https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/10710

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MILIMANI** **FAMILY DIVISION** **PROBATE & ADMINISTRATION CAUSE 757A OF 2019** ***IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF HYLAM MACHUA MBIRIRI* ALIAS *H. MACHUA MBIRIRI (DECEASED)*** **PAULINA KIBUI GAKAMI …….…….OBJECTOR/ APPLICANT** **VERSUS** **ELIZABETH KABURA MWINDI ................. 1ST RESPONDENT** **NICHOLAS MBIRIRI KANGÉTHE ................ 2ND RESPONDENT** **MILKAH NGÉNDO MACHUA ...................3RD RESPONDENT** **LUCY WANJIKU KAIRU ………........4TH RESPONDENT** **RULING** 1. The judicial mechanisms of succession law are fundamentally designed to facilitate the orderly, equitable, and transparent distribution of a deceased person's estate to their rightful dependents and beneficiaries. The Court operates as a court of conscience, burdened with the solemn fiduciary duty of ensuring that the intentions of the deceased—whether expressed through a testamentary instrument or implied through the statutory provisions of intestacy—are honoured and executed without subversion. When the machinery of the Court is alleged to have been manipulated through concealment, fraud, or procedural impropriety, the law provides a robust and uncompromising corrective framework. The matter presently before this Court invokes this corrective jurisdiction, juxtaposed against the equally compelling doctrines of the finality of litigation and jurisdictional competence. 2. Before the Court for determination are two competing Applications that strike at the very core of this succession cause, bringing into sharp focus the intersection of substantive justice and procedural finality. The first application is a Summons for Revocation of Limited Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate dated 18 September 2025, and filed by the Objector/Applicant. The Applicant seeks the revocation of the Grant of Letters of Administration issued to the Respondents on 4 February 2025, alongside corresponding injunctive relief aimed at restraining the Respondents from utilizing the said Grant to deal with the estate of the Deceased. 3. Secondly is a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 16 December 2025, raised by the Respondents. The Respondents urge the Court to strike out the Objector’s Summons in *limine* on the grounds that the issues raised therein are *res judicata*, offend the doctrine of *functus officio*, and invite the Court to exceed its statutory and constitutional jurisdictional mandate by determining land ownership disputes that properly belong before the Environment and Land Court. **Brief Background** 1. The Deceased died intestate on May 14, 1973. The Deceased was a polygamous patriarch who was married to two wives—Wanjiru Machua and Milka Ngendo Machua, both of whom have since passed away—and was blessed with a total of 10 children, comprising 8 sons and 2 daughters. Among his sons was Stanley Gakami Machua, who passed away on December 9, 2012. The Objector/Applicant herein is the widow of the late Stanley Gakami Machua, thereby establishing her status as a daughter-in-law to the Deceased. 2. The epicentre of the conflict is a specific parcel of land known as Title Number DAGORETTI/MUTUINI/70 (hereinafter referred to as the "Suit Property"). According to the detailed depositions of the Objector/Applicant, the Deceased informally distributed his vast landholdings in Dagoretti Mutuini among his sons in the year 1959. The Objector/Applicant asserts that while the other sons eventually sold their respective portions to third parties and relocated to areas such as Oloitokitok in Kajiado County and Kitale, her late husband, Stanley Gakami Machua, chose to retain the Suit Property. The Objector/Applicant contends that her late husband retained the land to maintain the dignity of their late father's home, and she, along with her children, has resided on this specific parcel of land for over four decades. 3. Following Stanley Machua's death in December 2012, the Objector/Applicant initiated succession proceedings to administer his estate. She petitioned for and obtained a Grant of Letters of Administration for the Estate of Stanley Gakami Machua in High Court Succession Cause No. 1803 of 2013. This Grant was subsequently confirmed by the Court on 10 June 2014, and the Suit Property was effectively placed under her control, to be held in trust for herself and her children, George Wamai Gakami and Lilian Ngendo Gakami. 4. However, this period of perceived legal tranquillity was decisively shattered when George Mbiriri Machua (now deceased), another son of the Deceased herein and a brother to Stanley Machua, filed an application on 6 April 2017, seeking to revoke the Objector/Applicant’s Grant in Cause No. 1803 of 2013. George Machua argued that the Suit Property never legally belonged to Stanley Machua, but rather remained the registered property of their patriarch, Hylam Machua Mbiriri. 5. On 2 October 2018, Hon. Justice A.O. Muchelule delivered a judgment in that cause, revoking the Objector’s Grant. The learned Judge found as a matter of fact that the Objector/Applicant had misrepresented material facts to the Court, as official land registry records confirmed that the Suit Property was still registered in the name of Hylam Machua Mbiriri at the time of Stanley Machua's death. A consequential Court Order was issued on 13 November 2018, directing the cancellation of any title entries in the Objector/Applicant’s name and ordering the restoration of the title to the name of Hylam Machua Mbiriri. This order was officially registered at the Nairobi Lands Registry on 3 June 2019. 6. Subsequently, in 2019, the Respondents initiated the present succession cause. The proceedings culminated in the issuance of a Grant of Letters of Administration to the Respondents on 4 February 2025. During this intervening period, the relationship between the Respondents and the Objector further deteriorated, leading to a separate and highly contentious legal battle before the Environment and Land Court (ELC) in Nairobi. In ELC Case No. ELCLC/E205/2023, the 1st Respondent seeks a permanent injunction and eviction orders against the Objector/Applicant and her lessee, the Full Gospel Churches of Kenya, arguing that they are trespassers on the Suit Property. 7. The Objector/Applicant has now returned to this Court, asserting that the Grant herein was obtained fraudulently and through deliberate, malicious concealment of material facts. She contends that as the widow of the Deceased’s acknowledged son, she and her house are undeniable legal beneficiaries of the Deceased's estate. Despite this undeniable biological and legal reality, she deposes that she was entirely excluded from the succession proceedings, actively omitted from a Mediation Settlement Agreement dated 15 August 2025, and intentionally kept in the dark regarding the eventual confirmation of the Grant. 8. In swift rejoinder, the Respondents filed the Notice of Preliminary Objection currently under review, asserting that the Objector/Applicant is merely attempting to re-litigate the absolute ownership of the Suit Property—an issue that they argue was definitively and permanently settled by Justice Muchelule in 2018. **The Submissions** 1. The Objector/Applicant’s Application is anchored on the provisions of Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act. Through her Supporting Affidavit, she deposes that the Respondents actively and maliciously concealed her existence, and that of her children, from the Court during the application for the Grant. She argues that even if the Suit Property legally belongs to the estate of the Deceased as ruled by Justice Muchelule in 2018, her late husband Stanley Machua was an acknowledged biological son of the Deceased. Therefore, under the laws of intestacy regarding polygamous households, Stanley Machua's house—which she represents—is legally entitled to a proportional share of the Deceased's entire estate. 2. The Objector/Applicant relies on ***In re Estate of Edward Ngangira Wamagata (Deceased)*** and ***In re Estate of Maimba Kiura (Deceased)*** to submit that a grant obtained by concealing legitimate beneficiaries, or by utilizing defective and exclusionary consent documents, must be revoked. Furthermore, she asserts that the Respondents engaged in material non-disclosure by failing to list the existence of several other properties forming part of the Deceased's estate, thereby violating the cardinal duty of full and frank disclosure incumbent upon prospective administrators. 3. Conversely, the Respondents mount a vigorous defence through the Replying Affidavit of Nicholas Mbiriri Kang'ethe and their written submissions. Their defence rests on three robust legal pillars: the doctrine of *res judicata*, the principle of *functus officio*, and a challenge to the Court's jurisdictional competence. 4. The Respondents argue that the Objector's Summons is nothing more than a disguised, collateral attack on the 2018 decision. They posit that the absolute ownership of DAGORETTI/MUTUINI/70 was directly and substantially in issue in Cause No. 1803 of 2013, was fully heard, and was finally decided against the Objector/Applicant. Consequently, they submit that Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act imposes a permanent bar, preventing the Objector/Applicant from reopening the issue. Relying on ***Kabansora Millers Ltd v Nyangena*,** they argue that the Court is *functus officio* and cannot revisit the matter outside of a formal appeal or an application for review—neither of which the Objector/Applicant pursued. 5. Finally, the Respondents invoke the jurisdictional principles established in ***In re Estate of Mbai Wainaina (Deceased)*,** arguing that this Court completely lacks the constitutional and statutory jurisdiction to determine disputes regarding land ownership. They submit that since the Objector continues to claim the Suit Property as her absolute own, she operates as a third-party objector. Therefore, her grievances belong exclusively before the Environment and Land Court, where the eviction litigation is already pending. **The Preliminary Objection** 1. The classic, time-honoured definition of a preliminary objection was articulated by Law J.A. in the foundational case of ***Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd EA 696*:** *"A preliminary objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings, and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the jurisdiction of the court or a plea of limitation, or a submission that the parties are bound by the contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration."* 1. In the same decision, Sir Charles Newbold P. provided a crucial, limiting caveat that remains the guiding star for judicial officers: *"A Preliminary Objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer. It raises a pure point of law which is argued on the assumption that all the facts pleaded by the other side are correct. It cannot be raised if any fact has to be ascertained or if what is sought is the exercise of judicial discretion."* 1. This standard was forcefully reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in ***Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission v Jane Cheperenger & 2 others eKLR*,** where the apex Court warned against the profligate deployment of preliminary objections as offensive weapons rather than defensive shields. 2. The Objector/Applicant contends that the Preliminary Objection fails this strict test because it requires the Court to ascertain deeply contested facts regarding her ongoing entitlement and the precise nature of her occupation of the Suit Property. Conversely, the Respondents argue that *res judicata* and a lack of jurisdiction are quintessential pure points of law capable of decisively disposing of the suit without the need to call evidence. 3. The Court observes that the Respondents' objection regarding *res judicata* relies primarily on a prior judgment of this very Court—namely, the decision by Justice Muchelule. The existence, text, and holding of a prior court judgment are matters of public record of which this Court takes immediate judicial notice. Ascertaining whether a previous suit finally determined an issue does not require the calling of witnesses, cross-examination, or the resolution of novel factual disputes; it requires a purely legal comparison of the pleadings, the issues framed, and the final judgments in the two respective suits. Therefore, a plea of *res judicata*, when based on undisputed court records, constitutes a highly valid preliminary objection. 4. Having established that the Preliminary Objection is procedurally competent, the Court must now determine whether the doctrine of *res judicata* actually applies to the facts at hand. 5. The doctrine is codified in Section 7 of the Civil Procedure Act which dictates: *No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court.* 1. The rationale for this doctrine is rooted in fundamental public policy—it is in the public interest that there be an end to litigation and no man shall be vexed twice for the same cause. In ***Mwachenga v Omondi & 3 others KEELC 3260 (KLR)*,** it was reiterated that all elements of Section 7 must be satisfied conjunctively: the issue must be identical, the parties must be the same, the title under which they litigate must be the same, and a competent court must have finally determined the matter on its merits. 2. Furthermore, the doctrine of *functus officio*, as highlighted by the Respondents via ***Kabansora Millers Ltd v Nyangena KEHC 4754 (KLR)*,** dictates that once a court has rendered its final decision, it ceases to have jurisdiction over the matter and cannot reopen the dispute, save for specific statutory exceptions such as an application for review. 3. Applying these exacting principles, the Court must ask a highly specific question: What was exactly determined by Justice Muchelule in 2018, and what is the Objector/Applicant asking this Court to determine today? 4. In Succession Cause No. 1803 of 2013, the Objector/Applicant claimed that DAGORETTI/MUTUINI/70 belonged absolutely to her late husband, Stanley Gakami Machua, and she sought to administer it solely as his estate. The Court analysed the land records and found as an incontrovertible fact that the property was registered to the Deceased and thus constituted part of the Deceased's larger estate. The Court unequivocally held: *"Now that the land parcel Dagoretti/Mutuini/70 belonged to Hylam Machua Mbiriri, the Respondents, who had no letters of Administration in respect of his estate, had no legal capacity and authority to indulge in his property."* 1. The Court ordered the title reverted to the Deceased. It is an uncontroverted fact that the Objector/Applicant did not file an appeal against this precise finding. Therefore, the question of whether the Suit Property belongs to the estate of Stanley Gakami Machua or the estate of the Deceased is unquestionably *res judicata*. The property belongs absolutely to the estate of Hylam Machua Mbiriri. The Court is entirely *functus officio* on the issue of absolute legal ownership. To the extent that the Objector’s present Summons seeks to assert absolute, indefeasible ownership over DAGORETTI/MUTUINI/70 as the exclusive property of her late husband, such a claim is fatally and permanently barred. 2. However, this finding does not end the Court's inquiry. The Respondents' Preliminary Objection commits a grave jurisprudential error by conflating the rejection of the Objector’s claim to absolute ownership with the total extinguishment of her rights as a beneficial dependent. 3. When Justice Muchelule reverted the property to the estate of the Deceased, he did not disenfranchise Stanley Machua’s dependents. Under the Law of Succession Act, the property simply became part of the pool of assets available for equitable distribution among the Deceased’s legal beneficiaries. The Objector/Applicant’s late husband was indisputably the Deceased’s biological son. Under Section 41 of the Act, where an intestate is polygamous, his personal and real property is divided among the various houses according to the number of children in each house. Stanley Machua constitutes a primary beneficiary within his respective mother's house. Because Stanley Machua is deceased, the law dictates that his share automatically devolves to his own dependents—namely, the Objector/Applicant and her children. 4. The Respondents effectively advance the argument that because the Objector/Applicant lost her claim to absolute, exclusive ownership in 2018, she somehow lost all standing in the estate of her father-in-law. This is a severe misapprehension of succession law. *Res judicata* operates strictly to bar the re-litigation of the specific issue of registered ownership; it does not, and cannot, erase the Objector’s statutory identity as a beneficiary in the Deceased's estate. 5. Consequently, the Preliminary Objection succeeds only partially: it effectively bars the Objector from claiming absolute ownership over the Suit Property, but it utterly fails to strike out her Summons for Revocation based on her broader status as an excluded, legitimate beneficiary of the estate. The Jurisdictional Boundary Between the Probate Court and the Environment and Land Court 1. The Respondents further contend that under the architectural framework of Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution, and the principles espoused in ***In re Estate of Mbai Wainaina (Deceased) KEHC 6978 (KLR)*,** this Court cannot entertain the Objector/Applicant's application because it inherently involves a complex dispute over land. 2. In the highly persuasive decision of ***Mbai Wainaina (supra)*,** Musyoka J. held: *"The mandate of the probate court under the Law of Succession Act is limited. It does not extend to determining issues of ownership of property and declaration of trusts... A party who wishes to have such matters resolved ought to file a substantive suit before the Environment and Land Court..."* 1. This Court fully agrees with this well-established principle, which was further reinforced by ***Richard Nalwelisie Masinde & 2 others v Barasa Nyongesa Mamati eKLR*.** The Probate Court acts as a specialized administrative conduit designed to gather the undisputed assets of a deceased person, accurately identify the rightful beneficiaries, pay off the debts of the deceased, and oversee equitable distribution. It is not designed, equipped, or constitutionally empowered to operate as a forum for resolving third-party claims of adverse possession, constructive trusts, or allegations of civil trespass. 2. This jurisdictional matrix perfectly explains why the Respondents' eviction suit against the Objector is properly and legally lodged in the Environment and Land Court (ELCLC/E205/2023). The ELC possesses the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the Objector/Applicant's four decades of continuous occupation of the Suit Property give rise to overarching equitable rights, whether a constructive trust was formed by the Deceased's actions in 1959, or whether she is merely a trespasser liable to summary eviction. 3. However, the Respondents misapply this sound jurisdictional principle to the present Application. The Objector/Applicant is not asking this Court to issue an injunction against her eviction, nor is she asking this Court to declare her the absolute owner based on adverse possession or proprietary estoppel. The specific prayers outlined in the Objector/Applicant’s Summons dated 18 September 2025, are strictly for the revocation of the Grant that was issued on 4 February 2025. 4. The revocation of a Grant is exclusively within the statutory purview of the High Court sitting in its probate jurisdiction under Sections 47 and 76 of the Law of Succession Act. The Environment and Land Court, despite its vast powers over land matters, possesses absolutely no jurisdiction to revoke or annul a Grant of Letters of Administration. Thus, the Respondents’ argument that the Objector has approached the wrong Court for the specific relief of revocation is jurisprudentially misconceived. This Court retains exclusive, non-delegable jurisdiction to scrutinize the procedural integrity of the Grants it issues. The Preliminary Objection on the ground of jurisdiction is, therefore, dismissed. **Summons for Revocation** 1. Having definitively established that the Court possesses the requisite jurisdiction, and having clarified that the Objector is not barred from seeking revocation in her capacity as an excluded beneficiary, the Court now turns to the substantive merits of the Summons for Revocation. 2. Section 76 of the Law of Succession Act provides the strict statutory grounds upon which a grant of representation may be revoked or annulled by the Court. The section reads: *A Grant, whether or not confirmed, may at any time be revoked or annulled if the court decides, either on application by any interested party or of its own motion—* *(a) that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance;* *(b) that the grant was obtained fraudulently by the making of a false statement or by the concealment from the court of something material to the case;* *(c) that the grant was obtained by means of an untrue allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the grant notwithstanding that the allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently.* 1. As clearly articulated in the case of ***In re Estate of Mati Njeru (Deceased) eKLR*,** the evidentiary burden lies squarely on the applicant to prove the existence of these specific grounds. Furthermore, the exercise of this immense power is discretionary, not mandatory. In ***Albert Imbuga Kisigwa v Recho Kavai Kisigwa KEHC 1528 (KLR)*,** Mwita J. profoundly stated: *"Power to revoke a grant is a discretionary power that must be exercised judiciously and only on sound grounds. It is not a discretion to be exercised whimsically or capriciously. There must be evidence of wrong doing for the court to invoke section 76 and order to revoke or annul a grant. And when a court is called upon to exercise this discretion, it must take into account interests of all beneficiaries entitled to the deceased's estate and ensure that the action taken will be for the interest of justice."* 1. The Objector/Applicant asserts that the Respondents obtained the Grant through the deliberate, calculated concealment of material facts. Specifically, she argues that as the widow of Stanley Gakami Machua, she and her children are legal beneficiaries. Yet, the Respondents actively excluded them from the Mediation Settlement Agreement dated 15 August 2025, and completely bypassed them during the subsequent confirmation of the grant. 2. The evidentiary record placed before the Court is glaringly clear and deeply troubling. In the Respondents' own Replying Affidavit, the Respondents do not at any point deny that Stanley Gakami Machua was a biological son of the Deceased. In fact, the Objector/Applicant correctly points out that in the Respondents' own Affidavit in Support of Confirmation of Grant (Form 9), sworn on 19 September 2025, Stanley Machua is explicitly listed as a son of the Deceased. 3. Despite possessing clear, undeniable knowledge of Stanley Machua's existence and his subsequent demise leaving dependents, the Respondents proceeded to distribute the vast estate without the slightest involvement of Stanley Machua's dependents. Under Rule 7(1)(e) of the Probate and Administration Rules, an applicant for a Grant must identify all persons who have an equal or prior right to the Grant, and where applicable, obtain their explicit consents. A deliberate failure to involve all known beneficiaries or dependents in the distribution of an estate renders the proceedings fundamentally defective in substance. 4. The jurisprudence on this specific issue is entirely unforgiving. In ***In re Estate of Maimba Kiura (Deceased) KEHC 14181 (KLR)*,** the Court decisively revoked a Grant due to the failure of the administrators to involve certain known beneficiaries in the distribution process. Similarly, in ***In re Estate of David William Kigumi Kimemia (Deceased) eKLR*,** the Court revoked a Grant where the consent to distribution purported to be from all beneficiaries but notably excluded specific individuals entitled to a share. As further emphasized in ***In the Matter of the Estate of L.A.K. (Deceased) eKLR*,** any Grant obtained through the concealment of important matters cannot be allowed to stand. 5. By proceeding to confirm the Grant and relying on a Mediation Settlement Agreement from which the Objector/Applicant was actively and intentionally excluded, the Respondents engaged in the precise concealment from the Court of something material to the case as strictly prohibited under Section 76(b) of the Act. The fact that the Objector/Applicant and the Respondents have an adversarial, highly litigious relationship in the Environment and Land Court did not absolve the Respondents of their paramount statutory and fiduciary duty to disclose all beneficiaries to this Court. The law does not permit administrators to unilaterally excommunicate beneficiaries from an estate simply because of collateral litigation or personal animosity. 6. The Respondents’ conduct is particularly egregious given the broader historical context of this litigation. They successfully weaponized the 2018 decision to legally force the return of the Suit Property to the Deceased's general estate. However, having succeeded in expanding the pool of the estate's assets, they immediately moved to ring-fence that estate for themselves, deliberately excluding the very house (Stanley Machua's) that had occupied and cared for that specific land for decades. Such conduct amounts to a gross abuse of the probate process. The proceedings to obtain and confirm the Grant were fundamentally defective in substance under Section 76(a), and obtained through fraudulent concealment under Section 76(b). 7. In a final attempt to salvage the Grant, the Respondents tangentially argue that the Objector/Applicant is guilty of unreasonable delay and comes to equity with unclean hands. They aver that she failed to file objection proceedings within 30 days of the gazette notice as required by Section 68 of the Act, and delayed in bringing the present Application, thereby offending the maxim "delay defeats equity". 8. This Court is entirely unpersuaded by this line of argument. First, as noted in ***In re Estate of Grace Nyambura Waweru (Deceased) eKLR*,** while standard objection proceedings to the initial making of a Grant are subject to strict timelines and require formal leave to file out of time, an application for revocation under Section 76 operates on a different jurisprudential plane. Section 76 explicitly states that a grant may be revoked at any time if fraud, concealment, or fundamental defects are discovered. The legislature deliberately avoided imposing a strict statute of limitations on Section 76 applications to ensure that fraud and material non-disclosure do not mature into indefeasible title merely through the passage of time. 9. Second, the maxim "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands" cuts both ways, and in this instance, it cuts deepest against the Respondents. The Respondents, who hold a sacred fiduciary duty as prospective administrators of the estate, cannot seek the protection of equitable maxims when they have demonstrably concealed the existence of a co-beneficiary's house from the Court. Equity will not assist a party who uses the strict procedural rules of the court to cement a fraudulent omission. The preservation of the integrity of the judicial process, and the protection of the estate, supersedes the Respondents' procedural complaints regarding delay. 10. To synthesize the preceding analysis, this Court makes the following findings: 11. The Notice of Preliminary Objection fails in substance to strike out the Objector's Summons in its entirety. While the doctrine of *res judicata* operates to legally bar the Objector from claiming absolute, exclusive legal ownership of DAGORETTI/MUTUINI/70 (an issue conclusively determined in 2018), it does not extinguish her status as a dependent and beneficiary representing the house of her late husband, Stanley Gakami Machua, within the broader Estate of the Deceased. 12. The Probate Court retains the exclusive, unassailable jurisdiction to entertain the Summons for Revocation of Grant. The ongoing eviction proceedings in the Environment and Land Court concerning the physical occupation of the land do not divest this Court of its supervisory jurisdiction over the probate grants it issues. 13. The Respondents breached their fiduciary duty and the absolute duty of full and frank disclosure by failing to involve the Objector/Applicant and her children in the succession proceedings, the mediation agreement, and the distribution of the estate. This non-disclosure and deliberate exclusion of a legitimate beneficiary's house constitute the concealment of material facts and render the proceedings fundamentally defective in substance. This conduct satisfies the high threshold for revocation under Sections 76(a) and 76(b) of the Law of Succession Act. 14. The administration of justice requires that the estate of a deceased person be distributed in a manner that meticulously protects the interests of all legitimate beneficiaries. The Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate issued on 4 February 2025, is irremediably tainted by non-disclosure and cannot be allowed to stand. 15. Flowing from the comprehensive analysis above, the Court proceeds to make the following Orders: 16. The Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 16 December 2025 is hereby dismissed. 17. The Summons for Revocation of Limited Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate dated 18 September 2025, is hereby allowed. 18. The Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate issued to the Respondents herein on 4 February 2025, and any subsequent Certificate of Confirmation thereof, are hereby revoked and annulled in their entirety. 19. The Respondents and the Objector/Applicant acting as the representative for the house of Stanley Gakami Machua, are directed to file a fresh, joint petition for a Grant of Letters of Administration Intestate. The parties are directed to propose a mode of distribution that reflects the equitable, statutory entitlement of all the houses of the Deceased. This joint application shall be filed within 90 days from the date of this Ruling. 20. For the absolute avoidance of doubt, this Ruling does not determine the Objector's equitable rights of physical occupation, claims of constructive trust, or liability for civil trespass, which remain the exclusive constitutional preserve of the Environment and Land Court in ELC/E205/2023. 21. Each party shall bear their own costs for these applications. **DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 17 DAY OF JULY 2026** **HELENE R. NAMISI** **JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT** Delivered on virtual platform in the presence of: Court Assistant: Lucy Mwangi