Bariello (Social policy - Principle of non-discrimination - support the in-service training of teachers and enhance their professional skills - Judgment) [2026] EUECJ C-654/24 (29 January 2026)

Judgment This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of clause 4 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999 ('the Framework Agreement'), which is annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43), and of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ('the Charter'). The request has been made in proceedings between M. M., a former teacher employed on a fixed-term basis, and the Ministero dell'Istruzione e del Merito (Ministry of Education and Merit, Italy) ('the Ministry') concerning the refusal to grant that teacher, for the academic years 2020/2021 to 2023/2024, the annual allowance in the form of an electronic card enabling teachers to purchase different goods and services, granted to support their in-service training and to enhance their professional skills. Legal context European Union law Under Article 1 of Directive 1999/70, the purpose of that directive is 'to put into effect the [Framework Agreement]'. Clause 2 of the Framework Agreement, entitled 'Scope', provides, in paragraph 1 thereof: 'This agreement applies to fixed-term workers who have an employment contract or employment relationship as defined in law, collective agreements or practice in each Member State'. Clause 3 of the Framework Agreement, entitled 'Definitions', is worded as follows: '1. For the purpose of this agreement[,] the term “fixed-term worker” means a person having an employment contract or relationship entered into directly between an employer and a worker where the end of the employment contract or relationship is determined by objective conditions such as reaching a specific date, completing a specific task, or the occurrence of a specific event. 2. For the purpose of this agreement, the term “comparable permanent worker” means a worker with an employment contract or relationship of indefinite duration, in the same establishment, engaged in the same or similar work/occupation, due regard being given to qualifications/skills. …' Clause 4 of the Framework Agreement, entitled 'Principle of non-discrimination', specifies, in paragraph 1 thereof: 'In respect of employment conditions, fixed-term workers shall not be treated in a less favourable manner than comparable permanent workers solely because they have a fixed-term contract or relation unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds.' Italian law Article 1 of legge n. 107 – Riforma del sistema nazionale di istruzione e formazione e delega per il riordino delle disposizioni legislative vigenti (Law No 107 reforming the national education and training system and introducing delegation measures for the reorganisation of the legislative provisions in force) of 13 July 2015 (GURI No 162 of 15 July 2015; 'Law No 107/2015'), states, in paragraphs 121 and 122: '121. In order to support the in-service training of teachers and to enhance their professional skills, an electronic card for the professional development and training of tenured teaching staff at teaching establishments at all levels is created, within the spending limit set out in paragraph 123. The card, having a nominal value of EUR 500 per academic year, can be used to purchase books and texts, including those in digital form, publications and journals relevant in any way for professional development, to purchase hardware and software, to enrol in professional development and certification courses for professional skills, organised by bodies accredited by the [Ministry], in undergraduate or masters courses related to the job profile, or in postgraduate courses or specialist masters courses related to the job profile, to attend theatrical performances and film [screenings], to access museums, exhibitions, cultural events and live performances, and for initiatives consistent with the activities identified under the three-year school educational plan and the national training plan referred to in paragraph 124. The sum charged on the card does not constitute additional remuneration or taxable income. 122. By decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, in agreement with the [Ministry] and the Ministry of Economy and Finance – to be adopted within 60 days from the date of entry into force of the present law – the criteria and procedures for allocating and using the card referred to in paragraph 121 and the amount to be allocated within the available resources referred to in paragraph 123, taking into account the public digital identity management system, and the procedures for providing the advantages and benefits associated with that card shall be defined.' The decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri recante Disciplina delle modalità di assegnazione e utilizzo della Carta elettronica per l'aggiornamento e la formazione del docente di ruolo delle istituzioni scolastiche di ogni ordine e grado (Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers regulating the procedures for the award and use of the electronic card for the professional development of tenured teaching staff in educational establishments of all levels) of 28 November 2016 (GURI No 281 of 1 December 2016), adopted pursuant to Article 1(122) of Law No 107/2015, provides, at Article 3(2) thereof: 'The card [referred to in Article 1(121) of Law No 107/2015] may no longer be used after termination of service.' The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling During the four school years 2020/2021 to 2023/2024, M. M. was employed as a teacher by the Ministry on a fixed-term basis. Not having been granted the benefit of the electronic card provided for in Article 1(121) of Law No 107/2015 ('the electronic card in question') in respect of those school years, M. M. brought an action on 5 April 2024 before the Tribunale ordinario di Ravenna (District Court, Ravenna, Italy), which is the referring court, by which she requests that the Ministry be ordered, primarily, to make available to her, in accordance with the rules governing the grant and use of the electronic card in question, the annual EUR 500 allowance represented by that card for each of those school years and, in the alternative, to pay her the sum of EUR 2 000 in total. The referring court states, first of all, that the electronic card in question, which is intended to support the in-service training of teachers, takes the form of an internet application, which generates a purchase code or a purchase order for the teacher for the goods or services which he or she has previously selected, and that the trader concerned can accept that card only for products which comply with the regulatory framework. Following the purchase of a product or service, the trader is granted a receivable of a corresponding amount vis-à-vis the Ministry. That court states, moreover, that the electronic card in question was initially granted only, pursuant to Article 1(121) of Law No 107/2015, to teachers employed on a permanent basis. It is apparent, however, from the order of 18 May 2022, Ministero dell'istruzione (Electronic Card) (C‑450/21, EU:C:2022:411), that that law is contrary to clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement in so far as it excludes from the benefit of that card teachers, such as M. M., who are employed on a fixed-term basis. According to the referring court, it appeared to follow from that order that teachers employed on a fixed-term basis have a right to be granted the electronic card in question. The Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy), by Decision No 29961/2023, of 4 October 2023, limited in several respects the rules for bringing legal proceedings in order to benefit from such a right, by ruling in particular that, among the persons who were wrongly deprived of the benefit of that card, only those who, on the date on which the court ruled on their right, were still in the service of the school system – in so far as they were employed as substitute teachers, registered on the reserve lists for substitute teachers, or had become tenured teaching staff – were entitled to the retrospective grant of that card. By contrast, according to that judgment, if the person concerned has in the meantime left the school system, as is the case with M. M., whose last employment contract expired on 30 June 2024 and who no longer performs any teaching duties and is not included on those reserve lists, the pecuniary obligation linked to the electronic card in question lapses retroactively and the application for that card is rejected on the merits. It is true that, in that judgment, the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) held that, in such a situation, the former teacher may claim compensation for the harm suffered as a result of the failure to grant the electronic card in question, instead of applying for that card. However, such an action for compensation is subject to a series of additional conditions, both substantive and procedural. Thus, it is for the person concerned to allege and prove that he or she has suffered specific harm, distinct from that linked solely to the loss of the sum of EUR 500 per year. Furthermore, the damage is not presumed and, although the judge may assess the damage on an equitable basis, such an assessment would, in principle, result in the award of a compensatory amount lower than that sum. In the present case, having regard to those conditions, the action brought by M. M. should be dismissed, in so far as, in particular, she has neither alleged nor demonstrated the existence of specific harm that is distinct from the mere loss of the economic benefit of EUR 500 per year. In the opinion of that court, those conditions are contrary to the prohibition of discrimination laid down in clause 4 of the Framework Agreement, in so far as they do not apply to teachers employed on a permanent basis. Furthermore, that court considers that the harm in the present case consists of the very fact that M. M. was deprived, contrary to clause 4, of the sum associated with the electronic card in question, since it was specified that the non-payment of such a sum is, as a general rule, sufficient for the judge automatically to award the person concerned an amount by way of compensation for that harm, together with interest. Consequently, to require a former teacher employed on a fixed-term basis to comply with specific conditions for obtaining compensation for the harm suffered by him or her as a result of the failure to grant the electronic card in question would undermine the effectiveness of EU law and would frustrate such a teacher's right to an effective remedy, within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter. The referring court adds, first, that the objective of introducing the electronic card in question, which is to support in-service training of teachers, is not such as to justify such conditions, in so far as that card makes it possible to purchase everyday consumer goods which are not strictly training tools, but which only have potential in that regard. Second, there are no practical or legal obstacles to the grant of the EUR 500 allowance linked to the electronic card in question to a teacher who is no longer employed in the school system or to the payment of automatic compensation up to the amount of that allowance, since, under Italian law, the discharge of a pecuniary obligation is always possible, and that obligation cannot be extinguished retroactively. Thus, according to the referring court, it is contrary to clause 4 of the Framework Agreement, as interpreted by the Court of Justice in its order referred to in paragraph 12 above, for M. M. to have been retroactively deprived of the grant, in the form of the electronic card in question, of a total amount of EUR 2 000 for the school years 2020/2021 to 2023/2024, on the sole ground that she is no longer employed in the school system. In those circumstances, the Tribunale ordinario di Ravenna (District Court, Ravenna) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: 'Must clause 4 of the [Framework Agreement] be interpreted (including for the purposes of the effectiveness of EU law and the guarantee of an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter) as precluding the limitations set out in the grounds [of the request for a preliminary ruling] (in the event of the applicant no longer being included in the [school] system) introduced by national case-law in the award of the [electronic card in question] and, therefore, is it necessary and sufficient, including for former teachers (persons outside the [school] system), in order to receive payment of the sums to which they would have been entitled during the course of their employment relationship under the [electronic card in question] (EUR 500 per year), to submit an application to the courts for payment of those sums, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the [electronic card in question] or directly in money which is legal tender, without any further burdens being imposed in relation to applications, allegations or proof?' Consideration of the question referred Admissibility The Italian Government submits that the question referred is inadmissible for several reasons. First, it submits that that question does not distinguish between the different categories of teachers employed on a fixed-term basis, whereas, in particular, the category of teachers carrying out short-term substitute teaching is not, in any event, entitled to the grant of the electronic card in question. Second, that question is not comprehensible in so far as it refers, as regards its scope, to the entire reasoning for the request for a preliminary ruling. Third, the same question concerns a difference in treatment based not on the fixed-term nature of the employment relationship, but solely on the fact that the teacher concerned left the school system, irrespective of the reason why. Fourth and lastly, since the applicant in the main proceedings is no longer in service, the Framework Agreement is no longer applicable to her. It should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court of Justice may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court for a preliminary ruling only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 4 September 2025, Pelavi , C‑253/24, EU:C:2025:660 , paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). In the present case, the referring court notes that M. M. is seeking, in essence, payment of the allowance linked to the electronic card in question, in respect of the school years 2020/2021 to 2023/2024 during which she worked as a teacher employed on a fixed-term basis. That court considers that that claim should, in principle, be granted, but states that it is prevented from doing so by the conditions imposed by the case-law of the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) on the retrospective grant of such a card. It thus appears, first of all, that, contrary to what the Italian Government appears to suggest, that court starts from the premiss that M. M. does not fall within a category of teachers who would in any event be excluded from the benefit of the electronic card in question. Next, it should be noted that, in the request for a preliminary ruling, the referring court describes precisely the scope of the conditions laid down by the case-law of the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation), as set out in paragraphs 13 to 16 above. While it is true that the wording of that question refers to the 'grounds' of that request, the fact remains that, in addition to the clarifications set out in those grounds, that question is understandable in itself. Furthermore, it should be noted that the examination of the Italian Government's argument that the conditions arising from the case-law of the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) apply irrespective of the duration of the employment relationship of the persons concerned, with the result that they are not discriminatory in the light of clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement, goes to the substance of the question referred. Lastly, that government is wrong to rely on the fact that, at the time of her request, M. M. was no longer in service in order to claim that the Framework Agreement is not applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings. It is apparent from the information provided by the referring court that the application for the electronic card in question relates to periods during which M. M. was employed as a fixed-term teacher and was, therefore, a 'fixed-term worker' within the meaning of clause 2(1) of the Framework Agreement, read in conjunction with clause 3(1) thereof. Since the discrimination contrary to clause 4 of the Framework Agreement, of which M. M. alleges that she is the victim, concerns periods of service completed as a fixed-term worker, the fact that she meanwhile lost that status is irrelevant (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 October 2012, Valenza and Others (C‑302/11 to C‑305/11, EU:C:2012:646 , paragraph 35). It follows that the question referred is admissible. Substance By its single question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement, read in the light of the principle of effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national case-law under which, regarding an action brought by a teacher employed on a fixed-term basis in order to remedy the wrongful deprivation – on account of the application of national legislation that is contrary to the first of those provisions – of the benefit of a financial advantage in the amount of EUR 500 per year, granted by means of an electronic card enabling the purchase of goods and services intended to support the in-service training of teachers, first, the retrospective grant of that card is subject to the condition that that teacher still be employed in the school system and, second, if that card is not granted retrospectively, that teacher may only claim compensation for the harm suffered as a result of that failure to grant the card subject to his or her compliance with certain specific conditions. As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that the Court has already held, in essence, in its order of 18 May 2022, Ministero dell'istruzione (Electronic card) (C‑450/21, EU:C:2022:411, paragraph 48), that clause 4 of the Framework Agreement must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which reserves the benefit of the electronic card in question solely to the permanent teaching staff of a ministry, and not to the teaching staff employed on a fixed-term basis by that ministry. The case in the main proceedings concerns the same national legislation as that at issue in the case which gave rise to that order, namely Article 1(121) and (122) of Law No 107/2015, which provides for the creation of an 'electronic card for the professional development and training of tenured teaching staff in teaching establishments at all levels … having a nominal value of EUR 500 per academic year.' In that context, the referring court starts from the premiss that teachers employed on a fixed-term basis such as M. M., who it is established were deprived of the benefit of the electronic card in question in breach of clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement, are entitled to the retrospective grant of that card or, at the very least, to payment of the amount which constitutes its nominal value. It follows, however, from the case-law of the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation), subsequent to that order, that a legal action seeking to claim the benefit of that right is subject to conditions. Thus, the referring court states, first, that those teachers must still be in service on the date of the decision on their application for the retrospective grant of such a card, with the result that they are no longer entitled to the benefit of that card when they have in the meantime 'left the school system', which is the case where those teachers are no longer employed as substitute teachers, are no longer registered on the reserve lists for substitute teachers and have not become tenured teaching staff. Second, in that situation, those teachers have only the possibility of bringing an action for compensation for the harm suffered as a result of the failure to grant that card, which, however, can be upheld only subject to compliance with certain additional substantive and procedural conditions, such as those referred to in paragraph 16 above. It is therefore necessary, in order to answer the question referred, to examine, in the first place, whether such conditions are contrary to clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement in so far as they entail, as the referring court is inclined to consider, less favourable treatment of fixed-term workers relative to comparable permanent workers as regards employment conditions, which is not justified by objective grounds. In that context, it must be borne in mind, first, as is apparent from paragraph 31 above, that the question referred is based on the premiss that a teacher, such as M. M., falls within the scope of the Framework Agreement, within the meaning of clause 2(1) of that agreement, read in conjunction with clause 3(1) thereof, in respect of the periods during which she was employed as a fixed-term worker. Furthermore, as mentioned in paragraph 32 above, that premiss cannot be called into question by the fact that the person concerned has in the meantime lost that status. Similarly, second, the electronic card in question must be considered as falling within the scope of 'employment conditions' within the meaning of clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement (judgment of 3 July 2025, Lalfi , C‑268/24, EU:C:2025:526 , paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). Third, as regards, in particular, the existence of a difference in treatment within the meaning of clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement, it must be borne in mind that it is sufficient for the fixed-term workers in question to be treated in a less favourable manner than permanent workers in a comparable situation in order for those fixed-term workers to claim the benefit of that clause (judgment of 3 July 2025, Lalfi , C‑268/24, EU:C:2025:526 , paragraph 49 and the case-law cited). That said, a difference in treatment that is based on a criterion other than whether the employment relationship is fixed-term or permanent is not covered by the prohibition laid down in clause 4 of the Framework Agreement (judgment of 4 September 2025, Gnattai , C‑543/23, EU:C:2025:653 , paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). In the present case, the referring court appears to take the view that the conditions referred to in its question imply a difference in treatment, under clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement, to the detriment of teachers employed on a fixed-term basis, in so far as those conditions governing legal actions brought by those teachers 'do not apply to teachers employed on a permanent basis'. For its part, the Italian Government states, as has been pointed out in paragraphs 25 and 30 above, that those same conditions are, on the contrary, applicable to all teachers, including teachers employed on a permanent basis, in the event that they have left the school system, irrespective of the reason why. However, the information provided by the referring court does not make it possible to determine whether or not the conditions laid down by the case-law of the Corte suprema di Cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) are also applicable to teachers employed on a permanent basis where, like a teacher employed on a fixed-term basis, such as M. M., they were unduly deprived, for reasons other than that relating to the duration of their employment relationship, of the benefit of the electronic card in question and where, in legal proceedings brought to remedy that wrongful deprivation, they seek retrospective grant of that card only after their departure from the school system. It is for the referring court to carry out the necessary verifications in that regard. If, at the end of those verifications, the referring court finds that those conditions apply, among teachers that have left the school system and have requested the retrospective grant of the electronic card in question, solely to former teachers employed on a fixed-term basis and not also to former teachers employed on a permanent basis, it must be held that the application of those conditions introduces a difference in treatment, for the purposes of clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement, to the detriment of those former teachers compared with former teachers employed on a permanent basis. In that case, it will be for that court to assess whether those two categories of former teachers are in comparable situations and, if so, whether there are, as the case may be, 'objective grounds', within the meaning of clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement, capable of justifying that difference in treatment, bearing in mind that the file before the Court does not contain any evidence to suggest that the assessment to be carried out in that regard should be based on factors which are appreciably different from those which the Court took into account in order to find, in the case which gave rise to the order of 18 May 2022, Ministero dell'istruzione (Electronic Card) (C‑450/21, EU:C:2022:411), and in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 3 July 2025, Lalfi (C‑268/24, EU:C:2025:526 ), that that clause 4(1) precluded legislation reserving the benefit of that electronic card to tenured teaching staff, to the exclusion of teachers employed on a fixed-term basis, even where those teachers carry out short-term substitute teaching. If, however, the referring court establishes that those same conditions apply without distinction to all the teachers referred to in paragraph 47 above, they cannot be regarded as giving rise to a difference in treatment, for the purposes of clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement, even though the national legislation under which teachers employed on a fixed-term basis were initially deprived of the benefit of the electronic card in question is contrary to that clause. That said, and in view of the doubts expressed by the referring court, it is necessary, in the second place, to ascertain whether the conditions established by the case-law of the Corte suprema di Cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation), set out in the question referred, are nevertheless liable to be contrary to clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement in that, even if they are not discriminatory in nature, they would undermine the effectiveness of that provision or the right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter, since former teachers employed on a fixed-term basis were deprived of the benefit of the electronic card in question under national legislation which, according to the order referred to in paragraph 35 above, is contrary to clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement. In that regard it must be recalled that, first, according to well-established case-law, where discrimination contrary to EU law has been established, as long as measures reinstating equal treatment have not been adopted, observance of the principle of equality can be ensured only by granting to persons within the disadvantaged category the same advantages as those enjoyed by persons within the favoured category. Disadvantaged persons must therefore be placed in the same position as persons enjoying the advantage concerned (judgment of 9 March 2017, Milkova , C‑406/15, EU:C:2017:198 , paragraph 66 and the case-law cited). In such a situation, a national court must set aside any discriminatory provision of national law, without having to request or await its prior removal by the legislature, and apply to members of the disadvantaged group the same arrangements as those enjoyed by the persons in the other category. That obligation persists regardless of whether or not the national court has been granted competence under national law to do so (judgment of 9 March 2017, Milkova , C‑406/15, EU:C:2017:198 , paragraph 67 and the case-law cited). However, the Court has stated that that approach is intended to apply only if there is a valid point of reference (judgment of 9 March 2017, Milkova , C‑406/15, EU:C:2017:198 , paragraph 68 and the case-law cited). That is the case in the main proceedings, since the national rules applicable to teachers employed on a permanent basis as regards the grant of the electronic card in question remain the only valid point of reference, for as long as measures reinstating equal treatment have not been adopted by the national legislature. Therefore, teachers employed on a fixed-term basis must be ensured the same treatment as that enjoyed by teachers employed on a permanent basis under the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings (see, by analogy, judgment of 22 January 2019, Cresco Investigation , C‑193/17, EU:C:2019:43 , paragraph 83). Second, in order to ensure such identical treatment, account must be taken, in a comprehensive and coherent manner, of all the elements which form an integral part of that national legislation, with its discriminatory component removed, and which condition the grant of the benefits provided for therein, including, where appropriate, the circumstances capable of restricting the grant. In the latter regard, it cannot be considered that to take such conditions into account would render ineffective the finding that that national legislation was discriminatory, even if they led to the exclusion of the grant of a benefit such as the electronic card in question, given that such an exclusion would then only be the consequence of the application to the persons of the disadvantaged group of the same arrangements as those applicable to the persons of the favoured group (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 May 2025, Melbán and Sergamo (C‑623/23 and C‑626/23, EU:C:2025:358 , paragraphs 88 and 89). In the present case, the Italian Government submits that the conditions laid down by the case-law of the Corte suprema di Cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) are intrinsically linked to the objective pursued by the introduction of the electronic card in question, which is to support the in-service training of teachers, since that purpose can no longer be achieved after the persons concerned have left the school system, which is corroborated by Article 3(2) of the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers referred to in paragraph 8 above, under which 'the [electronic card in question] may no longer be used after termination of service'. Those conditions are, moreover, justified by the nature of the benefit concerned, since Article 1(121) of Law No 107/2015 provides, in that regard, that 'the sum charged on [that] card does not constitute additional remuneration or taxable income'. Granting that card to teachers who have left the school system would therefore be contrary to its purpose and nature, without prejudice to the right of the persons concerned to seek compensation for the harm suffered as a result of the failure to grant the electronic card in question. In those circumstances, it appears that the conditions relating to legal actions brought in order to remedy the wrongful deprivation of the benefit of the electronic card in question laid down by the case-law of the Corte suprema di Cassazione (Court of Cassation), if, in accordance with the premiss set out in paragraph 50 above, it is found that they are not discriminatory, form an integral part of the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings and, thereby, of the point of reference, such that their application cannot be regarded as undermining the effectiveness of the principle of equal treatment enshrined in clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement, which is, however, as the case may be, a matter for the referring court to determine. In such a case, it is necessary, pursuant to that point of reference, and, in particular, under those conditions, to grant the electronic card in question retrospectively to teachers wrongly deprived of that benefit, provided, however, that they are still employed in the school system, since teachers who have left the school system, for their part, may exercise their right to compensation for the harm suffered, which, in that situation, also forms part of that point of reference. As regards, third, that right to compensation, it should be recalled that any measure seeking to eliminate discrimination contrary to EU law, including individual measures relating to the grant to persons within the disadvantaged category of the same benefits as those enjoyed by persons within the favoured category, constitutes an implementation of EU law, which must observe its requirements (judgment of 20 April 2023, Landespolizeidirektion Niederösterreich and Finanzamt Österreich , C‑650/21, EU:C:2023:300 , paragraph 80 and the case-law cited). That is true of a right to compensation which forms an integral part of the point of reference concerned and which must therefore be extended to persons falling within the disadvantaged category in order to ensure compliance with the principle of equal treatment enshrined in clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 51 above. Among the requirements of EU law which must therefore be complied with as regards that right to compensation are those arising from the right to an effective remedy, enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 February 2024, X (Lack of reasons for termination) , C‑715/20, EU:C:2024:139 , paragraph 77), which constitutes a reaffirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection (judgment of 12 January 2023, Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság , C‑132/21, EU:C:2023:2 , paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). That said, it is not apparent from the information provided by the referring court in what way the legal remedies available to M. M. in order to assert her right to compensation would not meet the requirements of EU law, in particular those provided for in Article 47 of the Charter, provided however that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness have been observed. In that regard, so far as concerns those principles, it must be recalled that, in the absence of EU rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State, pursuant to the principle of the procedural autonomy of those legal systems, to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law (judgment of 8 September 2011, Rosado Santana , C‑177/10, EU:C:2011:557 , paragraph 87 and the case-law cited). However, in that context, as is apparent from well-established case-law, the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual's rights under EU law must be no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and must not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness) (judgment of 8 September 2011, Rosado Santana , C‑177/10, EU:C:2011:557 , paragraph 89 and the case-law cited). It follows that, in the situation referred to in paragraph 62 above, it will be for the referring court to ensure that M. M. has, before it or, as the case may be, before another court, a genuine opportunity to assert her right to compensation for the harm suffered, in accordance with procedural, evidential or other rules, which are not less favourable than those applicable to similar actions under domestic law, in particular all those open to former teachers employed on a permanent basis in order to obtain the retrospective grant of the electronic card in question, and which do not have the effect of making it impossible or excessively difficult to exercise that right to compensation. That said, in so far as that right covers, precisely, compensation for the harm suffered following the failure to grant the electronic card in question, it is not, in itself, contrary to the principle of effectiveness to require the person concerned to claim and prove, for the purpose of exercising that right, the existence of a specific harm, distinct from that linked solely to the loss of the sum of EUR 500 per year, or to award compensation the amount of which is not equivalent to the monetary value of the electronic card in question, in particular if the harm suffered proves to be less significant. In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred is that clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement must be interpreted as not precluding national case-law under which, regarding an action brought by a teacher employed on a fixed-term basis to remedy the wrongful deprivation – on account of the application of national legislation that is contrary to that provision – of the benefit of a financial advantage in the amount of EUR 500 per year, granted by means of an electronic card enabling the purchase of goods and services intended to support the in-service training of teachers, first, the retrospective grant of that card is subject to the condition that that teacher is still employed in the school system and, second, if that card is not granted retrospectively, that teacher may only claim compensation for the harm suffered as a result of that failure to grant the card subject to compliance with certain specific conditions, provided that (i) all of those conditions also apply to teachers employed on a permanent basis who apply for the same card to be granted retrospectively, and (ii) the procedural rules governing the exercise of that right to compensation also comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Costs Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. On those grounds, the Court (Fifth Chamber) hereby rules: Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999 which is annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP must be interpreted as not precluding national case-law under which, regarding an action brought by a teacher employed on a fixed-term basis to remedy the wrongful deprivation – on account of the application of national legislation that is contrary to that provision – of the benefit of a financial advantage in the amount of EUR 500 per year, granted by means of an electronic card enabling the purchase of goods and services intended to support the in-service training of teachers, first, the retrospective grant of that card is subject to the condition that that teacher is still employed in the school system and, second, if that card is not granted retrospectively, that teacher may only claim compensation for the harm suffered as a result of that failure to grant the card subject to compliance with certain specific conditions, provided that (i) all of those conditions also apply to teachers employed on a permanent basis who apply for the same card to be granted retrospectively, and (ii) the procedural rules governing the exercise of that right to compensation also comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. [Signatures] * Language of the case: Italian. i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings. © European Union The source of this judgment is the Europa web site. The information on this site is subject to a information found here: Important legal notice . This electronic version is not authentic and is subject to amendment. BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII