The Attorney General v T

Inferior Number Sentencing - domestic abuse - perverting the course of justice - reasons [2025]JRC249 Royal Court (Samedi) 6 October 2025 Before : Sir Timothy Le Cocq, Bailiff, and Jurats Christensen MBE and Berry The Attorney General -v- T L. B. Hallam, Crown Advocate. Advocate O. A. Blakeley for the Defendant.

SENTENCING JUDGMENT THE BAILIFF: 1. On 26 August 2025, we sentenced T (“the Defendant”) to a total of 140 hours community service, the equivalent of eight months imprisonment, for each of two counts, one for domestic abuse and one for perverting the course of justice, to run concurrently, and made a Domestic Abuse Prevention Order in the terms sought by the Crown, with some amendment, for a period of five years. We did not make a recommendation for deportation.

2. At the time of sentencing, we indicated that we would give some further reasons for the sentence that we reached. These, in brief, are those reasons.

3. The Defendant is some thirty years of age and he met the victim when they were nineteen years old and they were married at the age of twenty-three. They were living in Country A. Their daughter was born in November 2021 and the family moved to Jersey for the victim’s job in August 2022.

4. In December 2024, the Defendant was on holiday in Place B when the victim contacted him to let him know that she wanted a divorce and for him to leave the family home. She had decided to tell the Defendant this whilst he was away as she was fearful of his reaction.

5. He returned to Jersey shortly thereafter and was scheduled to start a new job in the hotel industry. He remained mainly in hotels funded by his parents and the victim and in mid-January he moved into alternative accommodation organised by his new employer.

6. The Defendant and the victim were married under Religion C law and the divorce [was] finalised in March 2025.

7. Following their separation in December 2024, the victim had repeatedly told the Defendant she did not want any contact with him unless it was in relation to their daughter. It is clear that the Defendant refused to accept that the relationship had ended and between January and May 2025 he sent many calls, texts and made unwanted visits to the victim. She describes how there was constant contact from the Defendant which left her feeling extremely distressed and fearful.

8. There were a number of incidents of this kind of behaviour. For example, on 6 January 2025, the Defendant was waiting behind a pillar in the car park for the victim after she had finished work. Although she made it clear she did not want to speak to him, he stood in front of her car preventing her from leaving. She returned to her place of work and he followed her into the office building. She went upstairs to her office and began to run away from him. She was very scared. She used her access fob to get through the secure door into her office and her colleagues came to check if she was okay. Her colleague subsequently took her home and walked her to the door but when she got inside the Defendant was inside the flat. The Defendant continued to say he wanted to get back together with her.

9. On 19 January 2025, the Defendant sent a video to the victim via WhatsApp. He was intimating that he was going to kill himself saying there was no point in living without the victim and their daughter. Later that day, he attended the victim’s home.

10. On 21 January 2025, he sent a bunch of flowers to the victim making her feel very uncomfortable.

11. Between January 2025 and February 2025, whenever the Defendant went to the flat to collect their daughter for contact, he would persist in talking to the victim about them getting back together again. There were occasions when he would refuse to leave when he was legitimately visiting his daughter and he sent her, for example, in May 2025 an extended sequence of messages. We have read a large number of these messages and indeed have seen what appeared to be entries in the Defendant’s journals.

12. We have also heard that the Defendant was frequently in contact with the victim and we have reviewed many of the messages that passed between them, including the Defendant’s blunt requests for sexual intercourse from the victim.

13. The Defendant was interviewed under caution and explained that he was unaware of any problems when he received the victim’s message saying that she wanted a divorce. He admitted many of the incidents that the victim alleged and accepted that he placed his hand on the victim’s leg, for example, when she was sick in bed but denied trying to get her to lie down on the bed with him. He admitted to sending gifts and admitted to reading her personal diary. He was asked why he had asked to have sex with the victim after she had insisted correspondence between them only relate to their daughter and he stated he had only done so twice and understands why he should not have done so.

14. The Defendant was released on bail with conditions that he did not contact the victim unless it was in relation to their child, and not to attend the victim’s place of work or her flat. Shortly after he was released from custody, ignoring these restrictions, he called the victim and asked to see her. She agreed to meet him and during that meeting he tried to talk to her about the police investigation and asked why she was “doing this to him”. Later that afternoon, he continued the conversation in relation to the police investigation and pleaded with her to drop the charges. This left the victim feeling uncomfortable. He sent a number of messages on his Apple watch subsequently of an apologetic nature saying he was scared. The text was sent to the victim at 8.11pm and again at 9.40pm asking her to drop the charges.

15. The Defendant was arrested and interviewed again. He understood that he had breached his bail conditions.

16. The Crown put before us the case of Attorney General v Veloso [2024] JRC 094, in which the Court held that: “Domestic abuse is a serious offence and very often it will be appropriate to meet it with a sentence of imprisonment. The understanding of the harm done by domestic abuse has grown significantly over the last few years and the Court, and wider society, has developed an increasing understanding of how insidious and damaging it may be.” 17. The Crown puts before us other examples of similar statements by the Court and sets out as aggravating factors the involvement of the child in the abusive behaviour, the potential impact on the child because of what she was witnessing and the use of contact arrangements with the child to instigate the offence.

18. Perverting the course of justice is of course a very serious offence. In AG v Saaed [2013] JRC 246, the then Deputy Bailiff, Sir William Bailhache, said: “Perverting the course of justice is an extremely serious offence. It is an offence which, theoretically, carries no limit on the custodial sentence that might be imposed. It goes to the very heart of the delivery of justice. In this case it was an important threat to justice that was made by the defendant, putting pressure on a witness to change her statement which, if changed, was intended to work to his benefit.” 19. The Crown placed before us a number of other cases that show that this Court has emphasised on a number of occasions how serious the offence of perverting the course of justice is, how witnesses are entitled to the protection of the Courts from those who seek to intimidate them from giving evidence and, in the case of AG v Dominguez [2020] JRC 010 said: “Perpetrators of domestic abuse must understand that attempts to intimidate or persuade their victims not to give evidence will be dealt with severely by the Courts.” 20. We have, of course, read with care the victim’s personal statement and the fact that she has felt unsafe, and we fully understand how the Defendant’s campaign of unwelcome contact and persuasion must have been intimidating.

21. The pre-sentencing report makes it clear the Defendant has taken responsibility for his behaviour and now accepts that the marriage is over. He expresses remorse and we accept his remorse as genuine. He is assessed at being at low risk of general reconviction.

22. The Crown has moved for a custodial sentence for this matter with nine months’ imprisonment for each of Counts 1 and 2 consecutive, make a total of eighteen months imprisonment. We, however, have taken a different view of the mitigation available to this Defendant. We accept as genuine that this was wholly out of character and that his protestations of remorse and apologies to the victim and to the Court are sincerely meant. It has been described as a period of temporary madness in which he could not control his emotions.

23. We have no reason not to accept the Defendant’s story that the first he knew of the victim’s desire for a divorce was a remote message sent whilst he was a long way away, in Country A. That must have been shocking and potentially incomprehensible to him and he returned immediately. He did not return to the matrimonial home but lived elsewhere and he saw his daughter infrequently. It is clear that he simply did not understand or feel able to accept that the marriage was over, and there is no suggestion that he ever threatened or behaved with violence. He behaved in a way that to us suggests someone who is emotionally confused and distraught and out of control.

24. This is not to suggest that the Defendant’s behaviour is other than serious. We view as particularly troubling the fact that the victim had to run away back to her place of employment and lock the door behind her to feel safe, and even though she clearly did not want to speak to him, the Defendant had entered her home. Similarly, the perversion of the course of justice is something that normally would be met with a sentence of imprisonment which would indeed run consecutively to the sentence of imprisonment for the original offence. There is no doubt that the Defendant’s behaviour was harassment and that he was out of control. But, as we have already indicated, we are satisfied that his behaviour was out of character and resulted from the shock of an apparently peremptory termination of his marriage. In the circumstances, we felt able to treat this case as exceptional and instead of a custodial sentence, which such a case would normally attract to deal with this matter, in the way that we have set out in paragraph 1 above. We were mindful of the need to protect the victim in this case and, as indicated above, we imposed the domestic abuse protection order. Authorities Attorney General v Veloso [2024] JRC 094. AG v Saaed [2013] JRC 246. AG v Dominguez [2020] JRC 010