PT Ciliandra Perkasa v Council (Taxation of costs - Recoverable costs - Order) [2020] EUECJ T-120/14DEP_CO (10 March 2020)

PT Ciliandra Perkasa v Council (Taxation of costs - Recoverable costs - Order) [2020] EUECJ T-120/14DEP_CO (10 March 2020) [ Home ] [ Databases ] [ World Law ] [ Multidatabase Search ] [ Help ] [ Feedback ] [ DONATE ] Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions) You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions) >> PT Ciliandra Perkasa v Council (Taxation of costs - Recoverable costs - Order) [2020] EUECJ T-120/14DEP_CO (10 March 2020) URL: https://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/2020/T12014DEP_CO.html Cite as: [2020] EUECJ T-120/14DEP_CO, ECLI:EU:T:2020:103, EU:T:2020:103 [ New search ] [ Contents list ] [ Help ] ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber) 10 March 2020 ( * ) (Procedure — Taxation of costs — Recoverable costs) In Case T‑120/14 DEP PT Ciliandra Perkasa, established in West Jakarta (Indonesia), represented by F. Graafsma and J. Cornelis, lawyers, applicant, v Council of the European Union, represented by H. Marcos Fraile, acting as Agent, defendant, supported by European Biodiesel Board (EBB), established in Brussels (Belgium), and by European Commission, interveners, APPLICATION for taxation of costs further to the judgment of 15 September 2016, PT Ciliandra Perkasa v Council (T‑120/14, EU:T:2016:501), THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber), composed of A. M. Collins, President, Z. Csehi (Rapporteur) and G. De Baere, Judges, Registrar: E. Coulon, makes the following Order Facts, procedure and forms of order sought By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 18 February 2014, the applicant, PT Ciliandra Perkasa, brought an action seeking the annulment of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1194/2013 of 19 November 2013 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of biodiesel originating in Argentina and Indonesia (OJ 2013 L 315, p. 2, ‘the contested measure’) in so far as it imposed an anti-dumping duty on it. By orders of the President of the Ninth Chamber of the General Court of 17 July 2014 and 22 September 2014, the European Commission and the European Biodiesel Board (EBB) were granted leave to intervene in the proceedings in support of the Council of the European Union. By judgment of 15 September 2016, PT Ciliandra Perkasa v Council , (T‑120/14, EU:T:2016:501), the General Court annulled the contested measure in so far as it concerned the applicant. It ordered the Council to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the applicant. By appeal lodged on 24 November 2016, the Council sought to have set aside, under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the judgment of the General Court of 15 September 2016, PT Ciliandra Perkasa v Council (T‑120/14, EU:T:2016:501). By letter dated 22 January 2018, the Council informed the Court of Justice, in accordance with Article 148 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure, that it was discontinuing its appeal. By order of 16 February 2018, Council v PT Ciliandra Perkasa , (C‑605/16 P, not published, EU:C:2018:155), the President of the Court removed Case C‑605/16 P from the Court register and ordered the Council to pay the costs incurred by the applicant. By email dated 17 May 2018, the applicant requested that the Council reimburse the total sum of EUR 151 030.27 in respect of the proceedings before the General Court and those before the Court of Justice. By letter dated 25 July 2018, the Council stated that it disagreed with the amount of costs claimed by the applicant and offered to reimburse a total sum of EUR 25 324.74 in respect of both sets of proceedings, including, inter alia, 110 hours’ work at an hourly rate of EUR 225. The applicant rejected that offer by letter dated 11 September 2018 and once again claimed the amount initially sought. By letter dated 10 January 2019, the Council reiterated that it disagreed with the amount claimed by the applicant and offered to reimburse a total amount of EUR 32 824.74 in respect of both sets of proceedings. Given that the applicant and the Council failed to reach agreement on the amount of recoverable costs, by document lodged at the General Court Registry on 19 February 2019 the applicant lodged an application for taxation of costs pursuant to Article 170(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, claiming that the Court should set the amount of recoverable costs to be reimbursed by the Council at EUR 156 527.27 in respect of both sets of proceedings. In its observations lodged at the General Court Registry on 3 May 2019, the Council claims that the General Court should dismiss the application for taxation of costs as inadmissible in so far as it concerns the costs relating to the appeal proceedings before the Court of Justice, reject the applicant’s claim and set the amount of recoverable costs in respect of the proceedings before the General Court at EUR 26 874.77. Following a change in the composition of the Chambers of the General Court, the Judge-Rapporteur was assigned to the Third Chamber, to which the present case has therefore been assigned, in accordance with Article 27(5) of the Rules of Procedure. Law The costs incurred for the purpose of the proceedings before the Court of Justice As regards the costs incurred by the applicant in the proceedings before the Court of Justice, it must be noted that, pursuant to Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and Article 133 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, a decision as to costs is to be given in the judgment or order which closes the proceedings. By order of 16 February 2018, Council v PT Ciliandra Perkasa (C‑605/16 P, EU:C:2018:155), the President of the Court of Justice removed Case C‑605/16 P from the Court register as a result of the Council having discontinued its appeal. The Court also ordered the Council to pay the costs incurred by the applicant. In accordance with Article 145 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, an application for taxation of costs in respect of proceedings before the Court of Justice falls within the competence of the latter and outside that of the General Court (see order of 29 June 2015, Reber v OHIM — Klusmeier (Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart PREMIUM) , T‑530/10 DEP, not published, EU:T:2015:482, paragraph 10 and the case-law cited). In the present case, by order of 15 October 2019, PT Ciliandra Perkasa v Council (C‑605/16 P‑DEP, not published, EU:C:2019:885), the Court set the total amount of costs to be reimbursed by the Council to the applicant in respect of Case C‑605/16 P at EUR 11 000. Therefore it is not for the General Court to assess the costs claimed in relation to the appeal proceedings before the Court of Justice. The costs incurred for the purpose of the proceedings before the General Court Under Article 170(3) of the Rules of Procedure, if there is a dispute concerning the costs to be recovered, the Court, at the request of the party concerned, is to give its decision by way of an order from which no appeal may lie, after giving the party concerned by the application an opportunity to submit its observations. Under Article 140(b) of the Rules of Procedure, expenses necessarily incurred by the parties for the purpose of the proceedings, in particular travel and subsistence expenses and the remuneration of agents, advisers or lawyers, are to be regarded as recoverable costs. It follows from that provision that recoverable costs are limited, first, to those incurred for the purpose of the proceedings before the General Court and, second, to those which were necessary for that purpose (see order of 28 June 2004, Airtours v Commission , T‑342/99 DEP, EU:T:2004:192, paragraph 13 and the case-law cited). The amount of recoverable costs in the present case must be determined in accordance with those criteria. Amount of recoverable lawyers’ fees According to settled case-law, the Court is not empowered to tax the fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers, but it may determine the amount of those fees which may be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs. When ruling on an application for taxation of costs, the Court is not obliged to take account of any national scale of lawyers’ fees or any agreement in that regard between the party concerned and his agents or advisers (see order of 28 June 2004, Airtours v Commission , T‑342/99 DEP, EU:T:2004:192, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited). Furthermore, in the absence of provisions of EU law laying down fee scales, the Court must make an unfettered assessment of the facts of the case, taking into account the purpose and nature of the proceedings, their significance from the point of view of EU law, as well as the difficulties presented by the case, the amount of work generated by the proceedings for the agents and advisers involved and the financial interests which the parties had in the proceedings (see order of 28 June 2004, Airtours v Commission , T‑342/99 DEP, EU:T:2004:192, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited). The applicant submits that its action related to an important issue for the European Union, namely exports of biodiesel by Indonesia to the EU market. In addition, the proceedings raised a number of issues of EU law and established an important principle as the judgment gives an interpretation of Article 2(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ 2009 L 343, p. 51; ‘the Basic Regulation’). The applicant adds, in essence, that the case raised a number of complex factual and economic issues. The Council disputes that line of argument and contends, in particular, that the General Court did not examine all the pleas, but only the one relating to whether the institutions were allowed under Article 2(5) of the Basic Regulation to replace the cost data included in companies’ accounting records with other data, and that it simply confirmed the existing case-law. It also disputes, in essence, the contention that the economic issues involved are factually complex. In the first place, as regards the purpose and nature of the proceedings, their significance from the point of view of EU law and the difficulties presented by the case, the General Court notes that, as to the substance, the case in the main proceedings concerned an action for annulment relating to anti-dumping which was based on five pleas in law: the first plea in law alleged a manifest error of assessment in concluding that the applicant’s purchase prices are distorted; the second alleged, in essence, infringement of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT) (OJ 1994 L 336, p. 103), which appears in Annex 1 A to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), as regards the adjustment of the cost of producing crude palm oil; the third alleged infringement of Article 2(5) of the Basic Regulation; the fourth alleged that the reasonable profit margin was determined unlawfully, and the fifth a failure to state reasons and infringement of the obligation of due diligence and proper administration. It should be noted that the third plea raised an important issue from the point of view of EU law, involving a degree of factual and legal complexity and requiring detailed analysis. That plea concerned the application of Article 2(5) of the Basic Regulation, which sets out, in essence, various possibilities on the basis of which the institutions may take into account the costs associated, in particular, with the production and sale of a product under investigation for the purpose of calculating the normal value of the like product within the meaning of that regulation. In the present case, the applicant claimed that the Council had, in essence, infringed Article 2(5) of the Basic Regulation by disregarding, when calculating the normal value of the like product, the prices of palm oil included in the applicant’s accounting records. It contended, in particular, that the Council misapplied the judgment of 7 February 2013, Acron and Dorogobuzh v Council (T‑235/08, not published, EU:T:2013:65). It follows that that plea required detailed analysis, as the issue it raised led the General Court to rule, in particular, on the burden of proof and the discretion that the EU institutions have when calculating the normal value of the like product (see, to that effect and by analogy, order of 15 October 2019, PT Ciliandra Perkasa v Council , C‑605/16 P‑DEP, not published, EU:C:2019:885, paragraphs 40 to 42). It should be observed that the other pleas were not particularly complex. In the second place, as regards the financial interests that the parties had in the proceedings, it must be borne in mind that the contested measure imposed definitive anti-dumping duties amounting to EUR 76.94 per tonne net on the applicant. Consequently, while the applicant had a financial interest in the case, that interest cannot be regarded as unusual or significantly different from those at issue in any investigation procedure imposing anti-dumping duties. In the third place, as regards the amount of work generated by the case, the applicant states that three lawyers, including one partner, worked on it for more than four years. It has requested that the Court set the amount of recoverable costs by way of lawyers’ fees for both sets of proceedings, those before the General Court and those before the Court of Justice, at EUR 147 500, corresponding to 468.72 hours’ work charged at hourly rates ranging from EUR 190 for a trainee to EUR 480 for a partner. The applicant submits that one of the lawyers worked 140 hours, carrying out, inter alia, a substantial amount of legal research. Another lawyer worked 208.9 hours on further research, travelling to and from Geneva (Switzerland) in order to meet with the Indonesian Government delegation. The Council disputes the number of lawyers, the number of hours and the hourly rate applied. It claims that a maximum number of 105 hours worked by a single lawyer at an hourly rate of EUR 250 would have been sufficient for the main proceedings before the General Court. It follows from its letter dated 10 January 2019 that it allocates 75 hours to the preparation of the action for annulment, 15 hours to the preparation of the reply and 15 hours to the total amount of work required after receipt of the Council’s rejoinder. As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that it is for the applicant to produce supporting documents that establish that the expenses in respect of which reimbursement is claimed were actually incurred (see, to that effect, order of 8 July 2004, De Nicola v EIB , T‑7/98 DEP, T‑208/98 DEP and T‑109/99 DEP, EU:T:2004:217, paragraph 42). In the present case, in support of its application for repayment of the lawyers’ fees incurred in the main proceedings before the General Court, the applicant provides limited information consisting of the following invoices for lawyers’ fees: – an invoice of 29 November 2013 for EUR 5 000, entitled ‘EU [General Court] Proceeding: Down payment’; – an invoice of 29 January 2014 for EUR 25 000, covering the period from 5 December 2013 to 14 January 2014, relating to the bringing of the action for annulment; – an invoice of 1 September 2014 for EUR 15 000, relating to the review of an application to intervene and the preparation of a non-confidential version of the application for annulment and of the defence; – an invoice of 1 September 2014 for EUR 25 000, relating to the lodging of the reply to the defence; – an invoice of 26 November 2014 for EUR 7 500, covering the period from 4 July to 29 July 2014 and entitled ‘Reviewing reply of the “EU”’; – an invoice of 25 February 2015 for EUR 15 000, presumably relating to the drafting of the applicant’s observations on the statements in intervention; – an invoice of 19 May 2016 for EUR 25 000 relating to the preparation for the hearing and the actual hearing before the General Court. Although it is possible to infer from the brief descriptions in those invoices the nature of the majority of the services provided, it is not possible to determine the working time devoted to each of those services or the corresponding hourly rate. Admittedly, the applicant has also provided the breakdown of the total number of hours worked and the corresponding hourly rates in separate annexes, but they are not presented in such a way as to allow the hours and the amounts corresponding to the invoices referred to above to be identified. According to case-law, the lack of precise information makes it particularly difficult to verify the costs incurred for the purpose of the main proceedings and to identify those which were necessary for that purpose. In those circumstances, a strict assessment of the fees recoverable is necessary (see order of 27 April 2009, Mülhens v OHIM — Conceria Toska (TOSKA) , T‑263/03 DEP, not published, EU:T:2009:118, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited). It is apparent from the invoices referred to in paragraph 32 above that the applicant was charged total fees of EUR 117 500, and not EUR 147 500, in respect of the proceedings before the General Court, which are the only proceedings to be taken into account for the purpose of these taxation of costs proceedings, as is clear from paragraphs 13 to 17 above. Furthermore, it follows from the case-law referred to in paragraph 34 above that the invoice of 29 November 2013 for EUR 5 000 relating to a down payment for the proceedings before the General Court should be disregarded, as it provides no information on the type of work or the number of hours concerned. It is apparent from case-law, first, that, even though as a rule substantial legal work is carried out in the course of the phase preceding judicial proceedings, by ‘proceedings’, Article 140(b) of the Rules of Procedure refers only to proceedings before the General Court, to the exclusion of any prior phase. That follows, in particular, from Article 139 of the Rules of Procedure, which refers to ‘proceedings before the General Court’ (order of 24 January 2002, Groupe Origny v Commission , T‑38/95 DEP, EU:T:2002:13, paragraph 29). The costs relating to periods during which no procedural steps were taken by the Court cannot be recovered, as such costs cannot be regarded as directly connected to the steps taken by the lawyer before the Court (order of 21 December 2010, Le Levant 015 and Others v Commission , T‑34/02 DEP, EU:T:2010:559, paragraphs 33 and 34). The costs relating to the period after the oral procedure, when no procedural steps were taken after the hearing, cannot be recovered either (order of 24 January 2002, Groupe Origny v Commission , T‑38/95 DEP, EU:T:2002:13, paragraph 31). In the light of the case-law referred to in paragraph 36 above, the applicant is wrong to claim that the proceedings lasted more than four years. It must be noted that, as the action for annulment was brought on 18 February 2014 and the judgment was delivered on 15 September 2016, the proceedings lasted just over approximately two and a half years. In addition, it is not appropriate to take into account the time devoted to the review of the judgment of the General Court and the discussion with the client concerning that judgment (see, to that effect, order of 10 April 2019, Giant (China) v EBMA , C‑61/16 P‑DEP, not published, EU:C:2019:298, paragraph 33). Second, the Council submits that the applicant’s lawyers had already participated in the administrative proceedings and therefore had an in-depth knowledge of the documents in the case at the time the action was brought. According to case-law, where a party’s lawyers have already assisted that party during proceedings or procedures prior to the relevant action, it is necessary to have regard to the fact that those lawyers are aware of matters relevant to the action, which is likely to have facilitated their work and reduced the preparation time required for the judicial proceedings (order of 21 December 2010, Le Levant 015 and Others v Commission , T‑34/02 DEP, EU:T:2010:559, paragraph 43). Third, the applicant refers to tasks that cannot be included in the category of recoverable costs because they do not appear to be necessary for the proceedings before the General Court. This applies, in particular, to the hours corresponding to the time spent by an experienced lawyer travelling to and from Geneva (Switzerland) in order to meet with the Indonesian Government delegation and to the hours spent meeting with that delegation. Similarly, the breakdown of the hours of work annexed to the application shows, for example, the time spent by an experienced lawyer travelling to and from Luxembourg (Luxembourg) and attending, together with a second, less experienced lawyer, the hearings on 28 October 2015 concerning the related cases involving anti-dumping duties for imports of biodiesel originating in Argentina, which gave rise to the judgments of 15 September 2016, Unitec Bio v Council (T‑111/14, EU:T:2016:505) and Molinos Río de la Plata and Others v Council (T‑112/14 to T‑116/14 and T‑119/14, not published, EU:T:2016:509). The hours spent travelling and attending hearings in the related cases cannot be regarded as necessary for the purpose of the main proceedings before the General Court. Fourth, it must be borne in mind that the primary consideration of the Court is the total number of hours’ work that appears to have been objectively necessary for the purpose of the proceedings before the Court, irrespective of the number of lawyers who may have provided the services in question (order of 28 June 2004, Airtours v Commission , T‑342/99 DEP, EU:T:2004:192, paragraph 30). In the present case, the preparation and drafting of a 45-page application for annulment in an anti-dumping case raising one plea involving a complex, novel legal and factual issue and four other less complex pleas cannot justify more than 85 hours’ work; 40 hours appear to have been objectively necessary for a 25-page reply. In this case, two short requests for confidential treatment consisting of eight and three pages and the preparation of the non-confidential versions of the application, the defence, the reply and their annexes cannot justify more than 10 hours’ work for an inexperienced lawyer, given the low level of complexity of that work. The responses to the two statements in intervention lodged by the Commission and the EBB each have 11 pages. The Court considers that 17 hours’ work were objectively necessary in that regard. In this case, the 13-page response to the General Court’s measures of organisation of procedure objectively justified 21 hours’ work. In this case, the necessary communication with the client regarding the preparation of the various submissions before the General Court objectively justified five hours. As regards the hourly rates, apart from the very limited involvement of a trainee, two lawyers were retained at an hourly rate of between EUR 220 and EUR 260 for the less experienced lawyer, and between EUR 330 and EUR 385 for the more experienced lawyer. The average hourly rate for the services provided by the partner was EUR 480. As a result, the average hourly rate was approximately EUR 360. In that regard, lawyers who claim to be highly qualified and very experienced in anti-dumping law and whose services are invoiced at hourly rates exceeding EUR 300 are presumed to handle the cases entrusted to them, including those involving some complexity, efficiently and speedily (see, to that effect, order of 10 April 2019, Giant (China) v EBMA , C‑61/16 P‑DEP, not published, EU:C:2019:298, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). According to the applicant, the partner who was responsible for the case needed 32.65 hours to prepare for the hearing. As that partner is a particularly experienced professional, who is capable of working very efficiently and speedily within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 47 above, only 15 hours should be regarded as objectively necessary for the purpose of preparing for that hearing and representing the applicant at that hearing. Fifth, as the Council observes, the applicant’s lawyers also represented another applicant in the related case giving rise to the judgment of 15 September 2016, PT Pelita Agung Agrindustri v Council (T‑121/14, not published, EU:T:2016:500), which, because of the legal and factual similarities between the two cases, was likely to have led to economies of scale for them. The five pleas raised in the application in the main proceedings are, in essence, almost identical to five of the seven pleas raised in the application giving rise to the judgment of 15 September 2016, PT Pelita Agung Agrindustri v Council (T‑121/14, not published, EU:T:2016:500). It should be noted, in that regard, that all the written submissions made by PT Ciliandra Perkasa in Case T‑120/14 and by PT Pelita Agung Agrindustri in Case T‑121/14 are extremely similar as regards those pleas. In particular, the issues relating to the application of Article 2(5) of the Basic Regulation were raised in the same terms, so that the General Court was able to address them with almost identical grounds of reasoning. Such similarities between the cases and the fact that they were related necessarily led to economies of scale (see, to that effect, orders of 27 April 2009, Mülhens v OHIM — Conceria Toska (TOSKA) , T‑263/03 DEP, not published, EU:T:2009:118, and Mülhens v OHIM , T‑28/04 DEP, not published, EU:T:2009:119, paragraph 17; and order of 12 May 2016, Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners v Council , T‑150/09 DEP, not published, EU:T:2016:317, paragraph 28). Such economies of scale also concern the preparation for the hearings, which took place on the same day in Cases T‑120/14 and T‑121/14. In the light of the foregoing and in particular the economies of scale referred to in the previous paragraph, which must be taken into account, the General Court sets the total amount of working time objectively required by the applicant’s lawyers for the purpose of representing the applicant in the present case during the judicial phase at 154 hours. In those circumstances, EUR 55 440 represents a fair assessment of the fees recoverable by the applicant. The recoverable disbursements In the present case, it is apparent from the invoices referred to in paragraph 32 above that, as regards the proceedings before the General Court, which are the only proceedings for which disbursements may be claimed, a total amount of EUR 2 625 was invoiced to the applicant by way of administrative costs. The Council contends that, contrary to the applicant’s claim, the calculations for administrative costs are not detailed calculations and have not been duly justified. In that regard, the Council proposes a lump sum of EUR 80. Those costs correspond, on each invoice, to the following generic heading ‘General Administration Charges: copies, binders, CD-Roms, etc.@3%’. It is apparent from an examination of the invoices that 3% of the lawyers’ fees charged was systematically charged as general administrative costs. As such a rate is not unreasonable (see, to that effect, order of 22 March 2012, Brune v Commission , F‑5/08 DEP, EU:F:2012:42, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited; order of 2 July 2013, Martinez Erades v EEAS , F‑64/12 DEP, EU:F:2013:111, paragraph 30), it is appropriate in the present case, in the light of the amount of EUR 55 440 set by way of recoverable fees, to set the amount of recoverable general costs at EUR 1 663.20. As regards the travel and subsistence expenses relating to the hearing, it is apparent from the invoice of 19 May 2016 sent to the applicant that it was charged EUR 728.78 in respect of the expenses incurred by three persons travelling between Brussels (Belgium) and Luxembourg (Luxembourg) and the cost of three hotel rooms, a parking space and lunch. In that regard, the Council contends that only the travel and subsistence expenses of a single lawyer were objectively necessary. The General Court takes the view that the present case did not involve any specific circumstances that would justify the expenses incurred for the participation of three legal advisers at the hearing as being necessary within the meaning of Article 140(b) of the Rules of Procedure. The opposing party cannot be expected to bear the financial consequences of the fact that the applicant saw fit to allocate the work necessary for its representation to three legal advisers (order of 13 June 2007, Danske Busvognmænd v Commission , T‑157/01 DEP, EU:T:2007:175, paragraph 48). An amount of EUR 486 thus represents a fair assessment of the travel and subsistence expenses incurred by two lawyers to represent the applicant at the hearing in the present case. It follows from the foregoing that the General Court sets the total amount of recoverable disbursements in respect of the main proceedings at EUR 2 149.20. The costs of the present proceedings In fixing the amount of recoverable costs, the General Court is required to take account of all the circumstances of the case up to the making of the order on taxation of costs, including expenses necessarily incurred in relation to the taxation of costs proceedings (order of 23 March 2012, Kerstens v Commission , T‑498/09 P‑DEP, not published, EU:T:2012:147, paragraph 15). As regards the sum of EUR 5 497 claimed for the present taxation of costs proceedings, it should be noted that, apart from the fact that no supporting invoice has been provided, an application for taxation of costs is rather standardised in nature. In the present case, a substantial part of the application for taxation of costs, which consists of 18 pages, essentially merely reproduced the content of the applicant’s letter to the Council dated 11 September 2018 relating to recoverable costs. In addition, the present application for taxation of costs is almost identical to that lodged in Case T‑121/14 DEP. The economies of scale that exist between those two proceedings for the lawyers must therefore be taken into account. In those circumstances, the applicant’s costs relating to these proceedings are to be taxed at EUR 2 700. In view of all the foregoing considerations, EUR 60 289.20 represents a fair assessment of the costs recoverable by the applicant. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber), hereby orders: The total amount of the costs to be reimbursed by the Council of the European Union to PT Ciliandra Perkasa is set at EUR 60 289.20. Luxembourg, 10 March 2020. E. Coulon A. M. Collins Registrar President * Language of the case: English. © European Union The source of this judgment is the Europa web site. The information on this site is subject to a information found here: Important legal notice . 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