Carroo Construction Limited v Peroh (Royal Court : Hearing (Civil) : Cadin : Expert evidence) [2025] JRC 253 (9 October 2025)

judgment the Master: Introduction 1. This judgment sets out the reasons for my various decisions in relation to these proceedings. Background 2. In May 2025, for the reasons set out in a judgment reported at [2025] JRC 125 (the "May 2025 Judgment"), I directed that - (i) the parties mediate their dispute through a professional mediator; (ii) were mediation to be unsuccessful, any applications should be issued by 1 July 2025; (iii) the parties create a "complete, common bundle of relevant paginated documents" ; (iv) the experts meet again and prepare an updated joint report by 22 July 2025; (v) the parties exchange witness statements "cross-referenced to the common bundle" by 2 September 2025; and (vi) there be a further directions hearing after 23 September 2025.

3. In so doing, I noted that - "17. Both parties are acting in person and to date, have struggled to meet the expectations of the Court and/or the requirements of the Royal Court Rules 2004 ("RCR"). Whilst past performance in litigation is no guarantee of future performance, I think that the parties will continue to struggle to meet the ever-increasing expectations of the Royal Court as this case progresses towards a trial." 4. Unfortunately, that assessment has proved correct in that following an unsuccessful mediation: (i) the parties created a common bundle of documents which was not complete; (ii) notwithstanding the express wording of the Act of Court, Mr Peroh cross-referenced his witness statements to the 4,515 pages (9 lever arch files' worth) of the dynamic, Case Centre Master Bundle, the page numbers of which will, of course, change with every new document added; (iii) the Plaintiff filed its witness statements out of time and did not issue any application for an extension; (iv) the experts met, and a joint report was prepared by Mr Friel, the Defendant's Quantity Surveyor. Mr Friel sent that draft report to Mr Jones, the Plaintiff's Quantity Surveyor, but Mr Jones did not engage. The joint report has been signed by Mr Friel only, and there is no application, or proper explanation, in relation to Mr Jones' failure to sign it.

5. The parties tried to litigate these and other issues through correspondence copied to the Court. On 16 September 2025, my secretary wrote to the parties directing that if they wanted to cure their defaults, they should issue the requisite summonses and pay the appropriate Court fees and stop including the Court on unnecessary and inappropriate correspondence. That instruction worked in part and the following summonses were live at the directions hearing - (i) by the Plaintiff for - (a) an unless order against the Defendant requiring him to disclose video evidence concerning the property and to allow access to the property to the Plaintiff and its expert quantity surveyor; (b) the costs unnecessarily incurred by its quantity surveyor as a result of the manner in which the Defendant's expert reported; and (c) an extension of time for the filing of witness statements. (ii) by the Defendant for - (a) joinder of Mr Horgan personally to the proceedings; (b) the costs unnecessarily incurred by his quantity surveyor as a result of the manner in which Mr Horgan, on behalf of the Plaintiff, gave discovery; (c) extensions of time in which to agree and to file the common bundle, to file witness statements cross-referenced to that common bundle; (d) the filing of the joint expert report.

6. Following the hearing, Mr Horgan sent 3 further emails to the Court - (i) the first, timed at 9:34am on 1 October 2025, sought to relitigate issues concerning the common bundle and the experts. Somewhat unusually, and seemingly without consideration of any impact on legal privilege, that email set out in detailed terms the text of legal advice that he had apparently received on this issue from some unnamed lawyer or firm, no doubt in an attempt to persuade me of the correctness of his position; (ii) the second, timed at 9.35am on 1 October 2025, related to the JFSC and again set out the text of legal advice that he had received on this issue; (iii) the third, timed at 14:48 forwarded an email from Mr Jones, the Plaintiff's Quantity Surveyor, and I return to this email below. The Overriding Objective 7. The Plaintiff alleges that it is owed £8,338 under a final invoice on a "cost plus" contract; the Defendant alleges that he has been overcharged by some £126,771 and has also incurred losses for additional finance and rent. This is not a complex claim and litigating it should not be as difficult as the parties have made it.

8. As I noted previously - "21. In my judgment: ( i ) the net sum in issue is only marginally above the threshold for the Petty Debts Court, and that must inform consideration of the Overriding Objective; (ii) the financial issues should have been narrowed, if not resolved entirely, by the involvement of the quantity surveyors; (iii) the issues between the parties should not be as complex as they are trying to make them; (iv) once the experts have discharged their obligations properly, the Royal Court will be left to determine certain, limited factual matters together with the manner and timing of performance under this contract. Should the Royal Court find that there had been a breach of that contract, it would then consider the recoverability of the costs of additional finance, additional rental payments and distress.

22. Unfortunately, it does not appear that the parties yet appreciate, or share, the Court's view as to the route through their issues to a resolution in accordance with the Overriding Objective and further directions are required if this matter is to proceed to trial. Given that these proceedings have been extant since November 2023 and that only limited progress has been made towards a trial, any directions must be focussed on achieving expedition and clarity against a backdrop of likely sanctions for non-compliance." 9. Although often mentioned, the Overriding Objective rarely merits a line by line recital. However, in this case, I think it appropriate to set out RCR 1/6 and to emphasise those aspects that are particularly relevant to this litigation, and these applications - "1/6 The Overriding Objective (1) The overriding objective of the Court in proceedings is to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost . (2) Dealing with a case justly and at proportionate cost includes, so far as is practicable - (a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing; (b) saving expense ; (c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate - ( i ) to the amount of money involved , (ii) to the importance of the case , (iii) to the complexity of the issues, and (iv) to the financial position of each party; (d) ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and

fairly ; (e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court's resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases; and (f) enforcing compliance with rules, practice directions and orders . (3) The Court must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it - (a) exercises any power given to it by these Rules; or (b) interprets any Rules. (4) The parties are required to help the Court to further the overriding objective . (5) The Court must further the overriding objective by actively managing cases. (6) Active case management includes - (a) encouraging the parties to co-operate with each other in the conduct of the proceedings ; (b) identifying the issues at an early date; (c) deciding promptly which issues need full investigation and trial and accordingly disposing summarily of the others ; (d) deciding the order in which issues are to be resolved; (e) encouraging the parties to use an alternative dispute resolution procedure if the Court considers that appropriate and facilitating the use of such procedure ; (f) helping the parties to settle the whole or part of the case; (g) fixing timetables or otherwise controlling the progress of the case; (h) considering whether the likely benefits of taking a particular step justify the cost of taking it; ( i ) dealing with as many aspects of the case as it can on the same occasion; (j) dealing with

the case without the parties needing to attend at court; (k) making use of technology; and (l) giving directions to ensure that the trial of a case proceeds quickly and efficiently." 10. With the Overriding Objective firmly in mind, I turn to the individual summonses and issues. Extensions of Time for Witness Statements and the Common Bundle 11. My aim in requiring the parties to create a common bundle was to cut through some of the issues that had arisen around discovery and to ensure that both parties were proceeding on an equal footing which would provide solid ground for the Royal Court in due course. I remain of that view.

12. Mr Horgan states that he created the common bundle and Mr Peroh failed to engage which is why Mr Peroh had to refer to other documents in his witness statement. Why we find ourselves in this position is not an issue that needs to be resolved, and I direct that the parties work together to create a complete common bundle by 13 October 2025 and that any documents that are added to it, are added to the end so that the references in the Plaintiff's witness statements do not need to be changed.

13. I give permission for witness statements filed by the Plaintiff to be filed late and for Mr Peroh to file further versions of the two witness statements filed by him, updated only insofar as they are to be referenced to the complete common bundle as opposed to the Case Centre Master Bundle, such updated statements to be filed by 20 October 2025. The Plaintiff's Application for an Unless Order and Inspection of the Property 14. By the time the summons was heard, Mr Peroh had provided a copy of the video evidence, so this aspect of the summons fell away. So too did the application to inspect the property on the basis that Mr Horgan, for the Plaintiff, accepted that the contemporaneous photographs available provided sufficient evidence for it to make its case. Joinder of Mr Horgan Personally 15. This is an application made by Mr Peroh on the basis that, he submits - "...substantial evidence has emerged that directly implicates Mr. Horgan in conduct which goes beyond the ordinary scope of corporate representation. This includes new documentation, expert reports, forensic handwriting analysis, and cross- project patterns of behaviour - all of which point to personal misrepresentation, deliberate overcharging, and systematic abuse of the corporate structure." 16. In particular, he submits that - (i) Mr Horgan's conduct in both the underlying project and in the litigation has been

dishonest; (ii) it reflects a systemic course of conduct that he has pursued with other customers, including a Ms Kennedy who has provided a statement in relation to the works carried out at her property, Inglehurst ; and (iii) Mr Horgan hides behind the Plaintiff's corporate veil, in circumstances where he has previously dissolved a company that was facing a liability and the Plaintiff itself had been listed by the Jersey Financial Services Commission's Registry for dissolution.

17. These allegations were set out in the summons, a supporting statement containing a declaration of truth and signed by Mr Peroh and a set of draft Particulars of Claim joining Mr Horgan.

18. The application was strenuously resisted by Mr Horgan who submits in his Skeleton Argument that, amongst other things - "I, John Paul Horgan, have always acted for and represented the Plaintiff, Carroo Construction Limited, in this matter and my role on the La Ronde project was that of a Contracts Manager for the Plaintiff and in acting for the Plaintiff I undertook the following duties. I processed all supplier and sub-contractor bills received and entered these details into the Plaintiff's QuickBooks accountancy package which generated very detailed invoices of these services which were sent to Mr Peroh who inspected and approved these services prior to making payment for the same..." 19. The law on amendments was succinctly summarised in Patel v JTC Trust Company Limited [2023] JRC 152 - "6. The law on amendments is well established. Birt, Deputy Bailiff, as he then was, in Cunningham v Cunningham [2008] JLR 227 held - ( i ) Leave to amend should generally be given provided there is no prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated for by costs; (ii) More stringent considerations apply where leave to amend is sought late in the proceedings; and (iii) Amendments will not be permitted if they infringe the rules of pleading, or introduce a claim so hopeless it will be liable to be struck out.

7. It has always been the case that special additional considerations apply to amendments to plead fraud / dishonesty. In summary - ( i ) Any pleading of fraud must set out the facts, matters and circumstances relied upon to show that the party charged with such conduct was actuated by a fraudulent intention. Full and precise particulars are required - Makarenko v CIS Emerging Growth Limited [2001] JLR 348 ; (ii) Fraud must be distinctly alleged and sufficiently pleaded. Fraud will not be sufficiently particularised where the facts pleaded are consistent with innocence - Brakspear v Nedgroup Trust (Jersey) Limited [2018] JRC 121 at paragraph 59, and see Lord Millett in Three Rivers v Bank of England [2003] 2 AC 1 at paragraph 184. Lord Millett also said - "This means that a plaintiff who alleges dishonesty must plead the facts, matters and circumstances relied on to show that the defendant was dishonest and not merely negligent, and that the facts, matters and circumstances which are consistent with negligence do not do so." At paragraph 186, Lord Millett said - "It is not open to the Court to infer dishonesty from facts which have not been pleaded, or from facts which have been pleaded but are consistent with honesty. There must be some fact which tilts the balance and justifies an inference of dishonesty and this fact must be both pleaded and proved." (iii) Fraud is not to be

pleaded lightly - a party making such a plea should ensure that allegations are set out with full particularity. The Law Society Code of Conduct makes it clear that an advocate may not draft a statement of case containing an allegation of fraud 'unless the member has clear instructions to allege fraud and has reasonably credible material which establishes an arguable case of fraud'." 20. The draft Particulars of Claim pleads causes of action in deceit or alternatively negligent misstatement and does so in the following manner - "3. Representations Made 3.1 The Defendant relies on representations (both express and implied) made personally or through the corporate veil by Mr Horgan to the effect that: (a) Labour and material charges issued by Carroo were accurate and contractually compliant. (b) Underlying documentation substantiating those charges (e.g.., labour worksheets) either existed or had been disclosed. (c) The invoiced works reflected actual progress and materials delivered. 3.2 These representations were made via sworn witness statements, email correspondence, disclosure certificates, and invoices transmitted under cover of personal signature or instruction.

4. Knowledge and Falsity 4.1 The Defendant will rely on the following to establish falsity and knowledge on the part of Mr Horgan: (a) Internal inconsistencies in the explanations provided by Mr Horgan concerning the origin, existence, and loss/recovery of labour worksheets. (b) Meta-data contradictions and an implausible account of worksheet destruction and miraculous recovery from a "discarded" computer. (c) Video evidence and forensic handwriting analysis identifying unreconciled invoiced items and duplication across unrelated project sites (La Costa and Inglehurst ). (d) A repeated pattern of budget exhaustion, bridging loan imposition, and project incompletion across multiple Carroo projects - all involving Mr Horgan directly. (e) The liquidation of Unit 6 Joinery Ltd (Jersey) while litigation was ongoing-prior to any Court judgment-exemplifies the Defendant's concern that Mr Horgan has historically sought to avoid liability by allowing or orchestrating company closures during moments of legal pressure. This mirrors similar shutdowns across his corporate network....

6. Causes of Action A. Deceit 6.1 Mr Horgan knowingly or recklessly made false representations, intending the Defendant to act on them. 6.2 The Defendant did act on them and suffered loss as a result. B. Negligent Misstatement 6.3 Alternatively, if deceit is not established, Mr Horgan owed the Defendant a duty of care in making factual representations regarding billing and supporting documentation. 6.4 He breached that duty by making misleading or inaccurate statements, causing foreseeable loss..." 21. As Master Thompson, as he then was, noted in MacFirbhisigh (as Curator of B. L. Ching) v C. I. Trustees and Executors Limited [2014] (1) JLR 244, citing from Clerk & Lindsell on Torts at 18-17 - "First, in order to sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of fraud and nothing short of that will suffice. Secondly, fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made ( i ) knowingly, (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false..." 22. Having been involved with his case since it was first referred up to the Royal Court by the Petty Debts Court, I can readily appreciate why the Defendant has particularised his claims as he has done given both the information available to him, and the fact that he is acting in person. However, in my judgment, this pleading falls far short of the full and precise particulars

that are required to plead fraud. Moreover, the manner in which the alternative plea of negligent misstatement is raised seems to me to wholly undermine the plea of deceit and to fall into the difficulty identified by Lord Millett in Three Rivers v Bank of England [2003] 2 AC 1 where he held that - "This means that a plaintiff who alleges dishonesty must plead the facts, matters and circumstances relied on to show that the defendant was dishonest and not merely negligent, and that the facts, matters and circumstances which are consistent with negligence do not do so." 23. Even were I to be wrong in that assessment of the draft pleading and for it to be sufficient to plead impropriety in the form of deceit, in MacFirbhisigh (as Curator of B. L. Ching) v C. I. Trustees and Executors Limited , Master Thompson held that - "54 In La Générale des Carrières et des Mines v. FG Hemisphere Assocs. LLC (6), the Privy Council with apparent approval set out the domestic law as cited by counsel for the appellant on piercing the corporate veil as follows (2012 (2) JLR 172, at para. 23) - "In making this last submission, Mr. Hirst relies upon domestic law principles recently analysed by Munby, J. at first instance in Ben Hashem v. Ali Shayif .-�.-�. In summary, Munby, J. held ( [2008] EWHC 2380 (Fam) , at paras. 159-164) - '159 In the first place, ownership and control of a company are not of

themselves sufficient to justify piercing the veil. This is, of course, the very essence of the principle in Salomon v. A Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 22 Secondly, the court cannot pierce the corporate veil, even where there is no unconnected third party involved, merely because it is thought to be necessary in the interests of justice... Thirdly, the corporate veil can be pierced only if there is some 'impropriety' .-�.-�. Fourthly, the court cannot, on the other hand, pierce the corporate veil merely because the company is involved in some impropriety. The impropriety must be linked to the use of the company structure to avoid or conceal liability .-�.-�. Fifthly, it follows from all this that if the court is to pierce the veil it is necessary to show both control of the company by the wrongdoer(s) and impropriety, that is, (mis)use of the company by them as a device or façade to conceal their wrongdoing .-�.-�. Finally, and flowing from all this, a company can be a façade even though it was not originally incorporated with any deceptive intent. The question is whether it is being used as a façade at the time of the relevant transaction(s). And the court will pierce the veil only so far as is necessary to provide a remedy for the particular wrong which those controlling the company have done. In other words, the fact that the court pierces the veil for one purpose does not

mean that it will necessarily be pierced for all purposes.'" In the present matter, while factual allegations of control are pleaded, the proposed pleading does not meet the threshold of impropriety set out in FG Hemisphere and nowhere is it alleged that any impropriety is linked to the use of the first defendant as a company to avoid or conceal liability. In other words, it is not enough simply to allege a breach of duty by the first defendant or the fact that the first defendant's corporate status provides the protection of limited liability to found an allegation sufficient to plead impropriety. If I were to allow this amendment then it would be possible to make an allegation to pierce the corporate veil in any case where a company established for a single purpose, assuming this to be true, was used to obtain the benefit of limited liability. In my judgment, as with the tort of deceit, much more is required to make an allegation of impropriety to assert a case that the benefits of limited liability protection are being used as a device or façade to conceal wrongdoing. Such an allegation comes close to allegations of dishonesty and must be fully particularized . In this case no such particulars have been provided." (emphasis added) 24. There is no pleaded allegation in the draft Particulars of Claim relating to "use of the company by [Mr Horgan] as a device or façade to conceal [his] wrongdoing" and the highest that this is pleaded is in relation to Unit 6 Joinery Limited which is not the Plaintiff. In the absence of any such pleaded assertion, this claim is doomed to fail. I therefore decline permission to amend to join Mr Horgan personally.

25. As part of that application, the Defendant filed a statement from Ms Kennedy dealing with her engagement with Mr Horgan in respect of her property. The application having been rejected, in my judgment, her evidence is not relevant to the issues before the Court, whether directly or in accordance with the doctrine of similar fact set out in O'Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales [2005] 2 AC 534 and followed by the Royal Court in HSBC Bank PLC v David Hick Antiques Limited [2025] JRC 072 . Expert Evidence 26. In May 2025, I noted that - "19. Neither expert has provided the Court with the assistance required and as matters stand, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see the wood from the trees in terms of what is, and is not, in dispute and/or how it might be determined by the Royal Court." 27. Unfortunately, the expert evidence is still somewhat unsatisfactory. I have been provided with the chain of email correspondence between the experts which shows that - (i) in August 2025, there was active communication and discussion between the experts, and they agreed to meet up; (ii) they met at 10am on 2 September 2025, and at 9:30am on 3 September 2025, Mr Friel, the Defendant's Quantity Surveyor, emailed Mr Jones, the Plaintiff's Quantity Surveyor, the draft joint report for "review and signature"; (iii) it does not appear that Mr Friel received any response, as on 5 September 2025, Mr Friel chased Mr Jones again by email, without success; (iv) on 16 September 2025, Mr Friel again emailed Mr Jones stating that he was concerned the joint report had not been filed and was going to send it unilaterally to the Court, which he did.

28. The "joint report" was prepared and signed by Mr Friel, seemingly in accordance with the requirements of Schedule B to Practice Direction 17/09. It is a short document, cuts both ways insofar as the parties are concerned, and states that the agreed findings of the experts are - "Materials 2. The material invoices have been examined in detail.

3. Missing Invoices - The value of missing invoices is approximately £4,400.00 , representing around 4% of the total invoices charged by Carroo Construction Limited to Mr. Michael Peroh.

4. Incorrect Delivery Addresses - Materials invoiced to La Costa (the adjoining semi-detached property) total approximately £34,600 (circa 30% of all material invoices). Both experts agree that it is not possible to determine the precise allocation of materials between the two adjoining properties but do agree that it is highly likely that the material was used in the La Ronde property .

5. Deliveries to Other Sites - - Comasduea - £214.81 Lido - £46.18 Stock - £404.64 Labour 6. Labour Overcharges: Identified overcharges amount to £8,309 (circa 10% of labour costs).

7. Labour Without Timesheets - A further amount of £10,440 (circa 12.5%) has been charged without supporting timesheets. Contract Manager's Fees 8. The Contract Manager's fees have been charged in the sum of £14,577.50. Both experts agree that this figure is reasonable provided the associated information was properly allocated and validated. However, this was not the case . Issues for the Court's Determination 9. The joint view of Henro Consulting Limited and YOURQS is that the Master of the Royal Court is best placed to decide the following: i . Whether the defendant is liable for the missing invoices (£4,550). ii. Whether the incorrect addresses on invoices fall within the Contract Manager's responsibility. iii. Whether the defendant should be excluded from liability for materials delivered to other sites [£665.63). iv. Whether the defendant should be excluded from liability for labour discrepancies on the timesheets (£8,309). v. Whether the defendant should be excluded from liability for labour charges unsupported by timesheets (£10,440)." (Emphasis Added) 29. At the hearing, there was nothing before the Court from Mr Jones of Henro Consulting Limited. Nor was there any proper explanation from the Plaintiff whether on affidavit or otherwise. Nor any specific application by the Plaintiff to extend time for Mr Jones to file any report. The parties did however indicate that Mr Jones had sent a document to Mr Friel on 25 September, 6 days after the bundle freeze date for the hearing.

30. In submissions, Mr Horgan submitted that because issues had arisen in relation to the common bundle, the obligation to file a joint report was not triggered. The Act of Court dated 13 May 2025 provided that - "5. once that common bundle has been prepared and provided to the experts, the experts shall meet again to refine and/or clarify their conclusions and to identify those areas: a. outside of their knowledge or expertise; and/or b. where additional factual evidence will be required for them to revisit their respective opinions. 6. the updated joint written report should be provided to the parties by Tuesday, 22 July 2025..." 31. I reject Mr Horgan's submissions. Irrespective of whether it contained all the documents it should have contained, a common bundle was prepared and provided to the experts. They met and according to the report signed by Mr Friel, reached an agreed position which was documented by Mr Friel, albeit that it was late and requires an extension of time if it is to be filed.

32. Although there is no direct evidence as to why Mr Jones ceased his engagement in the process, on 4 September 2025, the day after Mr Friel circulated the draft report, Mr Horgan sent my secretary an email, copied to the Defendant, in the following terms - "Dear Mr Peroh, I have just had sight of the revised labour and material reports submitted by your expert Seamus Friel. I have noticed some obvious mistakes which I need to review then provide my comments to Henro Consultants to assist them in preparing what is the third Joint Report . Richard from Henro Consultants is on holiday from tonight until Friday 12th September so assuming that everything shall be in order by his return and the Joint Report report shall be ready for submission by Tuesday 16th September 2025 I believe that I shall be able to submit our witness statements on the same day..." (emphasis added) 33. Accordingly, it would appear that rather than engaging with Mr Friel to perfect their joint report, Mr Jones decided to send the draft to Mr Horgan, for his input. That was wholly improper. If there were issues which needed input from others, the experts should have reached an agreed position, identified the issues, and then the parties and/or the Court could have considered how to address them.

34. As Schedule B to Practice Direction 17/09 makes clear, "parties should not normally attend experts' discussions" and in the unusual event that they do, they should do so openly and not surreptitiously. But for Mr Horgan's email to the Court, his involvement in the preparation of the joint expert report might not have been known to the Court or the Defendant.

35. Having sent the draft to Mr Horgan, it would appear, given the contents of his email, that Mr Horgan usurped the role of the experts and tainted the process in which they were engaged. This is a repetition of previously criticised conduct on the part of the Plaintiff. In the May 2025 Judgment, I criticised the joint expert report and noted that: "12.( i )-�-�-�-�-�-�-�-�Rather than simply referring to the competing contentions of the experts and their reasons for taking one position rather than another, it also contains direct statements from the Plaintiff in response to the views of the experts.-�-�Quite how or why it contains such statements is wholly unclear." 36. As noted above, on 1 October 2025, following the hearing, Mr Horgan forwarded to the Court an email from Mr Jones attaching a revised draft report. That chain contains an email from Mr Jones to Mr Friel dated 25 September 2025 in which Mr Jones states that - "Following our meeting on September 2nd and our emails on August 28th, August 29th, and September 3rd and recent updates in relation to the common bundle.-� I believe there are still opportunities to substantiate certain aspects of the report beyond reasonable doubt and further narrow down the disputed items for the court. I'm mindful of the Master's criticism and want to ensure we fully address the obligations of an expert witness as per Practice

Directions RC/1709. I've reviewed your proposed draft report and have identified several areas that I believe need further attention, which I have now addressed in the attached revised draft - Consideration of all material facts:-�The previous draft did not review all evidence in the common bundle. I have now completed this exercise, and my comments are incorporated into the attached report... It took some time to thoroughly review all the material facts in the common bundle, but I believe this step is crucial to address the Master's previous criticisms and ensure the report is comprehensive. I appreciate that this will take time for you to review, but I am confident that all parties will agree on its necessity." 37. This email raises significant concerns in that: (i) the meeting was on 2 September 2025; Mr Friel had chased Mr Jones for his signature on 3 occasions, without response, and yet there is no mention in this email of those communications; (ii) the tone of the email appears to relate to spin rather than substance; nowhere in the email does Mr Jones state that Mr Friel recorded the meeting wrongly or that Mr Jones did not agree with that which was ascribed to him; (iii) the issue of the common bundle only arose on 15 September 2025 nearly 2 weeks after the meeting and it did so in the context of communications between the parties, not their experts - (a) an email was

sent to the Court by Mr Horgan on 14 September attaching a new common bundle index, entitled "Common Bundle Index 14th September 2025.pdf" which was said to be "revised to be more clearly indexed, updated to include the recently submitted witness statements and associated documents to assist the experts in their Joint Report which is still at large"; (b) Mr Peroh objected to that revised common bundle, and by email of 15 September 2025, Mr Peroh indicated that he had cross-referenced his statements to the Case Centre Master Bundle; (c) my secretary responded stating that "It is too late to make such amendments to the Common Bundle" and that the referencing in Mr Peroh's statements "must be rectified" ; (iv) Mr Jones' email attaches a document entitled "Common Bundle Index 14th September 2025.pdf" which was the same document Mr Horgan sent to the Court on 14 September 2025; (v) it is obvious that there has been communication between Mr Jones and Mr Horgan yet none of that interaction has been referenced or disclosed in the covering emails or the amended draft report from Mr Jones, nor has it been volunteered by Mr Horgan on behalf of the Plaintiff; (vi) moreover, the tone of the amended draft report is wholly different to that provided by Mr Friel and in terms, reads like a submission from the Plaintiff rather than an independent expert discharging his duties to the Court; (vii) the timing is also significant in that Mr Friel provided the draft report to Mr Jones on 3 September 2025; nothing was heard from Mr Jones until over 3 weeks later when statements had been filed by the Defendant and the Court bundle freeze date had closed.

38. In my judgment, Mr Jones has not engaged appropriately with Mr Friel, or indeed, the Court. If there were issues about the draft report prepared by Mr Friel, they should have been addressed contemporaneously by Mr Jones with Mr Friel, and in sufficient time for the joint report, or a document setting out areas of agreement and disagreement, to be placed before the Court at the hearing. If there were insurmountable issues preventing such a report from being filed, the Court should have been informed. The fact that this did not occur is of concern.

39. So too are the email chains, the amended draft report, and the chronology, which taken together suggest that far from providing an "independent opinion...uninfluenced by any other pressures", Mr Jones is arguing the case for the Plaintiff, instructed and/or encouraged by Mr Horgan.

40. In my judgment - (i) if an expert is not going to engage with the Court and/or the other party's expert, their evidence should not be adduced in front of the Court; (ii) similarly, if by their conduct or that of the party instructing them, the expert's independence is or appears to be compromised, in breach of their obligations in Schedule A to Practice Direction RC17/09, the Court can decline to allow the expert's evidence to be adduced ( Styles v. Att. Gen . [2006] JLR 210 ), or allow it only to be adduced on terms; (iii) in the absence of engagement from Mr Jones in the proper way, it is appropriate for the Defendant to file the joint report, signed by Mr Friel alone, pending further clarification of the position of Mr Jones; (iv) the Plaintiff should not be allowed to rely upon the evidence of Mr Jones pending further order.

41. Should the Plaintiff wish to bring an application to rely upon Mr Jones' evidence, it must make an application within 14 days of hand down of this judgment. Such application must be supported by a full and frank affidavit from Mr Jones: (i) explaining his failures to engage with Mr Friel and the Court, and his decision to forward the draft report to Mr Horgan; (ii) detailing all communications with the Plaintiff and/or Mr Horgan and/or anyone else concerning this case other than Mr Friel; and (iii) pursuant to paragraph 4(d) of Schedule A to Practice Direction RC 17/09, exhibiting all such communications where they exist in documentary form (which for the avoidance of doubt includes text messages, WhatsApp messages, voicemail, note or other recorded media). Potential Next Steps 42. The joint expert report signed by Mr Friel is potentially determinative of much of this case, and in my judgment, could certainly streamline the future trajectory, in that - (i) the experts identified labour overcharges on the part of the Plaintiff in the sum of £8,309 and agreed that the Contract Manager's fees of £14,577.50 were not reasonable. Given that the Plaintiff's claim was for £8,383.91, it would seem likely that the Plaintiff's claim will be wholly extinguished by these agreed amounts (which would leave a balance due to the Defendant on these elements of £14,502.59); (ii) whilst the

Defendant had counterclaimed on the basis that he had been overcharged for approximately £34,600 of materials delivered or invoiced to La Costa (the adjoining semi-detached property), the experts agreed that "it is highly likely that the material was used in the La Ronde property" which is the Defendant's property such that that claim might appear unlikely to succeed; (iii) there would remain - (a) the Defendant's Counterclaims for unnecessary finance costs, rent, and distress; and (b) quantification of any balance of the Defendant's claims for overcharging.

43. As to that latter aspect, the evidence would be limited in that: (i) the Plaintiff asserts that all of the invoices were properly due and owing and will adduce evidence to that effect; (ii) the experts agreed that sums were claimed where there were no timesheets (£10,440) or invoices (£4,400); (iii) the Court will need to consider the accuracy and veracity of the underlying timesheets - (a) these issues were mentioned in paragraph 16 of my previous judgment where I cited extracts from the Plaintiff's affidavit of discovery and noted that "it is unclear to me how either of the above passages would sit with the foreman completing the timesheets" . (b) since then, Mr Peroh unilaterally, and without permission from the Court, obtained evidence from a handwriting expert on 27 May 2025 who concluded that - "23 In my opinion, there is strong evidence to show that the handwritten entries, as specified, on the timesheets in the names Jermaine Bailey, Jono Nolan and Marius were written by Danny Fletcher." (c) in a Skeleton Argument for this hearing, Mr Horgan states - "I am genuinely amazed that Mr Peroh has paid for a Forensic Analysis of the timesheets to prove something which Daniel Fletcher freely admits." (d) Mr Fletcher provided a statement for the Plaintiff in which he stated that - "I can confirm that I completed timesheets for some on the La Ronde project (and others) as

three of these operatives 'struggled' to provide accurate timesheets for very different reasons. John Nolan was dyslexic, Marius Wojtan was Polish and Jermaine Bailey just didn't like writing timesheets so I would complete their timesheets for them based on their "recollection' of what they were doing the previous week. I have viewed the items in the schedule headed 'Labour Analysis' and I can confirm that the hours on the timesheets represent an operative's time on site, but not all time associated to the project. I would give these timesheets to the Contracts Manager on a Monday, cross reference their accuracy with the site diary, and I would tell the Contracts Manager when an operative worked through his break and when I went to the suppliers before or after work." (e) this statement echoes Mr Horgan's statement. The site diary has never been disclosed. Nor is it listed in any of the Plaintiff's affidavits of discovery. Nor is it explained as to why timesheets are required if the site diary is the definitive record. (f) similarly, the Court may need to reach a determination about the records recently discovered on the now, recently disposed of, computer. According to Mr Peroh, the timesheets disclosed from the computer included ones dated 2023 whereas in a Skeleton Argument for a hearing on 16 October 2024, Mr Horgan appeared to suggest that only ones predating that time

would or should have been available - "4. On 5" October 2024 whilst clearing a spare room I noted an old computer which I replaced in January 2024. I searched this computer and was unable to find anything extra until my wife showed me how to search the 'Recycle Bin' (new to me) where I discovered scanned copies of timesheets from recent years. These scans had been deleted after payment was received and was a process I employed two years ago but no longer use . These scanned copies have now been uploaded and also sent to the Defendant." (Emphasis Added) (iv) further and/or alternatively, irrespective of whether all or any of the Plaintiff's invoices and timesheets might provide a mathematical justification for the sums charged, Mr Friel's report dated 18 November 2023 compared and contrasted the amount paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff (£247,948) as against the estimated value of the works carried out by the Plaintiff (£121,177) to identify an overcharge of £126,771.18. That conclusion has not been the subject of any comment or criticism by Mr Jones in any expert report.

44. Were the issues to be narrowed as set out above, the oral evidence in relation to these limited claims would currently be from Mr Friel and from cross-examination of the Plaintiff, Mr Fletcher and the Defendant as their statements would provide their evidence in chief. In my judgment, two days of Court time would be sufficient to determine these matters, even acknowledging that the parties are acting in person. In my judgment, this would be a saving of Court time as compared to a trial of all matters.

45. Accordingly, if there is no application from the Plaintiff in relation to Mr Jones' evidence, I will direct that - (i) pursuant to RCR 7/1(2), of my own motion, that there be a summary judgment hearing and in accordance with RCR 7/3(3) such hearing shall be in relation to - (a) the Plaintiff's claim; and (b) the following aspects of the Defendant's Counterclaim - (1) labour overcharges (£8,309); (2) the Contract Manager's fees (£14,577.50); (3) materials delivered or invoiced to La Costa (approximately £34,600). (ii) such hearing should be fixed for the first available date 24 days after the handing down of this judgment and the parties will be respectfully reminded of the provisions of RCR 7/3(a) and (b); (iii) given the admissions now made by the Plaintiff, I will give permission for the Defendant to rely upon of the written evidence of the handwriting expert, Mr Stockton, as set out in his expert report dated 27 May 2025 in order that the trial court may have an overview of the evolution of the Plaintiff's position. The Cross-Summonses for Costs 46. The Plaintiff seeks an order that the costs of its expert are met by the Defendant, alternatively that each party meets its own costs as "neither of the reports have produced the correct result and only served to deepen the divide." 47. Mr Peroh seeks an order that the Plaintiff pay the costs of his quantity surveyor - (i) incurred after 3 January 2025 and amounting to £3,459.50 on the basis that Mr Friel had to redo his work as a result of the manner in which the Plaintiff gave discovery; and (ii) reasonable future costs incurred as a result of the Plaintiff disclosing further worksheets on 17 June 2025.

48. The principles on which the Court awards costs are well known and set out in Watkins v Egglishaw [2002] JLR 1 and applied in Flynn v Reid [2012] (2) JLR 226: "12 By way of preface I note, as is common ground, that the award of costs indeed involves the exercise of a discretion pursuant to the Civil Proceedings (Jersey) Law 1956, art. 2, which provides: "(1) Subject to the provisions of this Part and to rules of court made under the Royal Court (Jersey) Law 1948, the costs of and incidental to all proceedings in the Royal Court shall be in the discretion of the Court, and the Court shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid." 13. In Watkins v. Egglishaw (17) ("Watkins"), Page, Commr , set out the principles which, in his view, ought to guide the court in the exercise of its discretion when considering the issue of costs (2002 JLR 1 , at paras, 7-9): "7 The principles that should guide the court in the exercise of its discretion in this area appear to me, therefore, to be as follows, stating them as shortly and simply as possible: (a) The court's overriding objective in considering costs is, as in everything else, to do justice between the parties. (b) In many cases, that objective will be fulfilled by making an award of costs in favour of the 'winning' party, where a 'winner' is readily apparent. In any event, the "follow

the event" rule can still be a useful starting point. (c) It is a mistake, however, to strain overmuch to try to label one party as the 'winner' and one as the 'loser' when the complexity or other circumstances of the litigation do not readily lend themselves to analysis in these terms. (d) The discretion as laid down in art. 2 of the Civil Proceedings (Jersey) Law 1956 is a wide one and ought not to be treated as fettered by any particular supposed rule or practice, other than that the discretion should be exercised judicially and broadly in accordance with the guiding principles referred to in In re Elgindata (No. 2) ... and A. E. I. v. Phonographic Performance ... (e) It is, accordingly, open to the court to have regard to any and all considerations that may have any bearing on the overriding objective of doing justice. Its task is to take an overview of the case as a whole (Bank of Credit & Commerce Intl. v. Ali (No. 4) . . . per Lightman, J.). The new Civil Procedure Rules governing civil litigation in the English courts provide that the court 'must have regard to all the circumstances' and then go on to spell out certain matters that such circumstances include, the 'conduct of all the parties' being one and 'whether a party has succeeded on part of his case, even if he has not been wholly successful' another (Civil Procedure Rules, para. 44.3(4)). To a large

extent, however, the particular matters mentioned do no more than state the obvious and it is unnecessary to import them verbatim, in any formal way, into the practice of the Royal Court. (f) It is implicit in this that, even though a party would otherwise be regarded as having been 'successful,' justice may require that costs should not automatically follow the event." 49. I think it useful to set out a short chronology of relevant events: 8 November 2023 Proceedings instituted in the Petty Debts Court 18 November 2023 Mr Friel prepared his first report of behalf of the Defendant 1 December 2023 Petty Debts Court ordered the transfer of proceedings 12 December 2023 Directions given staying proceedings for ADR and, as subsequently varied, requiring discovery by affidavit by 7 June 2024, an updated report from Mr Friel by 12 July 2024 and a report on behalf of the Plaintiff by 16 August 2024 4 June 2024 Plaintiff's affidavit of discovery 14 June 2024 Defendant's affidavit of discovery (out of time) 27 August 2024 Directions given explaining the parties' discovery obligations and requiring updated lists of documents by 27 September 2024, verified by affidavit 26 September 2024 Plaintiff's Supplemental affidavit of discovery 27 September 2024 Defendant's affidavit of discovery 16 October 2024 Direction given requiring each party to provide updated affidavits of discovery by 30

October 2024 addressing the criticisms made by the other, ordering that, insofar as not already provided, the parties shall give inspection to the other of all documents disclosed", and requiring simultaneous exchange of expert reports by 29 November 2024 December 2024 Mr Jones provided a report in relation to invoices. 319-b; 324-b; 330-b; 337-b; 341-b; 349-b; 350-b; 355-b; 357-b; 360-b; 364-b; 366-b; 368-b; 370-b; 371-b 23 December 2024 Mr Friel provided a report noting that - "I have received a file which consists of the [invoices referred to by Mr Jones] with some supporting information i.e. timesheets and invoices. NB It is important to note the absence of critical documentation, including a significant portion of timesheets (approximately 67% missing) and several material invoices, severely undermines the ability to verify the accuracy and legitimacy of the submission by Carroo Construction Ltd. In a Cost- Plus contract, transparency and accountability are fundamental principles, as the client relies entirely on the contractor's records to validate costs incurred." 7 February 2025 Joint expert report 10 February 2025 Plaintiff's Supplemental affidavit of discovery having uploaded additional timesheets to Case Centre 17 April 2025 Revised joint expert report provided noting that "The plaintiff submitted materials to the court. The defendant considers that only partial

disclosure of some of the materials was provided. Your QS has reviewed only the materials directly disclosed to the plaintiff." 13 May 2025 Judgment given in which I noted that: 6. Discovery was problematic in that neither party's list of documents was entirely satisfactory and each issued a summons for specific discovery, and an associated unless order, against the other. Accordingly, I gave directions on 27 August 2024 identifying exactly what fell within the scope of discovery and what had to be disclosed to the other party. Compliance with those directions was unnecessarily complicated in that the Plaintiff, acting through Mr Horgan, decided to upload all of his unindexed, individual documents to Case Centre and then refused to provide the documents separately to the Defendant...

18. The Court is disappointed to note that the parties and/or their experts are still playing procedural games in relation to discovery: ( i ) Mr Horgan seeks to hide behind the apparent failure of Mr Peroh to serve a Notice to Inspect pursuant to RCR 6/17(4) as an excuse for not having provided him with copies of all of the relevant documents, notwithstanding that my Order dated 16 October 2024 required the parties to give inspection of the documents disclosed; (ii) The Court has repeatedly and vociferously decried the use by the parties of the Court's bundling system as a means to conduct discovery, yet once again Mr Horgan seeks to assert that because a matter was once uploaded to Case Centre, that is sufficient to meet any of his obligations for discovery and/or inspection; (iii) Despite the efforts the Court has made to ensure a common document universe, the Defendant's expert still appears to be applying some form of Nelsonian blindness to the available material. 17 June 2025 Plaintiff disclosed timesheets in relation to labour charges of £10,195 14 July 2025 Defendant's Supplemental affidavit of discovery in relation to video evidence and Inglehurst 50. In summary - (i) These proceedings concern a claim by the Plaintiff for an unpaid invoice under a cost plus contract, and a counterclaim by the Defendant for overcharging. The time between the Plaintiff leaving site

(August 2023) and proceedings being instituted (November 2023) was short. All of the relevant documents relating to costs charged in relation to the project must have been in the possession of the Plaintiff for it to invoice, yet obtaining a complete set of documentation has proved extremely challenging. (ii) The parties' experts reported in December 2024 and provided a joint report on 7 February 2025. However, on 10 February 2025, the Plaintiff provided further discovery rendering the reports inaccurate. (iii) A revised joint report was provided in April 2025, albeit that that report was problematic in that the Plaintiff had failed to provide formal discovery (using the Court's bundling system instead) and the Defendant's expert had failed to take into account any documents that had not been formally disclosed but which he could have identified and reviewed. (iv) The Plaintiff gave further discovery of timesheets in June 2025 and it was in September 2025 that the experts met again. (v) In terms, the experts have had 3 attempts at preparing a joint report and it was only on the last occasion that all of the available underlying documents were provided.

51. Quite apart from the piecemeal manner of discovery, the Defendant also complains that rather than simply identifying the newly discovery documents, the Plaintiff either buried the documents in the mass of documents on Case Centre or provided all of the information again, which required the Defendant's expert to reassess all of the material rather than simply considering the new material.

52. The Plaintiff complains about the fact that the Defendant's expert repeatedly produced reports which were inaccurate and/or biased and/or flawed.

53. In my judgment - (i) `both sides can be criticised, as indeed I did in May 2025; (ii) however, at all material times, the relevant documents were in the possession of the Plaintiff, and it was not until June 2025 that the Plaintiff disclosed the full set to the Defendant, at which point the Defendant's expert had already contributed to two joint reports; (iii) some, but not all, of the work carried out by the Defendant's expert was wasted as a result of the piecemeal disclosure; (iv) irrespective of whether the Plaintiff identified the additional disclosure, it should have been capable of identification by the Defendant; (v) given the piecemeal disclosure, the Defendant's expert would have had to get back up to speed on each occasion, at additional cost, and it was reasonable for him to revisit his reports in the light of the new material; (vi) any additional costs incurred by the Plaintiff are as a result of its own actions; (vii) the appropriate order is for: (a) the Plaintiff to pay 66% of the cost of the Defendant's expert's reports amounting to £2,283.27, wasted by the piecemeal discovery, and for the balance of that sum to be costs in the cause; (b) any future costs of the Defendant's expert being costs in the cause. Costs of the Various Summonses 54. In my judgment there have been a number of cross summonses and there is no obvious winner. The appropriate costs order

for these summonses is costs in the cause. Authorities Carroo Construction Limited v Peroh [2025] JRC 125 . Royal Court Rules 2004. Practice Direction 17/09. Patel v JTC Trust Company Limited [2023] JRC 152 . MacFirbhisigh (as Curator of B. L. Ching) v C. I. Trustees and Executors Limited [2014] (1) JLR 244. Clerk & Lindsell on Torts at 18-17. Three Rivers v Bank of England [2003] 2 AC 1 . O'Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales [2005] 2 AC 534

HSBC Bank PLC v David Hick Antiques Limited [2025] JRC 072 . Styles v. Attorney General [2006] JLR 210 . Watkins v Egglishaw [2002] JLR 1 Flynn v Reid [2012] (2) JLR 226 Page Last Updated: 04 Nov 2025 BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII