Hong Kong Judgment

Court of Appeal

L v. C

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01

Holding and result

The court exercised its discretion to make a supplemental order permitting the wife six months from the date of judgment (until 25 November 2007) to vacate and deliver possession of the property, finding the demand to vacate within days unreasonable and that six months was reasonable; the stay of execution as to payment was unnecessary because the sum had been paid. The court granted liberty to apply to preserve parties' positions and allocated costs: husband entitled to costs for the application seeking deferral of the lump sum, wife entitled to costs regarding the property application.

Court disposition

Summons granted in part: supplemental order made allowing wife until 25 November 2007 to vacate property; stay of execution unnecessary as payment made; liberty to apply granted to both parties; costs allocated between parties.

Orders

  • Wife shall vacate and deliver possession of the property to the husband on or before 25 November 2007.
  • Liberty to apply granted to both parties.
  • Costs: husband to have costs of the part of the application seeking deferral of the lump sum payment; wife to have costs of the application concerning the property.
  • No stay of execution required as the specified sum had already been paid.

02

Material facts

Parties

Wife

Petitioner Counsel: Ms Anita Yip

Husband

Respondent

Amounts and remedies

  • Monetary Award Ordered to Husband by Earlier Judgment: HKD 10,133,799

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Civil Appeal (court of Appeal) / Post Judgment Summons for Supplemental Order and Stay

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The wife sought an order staying execution of the payment until 25 August 2007 and an order that she vacate and deliver possession of the property by 25 November 2007. She argued the court could make a supplemental order, that she needed time (about six months) to find and complete a replacement property and to take necessary steps, and that six months was reasonable.
Respondent
The husband argued the application was effectively an application to stay execution, which should only be granted in exceptional circumstances, and that the wife should vacate immediately. He pressed that the wife had been unduly slow and cited pressure to carry out demolition/repair works from the Building Authority and loss of income from the property; he proposed a shorter period (three months).

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Court of Appeal judgment (this case)

    Court has power to make supplemental orders to its original judgment where appropriate; discretion is wide in such applications

  2. 02

    Court of Appeal judgment (this case)

    Stay of execution of a judgment is exceptional and should be granted only in exceptional circumstances

  3. 03

    Court of Appeal judgment (this case)

    Court will assess reasonableness of time allowed to vacate in light of need to obtain alternative accommodation and conduct of the parties

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The court exercised its discretion to make a supplemental order permitting the wife six months from the date of judgment (until 25 November 2007) to vacate and deliver possession of the property, finding the demand to vacate within days unreasonable and that six months was reasonable; the stay of execution as to payment was unnecessary because the sum had been paid. The court granted liberty to apply to preserve parties' positions and allocated costs: husband entitled to costs for the application seeking deferral of the lump sum, wife entitled to costs regarding the property application.

Obiter and limits

  • The court noted the parties' conduct was not edifying but that the wife required time to purchase alternative accommodation
  • The court observed that any short addition of months would be unlikely to affect the Building Authority's long history on the matter and that the order would likely persuade the Authority to extend time further
  • Comment that the husband had long been deprived of income from the property

Court disposition

Summons granted in part: supplemental order made allowing wife until 25 November 2007 to vacate property; stay of execution unnecessary as payment made; liberty to apply granted to both parties; costs allocated between parties.

  • Wife shall vacate and deliver possession of the property to the husband on or before 25 November 2007.
  • Liberty to apply granted to both parties.
  • Costs: husband to have costs of the part of the application seeking deferral of the lump sum payment; wife to have costs of the application concerning the property.
  • No stay of execution required as the specified sum had already been paid.

Source and reliance status

Court of Appeal · 12 July 2007

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Judgment text

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Source document

Court of Appeal

Judgment· 12 July 2007

L v. C

bjbj cacv 169/2006 in the high court of the hong kong special administrative region court of appeal civil appeal no. 169 of 2006 (on appeal from hcmc NO. 5 of 2006)

BETWEEN Petitioner and Respondent Before: Hon Stock JA, Yuen JA and Hartmann J in Court Date of Hearing: 12 July 2007 Date of Judgment: 12 July 2007

J U D G M E N T Hon Stock JA: By the judgment handed down in this case on 25 May 2007, we ordered the wife to pay the husband the sum of $10,133,799 and set aside the order of the court below requiring the husband to transfer to the wife the property known as 4 Beacon Hill Road ( the property ). A summons has been issued by the wife by which she seeks an order: that execution of the order requiring payment of the specified sum be stayed until 25 August 2007; and that the wife shall vacate and deliver possession of the property to the husband on or before 25 November 2007. We are convened to hear that summons. Save as to the question of costs, it is no longer necessary for us to concern ourselves with the first order sought, since the sum has already been paid. In making this application the wife seeks an order supplemental to that made by this court on 25 May, in which original order the court did no more than set aside the order of the court below; we made no order that the wife vacate the premises, although the effect of the resulting position is that she will have to, because the property remains in the name of the husband. It was said on behalf of the husband that, given the absence of a specific date in the order for the wife to vacate the premises, she was bound to do so and we note that, in reflection of that stance, the solicitors acting for the husband wrote on 28 May

2007 to those acting for the wife requiring her to vacate within seven days. Not surprisingly, in my view, those acting for the wife thought this unreasonable and requested time, but the husband s solicitors responded on 30 May saying that a demolition order in respect of unauthorized building works to the property had been made by the Building Authority and the time for that demolition had only been extended by the Authority until determination of the appeal. It is said that the husband is under pressure to carry out the works as soon as possible and, accordingly, so the solicitors wrote, they were instructed to institute enforcement proceedings if the property was not delivered up on 1 June 2007, namely, two days later. It is also said today that the husband has for long been deprived of income from the property. In the written material before us there is some argument as to the test to be applied to this application. On the one hand, it is said for the husband that this is in effect an application to stay execution of an order, an application which should only be granted in exceptional circumstances; whereas it is said on behalf of the wife that the application is made pursuant to the court s power in certain circumstances to make a supplemental order, in respect of which the discretion is wider. I do not think the rubric under which we are proceeding matters at all, for the

result must be the same. In my judgment, the stance taken by the husband has been unreasonable, certainly until very recently. Of course the wife must have time to look for alternative suitable accommodation to purchase, a process that takes months, and to do whatever has to be done to such new property as she acquires. There is evidence that she has already viewed a number of properties. The effect of the judgment is to require the wife to move out of a home that she has occupied for many years and the husband has his own accommodation. The demand made of her to move out within seven days of that judgment was distasteful, as seems now to be conceded, though it is only right to say that the history of the conduct of both parties in this litigation is not edifying. It is now suggested by the husband that the wife should have three months rather than six months. I think that the six months from the date of our judgment which she seeks is reasonable in the circumstances. As far as concerns the attitude of the Building Authority, it seems clear enough to me from the history of the matter that the addition of a few months to a history that began, in this regard, in 1991, will be of no significance. Applications have already been made to the Building Authority by those acting for the husband for further extensions of time, to the latest of which applications there has as yet been no

response. I would be most surprised if an order made in accordance with the wife s application would do other than persuade the Building Authority further to extend time to take account of it. But to preserve the husband s position in this regard, we should, I think, when making the order, grant liberty to apply. Accordingly, I propose an order in the terms of paragraph 2 of the summons, with a further provision granting both parties liberty to apply. Hon Yuen JA: I agree. Hon Hartmann J: I agree. [Submissions as to costs] Hon Stock JA: We have heard counsel as to costs. The husband should in my judgment have his costs of that part of the application that sought an order for deferral of the payment of the lump sum. It is self-evident that the wife did not need time to pay that sum. I would however grant the costs of the application concerning the property to the wife. Hon Yuen JA: I agree. Hon Hartmann J: I agree. (Frank Stock) Justice of Appeal (Maria Yuen) Justice of Appeal (M.J. Hartmann) Judge of the Court of First Instance Ms Anita Yip instructed by M 1udk

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