AG v Riddock 05-Feb-2021 [2021] JRC 037 (05 February 2021)

JUDGMENT THE COMMISSIONER: 1. The defendant stands to be sentenced for one count of larceny as a servant of £72,396.94, committed over a period of nearly 3 years, from her employer a small company of electrical engineers. She was employed as office manager, managing the company's accounts and using the online accounting software. She was the only employee to do so; the Managing Director and majority owner had access but rarely used it. Payments were ostensibly made by her to regular suppliers but in fact went to an account she had opened under a reference that used the name of the regular supplier. The accounting software shows that the defendant manually added each transaction that referenced the supplier and then deleted the invoice, thus ensuring that the accounting software was reconciled with the payments made. Matters came to light in December 2019 when one of the suppliers questioned why an account had not been paid. The Managing Director checked the online banking account which showed that it had been paid, but on enquiry he found that the account details given by the supplier were different to the account into which the money had been paid.

2. This is a small company and the financial loss to it is significant. The personal impact upon the Managing Director and majority owner has been substantial. He has been greatly effected suffering sleep deprivation and anxiety because of the stress caused by wondering why someone he thought was a friend and could trust could do this, and why he did not notice it sooner.

3. The defendant told the Probation Officer that she had taken the money as she was struggling to meet basic living expenses and maintenance costs for her two children who lived with their respective fathers from whom she was separated. She maintained that the money was not used on luxury items.

4. The defendant has no previous convictions and is assessed at a low risk of reconviction. We have been referred to the well-known case of R v Barrick (1985) 7 Cr. App. R. (S.) 142 and the questions which need to be considered when assessing the seriousness in cases of breach of trust, and taking some of them in turn: (i) The Managing Director placed complete trust in the defendant. Effectively she had control of the payment system. (ii) The offences took place over 2 years and 10 months, the first being a matter of months after she started employment and the defendant, as we have said, spent the money she said, to pay for her rent and support her children, something which the Prosecution have been unable to verify but there is no evidence to the contrary. (iii) We have already considered the impact upon the company and its Managing Director, but this crime has had no effect on public confidence or on other employees of the company.

5. In terms of mitigation we listened to everything put forward comprehensively by Advocate Dix. The defendant has pleaded guilty. She was cooperative with the police making full admissions. She has written to us a full letter of remorse and we have references on her behalf. We have letters from her parents and indeed her father is in Court to support her. She has suffered from depression and anxiety and there is no doubt that the impact upon her has been substantial. Her mental health has led her to attempt suicide last summer and very sadly her two children are no longer in contact with her.

6. The Court has been referred to a number of cases for comparison purposes namely AG v Quemard [2017] JRC 168 , AG v Arnold [2017] JRC 133 and AG v Gouveia [2016] JRC 166A , but as the Court has often noted previously, these types of offences often involve very strong mitigation with the offenders often being of good character and the effect upon them and their families severe.

7. There would have to be very exceptional circumstances to justify anything other than a sentence of imprisonment, which in our view is inevitable, and that is conceded by Advocate Dix.

8. The Prosecution have moved for a sentence of 2 years and 6 months. We think that is an appropriate sentence., but the light of all of the mitigation that has been put forward we are going to reduce it slightly.

9. You are sentenced to 2 years and 3 months' imprisonment.

10. Turning to the compensation order, a compensation order in favour of the company is sought in the amount taken under the Criminal Justice (Compensation Orders)(Jersey) Law 1994 . We can only agree that the company should be compensated and indeed it has a presumably undefendable civil claim against the defendant for the repayment of all of the monies stolen. It is implicit in the making of a compensation order that the Court takes into account the ability of the defendant to pay, such orders usually carrying a sentence of imprisonment in default, and whether the payment should be by instalments and over what period. We are satisfied that the defendant has no means in which to discharge such an order now and she has just been sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years and 3 months. We have no idea what her financial position will be when she has served her sentence. To make an order against her in such circumstances would be to set her up to fail, and to face the jeopardy of a further term of imprisonment in default of an order that she cannot meet. So as much as we sympathise with the position of the company, it would not be appropriate to make a compensation order today and we will not do so. Authorities R v Barrick (1985) 7 Cr. App. R. (S.) 142. AG v Quemard [2017] JRC 168 . AG v Arnold [2017] JRC 133 . AG v Gouveia [2016] JRC 166A . Criminal Justice (Compensation Orders)(Jersey) Law 1994 AG v Picot [1990] JRC 074 Page Last Updated: 25 Feb 2021 BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII