Hong Kong Judgment

Court of First Instance

HKSAR v. EME, PHILIPPE JEAN

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Source document

01

Holding and result

Given the appellant had already spent 34 days in custody and there was compelling, documented mitigation (loss of employment and substantial adverse effect on SFC licensing), the appropriate exercise of sentencing discretion was to quash the remaining custodial term and impose 70 hours community service to run concurrently while leaving driving disqualification periods intact; the need to mark the seriousness of the offence was acknowledged but addressed by credit and community service.

Court disposition

Imprisonment terms quashed and substituted with community service; disqualification periods to remain in force.

Orders

  • Quash the terms of imprisonment imposed by the magistrate.
  • Sentence the appellant to 70 hours community service on both charges to run concurrently.
  • Acknowledge credit for 34 days spent in custody and impose no further immediate custodial term.
  • Periods of driving disqualification imposed by the magistrate to remain in force.

02

Material facts

Parties

HKSAR

Respondent Counsel: Mr Frederick Chung, Senior Public Prosecutor, Department of Justice

Philippe Jean Eme

Appellant Counsel: Mr Clive Grossman SC, instructed by Messrs Tanner De Witt

Amounts and remedies

  • Days Spent in Custody Credited: 34
  • Original Total Imprisonment Imposed by Magistrate (months): 3
  • Community Service Ordered (hours): 70

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Magistracy Appeal (criminal Driving Offences) / Rehearing on Appeal Against Sentence in High Court (appeal From Magistrate)

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
Appellant pleaded guilty, had spent 34 days in custody, expressed contrition and produced detailed mitigation including loss of employment and likely adverse effect on SFC licence; sought credit for time served and non-custodial disposal such as community service.
Respondent
Prosecution maintained that the conduct was a blatant disregard of court order warranting custody; magistrate had adopted a starting point of four months and imprisonment was appropriate to mark the seriousness and deter similar conduct.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Common law sentencing principles

    Credit must be given for time already spent in custody when re-sentencing

  2. 02

    Magistrates' sentencing practice / common law

    Sentencing starts from an appropriate starting point which may be adjusted for mitigation and aggravation

  3. 03

    Common law and sentencing standards in road traffic offences

    Serious breaches of court orders and blatant disregard of the law ordinarily attract custodial sentences

  4. 04

    Common law mitigation principles and administrative licensing considerations (SFC)

    Significant collateral consequences (loss of employment, professional licensing) are relevant mitigation that can justify non-custodial disposals in appropriate cases

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

Given the appellant had already spent 34 days in custody and there was compelling, documented mitigation (loss of employment and substantial adverse effect on SFC licensing), the appropriate exercise of sentencing discretion was to quash the remaining custodial term and impose 70 hours community service to run concurrently while leaving driving disqualification periods intact; the need to mark the seriousness of the offence was acknowledged but addressed by credit and community service.

Obiter and limits

  • The magistrate was not wrong to regard such conduct as ordinarily warranting custody though the appellate court may reach a different result on rehearing.
  • Appellant demonstrated genuine contrition and positive personal attributes including good character and sporting achievement.
  • Starting-point for sentence in an ordinary case would be three months after trial; four months was unnecessary in this instance.
  • Community service allows the offender to put something back into the community while recognising punishment already served.

Court disposition

Imprisonment terms quashed and substituted with community service; disqualification periods to remain in force.

  • Quash the terms of imprisonment imposed by the magistrate.
  • Sentence the appellant to 70 hours community service on both charges to run concurrently.
  • Acknowledge credit for 34 days spent in custody and impose no further immediate custodial term.
  • Periods of driving disqualification imposed by the magistrate to remain in force.

Source and reliance status

Court of First Instance · 10 November 2008

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Judgment reading view

Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

Court of First Instance

Judgment· 10 November 2008

HKSAR v. EME, PHILIPPE JEAN

bjbj HCMA141/2008

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 141 OF 2008 (ON APPEAL FROM ESCC155/2008) ____

BETWEEN HKSAR Respondent and EME, PHILIPPE JEAN Appellant ____ Before: Deputy High Court Judge Line in Court Dates of Hearing: 27 March 2008, 8 October 2008 & 10 November 2008 Date of Judgment: 10 November 2008 _____

JUDGMENT _____ This is an appeal against a sentence of imprisonment passed for driving whilst disqualified and without insurance. The facts leading to it can be stated in this way: that on 1 August 2007, the police stopped the appellant driving a red Ferrari. He did not have any insurance for it and he was proceeded against. On 3 October, he was disqualified by a court from driving. On 7 December 2007, he was driving the same red Ferrari again and therefore was prosecuted for these offences. The magistrate sentenced him to a total amount of imprisonment of 3 months. He pleaded guilty. A starting-point of 4 months' imprisonment had been taken. This is a rehearing and I am in a very different position today from that which the magistrate was in. To him, he had a man who had shown an arrogant disregard of the law in front of him and there were some not very well supported submissions made to him about the effect that imprisonment would have upon his job. The appellant holds a responsible job as a man in charge of the department in a company dealing with equity derivatives. In front of me today, I have a man who has spent 34 days in prison and I have before me, well documented, what the consequences would be of an immediate custodial sentence. I want to say immediately that for the disregard of the law that this appellant has shown, he was bound to be locked up

for some time. People who behave so have to go to prison . The appellant, after 34 days in custody, comes here as a man now contrite and someone who, I am told, has learned his lesson. I believe that to be the case. That accords with common sense and my observation of him here in court. The appellant is a man of obvious ability, a fine outstanding sportsman; there is a probation report upon him that speaks of his character in good terms. The driving whilst disqualified was accompanied by no grave aggravating circumstances other than the bare-faced disregard of the court's order. In an ordinary case, I would have started at 3 months after trial. I do no think it needs a sentence of 4 months. If I had been the magistrate, I would have taken that as my starting point and I would have sentenced him to 2 months' imprisonment. I could make the appellant serve the small amount that remains, after crediting time spent in custody I am not going to do that because there is powerful mitigation to be found in the consequences of an immediate custodial sentence to this appellant. That is because I know by now reliable and documented evidence that as regards his employment, he would lose his job. That would have disastrous consequences for him. On the other hand, people do face those sort of disastrous consequences by going to prison for driving whilst disqualified. But it would not only be

that. It would have a long-term effect upon his prospects of employment because in the job that he does, he is obliged to be licensed by the SFC. The material before me tells me that if he were to receive an immediate custodial sentence, the prospects of him being denied a licence or denied a licence for a longer term are substantially increased. The question is, does he have to serve any more time in prison. He did enjoy bail originally but on an adjourned hearing of this appeal before me, wise counsel prevailed, and he did not make a bail application. So the fact is today I can, I hope, do justice in what is a difficult case by acknowledging the 34 days in custody, and acknowledging the mitigation as to the effects of an immediate custodial sentence, and pass a sentence of community service. It seems to me that achieves a balance because the man has had the punishment of imprisonment and he can now put something back into the community, albeit in fairly moderate terms. I have an order of 70 hours in total in mind. I do not say the magistrate was wrong. I disagree with him slightly on the starting-point but that is of no great moment. The situation I am faced with is one that is different from him. I agree with him that conduct of this sort, where there is a disregard of the court order that is so blatant, will be met with custody and that message still applies even though on

paper the result of this case is community service rather than imprisonment. So I shall alter the sentence. I shall quash the terms of imprisonment that were imposed and order that there be 70 hours community service on both of the charges to run concurrently. The periods of disqualification will stand (P Line) Deputy High Court Judge Mr Frederick Chung, Senior Public Prosecutor, of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent Mr Clive Grossman, S C, instructed by Messrs Tanner De Witt for the Appellant

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