contested decision to list or maintain a listing (judgment in Commission and Others v Kadi , cited in paragraph 54 above, EU:C:2013:518 , paragraphs 121 to 123). In the present case, it is apparent from the documents provided by the applicant that, as at the date on which the contested measures were adopted, ownership of the applicant’s share capital was as follows: – 49% owned by the Social Security Organisation, to which National Iranian Gas Export Co., a subsidiary of NIOC, transferred its shares on 18 March 2012; – 50% (less two shares) owned by the Petroleum Industry Pension Saving Fund (‘PIPF’); – 1% owned by Oil Pension Fund Investment Co. (‘Investorco’), a 99.9% subsidiary of PIPF; – 1 share owned by Saba Naft Construction and Engineering Co., a 99.9% subsidiary of Investorco; – 1 share owned by Jey Oil Refining Co., a 99.9% subsidiary of Investorco. It must be noted, as did the Council, that by holding almost all the share capital of Investorco, Saba Naft and Jey Oil Refining, PIPF is, de facto , holding 51% of the applicant’s share capital and is thus the applicant’s majority shareholder. However, PIPF’s majority interest in the applicant’s share capital does not in any way lead to the conclusion that the applicant is a subsidiary of NIOC. First, examination of the composition of the shareholdings in the applicant clearly shows that NIOC does not own any shares, even indirectly, in the capital of the applicant or in that of PIPF and does not, therefore, have any voting rights in those companies. Secondly, the Council’s file contains nothing to permit the inference that NIOC exerts control over the applicant through PIPF. The Court would point out in that regard that the mere fact that the members of the board of directors of NIOC also constitute the board of trustees of PIPF is not sufficient to establish the existence of such control. In the absence of information regarding the person or entity authorised to appoint the members of those boards of directors or trustees, there is nothing to support the conclusion that it is NIOC which exerts control over PIPF, and not vice versa. The identity of the persons on the board of directors of NIOC and on the board of trustees of PIPF reveals, at most, that those entities are sister companies, but does not in any way support the conclusion that one of them is a subsidiary of the other or, therefore, that the applicant is a subsidiary of NIOC. Consequently, the decision to place the applicant’s name on the lists on the ground that it is a subsidiary of NIOC is not justified. Given that that was the only reason given in respect of the applicant when the contested measures were adopted, the other reasons which the Council put forward in the course of the proceedings before this Court, such as the importance of the applicant’s activities in the Iranian gas and oil industries, cannot be taken into consideration. According to the case-law, the legality of the contested measures may be assessed only on the basis of the elements of fact and of law on which they were adopted. The Court cannot, therefore, substitute the grounds on which those measures are based (see judgment of 12 November 2013 in North Drilling v Council , T‑552/12, EU:T:2013:590, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited). In the light of the foregoing, the fifth plea, alleging an error of assessment, must therefore be upheld and the contested measures annulled without there being any need to examine the other pleas put forward by the applicant. Temporal effects of the annulment of the contested measures The applicant submits that there are no valid grounds, under the second paragraph of Article 264 TFEU, for maintaining any effects of the contested measures until such time as the Council might adopt a new decision. It must be borne in mind that, under the second paragraph of Article 264 TFEU, the Court may, if it considers it necessary, state which of the effects of the act which it has declared void are to be considered as definitive. It follows from the case-law that the General Court may, on the basis of that provision, decide the date when its annulling judgments are to take effect (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 December 2013 in Nabipour and Others v Council , T‑58/12, EU:T:2013:640, paragraphs 250 and 251). In the circumstances of the present case, the Court considers, for the reasons set out below, that it is necessary to suspend the taking effect of this judgment until the date of expiry of the period for bringing an appeal stated in the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice or, if an appeal has been brought within that period, until the dismissal of the appeal. The nuclear programme pursued by the Islamic Republic of Iran is a source of serious concern at both the international and European levels. That is the background to the Council’s gradual extension of the number of restrictive measures adopted against that State, in order to hinder the development of activities which jeopardise peace and international security, in the context of implementation of Security Council resolutions. Consequently, the applicant’s interest in ensuring that this annulling judgment should take effect immediately must be weighed against the objective of general interest pursued by the European Union’s policy in relation to restrictive measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The adjustment of the temporal effects of the annulment of a restrictive measure may thus be justified by the need to ensure that the restrictive measures are effective and, in short, by overriding considerations pertaining to the security or to the conduct of the international relations of the European Union and of its Member States (see, by analogy with the absence of an obligation to inform the person or entity concerned beforehand of the grounds for an initial listing, judgment of 21 December 2011 in France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran , C‑27/09 P, ECR, EU:C:2011:853, paragraph 67). The annulment with immediate effect of the contested measures in so far as they concern the applicant would enable other designated entities or the Government of Iran to use the applicant to circumvent the restrictive measures taken against Iran, without the Council being able, if appropriate, to apply in good time Article 266 TFEU, with a view to correcting the irregularities identified in this judgment, and consequently the effectiveness of those restrictive measures might be seriously and irreversibly prejudiced. As regards the application of Article 266 TFEU in this case, it must be observed that the annulment by this judgment of the applicant’s listing stems from the fact that the reasons stated for that listing are not supported by sufficient evidence. Although it is for the Council to decide on what measures to adopt to comply with this judgment, a further listing of the applicant cannot automatically be ruled out. In the course of a further review, it would be open to the Council to re-list the applicant on the basis of reasons which are supported to the requisite legal standard. It follows that the effects of the contested measures must be maintained as regards the applicant until the date of expiry of the period for bringing an appeal or, if an appeal is brought within that period, until the dismissal of the appeal. Costs Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the Council has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs of the present proceedings and of those relating to the application for interim measures, in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber) hereby: 1) Annuls Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP of 15 October 2012 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran, in so far as it listed Iran Liquefied Natural Gas Co. in Annex II to Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140/CFSP; 2) Annuls Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 945/2012 of 15 October 2012 implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran, in so far as it listed Iran Liquefied Natural Gas in Annex IX to Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010; 3) Orders the effects of Decision 2012/635 and Implementing Regulation No 945/2012 to be maintained as regards Iran Liquefied Natural Gas until the date of expiry of the period for bringing an appeal stated in the first paragraph of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union or, if an appeal has been brought within that period, until the dismissal of the appeal; 4) Orders the Council of the European Union to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Iran Liquefied Natural Gas in the context of the present proceedings and of the proceedings relating to the application for interim measures. Van der Woude Wiszniewska-Białecka Ulloa Rubio Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 18 September 2015. [Signatures] * Language of the case: English. © European Union The source of this judgment is the Europa web site. The information on this site is subject to a information found here: Important legal notice . This electronic version is not authentic and is subject to amendment. BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII