1999/163 - Boyd v Pickersgill and Le Cornu [1999] UR 163 (30 September 1999)

1999/163 - Boyd v Pickersgill and Le Cornu [1999] UR 163 (30 September 1999)

The Court held that, under Jersey law, the running of the ten-year prescription period in contract may be suspended where the plaintiff is under a practical impossibility of bringing proceedings, including reasonable ignorance of the cause of action due to the defendant's conduct. The plaintiff is entitled to argue at trial that her claim is not time-barred if she can establish such impossibility up to the relevant date.

Citation
[1999] UR 163
Parties
Plaintiff/appellant: Margaret Milne Boyd; Defendant/respondent: Barry Keith Pickersgill; Defendant/respondent: David Eldon Le Cornu
Jurisdiction
Jersey
Judgment Date
30 September 1999
Procedural Posture
Appeal / Appeal From Royal Court Judgment on Preliminary Issue of Prescription
Outcome
Appeal allowed
Legal Topics
Prescription, Limitation Periods, Suspension of Limitation, Professional Negligence by Lawyers, Breach of Contract

Case Brief

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Parties

Margaret Milne Boyd

Plaintiff/appellant

Barry Keith Pickersgill

Defendant/respondent

David Eldon Le Cornu

Defendant/respondent

Procedural Posture

Appeal / Appeal From Royal Court Judgment on Preliminary Issue of Prescription

  1. 1 Whether the plaintiff's claim in contract against her former solicitors is time-barred by prescription under Jersey law
  2. 2 Whether ignorance of a cause of action due to the defendant's conduct can suspend the running of prescription
  3. 3 Whether the maxim 'non valenti agere nulla currit praescriptio' applies to suspend prescription in cases of professional negligence

Ratio Decidendi

The Court held that, under Jersey law, the running of the ten-year prescription period in contract may be suspended where the plaintiff is under a practical impossibility of bringing proceedings, including reasonable ignorance of the cause of action due to the defendant's conduct. The plaintiff is entitled to argue at trial that her claim is not time-barred if she can establish such impossibility up to the relevant date.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed

Orders

  • The plaintiff is not shut out from contending at trial that her claim in breach of contract is not time-barred.
  • The matter is remitted for trial to determine whether the prescription period was suspended.