https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/11778

In re Estate of Muigai (Deceased) (Succession Cause 3608 of 2003) [2026] KEHC 11778 (KLR) (Family) (30 July 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 11778 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Family Succession Cause 3608 of 2003 H Namisi, J July 30, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF WALTER KARANJA MUIGAI (DECEASED) Between Everton Enterprises Ltd 1st Applicant Geoffrey Chege Kirundi 2nd Applicant Lucy Wamaitha Chege 3rd Applicant and Kennedy Ndichu Karanja 1st Respondent William Muigai Karanja 2nd Respondent James Gikami Walter Karanja 3rd Respondent Ruling 1.The matters placed before this Court for determination consist of two vehemently contested Applications that represent the latest iterations in a sprawling, multi-decade legal saga concerning the estate of the Deceased. The underlying dispute, which has consumed judicial time and resources for over a quarter of a century, revolves around the proprietary rights, beneficial interests, and subsequent legal standing of an expansive tract of agricultural land known as L.R. No. 10090/23, comprising approximately 47 acres, situated in Juja within the Thika Municipality (“Suit Property”). The protracted nature of this dispute requires this Court to exercise its jurisdiction with profound circumspection, balancing the sacred right of access to justice against the equally critical constitutional imperative of concluding litigation and preventing the abuse of the judicial process. 2.The first application is Summons originally dated 6 June 2024, and subsequently amended on 8 October 2025, filed by Everton Coal Enterprises Limited, the 1st Applicant. The 1st Applicant approaches this Court seeking to stay the hearing of the Summons for Confirmation of Grant, which was filed by the Administrators on 10 April 2017, and to strictly suspend the distribution of the aforementioned Suit Property. This prayer for suspension is anchored on the premise that the 1st Applicant has an active appeal pending before the Court of Appeal, designated as Nairobi Civil Appeal No. E467 of 2025, which purportedly challenges an Environment and Land Court decision regarding the ownership of the property. 3.The second application is a Summons dated 18 September 2025, filed jointly by the Creditors, in which they seek an unprecedented judicial declaration that the estate of the Deceased owes them a staggering and astronomical sum of Kshs. 2,356,000,000.00. Furthermore, they seek an order compelling the Administrators to either pay this colossal sum directly from the estate's general corpus or to secure the alleged debt using the Suit Property or its resulting subdivisions. 4.The Respondents are the duly appointed Administrators of the Deceased's intestate estate. The Administrators have stoutly opposed both Applications through various Replying Affidavits and written submissions, arguing that the Applications are legally untenable, inherently defective, caught by the doctrines of res judicata and ex turpi causa non oritur actio, and constitute a blatant, systematic abuse of the judicial process designed solely to frustrate the rightful beneficiaries of the Estate. 5.The record demonstrates a relentless phenomenon of forum shopping and floodgate litigation that tests the very limits of the principle of finality in judicial proceedings. Litigation History 6.The genesis of this protracted dispute traces back to the late 1980s, long before the demise of the Deceased. The ensuing legal battles have traversed the High Court, the Environment and Land Court (ELC), the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court. A comprehensive understanding of this chronological progression is essential, as the determinations made by these superior courts establish the binding jurisdictional and substantive parameters within which this Court must now operate. The history of this dispute is not merely background information; it forms the substantive legal foundation upon which the doctrines of res judicata and functus officio must be evaluated. 7.In 1988, the Deceased, acting as the registered proprietor of L.R. No. 10090/23, entered into a sale agreement concerning the Suit Property with a couple known as Mr. and Mrs. Mugo Kirika. The agreed purchase price was Kshs. 35,000/= per acre for the entire 47-acre parcel. The Kirikas remitted a partial payment of Kshs. 405,000/= towards the purchase price but subsequently defaulted on the payment of the remaining balance, even after the period for completion was mutually extended. Asserting a fundamental breach of contract, the Deceased rescinded the Sale Agreement. In response to this rescission, the Kirikas instituted High Court Civil Suit (HCCC) No. 3398 of 1988 against the Deceased, seeking an order for specific performance and successfully placing a judicial injunction on the Suit Property to prevent any alienation or dealing. 8.Crucially, in HCCC No. 3398 of 1988, the Deceased retained the professional legal services of Geoffrey Chege Kirundi, an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya and the 2nd Applicant/Creditor herein, to represent him in the litigation. 9.While this litigation was actively pending before the High Court, and while the judicial injunction prohibiting any dealings with the Suit Property was fully subsisting and registered against the title, a highly controversial and legally fatal event occurred. On 26 October 1990, the Deceased purportedly entered into a second Sale Agreement over the exact same Suit Property, this time selling it directly to his own Advocate, the 2nd Applicant/Creditor, and the Advocate's wife, the 3rd Applicant/Creditor. 10.The original dispute in HCCC No. 3398 of 1988 was ultimately determined in favor of the Deceased on 28 October 1993, with the Court dismissing the Kirikas' claim for specific performance and instead directing the Deceased to refund the Kshs. 405,000/= deposit that he had received. The Kirikas appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal, but their appeal was formally dismissed on 21 January 2000, bringing the initial dispute between the Deceased and the Kirikas to a definitive conclusion. Following this, the 2nd Applicant/Creditor processed the refund of Kshs. 405,000/= to the Kirikas. 11.Walter Karanja Muigai passed away intestate on 21 June 1996. On 18 December 2003, his legal representatives and dependents filed this Cause No. 3608 of 2003, petitioning to be appointed as the legal administrators of the intestate estate. In their initial Petition and the accompanying affidavit of means, the Administrators indicated that the Estate had no liabilities. 12.Upon discovering the pendency of the succession proceedings, the 2nd Applicant/Creditor filed an Affidavit of Protest dated 29 April 2004, asserting that the Estate had maliciously omitted him and his wife as creditors, given the 1990 Sale Agreement. When the Administrators subsequently amended their Petition via a Notice dated 23 September 2004 to explicitly list the Suit Property (L.R. No. 10090/23) as a primary asset of the Estate, the 2nd Applicant/Creditor filed a further, more vehement Affidavit of Protest on 7 December 2004. He demanded that the property be removed from the schedule of assets and instead be listed as a liability owed to him. 13.To forcefully assert their claim to the land and bypass the strictures of the probate process, the 2nd and 3rd Applicants/Creditors filed two originating summons: HCCC Misc. Case No. 1277 of 2004 and HCCC Suit No. 1401 of 2004. They sought equitable orders to compel the Administrators of the Estate to execute fresh transfer documents in their favour and to retrospectively validate the Land Control Board (LCB) consent, which had purportedly been obtained on 16 December 1993—a date well outside the mandatory statutory six-month period following the execution of the October 1990 sale agreement. 14.These civil suits were subsequently consolidated with the present Succession Cause No. 3608 of 2003 with the consent of all parties. On 31 March 2009, the High Court (Hon. Rawal, J., as she then was) delivered a Ruling favouring the 2nd and 3rd Applicants/Creditors. The Court allowed the protest, ordered the Administrators to remove the Suit Property from the Estate's inventory, and directed the Deputy Registrar to execute a transfer to the Creditors if the Administrators defaulted. The Court rationalized that statutory time limits under the Land Control Act were tolled during the pendency of the 1988 Kirika litigation (a period of disability) and that the sale agreement did not offend Section 46 of the Advocates Act because it only became enforceable after the completion of the 1993 suits. 15.Armed with this Ruling, a transfer of the Suit Property was executed in favour of the Creditors on 24 April 2009. The speed of the subsequent transactions was startling. Merely 11 days later, on 5 May 2009, the Creditors executed a third-party Sale Agreement, transferring the Suit Property to Everton Coal Enterprises Limited, the 1st Applicant herein, for a declared consideration of Kshs 100 million. The transfer to the 1st Applicant was formally registered against the title on 11 May 2009. 16.The Administrators, deeply aggrieved by the Court's determination, filed an appeal at the Court of Appeal: Civil Appeal No. 172 of 2010 (Rose Wakanyi Karanja & 3 others v. Geoffrey Chege Kirundi & another). On 29 July 2016, a three-judge bench comprising Warsame, Mwilu, and Sichale, JJ.A., delivered a comprehensive judgment that unequivocally overturned the 2009 High Court Ruling. The Court of Appeal subjected the 1990 transaction between the Deceased and his Advocate to intense judicial scrutiny and declared it absolutely null and void ab initio on three separate, independent, and fatal statutory grounds. 17.Firstly, violation of the Advocates Act. The Court of Appeal firmly held that the 2nd Applicant/Creditor's purchase of the Suit Property while actively representing the Deceased in HCCC No. 3398 of 1988 was champertous and a direct, unequivocal violation of Section 46 of the Advocates Act. The law expressly prohibits an Advocate from purchasing or holding a proprietary interest in property that forms the subject matter of contentious litigation in which the Advocate is acting for a client. 18.Secondly, violation of the Land Control Act. The Court determined that the pendency of a lawsuit does not create a legal disability excusing strict compliance with mandatory statutory timelines. Because the Land Control Board consent was obtained years after the statutorily mandated six-month window prescribed by the Land Control Act, the 1990 Sale Agreement became null and void for all intents and purposes, and its subsequent validation by the High Court had no force of law. 19.Thirdly, the doctrine of Lis Pendens. The Court ruled that entering into the Sale Agreement violated Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, which strictly prohibits the transfer or dealing of immovable property while a suit regarding rights to that property is actively pending before a competent court. 20.Consequently, the Court of Appeal issued a mandatory order reinstating the Suit Property to the name of the Deceased and returning it entirely to the Estate corpus for distribution to the rightful beneficiaries. 21.The nullification of the root of title fundamentally threatened the interests of the 1st Applicant/Interested Party. Having not been a primary party to Civil Appeal No. 172 of 2010, the 1st Applicant filed a Notice of Motion on 23 September 2016 seeking to be enjoined in the appellate proceedings as an Interested Party, to stay the execution of the 2016 judgment, and to review or set aside the nullification of title based on their unpleaded defence of being an innocent purchaser for value without notice. 22.On 5 June 2020, the Court of Appeal allowed the 1st Applicant/Interested Party's joinder as an Interested Party post-judgment solely on the equitable basis that their proprietary rights were adversely affected without them being afforded a right to be heard. However, this procedural victory was short-lived. In a subsequent comprehensive Ruling dated 7 July 2023, the Court of Appeal systematically dismissed all of the 1st Applicant's substantive prayers. The Court ruled that it lacked the jurisdiction to stay the execution of its own final judgment, found no exceptional circumstances warranting a review of a finalized decree, and flatly refused to grant certification for the 1st Applicant to appeal to the Supreme Court. Concurrently, similar Applications filed by the 2nd and 3rd Applicants seeking Supreme Court certification (Civil Applications No. SUP 5 and SUP 6 of 2016) were also conclusively dismissed, with the Court of Appeal noting that the matters raised did not transcend the private interests of the parties to affect the broader public interest, as required by the threshold established in Hermanus Phillipus Steyn v Giovanni Gnecchi-Ruscone [2010] eKLR. 23.Undeterred by these repeated failures, the 1st Applicant/Interested Party escalated the matter by filing Supreme Court Application No. E026 of 2023, seeking an extension of time and a review of the Court of Appeal's refusal to grant certification. On 10 November 2023, a five-judge bench (Ibrahim, Wanjala, Njoki, Lenaola, and Ouko, SCJJ) delivered a fatal jurisprudential blow to the 1st Applicant's procedural manoeuvres. 24.The Supreme Court definitively established that the 1st Applicant lacked the requisite locus standi to invoke the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Rule 33(5) of the Supreme Court Rules because it was never a substantive, primary party to the original trial proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal had erred fundamentally in joining a party post-judgment, elucidating that a joinder contemplates a situation where proceedings are still pending. The Supreme Court pronounced with absolute clarity that once a court delivers its final judgment, it becomes functus officio. A Court cannot reopen finalized proceedings to admit new parties or hear new substantive claims, such as the 1st Applicant's unpleaded defence of being an innocent purchaser for value. The Supreme Court dismissed the Application with costs, irrevocably affirming the finality of the Court of Appeal's 2016 reinstatement of the property to the Estate. 25.In a collateral attempt to resurrect their decimated claim, the Applicants instituted ELC Civil Suit No. E089 of 2024 at the Environment and Land Court in Thika against the Administrators. Through a Notice of Motion dated 4 June 2024, the 1st Applicant sought a temporary injunction to restrain the Estate from dealing with or distributing the Suit Property, advancing the novel argument that because their specific rights as an innocent purchaser had never been substantively litigated in the previous forums, they were entitled to a fresh hearing. 26.The Administrators immediately mounted a robust defence by raising a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 20 January 2025, grounded in the doctrines of res judicata, statutory limitation under Section 7 of the Limitation of Actions Act, and gross abuse of the court process. 27.On 6 March 2025, the Environment and Land Court (ELC) upheld the Preliminary Objection and struck out the suit in its entirety. Relying on the seminal authority of Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd (1969) EA 696, the ELC found the preliminary objection merited. Furthermore, applying the principles of res judicata as expounded in Stephen Wanganga Njoroge v Stanley Ngugi Njoroge & Another eKLR, the ELC decisively held that the core issue of proprietorship over L.R. No. 10090/23 had been thoroughly, exhaustively, and finally settled by competent superior courts. 28.Aggrieved by the ELC's dismissal, the 1st Applicant/Interested Party lodged a Notice of Appeal and subsequently filed Civil Appeal No. E467 of 2025 at the Court of Appeal. It is the pendency of this specific appeal against the ELC's dismissal that forms the primary basis of the 1st Applicant's current Application before this Court. 29.Having laid out the exhaustive historical record, the Court now directs its attention to the specific applications pending determination, evaluating the pleadings, the Affidavits, and the submissions filed by the respective counsel. The 1st Applicant's Amended Summons dated 8 October 2025 30.The 1st Applicant approaches this Court under the auspices of Rules 41(3) and 49 of the Probate and Administration Rules, read together with Articles 162(2)(b) and 165(5)(b) of the Constitution. The Application is heavily supported by the detailed Affidavit of its director and shareholder, Patrick Karanja Ngugi. The 1st Applicant seeks definitive orders to stay the hearing of the Summons for Confirmation of Grant filed by the Administrators on 10 April 2017 and to urgently suspend the distribution of the Suit Property. 31.The fundamental cornerstone of the 1st Applicant's argument is its assertion that it is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of any defect in title. The 1st Applicant strenuously asserts that it acquired the Suit Property through a legitimate Agreement for Sale dated 5 May 2009 for a massive consideration of Kshs. 100 million, with a transfer duly registered in its favour on 11 May 2009 against Certificate of Title No. IR 23757. 32.The 1st Applicant submits that this Court possesses a highly circumscribed jurisdiction, strictly limited to determining the assets of an estate, identifying legitimate beneficiaries, and executing the distribution thereof. Citing persuasive precedents such as Re Estate of Alice Mumbua Mutua (Deceased) eKLR and Re Estate of M'chokera M'ramare (Deceased) eKLR, the 1st Applicant argues that whenever a complex, third-party dispute over the ownership of land arises within succession proceedings, the Probate Court must immediately divest itself of jurisdiction over that specific property and defer the matter to the ELC. 33.Consequently, the 1st Applicant submits that because its appeal (Nairobi Civil Appeal No. E467 of 2025) remains actively pending before the Court of Appeal regarding the ELC's dismissal of its ownership claim, the Suit Property is inherently in dispute. Therefore, they argue, this Court is constitutionally and statutorily barred from distributing the land to the beneficiaries until the appellate Court conclusively dictates ownership. Failure to stay the distribution, the 1st Applicant contends, would cause it to suffer a grave miscarriage of justice and irreparable loss that cannot be adequately compensated by damages. The 2nd and 3rd Applicants' Summons dated 18 September 2025 34.In a remarkably aggressive and novel legal manoeuvre, the 2nd and 3rd Applicants filed a Summons demanding that the Estate of the Deceased be formally declared indebted to them for an astonishing sum of Kshs 2.356 billion. 35.The 2nd and 3rd Applicants aver that they provided immense, unquantifiable assistance to the Deceased during his lifetime, specifically helping him salvage multiple properties, including the Suit Property, from imminent auction and absolute financial ruin. Having been stripped of the physical land by the Court of Appeal's 2016 judgment, which nullified their title, they now seek massive monetary restitution. 36.They compute the Kshs. 2.356 billion figure based on nebulous allegations of consideration retained by the Deceased and extensive damages for lost financial advantage and lost commercial opportunities spanning over three decades. They forcefully pray that this Court issues an order mandating the Estate to pay this sum directly or to secure the debt using the Suit Property prior to any final distribution to the beneficiaries, essentially holding the Estate hostage until this debt is settled. The Respondents/Administrators' Responses and Objections 37.The Respondents have mounted a fierce defence, filing extensive Replying Affidavits, notably sworn by William Muigai Karanja on 25 September 2025 and a Further Replying Affidavit in October 2025. These are accompanied by submissions dated 12 November 2025. 38.The Respondents urge the Court to dismiss both Applications with punitive costs, characterizing them as legally sterile, irreparably defective, and constituting a malicious, calculated abuse of the court process meant only to delay the confirmation of the Grant. 39.Against the 1st Applicant's application for a stay, the Administrators assert that the ownership of the Suit Property is no longer in dispute. They submit that the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No. 172 of 2010 conclusively restored the property to the Estate, and the Supreme Court irrevocably shut the door on any further review in Application No. E026 of 2023. They argue that the ELC in Thika already declared the 1st Applicant's latest lawsuit res judicata. A collateral appeal (E467 of 2025) stemming from a struck-out suit cannot legitimately serve as a legal anchor to paralyse a 22-year-old succession cause. 40.Against the 2nd and 3rd Applicants' demand for Kshs 2.356 billion, the Administrators raise formidable jurisdictional and substantive defences. First, they argue that this Court completely lacks the jurisdiction to hear, assess, and determine highly complex claims of contractual breach, tortious liability, or abstract lost financial advantage. Second, they highlight a total evidentiary vacuum, noting that the 2nd and 3rd Applicants have provided absolutely zero documentary evidence that any such astronomical funds were ever paid to the Deceased. Third, and most fatally, the Administrators rely on the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio. Because the Court of Appeal ruled that the underlying 1990 contract was an illegal, champertous transaction offending Section 46 of the Advocates Act, no court of law can grant restitution, damages, or enforce claims arising directly from that illegality. Analysis & Determination 41.The Court distils the following issues for comprehensive determination:i.Does this Court possess the requisite statutory and constitutional jurisdiction to determine the 1st Applicant's third-party claim to stay distribution, or to adjudicate the 2nd and 3rd Applicants' claim for an unliquidated Kshs 2.356 billion debt?ii.Is the 1st Applicant's request to stay the distribution of the Suit Property barred by the doctrine of res judicata and the Supreme Court's pronouncement on functus officio?iii.Are the monetary claims advanced by the 2nd and 3rd Applicants defeated by the equitable doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur actio flowing directly from their statutory violations?iv.Should the Court grant the prayers sought in the Applications? Jurisdictional Boundaries of the Probate Court 42.The question of jurisdiction is foundational, serving as the bedrock upon which the entire edifice of judicial authority rests. It is a well-settled principle of law that jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine a cause. A Court cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction it does not possess by statute or the Constitution. Where a court lacks jurisdiction, any orders issued, no matter how well-intentioned or substantively sound, are a complete nullity. As famously stated in MacFoy v United Africa Co. Ltd 3 All ER 1169, you cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there; it will collapse. 43.When analysing preliminary objections touching on jurisdiction, this Court is guided by the holding in Oraro v Mbaja eKLR, where J.B. Ojwang J. (as he then was) remarked that a preliminary objection must raise a pure point of law based on pleaded facts and must not require the Court to test factual information through the normal rules of evidence. 44.The Applicants in both Summons rely heavily on the argument that the Probate Court is ill-equipped to handle disputes involving land ownership or massive contractual debts, and therefore, the Court must halt the succession process until these matters are resolved elsewhere. The Court entirely agrees with the premise of the Applicants' argument regarding the limitations of probate jurisdiction, but drastically disagrees with the legal conclusions the Applicants attempt to draw from it in the specific context of this case. 45.The parameters of this Court's jurisdiction are well defined under the Law of Succession Act. In the highly persuasive authority of Re Estate of Alice Mumbua Mutua (Deceased) eKLR, Musyoka J. eloquently articulated these strict boundaries:“The Law of Succession Act, and the Rules made thereunder, are designed in such a way that they confer jurisdiction to the probate court with respect to determining the assets of the deceased, the survivors of the deceased and the persons with beneficial interest, and finally distribution of the assets amongst the survivors and the persons beneficially interested. The function of the probate court does not go beyond that... claims by and against third parties meaning persons who are neither survivors of the deceased nor beneficiaries are for resolution outside the framework set out in the Law of Succession Act.". 46.This position was further cemented by the Court of Appeal in Richard Nalwelisie Masinde & 2 others v. Barasa Nyongesa Mamati [2020] eKLR, where it was held that:“Evidently, and in the context of the present case, the court sitting as a probate court has no jurisdiction to determine the question of ownership of land where such is in dispute. In this case, even assuming that the appellants had lodged their claim in the succession cause, the claim would still have been referred to the Land and Environment Court which is the court seized of jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes related to land ownership.". 47.Applying these strict jurisdictional principles to the Application by the 2nd and 3rd Applicants for Ksh. 2.356 billion, it is patently clear that this Court, sitting as a Probate Court, completely lacks the jurisdictional competence to investigate, assess, or award unliquidated damages for lost financial advantage or massive contractual claims against the Deceased. The 2nd and 3rd Applicants are strangers to the bloodline and are not legal beneficiaries. Their claim is fundamentally a complex commercial and tortious dispute dressed in the garb of a succession protest. For this Court to entertain a claim for over Kshs 2 billion based on abstract, unproven contractual interactions that occurred 35 years ago would be a gross judicial overreach and a usurpation of the jurisdiction vested in the Commercial Division of the High Court. The Probate Court is strictly an avenue for the transmission of wealth to heirs, not a debt-collection tribunal for contested, unliquidated third-party claims. 48.Regarding the 1st Applicant, it is entirely correct in law that if a legitimate, unresolved dispute over land ownership existed, this Court would be obliged to refer the matter to the ELC and suspend distribution. However, this rule only applies where the ownership of the land is genuinely and legally in dispute. This leads directly to the second issue for determination, which evaluates whether any genuine dispute remains. Res Judicata, Functus Officio, and the Finality of Litigation 49.The 1st Applicant requests a stay of distribution based on the pendency of Civil Appeal No. E467 of 2025. The 1st Applicant argues that because they have an active appeal challenging the ELC's dismissal of their ownership suit, the ownership of L.R. No. 10090/23 remains in dispute, thereby stripping the Probate Court of the mandate to distribute it. 50.This argument is an exquisite example of legal sophistry that the Court must forcefully deconstruct. A property is not in dispute merely because a litigant refuses to accept defeat and continuously files collateral, doomed-to-fail applications. The legal concept of a dispute requires a triable, legally recognized contestation that has not yet been finally pronounced upon by a competent court of jurisdiction. 51.In this matter, the issue of ownership over the Suit Property has been exhaustively determined, has scaled the entire hierarchy of the Kenyan judicial system, and has achieved absolute, unassailable finality. 52.In Civil Appeal No. 172 of 2010, the Court of Appeal unequivocally cancelled the title transferred to the 2nd and 3rd Applicants, and by necessary legal extension, destroyed the root of title that the 1st Applicant claims to hold. It is an elementary principle of property law that a person cannot pass a better title than they possess. Since the 2nd and 3rd Applicants' acquisition was voided for illegality, the 1st Applicant's subsequent purchase was built on legal quicksand. The Court of Appeal explicitly ordered the Suit Property to revert to the Estate of the Deceased. That judgment is final and binding on this Court. 53.When the 1st Applicant attempted to inject its “innocent purchaser" defence post-judgment, the Supreme Court in Everton Coal Enterprises Limited v Karanja & 5 Others KESC 98 delivered a masterclass on the doctrine of functus officio. The Supreme Court ruled that once proceedings are finalized and a judgment rendered, the Court is stripped of its authority to reopen the cause to admit new parties or entertain new defences. The Supreme Court held that joinder is only applicable to pending proceedings. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the 1st Applicant's application, forever sealing the finality of the Court of Appeal's judgment. 54.When the 1st Applicant filed ELC E089 of 2024 attempting to relitigate its innocent purchaser claim, Mogeni J. rightly struck it out on 6 March 2025 based on the doctrine of res judicata. Relying on authorities such as Stephen Wanganga Njoroge v Stanley Ngugi Njoroge & Another eKLR, the ELC found that the identical property, the identical core issues of proprietorship, and the identical substantive parties (or those claiming through them) had already been conclusively handled by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the doctrine of constructive res judicata (as established in the classic case of Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100) prevents a party from raising matters in subsequent litigation which they should have raised in the earlier proceedings. 55.The doctrine of res judicata serves a sacred purpose: to protect litigants from endless harassment and to preserve the integrity and authority of the judicial system by ensuring finality. In matters of equity, the discretion of the Court must follow settled principles, the chief among them being that there must be an end to litigation. 56.The 1st Applicant's current appeal (E467 of 2025) is merely an appeal against a dismissal based on a preliminary objection of res judicata. The mere filing of a Notice of Appeal or a Record of Appeal does not automatically operate as a stay of execution, nor does it magically breathe life back into a “dispute" that the Supreme Court of Kenya has already buried. 57.This Court is profoundly guided by the overarching constitutional imperative under Article 159(2)(b) to administer justice without undue delay. The beneficiaries of the Estate of the Deceased have waited for 22 agonizing years since the filing of the Succession Cause in 2003. They have endured a tortuous marathon of litigation orchestrated by strangers to the Estate. To grant a stay of distribution based on a peripheral, legally emaciated appeal would be to elevate the procedural manoeuvring of a third party over the substantive justice owed to the rightful heirs. 58.The Court finds that the ownership of L.R. No. 10090/23 is unequivocally vested in the Estate of the Deceased. The matter is unquestionably res judicata. The 1st Applicant's Amended Summons dated amended 8 October 2025 is, therefore, completely bereft of merit and constitutes a gross abuse of the court process. Statutory Illegality and the Doctrine of Ex Turpi Causa Non Oritur Actio 59.The Court now shifts its intense focus to the 2nd and 3rd Applicants' audacious claim for Kshs. 2.356 billion. Beyond the insurmountable jurisdictional bar discussed hereinabove, this claim suffers from a fatal substantive defect rooted deeply in illegality and equitable principles. 60.The foundational basis of the 2nd and 3rd Applicants’ financial claim is their contractual interaction with the Deceased regarding the Suit Property in 1990. They assert that they are owed massive damages for lost financial advantage stemming from their ultimate inability to realize the property following the Court of Appeal's nullification of their title. 61.It is a cardinal pillar of law, encapsulated in the ancient maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio, that no court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act. If the transaction forming the entire basis of a claim is tainted with illegality, the claimant loses their right of action, and the court must decline to offer any remedy. This principle was eloquently discussed by the Kenyan courts in matters such as Mureithi & 2 Others v Attorney General eKLR, where it was reinforced that the courts cannot be used to sanitize illegal undertakings. 62.The Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No. 172 of 2010 conclusively determined that the 1990 sale agreement between the Deceased and the 2nd Applicant was an illegal, void transaction. The illegality was multifaceted as highlighted hereinabove. 63.Because the underlying contract was void ab initio due to statutory illegality, it is legally impossible for any actionable debt, expectation damages, or claims for lost financial advantage to flow from it. One cannot claim lost profits on an illegal enterprise. The law will simply let the loss lie where it falls, particularly given that the 2nd Applicant, as an Advocate, was presumed to know the law and was in pari delicto. 64.The 2nd and 3rd Applicants’ attempt to pivot from a failed land grab to a multi-billion-shilling debt claim against the Estate is not merely legally unsupportable; it is a brazen affront to public policy and an insult to the intelligence of the Court. Seeking to extract Kshs 2 billion as damages from a contract that was expressly outlawed by the Advocates Act is an exercise in futility. The 18 September 2025 Application is frivolous, vexatious, and an egregious abuse of the judicial process that warrants summary dismissal. Integrity of the Judicial Process 65.Before pronouncing the final orders, this Court feels compelled to register its profound deprecation of the litigation tactics deployed by the Applicants throughout the lifespan of this dispute. The chronological record of this case reads as a manual on how to weaponize the judicial system to frustrate the administration of justice. 66.Since the High Court's erroneous transfer of the property in 2009, the Applicants have initiated over half a dozen overlapping Applications, Originating Summonses, and appeals across multiple forums. Even after the Supreme Court delivered a final, binding determination in 2023, the Applicants immediately filed a fresh suit at the ELC in 2024, and upon its dismissal, returned to this Probate Court demanding stays and multi-billion-shilling payouts. 67.Litigation must come to an end. The courts are not revolving doors for litigants who refuse to accept appellate defeat. The Estate of the Deceased has been trapped in a state of suspended animation for over two decades. The emotional and financial toll on the rightful beneficiaries—who have been blocked from realizing their inheritance by the relentless barrages of third-party litigation—is incalculable. 68.Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution mandates that justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities, while Article 159(2)(b) commands that justice shall not be delayed. The Court has a solemn, unyielding duty to ring-fence the Estate from further unwarranted assaults and to facilitate its swift distribution in accordance with the substantive dictates of the Law of Succession Act. The judicial system cannot be held hostage by litigants who deploy continuous, fragmented litigation as a strategy of attrition. Disposition 69.The Court has meticulously evaluated the totality of the pleadings, the exhaustive Affidavits, the scholarly submissions, and the binding precedents applicable. The Court finds that it completely lacks the jurisdiction to entertain third-party commercial debt claims. Furthermore, the ownership of the Suit Property is definitively settled as belonging to the Estate, rendering all attempts to halt its distribution based on collateral, already-dismissed suits as res judicata and abusive. Finally, the 2nd and 3rd Applicants' monetary claims are entirely eclipsed by the doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur actio. 70.Accordingly, doing the best that this Court can to advance the cause of justice and bring closure to a dispute that has outlived its legal viability, the Court issues the following orders:i.The 1st Applicant's Amended Summons dated 8 October 2025 is hereby found to be utterly bereft of legal merit, statutorily barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and is consequently dismissed in its entirety.ii.The 2nd and 3rd Applicants' Summons dated 18 September 2025 seeking a declaration of indebtedness of Kshs. 2.356 billion is declared a gross abuse of the court process, incurably tainted by illegality, and is consequently dismissed in its entirety.iii.The Administrators/Respondents are hereby directed and granted explicit leave to immediately proceed with the hearing of the Summons for Confirmation of Grant dated 10 April 2017 to facilitate the final distribution of the Estate to the rightful beneficiaries without any further delay.iv.Considering the frivolous, vexatious, and highly abusive nature of these Applications, which have unnecessarily consumed judicial time and delayed justice for the beneficiaries, the Applicants shall bear the costs of these Applications. Costs are hereby awarded to the Respondents/Administrators, to be borne by the Applicants jointly and severally. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 30 DAY OF JULY 2026HELENE R. NAMISIJUDGE OF THE HIGH COURTDelivered on virtual platform in the presence of:For the 1st Applicant/Objector: Mr. Musyoka h/b Kanjama SCFor the 2-3 Applicants/Creditors: Ms Wairimu h/b NguringaFor the Respondents: Mr. Kaifa h/b Mr. GithinjiCourt Assistant: Lucy Mwangi