Hong Kong Judgment

Family Court

ALDL v. FTFC AND ANOTHER

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Source document

01

Holding and result

Applying s63A(2) DCO the judge found neither applicant demonstrated an arguable appeal with reasonable prospects of success: key grounds were either not raised at trial or would not change the outcome; discretionary assessments (needs, interim adjustments, security) were not plainly wrong; accordingly leave to appeal for both parties was refused and there was no order as to costs of the leave applications.

Court disposition

Applications for leave to appeal dismissed for both Petitioner and 1st Respondent

Orders

  • Leave to appeal refused for both applicants
  • No order as to costs of these leave applications
  • Certificate for two counsel disallowed

02

Material facts

Parties

ALDL

Petitioner Counsel: Mr Adrian Kwan; Ms Bonnie Cheng; instructed by Chaine Chow & Barbara Hung

FTFC

1st Respondent Counsel: Mr Azan Marwah; Mr Josh Baker; instructed by Tsang, Chan & Woo Solicitors & Notaries

TMPM

2nd Respondent

Amounts and remedies

  • Wife Receipt in 2012: HKD 12,000,000
  • Final Joint Lives Periodical Payment Ordered: HKD 260,700
  • Value of Late Mother Estate Claimed to Be Added Back: HKD 1,180,000
  • W’s Claimed Costs for Leave Application: HKD 108,364
  • H’s Claimed Costs for Leave Application: HKD 148,192
  • Respondent Suggested Interim MPS Reduction by H: HKD 80,000
  • Broad Brush Insurance Figure Used by Judge: HKD 20,000

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Matrimonial Causes (ancillary Relief) / Leave to Appeal (application Before District Court)

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The petitioner (W) sought leave to appeal contending that the judge should have added back the value of certain landed properties purchased recklessly, should have included $1.18m from the husband’s late mother’s estate as an asset, and should have ordered a maximum lump sum offset against periodical payments. The 1st respondent (H) sought leave arguing the judge failed to rule on 62 distinct points regarding W’s ME/CFS diagnosis, misassessed W’s needs and medical expenses, failed to adjust for overpaid interim maintenance suggesting an $80,000 per month reduction, misassessed insurance and housing needs, and was plainly wrong to refuse to stop maintenance on retirement.
Respondent
The judge (respondent) held that under s63A(2) DCO neither applicant showed an arguable case with reasonable chances of success. Grounds were dismissed because the add‑back issue was not pleaded or raised at trial, the $1.18m would not materially change the outcome, discretionary decisions under section 7 MPPO were not plainly wrong, needs were generously assessed given ME/CFS and supporting expert evidence, and alleged errors would not produce a reasonable prospect of success. Costs of the leave applications were ordered to have no order as to costs and certificate for two counsel disallowed.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336) s63A(2)

    Leave to appeal requires the intended appeal to have a reasonable prospect of success or some other reason in the interests of justice

  2. 02

    SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125

    A reasonable prospect means an arguable case with prospects more than fanciful but not necessarily probable

  3. 03

    Case law principle and appellate practice (applied in Ancillary Relief context)

    New issues not raised at trial cannot be the basis for a successful appeal where the opponent had no opportunity to respond

  4. 04

    LKW case, para. 79 (Baroness Hale)

    Assessment of needs should be generously interpreted in matrimonial cases involving disability or chronic illness

  5. 05

    General appellate principle applied to section 7 MPPO exercise

    An appellate court will not interfere with discretionary factual assessments unless plainly wrong

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

Applying s63A(2) DCO the judge found neither applicant demonstrated an arguable appeal with reasonable prospects of success: key grounds were either not raised at trial or would not change the outcome; discretionary assessments (needs, interim adjustments, security) were not plainly wrong; accordingly leave to appeal for both parties was refused and there was no order as to costs of the leave applications.

Obiter and limits

  • Judge found wife’s ME/CFS diagnosis was supported by multiple expert reports and guarded against malingering
  • Judge described assessment of needs as requiring generous interpretation given chronic illness
  • Judge considered security sought by wife unreasonable and unnecessary
  • Judge declined to order sale or mortgage of wife’s only residence at Parc Royale as onerous
  • Judge disallowed certificate for two counsel in the applications

Court disposition

Applications for leave to appeal dismissed for both Petitioner and 1st Respondent

  • Leave to appeal refused for both applicants
  • No order as to costs of these leave applications
  • Certificate for two counsel disallowed

Source and reliance status

Family Court · 17 October 2024

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Judgment reading view

Judgment text

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Source document

Family Court

Judgment· 17 October 2024

[2024] HKFC 193

bjbj FCMC 13698/2013 [2024] HKFC 193

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 13698 OF 2013 ----------------------------

BETWEEN ALDL Petitioner and FTFC 1st Respondent TMPM 2nd Respondent ---------------------------- Coram: His Honour Judge S. Lo in Chambers (Not Open to Public) Date of Petitioner s amended submissions for her appeal: 16 May 2024 Date of 1st Respondent s submissions to oppose P s appeal: 28 May 2024 Date of 1st Respondent s amended submissions for his appeal: 17 May 2024 Date of Petitioner s submissions to oppose R1 s appeal: 30 May 2024 Date of Decision: 17 October 2024 -----------------------

DECISION ( Leave to Appeal: Ancillary Relief Judgment ) ----------------------- There are 2 applications before me respectively taken out by the petitioner ( ) and the 1st respondent ( ), both for leave to appeal against the Judgment made by me on 17 April 2024 (Re: Ancillary Relief) ( Ancillary Relief Judgment ). With a view to saving time and costs, I consider that it is appropriate for me to deal with them in the same decision. I would deal with W s application first and then H s application. In so far as applicable, I would use the same abbreviations as that in the Ancillary Relief Judgment . Legal principles regarding leave to appeal Section 63A(2) of the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336) provides that leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the intended appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or that there is some other reason in the interests of justice that the appeal should be heard. The relevant test of whether an appeal has a reasonable prospect of success is whether the applicant for leave can show that he has an arguable case with reasonable chances of success on appeal. A reasonable prospect of success therefore means an appeal with prospects that are more than fanciful but which do not need to be shown to be probable : SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125. W s Ground 1 This ground raised by W is premised on the success of her intended appeal against the

Preliminary Issues Judgment . As I had refused to grant leave to W to appeal , this ground has no merit and reasonable prospect of success. W s Ground 2 Relying on A v B , W argued that I should add back the value of the Landed Properties on the basis that the purchases were wanton and reckless. I reject this ground as rightly submitted by H that this add-back issue has not been raised in any of the W s evidence, her counsel s opening, closing submissions or run at the trial. H was not even asked by W s counsel at cross examination as to this issue and he had no chance to rebut or defend such accusations by way of filing his affidavit or giving oral evidence to explain at trial. This ground has no merit and reasonable prospect of success. W s Ground 3 W contended that the value of the estate of H s late mother for $1.18m should be added back under H s assets. I accept H s submission that whether or not this $1.18m was added back, it would make very little or even no difference to the outcome of the Judgment, in view of the fact that W had already received over $12m in 2012 and my order for joint lives periodical payment for HK$260,700 per month against H. This ground has no merit and reasonable prospect of success. W s Ground 4 W submitted that I ought to have ordered H to pay the maximum possible lump sum with a periodical payment order, which would be adjusted downward

proportionally to account for the lump sum. This is a completely new submission, especially the example illustrated in paras. 13 to 15 of the W s submissions for this application, which was never raised before. In any event, W failed to establish the exercise of my discretion under section 7 of MPPO was plainly wrong in failing to make such an order for maximum possible lump sum . Furthermore, I have carefully considered all circumstances including the 4 factors mentioned by W such as H s intention to relocate to Australia etc, and then came to conclude that the security requested by W was unreasonable and unnecessary. H s Ground 1 I now turn to H s application for leave to appeal. Under this ground, H argued that I declined to specifically rule on all of the 62 distinct points embedded in H s closing submissions regarding W s ME/CFS. According to both experts evidence, no one has ever suggested a single NASA Lean test alone is sufficient to support a diagnosis of ME/CFS. When reaching the conclusion that W did suffer from ME/CFS, I had carefully considered all of the 62 distinct points raised by H but I do not think that I had to specifically rule on all the points raised by H. I had certainly guarded against the potential malingering by W and eventually, I found that W s ME/CFS condition was well supported by other tests including the results made by Dr Bateman and other

doctors. I accept W s submissions that based on the parties expert evidence, cognitive impairment is not necessary for a diagnosis according to the IOM criteria. This ground has no merit and reasonable prospect of success. H s Ground 2 H contended that I failed to assess W s needs objectively. I am of the view that I am entitled to rely on my own judicial experience and common senses so as to assess W s needs. As said in para. 79 of LKW s case, Baroness Hale stressed that the parties needs should be generously interpreted . The blanket assertion of H for lack of W s supporting documents should be rejected. Due to W s ME/CFS condition, her medical expenses must be assessed generously. H s Ground 3 H tried to argue that I failed to adjust for overpaid interim MPS. H suggested a reduction of $80,000 per month. This ground has no merit and reasonable prospect of success since the final periodical payment order exceeds W s MPS . H s Ground 4 H submitted that I inaccurately assessed W s needs, such as her over-house and her insurance premia not payable after 1 September 2024. I just found in the Ancillary Relief Judgment that W was just a bit but not grossly over-housed. It would be extremely onerous to force W to sell or mortgage her only place of residence at Parc Royale. The issue of W s insurance premia not payable after 1 September 2024 was not raised in H s closing

submissions . A broad brush figure of $20,000 is appropriate in the light of the parties living standard during marriage. H s Ground 5 H argued that I was plainly wrong to refuse to stop maintenance at H s retirement. H simply cannot establish that my discretion in this regard is plainly wrong . As said , I found it unbelievable for H to retire in the near future. This ground has no merit and reasonable prospect of success. Conclusion To conclude, both of W and H have failed to demonstrate any reasonable prospect of success in their respective intended appeals and there is no other reason in the interests of justice why their appeals should be heard. Their applications for leave to appeal should be dismissed. Regarding the question of costs, the usual principle is that costs shall follow event. W and H have lodged their respective statements of costs claiming about $108,364 and $148,192 respectively. However, I consider the costs incurred by them shall be more or less the same. Besides, I would no doubt disallow the certificate for 2 counsel in these application. With a view to saving further time and costs for taxation, I exercise my discretion to order that there be no order as to costs of the applications of W and H for leave to appeal. ( Simon Lo ) District Judge Petitioner: Mr Adrian Kwan (for P s appeal) and Ms Bonnie Cheng and Mr Adrian Kwan (for opposing R1 s appeal)

instructed by Chaine Chow & Barbara Hung 1st Respondent: Mr Azan Marwah and Mr Josh Baker instructed by Tsang, Chan & Woo Solicitors & Notaries [2024] HKFC 70 [2024] HKFC 13 See [2024] HKFC 192 [2017] 1 HKLRD 187 See para. 10(1)(a) of the Preliminary Issues Judgment See para. 28 of the Ancillary Relief Judgment See para. 132 of the Ancillary Relief Judgment See para. 164 of the Ancillary Relief Judgment PAGE \* MERGEFORMAT -

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Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125

Case cited

A v B

Case cited

LKW (para. 79)

Case cited

[2017] 1 HKLRD 187

Case cited

[2024] HKFC 70

Case cited

[2024] HKFC 13

Case cited

[2024] HKFC 192

Case cited

[2024] HKFC 193

Case cited

District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336) s63A(2)

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance (MPPO) s7

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

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