NG and Others v Parliament and Council (Action for annulment - Road transport - Driver's rest periods - Order) [2021] EUECJ T-646/20_CO (28 July 2021)

NG and Others v Parliament and Council (Action for annulment - Road transport - Driver's rest periods - Order) [2021] EUECJ T-646/20_CO (28 July 2021) [ Home ] [ Databases ] [ World Law ] [ Multidatabase Search ] [ Help ] [ Feedback ] [ DONATE ] Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions) You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions) >> NG and Others v Parliament and Council (Action for annulment - Road transport - Driver's rest periods - Order) [2021] EUECJ T-646/20_CO (28 July 2021) URL: https://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/2021/T64620_CO.html Cite as: EU:T:2021:498, ECLI:EU:T:2021:498, [2021] EUECJ T-646/20_CO [ New search ] [ Contents list ] [ Help ] ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber) 28 July 2021 ( * ) (Action for annulment – Road transport – Regulation (EU) 2020/1054 – Driver’s rest periods – Impossibility of taking certain rest periods in the vehicle – Return to the employer’s operational centre or to the place of residence for certain rest periods – Professional association – Standing to bring proceedings – Act not of individual concern – Inadmissibility) In Case T‑646/20, NG, and the other applicants whose names are set out in the annex, ( ) represented by R. Martens, lawyer, applicants, v European Parliament, represented by R. van de Westelaken and A. Tamás, acting as Agents, and Council of the European Union, represented by A. Norberg, L. Vétillard and S. Emmerechts, acting as Agents, defendants, APPLICATION under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Article 1(6)(c) and (d) of Regulation (EU) 2020/1054 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2020 amending Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 as regards minimum requirements on maximum daily and weekly driving times, minimum breaks and daily and weekly rest periods and Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 as regards positioning by means of tachographs (OJ 2020 L 249, p. 1), THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber), composed of J. Svenningsen, President, T. Pynnä and J. Laitenberger (Rapporteur), Judges, Registrar: E. Coulon, makes the following Order Background to the dispute NG and the 12 natural persons whose names are set out in the annex state that they are professional drivers engaged in the long-distance international transport of goods (‘the applicant drivers’), whose places of residence are situated in Romania. They also state that the operational centres of their employers are established in Romania, that they provide their services in Central and West European Member States and that they take their regular weekly rest periods outside Romania, normally in their vehicle, which is equipped with suitable sleeping facilities. Furthermore, according to the applicant drivers, members of their families reside outside Romania, in particular in the United Kingdom and Spain. Dual Star Logistic SRL, Eliton Trans SRL, Agexim Spedition SRL and SC A & C International Road Cargo SRL are road transport undertakings established in Romania whose operational centres are also situated in Romania (‘the applicant undertakings’). The applicant undertakings provide long-distance international transport of goods to Central and West European Member States. They state that their employees are drivers who were usually authorised to take their regular weekly rest periods in their vehicle, which is fitted with suitable sleeping facilities. Uniunea Naţională a Transportatorilor Rutieri din România (UNTRR, National Union of Road Hauliers, Romania), also established in Romania, is the professional organisation of employers in the Romanian road transport sector and, according to its statements, the main social dialogue partner in the transport sector in Romania. On 15 July 2020, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2020/1054 amending Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 as regards minimum requirements on maximum daily and weekly driving times, minimum breaks and daily and weekly rest periods and Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 as regards positioning by means of tachographs (OJ 2020 L 249, p. 1). The applicant drivers, the applicant undertakings and UNTRR (‘the applicants’) seek, first, annulment of Article 1(6)(c) of Regulation 2020/1054 (‘the first contested provision’), by which Article 8(8) of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 (OJ 2006 L 102, p. 1), has been amended. Article 8(8) of Regulation No 561/2006 reads as follows: ‘8. The regular weekly rest periods and any weekly rest period of more than 45 hours taken in compensation for previous reduced weekly rest periods shall not be taken in a vehicle. They shall be taken in suitable gender-friendly accommodation with adequate sleeping and sanitary facilities. Any costs for accommodation outside the vehicle shall be covered by the employer.’ The previous version of Article 8(8) of Regulation No 561/2006 stated as follows: ‘8. ‘Where a driver chooses to do this, daily rest periods and reduced weekly rest periods away from base may be taken in a vehicle, as long as it has suitable sleeping facilities for each driver and the vehicle is stationary.’ The applicants seek, secondly, annulment of Article 1(6)(d) of Regulation 2020/1054 (‘the second contested provision’), which provides for the insertion, in response to Article 8(8) of Regulation No 561/2006, of the following paragraph: ‘8a. Transport undertakings shall organise the work of drivers in such a way that the drivers are able to return to the employer’s operational centre where the driver is normally based and where the driver’s weekly rest period begins, in the Member State of the employer’s establishment, or to return to the drivers’ place of residence, within each period of four consecutive weeks, in order to spend at least one regular weekly rest period or a weekly rest period of more than 45 hours taken in compensation for reduced weekly rest period. However, where the driver has taken two consecutive reduced weekly rest periods in accordance with paragraph 6, the transport undertaking shall organise the work of the driver in such a way that the driver is able to return before the start of the regular weekly rest period of more than 45 hours taken in compensation. The undertaking shall document how it fulfils that obligation and shall keep the documentation at its premises in order to present it at the request of control authorities.’ Procedure and forms of order sought By application lodged at the Court Registry on 23 October 2020, the applicants brought the present action. The applicants claim that the Court should: – annul the first contested provision and the second contested provision (together ‘the contested provisions’); – order the Parliament and Council to pay all costs, including all costs reserved in the interlocutory proceedings. By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 26 October 2020, the applicants made an application for interim relief seeking suspension of operation of Regulation 2020/1054. That application was rejected by the President of the General Court by order of 13 November 2020, NG and Others v Parliament and Council (T‑646/20 R, not published, EU:T:2020:540 ), the costs relating to those proceedings having been reserved. By letter lodged at the Court Registry on 28 October 2020, the applicants applied for anonymity in accordance with Article 66 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. The Court granted that request in respect of the applicant drivers and rejected it so far as the applicant undertakings and UNTRR were concerned. By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 4 January 2021, the Parliament raised a plea of inadmissibility under Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, in which it claims that the Court should: – dismiss the application as inadmissible; – in the alternative, should the Court reject the plea of inadmissibility or reserve its decision on admissibility, prescribe new time limits for the defendants to submit their observations on the substance of the case, in accordance with Article 130(8) of the Rules of Procedure; – in any event, order the applicants to pay the costs. By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 12 January 2021, the Council raised a plea of inadmissibility under Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure, in which it claims that the Court should: – dismiss the action as inadmissible; – order the applicants to pay the costs. By documents lodged at the Court Registry on 2 March 2021, the applicants submitted their observations on those pleas of inadmissibility, in which they claim that the Court should: – reject, in full, the pleas of inadmissibility; – or, in the alternative, reserve its decision on admissibility until a ruling is given on the substance of the case; – in any event, grant the Parliament and the Council new time limits for submitting their observations on the substance of the case. Law Under Article 130(1) and (7) of the Rules of Procedure, if the defendant so requests, the Court may give a ruling on inadmissibility or lack of competence without going to the substance of the case. In the present case, as the Parliament and the Council have applied for a ruling on inadmissibility, the Court, considering that it has sufficient information from the documents in the case file, has decided to rule on those applications without taking further steps in the proceedings. In support of their pleas of inadmissibility, the Parliament and the Council submit that the applicants do not have standing to bring proceedings under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. According to the Parliament, the applicants are not individually concerned by the contested provisions. According to the Council, the applicants have adduced only limited evidence to show that the contested provisions are of direct concern to the applicant drivers. However, the applicant drivers are not directly concerned. The contested provisions have effects only on the factual situation of the applicant drivers. The applicant drivers’ alleged obligation to return to Romania depends on the choices made by their employer, as their relationship with that employer is governed by national law. Regulation 2020/1054 did not introduce a prohibition on taking weekly rest periods in the vehicle, since such a prohibition was already provided for in the previous version of Regulation No 561/2006. The applicants have not submitted any evidence to show that the applicant undertakings are directly concerned. As regards UNTRR, in particular, the Parliament and the Council submit that it does not have standing to bring proceedings, since it does not meet the requirements laid down by the case-law for the admissibility of an action brought by an association set up to promote the collective interests of its members. The applicants maintain that they are directly and individually concerned by the contested provisions. They point out that, according to the case-law and for reasons of procedural economy, if it is held that the action is admissible as regards one applicant, it is no longer necessary to examine admissibility as regards the other applicants. Consequently, in their view, if it were held that the action brought by one of the applicants was admissible, the present action would be admissible in its entirety, even if one of the other applicants did not have standing to bring proceedings. Lastly, the applicants submit that they have a personal, vested and present interest in the annulment of the contested provisions. Preliminary observations Under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, ‘any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures’. In that regard, the first situation is not applicable in the present case, since the applicants are not addressees, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, of Regulation 2020/1054. As regards the concept of ‘regulatory act’ within the meaning of the third situation of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, it must be understood as relating to all acts of general application, apart from legislative acts. As regards legislative acts, the authors of the Lisbon Treaty sought to maintain a restrictive approach as regards the possibility for individuals to seek their annulment, requiring proof that they were ‘directly and individually’ concerned by those acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council , C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625 , paragraphs 59 and 60). In that regard, the test for distinguishing between a legislative act and a regulatory act is based, according to the FEU Treaty, on the criterion of the procedure, legislative or not, which led to its adoption (see order of 7 January 2015, Freitas v Parliament and Council , T‑185/14, not published, EU:T:2015:14, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). In the present case, it is apparent from the preamble to Regulation 2020/1054, in which the contested provisions appear, that it was adopted under Article 91(1) TFEU and in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, as set out in Article 294 TFEU. It is apparent from Article 289(1) and (3) TFEU that legal acts adopted under that procedure constitute legislative acts. Consequently, Regulation 2020/1054 constitutes a legislative act within the meaning of the FEU Treaty. It follows that the applicants also do not have a right to bring an action by reason of the third situation referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. Thus, the present action is admissible only in so far as the applicants are directly and individually concerned by the contested provisions, by reason of the second situation referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. Whether the applicant drivers and the applicant undertakings are individually concerned The Parliament contends that the applicant drivers and the applicant undertakings are not individually concerned. The mere possibility of determining, at the time of adoption of a contested measure of general application, more or less precisely, the number or even the identity of the persons to whom a measure applies by no means implies that that measure must be regarded as being of individual concern to those persons as long as that application takes effect by virtue of an objective legal or factual situation defined by the measure in question. Moreover, the fact that some operators are economically more affected by a measure of general application than others does not suffice to distinguish them from those other operators. In the present case, the category of persons to which the contested provisions apply, namely drivers and transport undertakings, is entirely open-ended. Moreover, even the narrower category to which the applicants claim to belong, namely drivers and transport undertakings established in Romania, is entirely open-ended, since any person can at any time become part of that category. The situation of the applicant drivers and the applicant undertakings cannot therefore be differentiated from the situation of any other person established or potentially established in Romania as a driver or transport undertaking. Clearly, that category is not closed and the number and identity of the drivers and undertakings potentially affected by the measure whose annulment is sought is, by definition, neither fixed nor ascertainable. The Council submits that Regulation 2020/1054 applies to objectively determined situations and that the categories of transport operations referred to in that regulation do not take account of the individual situation of the applicant drivers and the applicant undertakings. In addition, the contested provisions are set out in general terms and apply without distinction to any driver or undertaking which falls within the scope of Regulation 2020/1054, namely any person who carries out or will carry out, in the future, the transport operations covered by Regulation No 561/2006. The applicant drivers and the applicant undertakings cannot therefore be regarded as belonging to a defined or definable group of persons individually concerned by Regulation 2020/1054. The possibility that the applicant drivers and the applicant undertakings are more affected by the contested provisions than Central or West European nationals or undertakings is not sufficient to distinguish them from all other economic operators and, in any event, from their competitors established in Romania or in other peripheral regions of the European Union. Thus, the applicant drivers and the applicant undertakings cannot be regarded as belonging to a completely closed class of economic operators. The applicants submit that such an interpretation of that criterion is too narrow. Certain judgments of the General Court, Opinions of the Court’s Advocates General and academic publications have criticised such an interpretation of that requirement, since it unduly restricts the access of legal and natural persons to the Court of Justice of the European Union as regards legislative acts. Moreover, the objective of that interpretation is to prevent an actio popularis against legislative acts. However, the present action is not an actio popularis , since the applicant drivers and applicant undertakings are affected as a completely closed class of East European drivers and undertakings. First, that class, to which the applicant drivers belong, consists of professional drivers, engaged in the international long-distance haulage of goods, who offer services in Central and West European Member States, who spend their regular weekly rest periods outside their East European Member State, who have their place of residence in that Member State, who have family members whose place of residence is outside that State and who are normally assigned to their employer’s operational centres in that State, where their normal weekly rest periods begin. Secondly, that class, to which the applicant undertakings belong, consists of professional transport undertakings, established in their respective East European Member State, which have operational centres in that State and offer long-distance international freight transport services to Central and West European Member States. The applicants claim that the cumulative combination of those attributes specific to the closed class to which the applicants belong distinguishes them from all other drivers and from all other transport undertakings in the European Union and leads to them being, in practice, the only ones significantly affected by the contested provisions, in essence, in the same way as if those provisions had been addressed to them. By contrast, all other professional drivers and all other professional transport undertakings who do not possess those attributes are not affected by the contested provisions. For example, the contested provisions do not, in practice, deprive Central and West European professional drivers of their freedom to choose to take their weekly rest periods in their vehicle, since those drivers do not provide their services far enough from their place of residence. Similarly, those provisions do not, in practice, require them to return every four weeks to their employer’s place of establishment or to their place of residence, since they do not spend four consecutive weeks away from the Member State in which their employer is established or from their place of residence. That observation is underlined by the fact that all the actions concerning Regulation 2020/1054 were brought before the Court of Justice and the General Court, respectively, by East Europeans and not by Central or West Europeans. Moreover, the contested provisions have substantial adverse effects on the closed class of applicant drivers and applicant undertakings, which distinguishes them individually from all other professional drivers and professional transport undertakings in the European Union concerned by the legislation of which those provisions form part. Lastly, the applicants submit that the contested provisions are of individual concern to the applicant drivers and the applicant undertakings because they benefit from the specific protection provided for in Article 95 TFEU, particularly against any discrimination in the area of transport. In their view, that article required the Parliament and the Council, when adopting the contested provisions, to take specific account of the particular situation of East European professional drivers and professional transport undertakings, including the applicants’ situation. According to the applicants, both the Parliament and the Council infringed that obligation. In that regard, the Court notes, first of all, that it is not entirely inconceivable that a provision which by its nature and by virtue of its sphere of application, is of a legislative nature, in that it applies to the economic operators concerned in general, may nevertheless be of individual concern to some of them (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 May 1994, Codorniu v Council , C‑309/89, EU:C:1994:197, paragraph 19). However, natural or legal persons can claim to be individually concerned only if the contested provision affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed (judgments of 15 July 1963, Plaumann v Commission , 25/62, EU:C:1963:17 , p. 223, and of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council , C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625 , paragraph 72). In so far as the applicants claim that the criterion of individual concern, as interpreted by that settled case-law, is overly strict and curtails the access of natural and legal persons to the Court of Justice of the European Union as regards legislative acts, it must be borne in mind that, during successive amendments to the Treaties, and more particularly when the authors of the Treaty of Lisbon drafted the present Article 263 TFEU, those authors did not alter the wording of the condition that the act whose annulment is sought should be of individual concern, as interpreted by the Court in its settled case-law since the judgment of 15 July 1963, Plaumann v Commission (25/62, EU:C:1963:17 ) (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council , C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625 , paragraphs 70 and 71). As regards in particular the protection conferred by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union , the Court of Justice has already clarified the fact that that article is not intended to change the system of judicial review laid down by the Treaties, and particularly the rules relating to the admissibility of direct actions brought before the Courts of the European Union (judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council , C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625 , paragraph 97). Therefore, it is necessary to examine the criterion of individual concern in the light of the settled case-law referred to in paragraph 44 above. In the present case, the applicants take the view that the applicant drivers and the applicant undertakings are individually concerned by the contested provisions, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 37 and 38 above. It must be borne in mind that the possibility of determining more or less precisely the number, or even the identity, of the persons to whom an EU measure applies at any given moment by no means implies that it must be regarded as being of individual concern to them as long as that measure is applied by virtue of an objective legal or factual situation defined by it (see judgment of 28 April 2015, T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission , C‑456/13 P, EU:C:2015:284 , paragraph 64 and the case-law cited). In the present case, it is clear that the contested provisions apply to objectively determined situations. In accordance with Article 2(1) of Regulation No 561/2006, as amended by Regulation 2020/1054, Regulation No 561/2006 is to apply to the carriage by road of goods where the maximum permissible mass of the vehicle, including any trailer, or semi-trailer, exceeds 3.5 tonnes, to the carriage of passengers by vehicles which are constructed or permanently adapted for carrying more than nine persons including the driver, and are intended for that purpose and, from 1 July 2026, to the carriage of goods by road in international transport operations or in cabotage operations, where the maximum permissible mass of the vehicle, including any trailer, or semi-trailer, exceeds 2.5 tonnes. The limitations on that scope provided for in Article 3 of Regulation No 561/2006 are also described in objective and general terms. The contested provisions are deemed to apply to any driver or any transport undertaking which falls within the scope of that regulation without distinction. Those provisions make no distinction, in particular, on account of the nationality of professional drivers, their place of residence, the place of establishment of their employer, the location of their employer’s operational centre within the European Union or on account of one of the other criteria to which the applicants refer. Furthermore, as regards the applicants’ argument that the applicant drivers and the applicant undertakings belong to a closed class of economic operators particularly affected by the contested provisions, in particular on account of the place of residence of the applicant drivers or the place of establishment or location of the applicant undertakings’ operational centre, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the fact that certain operators are economically more affected by a measure than others is not sufficient for them to be regarded as individually concerned by that measure (see order of 10 May 2004, Bundesverband der Nahrungsmittel- und Speiseresteverwertung and Kloh v Parliament and Council , T‑391/02, EU:T:2004:138, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited). Moreover, such an argument is not capable of distinguishing the applicant drivers and the applicant undertakings from all other drivers residing in Romania or any other road transport undertaking established in Romania, or from any other driver resident in other Member States or any other road transport undertaking established in those States, situated for example in the peripheral areas of the European Union. Therefore, the applicants have not shown that the applicant drivers and the applicant undertakings were part of a closed class of operators identified or identifiable at the time Regulation 2020/1054 was adopted (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2014, Stichting Woonlinie and Others v Commission , C‑133/12 P, EU:C:2014:105 , paragraph 46 and the case-law cited). In the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 51 above, the applicants’ argument based on the significant damage allegedly suffered as a result of the contested provisions also has no bearing on whether the applicant drivers and the applicant undertakings are individually concerned by the contested provisions. The applicants’ argument that several actions concerning Regulation 2020/1054 were brought before the Court of Justice and the General Court, respectively, by certain East Europeans, whereas no Central or West European brought such an action, does not call into question the finding that the contested provisions are applicable by reason of an objective legal and factual situation laid down by those provisions and by Regulation No 561/2006. Moreover, it is neither necessary nor possible to rule on the reasons of different Member States and other persons for bringing or not bringing an action for annulment against certain provisions of Regulation 2020/1054. As regards the applicants’ argument that the applicant drivers and the applicant undertakings enjoy the specific protection afforded by Article 95 TFEU, it should be noted that, according to the case-law, the fact that the EU institutions are obliged, pursuant to specific provisions, to take into account the consequences of the act which they propose to adopt on the situation of certain individuals may be such as to distinguish those persons individually (judgments of 17 January 1985, Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v Commission , 11/82, EU:C:1985:18, paragraphs 28 to 31; of 26 June 1990, Sofrimport v Commission , C‑152/88, EU:C:1990:259, paragraphs 11 to 13; and of 11 February 1999, Antillean Rice Mills and Others v Commission , C‑390/95 P, EU:C:1999:66, paragraphs 25 to 30). However, clearly neither Article 95 TFEU nor any other provision of EU law contains any specific provision which obliged the Parliament and the Council to take into consideration, when adopting Regulation 2020/1054 or, more specifically, the contested provisions, the individual situation of the applicant drivers and the applicant undertakings. The applicants’ arguments that the Parliament and the Council were obliged under Article 95 TFEU to take specific account of the individual situation of professional drivers and professional transport undertakings in Eastern Europe, who are discriminated against and who suffer only the negative effects of the contested provisions, also fail to demonstrate the existence of a specific provision obliging those institutions to take specific account of the individual situation of the applicant drivers and of the applicant undertakings. If the applicants’ line of argument were upheld, that would mean that any legislative act alleged to have potentially discriminatory negative effects on a given group of natural or legal persons would affect all the members of that group individually, which would not be consistent with the interpretation of the criterion of individual concern adopted in the settled case-law cited in paragraph 44 above. In the light of those considerations, it must be concluded that neither the applicant drivers nor the applicant undertakings are individually concerned by the contested provisions. Consequently, since the criteria of direct and individual concern are cumulative criteria for admissibility when it is examined in the light of the second situation referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, there is no need to examine whether the applicant drivers and the applicant undertakings are directly concerned by the contested provisions. UNTRR’s standing to bring proceedings The Parliament and the Council contend that the action brought by UNTRR does not satisfy the requirements laid down by the case-law for the admissibility of an action brought by an association set up to promote the collective interests of its members. The Parliament submits that no legal provision expressly confers on UNTRR the right to bring the present action. The undertakings represented by that association do not have standing to bring proceedings in their own right. The applicants did not claim, in the application, that UNTRR had an interest of its own in bringing proceedings. The Council submits that Regulation 2020/1054 does not expressly confer procedural rights on any professional association. The applicants do not put forward any argument in the application to show that UNTRR represents the interests of its members who themselves have standing to bring proceedings or that it is differentiated because its own interests as an association are affected. Moreover, the members of UNTRR do not have standing to bring proceedings in their own right. The applicants maintain in their observations on the objections of inadmissibility that UNTRR has standing to bring proceedings. First, they argue that it represents the interests of its members, including the applicant undertakings, which, for their part, have standing to bring proceedings. Secondly, UNTRR’s own interests as a professional association are affected. It is the principal representative of Romanian hauliers and the main partner in social dialogue in the transport industry in Romania. In addition, UNTRR is a member of the Federatia Patronala a Transportatorilor din Romania (Employer’s association of Romanian Hauliers) and of the Confederatia Patronala Concordia (National Confederation of Employers). Furthermore, UNTRR played a role in the procedure leading to the adoption of Regulation 2020/1054. It conducted discussions with the European Commission and attempted to convince it, Members of the Parliament and national authorities that the contested provisions were anti-democratic, discriminatory and unjust. In that regard, it submitted, for example, more than 30 written observations to various Members of the Commission and of the Parliament. In that regard, it must be borne in mind that actions for annulment brought by associations are admissible in three types of situations: (i) where a legal provision expressly confers on professional associations a number of powers of a procedural nature; (ii) where the association represents the interests of its members which themselves have locus standi ; and (iii) where the association is differentiated by reason of the impact on its own interests as an association, in particular because its position as a negotiator has been affected by the measure of which the annulment is sought (judgment of 15 September 2016, TAO-AFI and SFIE-PE v Parliament and Council , T‑456/14, EU:T:2016:493 , paragraph 55). Concerning the first situation, it should be borne in mind that associations have a right to bring proceedings against an act of the Union where the provisions of EU law specifically recognise those associations as having procedural rights (see judgment of 25 March 2021, Carvalho and Others v Parliament and Council , C‑565/19 P, not published, EU:C:2021:252 , paragraph 90 and the case-law cited). In the present case, the applicants have not claimed that such procedural guarantees are laid down in favour of UNTRR by EU legislation, but merely stated that UNTRR was the principal representative of Romanian hauliers, the main partner in the social dialogue in the transport industry and that it had been in contact with the Commission, Members of the Parliament and the national authorities before the adoption of Regulation 2020/1054. However, the fact of voluntarily participating in the preparation of a measure of a legislative nature, in the context of a procedure not providing for any intervention by individuals, cannot, in contrast to participation in a procedure providing for such intervention, give rise to a right to bring proceedings against that measure (see order of 10 December 2004, EFfCI v Parliament and Council , T‑196/03, EU:T:2004:355, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited). As regards the second situation, it must be borne in mind that Regulation 2020/1054, and in particular the contested provisions, applies without distinction to any transport undertaking which falls within the scope of Regulation No 561/2006, as described in Article 2 and 3 of that regulation, as found above with regard to the applicant undertakings, all members of UNTRR. The applicants do not provide any evidence to suggest that the members of UNTRR nevertheless have standing to bring proceedings against the contested provisions as persons individually and directly concerned by it. It should be noted that the applicants merely referred, in their written pleadings, to the considerations developed in relation to the situation of the applicant undertakings, whose lack of individual concern was established in paragraph 60 above. Consequently, UNTRR cannot, as a professional association, rely on its members’ standing to bring proceedings. Concerning the third situation, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, an organisation formed for the protection of the collective interests of a category of persons, cannot be regarded as being directly and individually concerned by a measure affecting the general interests of that category (see judgment of 15 September 2016, TAO-AFI and SFIE-PE v Parliament and Council , T‑456/14, EU:T:2016:493 , paragraph 57 and the case-law cited). In addition, the applicants have not shown that UNTRR had a negotiating role in the adoption of the contested provisions (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 May 2000, Comité d’entreprise de la Société française de production and Others v Commission , C‑106/98 P, EU:C:2000:277, paragraphs 42 to 45). Consequently, it must be held that the applicants are not in a position to demonstrate that the contested provisions affect UNTRR’s own interests, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 67 above. In the light of all the foregoing, the pleas of inadmissibility raised by the Parliament and the Council must be upheld, without it being necessary to examine the applicants’ arguments relating to their alleged interest in bringing proceedings and, accordingly, the action must be dismissed as inadmissible. Costs Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay the costs, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings, in accordance with the forms of order sought by the Parliament and the Council. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber) hereby orders: 1. The action is dismissed as inadmissible. 2. NG and the other parties whose names are set out in the annex shall pay the costs of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings. Luxembourg, 28 July 2021. E. Coulon J. Svenningsen Registrar President * Language of the case: English. The list of the other applicants is annexed only to the version sent to the parties. © European Union The source of this judgment is the Europa web site. The information on this site is subject to a information found here: Important legal notice . This electronic version is not authentic and is subject to amendment. BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII URL: https://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/2021/T64620_CO.html