https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/7829

In re Estate of Late Muinde (Deceased) (Succession Cause 18 of 2009) [2026] KEHC 7829 (KLR) (4 June 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 7829 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Machakos Succession Cause 18 of 2009 RC Rutto, J June 4, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ANNA MUSYAE MUINDE (DECEASED) Between Mwatati Farmers Cooperative Society Limited 1st Objector Patrick Makau Musyoki 2nd Objector Charles Munyao Kituu 3rd Objector Margaret Nduku Makilya 4th Objector Chris Ngolya Nthale 5th Objector Stephen Mutua Ndungo 6th Objector Hennieta Mutinda Ndambuki 7th Objector and Josephine Nthenya Muya 1st Defendant Sheela Chipinde 2nd Defendant Ruling 1.Before this Court for determination is a Summons for Revocation and or annulment of grant dated 17th September, 2025, seeking the following orders;a.Spentb.Spentc.Spentd.Spente.That a fresh grant of letters of administration be issued and confirmed factoring in the purchasers’ interests of all the Applicants/objectors in the properties of the deceased.f.That costs of this application be provided for. 2.The application is premised on the grounds set out on the face of the summons and is supported by the affidavit sworn by Alexander Muya Kaindi, the Chairperson of the 1st Objector/Applicant, on behalf of the 1st to the 6th Objectors. The crux of the application is that on 12th July, 2019, the 1st Objector purchased a portion of the parcel of land measuring approximately 18, 645sq.ft being part of a parcel adjacent to Uamani Factory Chemical Plot No. 22 from John Norman Muinde, a son and beneficiary to the deceased estate. 3.The 1st Objector states that upon purchase, it took possession and has since occupied and utilized the property peacefully, without objection from the Respondents, until recently when it received an eviction notice. It further contends that it was not disclosed as purchasers or beneficiaries in the petition for grant and confirmation proceedings, and thus seeks protection of its interest and inclusion in the distribution of the estate. It sought that the Court grants the prayer sought herein the application. 4.The 2nd Objector/applicant alleges that he purchased several portions of the parcel of land known as Matungulu/Kambusu/2 from the said John Norman Muinde, on diverse dates namely; Matungulu/Kyaume/505 on 28th October 2016 and Matungulu/Kambusu/ on 27th May, 2013, and again on 21st March, 2015. 5.He states that the late John Norman Muinde is the son and a beneficiary to the estate of the deceased and upon purchase, he took possession of the respective parcel and has been in open and uninterrupted occupation which was never challenged by the Respondents until the issuance of an eviction notice. He maintains that he is an innocent purchaser for value whose interest was not disclosed in the succession proceedings thereby exposing him to the risk of eviction. 6.Similarly, the 3rd to 6th Objectors claim to have purchased various portions of land from the said John Norman Muinde and to have been in possession thereof without interference for extended periods. Specifically 7.The 3rd Objector purchased Matungulu/Kambusu/10 on 27th January, 2018. The 4th Objector purchased Matungulu/Kambusu/22 on 27th November, 2008. The 5th Objector purchased Plot No. 2 measuring ½ acre 60ft x 57 under Kambusu/ Matungulu area on 8th March, 2016. The 6th objector purchased Matungulu/Kambusu/2 on 13th May, 2019. 8.Each of them asserts that they have been in peaceful occupation until recently when eviction notices were issued. They contend that they were not included in the succession proceedings despite being purchasers for value and urge the Court to safeguard their interests in the estate. 9.The application is opposed. The Respondents filed a replying affidavit sworn on 8th December, 2025, by Sheela Chipinde in her capacity as a co-administrator of the estate of the deceased with the authority of his co- administrator. She deponed that the grant was lawfully obtained and that all material facts were disclosed to the court. It is her testimony that the Objectors have not satisfied the legal threshold for revocation of grant. 10.She further avers that the alleged sales are legally untenable, as the properties in question belonged to the estate of the deceased Ann Musyae Muinde who died intestate on 18th July, 2000, According to her, the parcels forming the estate are Matungulu/Kambusu/2, Matungulu/Kambusu/10, Matungulu/Kambusu/22 and Matungulu/Kambusu/505 and the deceased could not sell the properties on the dates alleged by the Objectors. She maintains that the said John Norman Muinde was neither the registered proprietor of the said parcels nor solely entitled to dispose of them, and that no consent was obtained from the co-administrator or other beneficiaries for any such transactions. 11.The Respondents contend that the Objectors are neither beneficiaries nor lawful creditors of the estate and therefore lack the requisite standing to seek revocation of the grant. She also states that the family had previously taken steps to restrain John Norman Muinde from unlawfully selling estate property including involving the local administration, and that notices to vacate were issued to the Objectors as early as 2016. 12.The Respondents further deponed that the Applicants have engaged in acts of threatening the beneficiaries of the estate of the deceased’s estate with the aim of taking possession and control of the suit properties. She alleges that some objectors have involved the police to harass and procure the arrest of beneficiaries, leading to their incarnation at the police cells without any trial. She also states that the deceased is buried on one of the properties that some of the objectors, allegedly acting with the authority of John Norman Muinde, attempted to exhume the remains of the deceased. This prompted the then 1st Administrator Margaret Nduku Ndaka to seek orders to stop the intended exhumation. 13.It is her further position that the impugned sale agreements are invalid as they were executed by only one of the administrators notwithstanding that the estate had two administrators at the material time. She contends that this rendered the agreement null and void. She adds that the Applicants cannot be regarded as innocent purchasers for value, as they failed to conduct due diligence and were aware, or ought reasonably to have been aware, that the properties did not belong to the purported seller. 14.The Respondent also challenges the authenticity of the documents relied upon by the Objectors. She points out that one of the agreements produced by the 1st Objector appears to have been executed by members of the family of John Norman Muinde rather than that of the deceased, Ann Musyae Muinde. She identifies discrepancies in the names and identity card numbers indicated, asserting that they correspond to different individuals, thereby suggesting fraud and forgery. 15.She further refers to a purported consent dated 3rd August, 2012, which allegedly introduces one Angelinah Mwikali John as a beneficiary. The Respondent contends that this document, though endorsed by an Assistant Chief, was never filed in court and is therefore of no legal consequence. In her view, the Applicants should pursue remedies against the persons who purported to sell the land to them. 16.The Respondent maintains that the Applicants were at all times aware that the properties formed part of the deceased’s estate and that this succession cause was pending, as they had been served with demand and warning letters. She emphasizes that no evidence has been tendered to show that John Norman Muinde had title to, or authority to dispose of, the estate properties, or that the administrators consented to the alleged sales. She further notes that some of the agreements expressly acknowledge that the land is registered in the name of the deceased, confirming that John Norman Muinde only held a beneficial interest. 17.She concludes that there was no concealment of material facts in the succession proceedings and that all rightful beneficiaries and dependants were duly provided for. In her view, the present application is an attempt to delay the distribution of the estate and to enable continued unlawful interference with the estate. 18.The application was canvassed by way of written submissions. The Applicant’s submissions are dated 1st December, 2025, and the Respondent’s submissions is dated 26th January, 2026. Applicant’s submissions 19.The Applicant began her submissions with a brief background to the matter and the summons before the court. They identified three issues for determination namely; whether this Court has jurisdiction to revoke the grant; whether the Respondents concealed material facts, thereby rendering the proceedings defective and whether the grant should consequently be revoked. 20.On jurisdiction, the Applicants submit that this Court is properly seized of the matter pursuant to Section 47 of the Law of Succession Act and section 76 thereof, which confers jurisdiction to entertain applications for revocation of grant. They clarified that they are not inviting the court to determine questions of ownership of land, which would fall within the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court under Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act. Rather, their claim is limited to revocation of the grant on account of alleged concealment of material facts and false misrepresentation. They rely on the decision In re Estate of Julius Ndubi Javan (Deceased) [2018] KEHC 8523 (KLR) where the High Court held that a probate court may revoke a grant upon being satisfied that material facts were concealed, without determining substantive ownership disputes reserved for the Environment and Land Court. They further cite the court’s finding that full disclosure is required in succession proceedings and that concealment of purchaser interests undermines justice. They also rely on the same authority for the proposition that a purchaser whose money passed to the deceased may at the very least be treated as a creditor and therefore an interested party with locus standi to seek revocation under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act. 21.On the question of concealment of material facts, the Applicants submit that Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act permits revocation where proceedings are defective in substance, where a grant is obtained fraudulently through false statements or concealment of material facts, or where untrue allegations essential in law were made. They enumerate the various transactions allegedly entered into between themselves and the late John Norman involving portions excised from properties forming part of the estate. 22.Specifically, the 2nd Applicant allegedly purchased portions to be excised from MATUNGULU/KAMBUSU/2 on 27th May, 2013, and 21st March, 2015, and another portion from MATUNGULU/KYAUME/505 on 28th October, 2016. The 5th Applicant allegedly purchased a half-acre portion in Kambusu/Matungulu on 8th March, 2026. The 3rd Applicant allegedly bought land from MATUNGULU/KAMBUSU/10 on 27th January, 2018. The 4th Applicant allegedly purchased land from MATUNGULU/KAMBUSU/22 on 27th November, 2008. The 1st Applicant allegedly purchased a portion adjacent to Uamani Factory Chemical Plot No. 22 on 12th July, 2019 while the 6th Applicant allegedly purchased Plot No. 2 measuring 0.393 hectares to be hived off MATUNGULU/KAMBUSU/2 on 13th May 2019. They state that all these transactions were evidenced by duly executed sale agreements. 23.The Applicants contend that the Respondents were aware of their occupation of the land, as they lived in close proximity, and were also aware that John Norman Muinde had disposed of his beneficial interest in the estate. Despite this knowledge, the Respondents are said to have failed to disclose the Applicants’ purchaser interests during the petition and confirmation proceedings. This omission, they argue, rendered the proceedings defective and amounted to concealment of material facts 24.In support of this argument, they rely on Albert Imbuga Kisigwa v Recho Kavai Kisigwa [2016] KEHC 1528 (KLR) for the proposition that revocation of a grant is discretionary remedy that must be exercised judiciously, and upon proof of wrongdoing. They further cite In Re Estate of Julius Ndubi Javan (Deceased) [2018] KEHC 8523 (KLR) and Jamleck Maina Njoroge v Mary Wanjiru Mwangi [2015] KEHC 7143 (KLR) where the courts have emphasized the duty of full disclosure in succession proceedings and have revoked grants where purchasers’ interests were concealed. They submit that liabilities incurred by a deceased person do not abate upon death but bind the estate, and that failure to disclose such liabilities misled the Court into issuing and confirming the grant 25.On whether the grant should be revoked, the Applicants argue that once concealment and misrepresentation are established, revocation becomes inevitable. They contend that although the Respondents were served with the application, they failed to file any response or challenge the Applicants’ evidence and thus they argue that their evidence remains uncontroverted and should be accepted as proof on a balance of probabilities. They rely on In re Estate of Prisca Ong’ayo Nande (Deceased) [2020] KEHC 6553 (KLR) and In re Estate of Kithenge Kibinda (Deceased) [2022] KEHC 10820 (KLR) where grants were revoked on account of non-disclosure of material facts and beneficiaries. 26.In the alternative, the Applicant urged the Court, should it decline to revoke the grant, to stay its implementation and direct that the dispute relating to ownership and validity of the sale agreement be determined before the Environment and Land Court. They contend that such an would protect their interests as alleged purchasers for value. Ultimately, they pray that the application be allowed as prayed. Respondent’s submissions 27.The Respondents submit that the Objectors’/Applicants’ Summons for Revocation dated 17th September, 2025, is misconceived, misguided, and founded on a misapprehension of both the facts and the law. That the Application constitutes an abuse of the court process, time, and resources. They further state that the application has been vigorously opposed through the replying affidavit sworn by the 2nd Administrator/Respondent, which they fully rely upon. According to the Respondents, the gravamen of the Applicant’s case is that the grant was obtained through defective proceedings, fraud, false statements and concealment of material facts, particularly the alleged failure to disclose the Applicants as liabilities of the estate of the late Anna Musyae Muinde. However, the Respondents maintain that these allegations are false, unsupported and without basis as all material facts relevant to the obtaining of the grant were fully disclosed to the court. 28.The Respondents further deny the Applicants’ allegation that they have been in peaceful use and occupation of the suit properties. They contend that the Applicants were, through their previous advocates, served with notices requiring them to vacate the parcels of land, but failed to comply. In this regard they refer the Court to annexure “SC-2” in support of this position. The Respondents also challenge the validity of the alleged sale agreements relied upon by the Applicants, arguing that the said agreements were allegedly signed only one administrator, despite the estate having two administrators at the material time. They submit that one administrator had no authority to bind the estate unilaterally, and, consequently, the agreements are null, void, and illegal. 29.On the question of revocation, the Respondents rely on In re Estate of Prisca Ong’ayo Nande (Deceased) [2020] eKLR wherein the court discussed the principles governing revocation of grants under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act. They emphasize that revocation can only be granted where the statutory grounds under Section 76 have been established. They further submit that there must be credible evidence of wrongdoing before a court can invoke its powers under that provision, and that the discretion to revoke a grant must be exercised judiciously, taking into account the interests of all beneficiaries entitled to the deceased’s estate and ensuring that justice is served. 30.In conclusion, the Respondents submit that the application is devoid of merit and is merely a stratagem by the Applicants to continue intermeddling with the estate of the deceased and to deny the lawful beneficiaries the enjoyment of the estate properties. They maintain that there was no concealment of beneficiaries, dependants, or liabilities of the estate and that all rightful beneficiaries and dependants were duly provided for during distribution of the estate. Accordingly, they urge the Court to dismiss the Summons for Revocation with costs to the Administrators/Respondents. Analysis and Determination 31.Having carefully considered the summons application herein, the affidavits filed by parties, and submissions placed on record, it is my view that the following issues arise for determination:-a.Whether the Applicants have established grounds for revocation of the confirmed grant under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act.b.Whether the Applicants have demonstrated a legally recognizable interest in the estate capable of protection by this court. Whether the Applicant has established grounds for revocation of the confirmed grant under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act. 32.The application before this Court seeks revocation of grant. The governing provision is Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act which sets out the circumstances under which a grant may be revoked or annulled, including where the proceedings were defective, where the grant was obtained fraudulently through false statements or concealment of material facts, or where it was founded on untrue allegations of essential facts among other grounds.76.Revocation or annulment of grantA grant of representation, whether or not confirmed, may at any time be revoked or annulled if the court decides, either on application by any interested party or of its own motion—a.that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substanceb.that the grant was obtained fraudulently by the making of a false statement or by the concealment from the court of something material to the casec.that the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant notwithstanding that the allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertentlyd.that the person to whom the grant was made has failed, after due notice and without reasonable cause either;i.to apply for confirmation of the grant within one year from the date thereof, or such longer period as the court order or allow; orii.to proceed diligently with the administration of the estate; oriii.to produce to the court, within the time prescribed, any such inventory or account of administration as is required by the provisions of paragraphs (e) and (g) of section 83 or has produced any such inventory or account which is false in any material particular; ore.that the grant has become useless and inoperative through subsequent circumstances. 33.The principles underlying Section 76 have been succinctly summarized in the case of In Re Estate of Prisca Ong’ayo Nande (Deceased) [2020] KEHC 6553 (KLR) where the Court observed as:-“8.……………. A grant of letters of administration may be revoked on three general grounds. The first is where the process of obtaining the grant was attended by problems. The first would be where the process was defective, either because some mandatory procedural step was omitted, or the persons applying for representation was not competent or suitable for appointment, or the deceased died testate having made a valid will and then a grant or letters of administration intestate was made instead of a grant of probate, or vice versa. It could also be that the process was marred by fraud and misrepresentation or concealment of matter, such as where some survivors are not disclosed or the applicant lies that he is a survivor when he is not, among other reasons. The second general ground is where the grant was obtained procedurally, but the administrator, thereafter, got into problems with the exercise of administration, such as where he fails to apply for confirmation of grant within the time allowed, or he fails to proceed diligently with administration, or fails to render accounts as and when required. The third general ground is where the grant has become useless and inoperative following subsequent circumstances, such as where a sole administrator dies leaving behind no administrator to carry on the exercise, or where the sole administrator loses the soundness of his mind for whatever reason or even becomes physically infirm to an extent of being unable to carry out his duties as administrator, or the sole administrator is adjudged bankrupt and, therefore, becomes unqualified to hold any office of trust.” 34.Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act empowers the Court to revoke or annul a grant at any time where, inter alia, It was obtained fraudulently or by concealment of material facts; the administrator has failed, after due notice, to apply for confirmation or to proceed diligently with administration; the administrator has failed to render accounts as required and the grant has become useless or inoperative through subsequent circumstances. The duty of full and candid disclosure is central to succession proceedings. It is thus clear that the burden lies upon the Applicants to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, the existence of any of the statutory grounds that would justify revocation. 35.The Applicants’ case is principally premised on their claim that they are purchasers for value who acquired portions of the estate property from the late John Norman Muinde, a son and beneficiary of the deceased estate. They argued that their interests were not disclosed during confirmation of the grant thereby constituting concealment of material facts. The Respondents however, dispute this position and maintain that the Applicants are neither beneficiaries nor creditors of the estate and that the purported sale agreements are null and void for having been entered into without authority and in respect of property belonging to a deceased person. 36.The first issue for determination, therefore, is whether the Applicants have established any legally recognizable interest in the estate capable of invoking the jurisdiction of this probate court under section 76 of the Law of Succession Act. From the material before Court, it is not in disputed that the properties in question namely Matungulu/Kambusu/2, Matungulu/Kambusu/10, Matungulu/Kambusu/22 and Matungulu/Kambusu/505 were registered in the name of the deceased Anna Musyae Muinde at the time of her death on 18th July, 2000. It is further not disputed that the impugned transactions were entered into between the years 2008 and 2019, long after the demise of the deceased. 37.Under Section 45 of the Law of Succession Act, expressly prohibits any person unless authorized by law or by a grant of representation, from taking possession of, dispose of or otherwise intermeddle with the free property of a deceased person. Similarly, Section 82(b)(ii) of the Act prohibits the sale of immovable property of an estate before confirmation of grant. These provisions are intended to preserve the estate from unlawful dissipation prior to lawful administration and distribution. It follows, therefore that any purported dealings with estate property undertaken in contravention of these provisions are unlawful and unenforceable. 38.The Applicants’ claims are anchored on sale agreements allegedly entered into with the late John Norman Muinde. However, the Applicants have not demonstrated that the said John Norman Muinde was the registered proprietor of the suit properties or that the properties had devolved exclusively to him by way of transmission or confirmation of grant. On the contrary, the evidence on record shows that the estate had two administrators and that no consent from the co-administrator or the other beneficiaries was obtained prior to the purported transactions. In law, an administrator holds estate property in trust a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of all beneficiaries and cannot unilaterally alienate such property in disregard of statutory requirements. Any such purported alienation is void. 39.The Applicants have placed reliance on the decision in In re Estate of Julius Ndubi Javan (Deceased) [2018] KEHC 8523 (KLR) to support the proposition that purchasers’ interests ought to be disclosed before confirmation of grant. While this Court agrees with the general principle that obligations lawfully incurred by a deceased person may constitute liabilities to the estate, the present case is distinguishable. The transactions relied upon herein were undertaken after death of the deceased by a beneficiary who lacked legal authority to dispose of estate property. Such transactions cannot bind the estate in the same manner as obligations incurred by the deceased during her lifetime. 40.Furthermore, the material before the Court suggests that the Applicants have not demonstrated that they conducted due diligence before entering into the impugned transactions. Several of the sale agreements expressly indicated that the properties belonged to the deceased and that the seller merely claimed beneficial interest. The Applicants were therefore aware, or ought reasonably to have been aware that the properties formed part of a deceased’s estate and were subject to succession proceedings. A purchaser dealing with estate property bears the responsibility of ascertaining whether the seller possesses legal authority to sell the property. Equity does not aid a party who knowingly engages in a transaction that is contrary to express provisions of the law. 41.The Respondents’ have also demonstrated that the Applicants had previously been issued with notices and warnings to vacate the suit properties and that family members had complained to the local administration concerning the unauthorized sales by John Norman Muinde. Such evidence further undermines the Applicants’ assertion that they were innocent purchasers for value without notice. 42.On the issue of concealment of material facts, this Court is not persuaded that the Respondents failed to disclose material facts within the meaning of Section 76. For concealment to warrant revocation, the concealed facts must relate to a legally recognizable interest in the estate. In the present case, the Applicants have failed to established enforceable interests against the estate capable of constituting liabilities of the estate. Consequently, failure to include the Applicants in the succession proceedings cannot amount to concealment of material facts within the meaning of Section 76 of the Act. 43.Revocation of grant is a drastic remedy that ought to be exercised judiciously and only upon sufficient proof of one or more of the statutory grounds. In re Estate of Prisca Ong’ayo Nande (Deceased) [2020] KEHC 6553 (KLR) the court reiterated that the statutory grounds under Section 76 must be firmly established before revocation can issue. Having considered the evidence before Court, I am not satisfied that the Applicants have established fraud, concealment of material facts, defective proceedings or any other ground contemplated under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act. 44.The Applicants have also invited this Court, in the alternative, to stay implementation of the confirmed grant pending determination of ownership disputes before the Environment and Land Court. While this Court appreciates that disputes touching on ownership and validity of sale agreements fall within the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court pursuant to Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, this Court finds no basis for staying implementation of a confirmed grant on the basis of transactions that prima facie offend the provisions of the Law of Succession Act. The Applicants remain at liberty, should they deem fit, to pursue any remedies available to them against the persons with whom they contracted. 45.I therefore find that the Applicants/Objectors have failed to establish any of the grounds set out under Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act to warrant revocation or annulment of the grant issued herein. The summons for revocation and annulment of grant dated 17th September, 2025, is therefore devoid of merit. 46.Consequently, the Summons for Revocation and/or Annulment of Grant dated 17th September, 2025, is hereby dismissed with costs to the Respondents/Administrators. 47.Orders accordingly. DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED VIRTUALLY THIS 4TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026RHODA RUTTOJUDGEIn the presence of;Court Assistant: WabwireMr. Guda holding brief for Mr. Nzyuko for Objector/ApplicantMs. Mbilo for the Petitioner/Administrator