https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/3072

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT GARISSA** **ELCLA NO. E005 OF 2025** **ABDI MALELE ABDILLE ………………………….……………… APPELLANT** **VERSUS** **FARHIYA ABDULLAHI ABDILLE ……………………….. 1ST RESPONDENT** **MOHAMUD ABDULLAHI ABDILLE ………………….. 2ND RESPONDENT** **SALAD ABDULLAHI ABDILLE ………………………….. 3RD RESPONDENT** **DAUD ABDULLAHI ABDILLE …………………………… 4TH RESPONDENT** **DEKA ABDULLAHI ABDILLE ……………………………. 5TH RESPONDENT** **AHMED ABDULLAHI ABDILLE ………………………… 6TH RESPONDENT** **JUDGMENT** ***(Being an appeal against the ruling of Hon. Omwange Jackson, PM, delivered on 14th May 2025 in Garissa CMCELC No. E002 of 2022)*** 1. This appeal arises from the judgment of **Hon. Jackson Omwange, Principal Magistrate**, delivered on **14th May 2025** in **Garissa CM ELC No. E002 of 2022**. In the said judgment, the learned trial magistrate dismissed the appellant’s suit that was seeking for eviction and injunctive relief against the respondents, and directed that the respondents were to remain in occupation of the portion historically referred to as **Plot No. 338B**, with each party bearing their own costs. 1. In arriving at that determination, the learned trial magistrate observed that both the appellant and the respondents had placed before the trial court evidence relating to their respective plots, namely **Plot No. 338 and Plot No. 338B.** While the court acknowledged that the documents produced by the parties did not constitute formal instruments of title capable of conclusively conferring ownership, it nevertheless found that the same carried evidentiary weight and supported competing, but bona fide claims of occupation, over the disputed property. 1. With regard to the allegation of trespass, the learned trial magistrate held that the respondents’ long-standing and unchallenged occupation of the suit premises, together with evidence suggesting recognition by the local authority, militated against the appellant’s assertion that the respondents’ presence on the land was unlawful. 2. Aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgment, the appellant preferred the present appeal vide the Memorandum of Appeal dated 26th May 2025, raising ten (10) grounds faulting the findings and conclusions of the learned trial magistrate. The appellant inter alia contends that the trial court erred both in fact and in law in failing to find that he lawfully acquired **Plot No. 338**, originally known as **Plot No. GSA/BULLA/1002**, in the year 1996 and that the respondents’ father had merely been permitted limited occupation over a portion thereof. The appellant further faults the trial court for failing to appreciate that the permission allegedly granted to the respondents’ father was personal, limited in scope, and incapable of transmission to the respondents as a hereditary entitlement. 1. The appellant also challenges the finding by the trial court that **Plot No. 338B** belonged to the respondents, contending that the said plot was fraudulently acquired, and that the respondents were improperly using the court process to sanitize and legitimise that alleged fraud. It is further the appellant’s case that the learned trial magistrate erred in declining to grant a permanent injunction merely because the parties were related as family members, and in finding that **Plot No. 338** constituted family property. 1. The appellant additionally faults the trial court for failing to find that the respondents had trespassed onto, and encroached upon **Plot No. 338** and for erroneously concluding that the appellant had facilitated the respondents’ occupation whereas, according to the appellant, any access granted was strictly limited to the respondents’ father and did not extend to the respondents themselves. 2. On the basis of the foregoing grounds, the appellant prays that the appeal be allowed with costs, that the judgment of the trial court delivered on 14th May 2025 be set aside in its entirety, and be substituted with orders confirming that the entirety of **Plot No. 338** belongs to the appellant as the lawful owner thereof, and that a permanent injunction be issued restraining the respondents, whether by themselves, their agents or servants, from entering upon, occupying, or in any manner interfering with the appellant’s possession and occupation of **Plot No. 338**. 3. The background to the dispute is that the appellant instituted the suit before the subordinate court vide a plaint dated 19th January 2022 seeking for inter alia a permanent injunction restraining the respondents, whether by themselves, their servants or agents, from selling, offering for sale, or trespassing upon the appellant’s property; an eviction order compelling the respondents to vacate the suit property; enforcement of the orders through the Officer Commanding Garissa Police Station; damages for trespass and damage to the property together with interest and costs of the suit. 4. The appellant’s case before the trial court was that he was, at all material times, the lawful owner of **Plot No. 338** situated in Bulla area within Garissa County. He maintained that he had never sold, offered for sale, or in any manner permitted the respondents to enter into or continue occupying the suit property. According to the appellant, it was only upon the request of the respondents’ late parents that he granted them a limited licence to reside on the property. He contended that upon expiry of the said licence and following the demise of the respondents’ parents, the respondents unlawfully remained on the land without his consent or any lawful justification. 1. The appellant further asserted that the respondents had continued to occupy and trespass upon **Plot No. 338**, originally known as **GSA/BULLA/1002,** unlawfully and illegally. It was his case that the respondents had consistently remained on, and interfered with the suit property without any authority from him, and without any lawful entitlement or recognizable legal interest therein. The appellant therefore maintained that the respondents were not entitled in law to reside upon, trespass onto, or in any manner interfere with his quiet possession and occupation of the suit property. Consequently, he claimed damages arising from what he termed as the respondents’ wrongful entry and continued occupation of his property. 1. The respondents vehemently opposed the suit through their joint statement of defence dated 28th March 2024. They denied ever residing on **Plot No. 338** and instead maintained that they had always lived on **Plot No. 338B**, where their parents had allegedly settled and resided since the year 1996 until their demise. They contended that they continued to reside on **Plot No. 338B**, which they described as the only home they had ever known. 2. The respondents further denied that their late parents had ever occupied the land pursuant to any licence or permission granted by the appellant. They maintained that they had never trespassed onto **Plot No. 338**, asserting that the same was fully occupied by the appellant. According to the respondents, their occupation had at all times been confined strictly to **Plot No. 338B**. They further averred that succession proceedings relating to **Plot No. 338B**, which had allegedly been registered in their late mother’s name, had already been concluded and appropriate orders issued, thereby legitimizing their continued occupation thereof. 1. The respondents, therefore, maintained that the appellant’s suit was actuated by malice and devoid of merit, insisting that they had never trespassed upon, occupied, possessed, or in any way interfered with the appellant’s property. On that basis, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit with costs. 2. The court issued directions on the 28th July 2025 that the appeal be canvassed through written submissions. The appellant filed submissions dated 10th August 2025 identifying the following issues for determination, namely: 1. *Whether the appellant proved ownership of* ***Plot No. 338****; whether the respondents were trespassers;* 2. *Whether respondents were trespassers;* 3. *Whether the respondents lawfully proved their claim over* ***Plot No. 338B****; and* 4. *Whether the appellant was entitled to the reliefs sought*. 3. On the question of ownership, counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant had produced documentary evidence in the form of receipts for payment of land rates together with an official letter from the Town Council identifying him as the registered owner of **Plot No. 338**. Counsel argued that the respondents did not produce any superior or competing ownership documents capable of displacing the appellant’s claim. It was further submitted that courts operating within Northern Kenya have, owing to the prevalence of unregistered parcels of land, consistently recognized municipal records and related documentation as probative evidence of ownership. In support of that proposition, counsel relied on the decision in ***Isaac Gathungu Wanjohi & Another versus Attorney General & 6 Others [2012] eKLR***. Counsel therefore contended that the appellant had discharged the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities and that the trial court erred in failing to so find. 1. Regarding the issue of trespass, counsel submitted that the respondents had admitted being in occupation of the disputed property without the appellant’s consent following the alleged subdivision. Counsel argued that the respondents did not tender any evidence of purchase, transfer, lease, or any other lawful instrument capable of conferring a proprietary interest upon them. According to counsel, the respondents’ defence rested entirely on unsubstantiated claims of inheritance which had not been legally proved. It was therefore submitted that the respondents’ continued occupation of the property amounted to trespass and that the trial court failed to properly apply the settled legal principles governing trespass to land. 1. On whether the respondents had lawfully established their claim over **Plot No. 338B**, counsel submitted that succession proceedings, whether conducted before a Kadhi’s Court or any other forum, do not by themselves confer title to land in the absence of compliance with the requirements of the **Land Registration Act**. Counsel argued that the respondents failed to produce a grant of representation, certificate of confirmation of grant, transfer instruments, or any documentary evidence demonstrating lawful transmission of the property from their deceased mother to themselves. Reliance was placed on **Sections 107, 108 and 109 of the Evidence Act, Chapter 80 of Laws of Kenya.** The counsel submitted that once the appellant had established a prima facie claim to ownership, the evidentiary burden shifted to the respondents to demonstrate a lawful interest in the suit property, which burden they failed to discharge. 1. In conclusion, counsel submitted that the appellant had proved, on a balance of probabilities, that he was the rightful owner of **Plot No. 338** through municipal ownership records, land rate payment receipts, and other supporting documentation, particularly in the absence of any superior title on the part of the respondents. Counsel further argued that the respondents’ continued occupation of the property after the alleged expiry of the limited licence granted to their parents amounted to trespass in law, and that their purported claim of inheritance over **Plot No. 338B** lacked any lawful conveyance, statutory compliance under the Land Registration Act, or recognizable legal basis. It was therefore submitted that the trial court misapprehended both the facts and the applicable law by disregarding the probative value of the appellant’s documentary evidence while according undue weight to the respondents’ unsubstantiated claim founded on succession. 1. The respondents, on their part, filed written submissions dated 27th October 2025 in which they similarly identified four issues for determination, namely; 1. *Whether the trial court erred in finding that* ***Plot No. 338*** *had been subdivided into* ***Plot Nos. 338A and 338B****;* 2. *Whether the respondents had a lawful and equitable claim over* ***Plot No. 338B****;* 3. *Whether the respondents were trespassers on the suit property; and* 4. *Whether the judgment of the trial court was sound both in fact and in law.* 2. On the first issue, counsel for the respondents submitted that the evidence tendered before the trial court clearly demonstrated that the original parcel known as **Plot No. 338**, formerly **GSA/BULLA/1002**, had been subdivided in or about the year 1996 into two distinct portions, namely **Plot No. 338A and Plot No. 338B**. Counsel argued that the appellant did not dispute that the respondents’ homes and developments had, since the subdivision, been situated on the portion identified as **Plot No. 338B**. It was therefore submitted that the trial court properly appreciated the evidence before it, and correctly found that **Plot No. 338B** constituted a distinct portion separate from the appellant’s **Plot No. 338A,** and that the respondents’ occupation related solely to that portion. 1. On the issue of equitable interest and proprietary estoppel, counsel submitted that the trial court rightly found that the respondents’ occupation and possession of **Plot No. 338B** arose out of family arrangements and with the knowledge, acquiescence, and consent of the appellant, who had allegedly permitted the respondents and/or their parents to settle on the said portion. Counsel submitted that since 1996, the respondents and their family had openly occupied, developed, and remained in possession of **Plot No. 338B** without interruption and with the appellant’s full knowledge. In those circumstances, it was argued that the trial court correctly held that the respondents had established a bona fide equitable claim over **Plot No. 338B**, consistent with the doctrines of proprietary estoppel and constructive trust. 1. With regard to trespass, counsel submitted that the trial court properly found that no claim for trespass could arise where occupation of land had initially been sanctioned by the owner, or arose within the context of a family arrangement. Counsel further submitted that the respondents’ occupation, which had endured for nearly three decades, had never been challenged by the appellant until the institution of the suit before the subordinate court. It was therefore contended that the respondents could not be treated as trespassers in the circumstances of the case. Counsel additionally submitted that although the respondents had not formally pleaded adverse possession, the trial court correctly observed that their prolonged occupation under an arrangement acknowledged by the appellant substantially negated the appellant’s claim for trespass. In support of that position, reliance was placed on the decision in ***Wambugu versus Njuguna* [1983] KLR 172.** 1. In conclusion, counsel submitted that the judgment of the trial court was properly founded on both the evidence and the applicable legal principles and that the learned magistrate correctly evaluated the competing claims before the court. The respondents therefore, urged this court to dismiss the appeal in its entirety, uphold the judgment of the subordinate court, and award them the costs of the appeal. 2. The issues arising in this appeal for the court’s determinations are as follows: 1. *Whether the appellant proved a superior proprietary interest over* ***Plot No. 338.*** 2. *Whether the respondents proved any lawful or equitable interest over the portion referred to as* ***Plot No. 338B****.* 3. *Whether the respondents’ occupation of the disputed portion amounted to trespass.* 4. *Whether the learned trial magistrate properly evaluated the evidence and arrived at a legally sustainable determination*. 3. The court has carefully considered the grounds on the memorandum of appeal, record of appeal, submissions by the learned counsel for the parties, superior court decisions referred to thereon, and come to the following conclusions: 1. As this is a first appeal, the duty of this Court is to re-evaluate the evidence afresh and draw its own conclusions, while bearing in mind that it did not see or hear the witnesses. This principle was stated in ***Selle & Another versus Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others* [1968] EA 123**, where the Court of Appeal held: ***“This Court is not bound necessarily to accept the findings of fact by the court below. An appeal to this Court is by way of retrial… this Court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions, though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect.”*** * 1. **Whether the appellant proved a superior proprietary interest over Plot No. 338**: The appellant’s case before the trial court was anchored on the assertion that he was the lawful owner of **Plot No. 338**, formerly known as **GSA/BULLA/1002**, and that the respondents had unlawfully entered and occupied a portion thereof. The burden, therefore, rested upon him, in accordance with **Sections 107 to 109 of the Evidence Act**, to establish not only his proprietary interest over the suit property but also that the portion occupied by the respondents formed part of his land and that the respondents lacked any lawful or recognizable basis for their occupation. * 1. In support of his claim, the appellant produced a letter from the former Town Council of Garissa indicating that **Plot No. GSA/BULLA/1002** was registered in his name, receipts evidencing payment of annual plot rates. In the context of informal settlement tenure systems, particularly within areas where formal registration processes remain incomplete, such documentation cannot be dismissed outright merely because no certificate of title was produced. Indeed, municipal allocation records, rate payment receipts, and official correspondence often constitute important indicators of possessory and allocative interests in land pending formal titling. * 1. However, the difficulty with the appellant’s case lies not so much in the absence of evidence of ownership, but rather in the inability to conclusively demonstrate that the disputed occupied portion exclusively fell within his uncontested possession to the exclusion of the respondents’ long-standing occupation claim. 2. First, the appellant expressly admitted during cross-examination that he allowed the respondents’ father onto the land in or about the year 1996. He further acknowledged that the respondents’ family had remained on the land continuously thereafter, and that structures existed thereon occupied by them. Although he maintained that the permission granted was limited and temporary in nature, no evidence was tendered demonstrating the terms of that alleged licence, the acreage or portion affected, the duration thereof, or any subsequent revocation communicated to the respondents or their deceased parents. * 1. Secondly, the appellant’s own evidence revealed uncertainty regarding the exact dimensions and boundaries of the disputed portion. While he asserted that the survey map would reveal the position on the ground, no surveyor, lands officer, or physical planner was called to testify and authenticate whether the original suit plot had been subdivided into **Plot No. 338** and the portion claimed as **Plot No. 338B**. This omission becomes particularly significant considering that counsel for the appellant had initially sought adjournment specifically to secure the attendance of officers from the Lands Department, and later informed the trial court that such efforts had proved futile. 2. Further, among the documents produced before the trial court by consent was correspondence from the County Government of Garissa addressed to the Directorate of Criminal Investigations regarding the authentication of ownership of **Plot Nos. 338 and 338A**. The contents of that communication indicated that **Plot No. 338** was associated with Zeynab Mohamed Ali, while **Plot No. 338A** was associated with the appellant herein. The same letter acknowledged the existence of distinct survey references and measurements for the two portions under the ongoing KISIP settlement framework. 3. Although the appellant disputed the authenticity and legitimacy of those records, no rebuttal evidence from the relevant County or Lands offices was ultimately tendered to discredit the same. The trial court was therefore entitled to consider that evidence alongside the appellant’s admissions regarding the respondents’ long occupation. 4. This court therefore agrees with the learned trial magistrate that while the appellant demonstrated a recognizable documentary and historical connection to **Plot No. 338**, the totality of the evidence did not conclusively establish an exclusive proprietary entitlement over the disputed occupied portion, sufficient to warrant the drastic remedies of eviction and permanent injunction. 5. Crucially, proof of ownership alone, particularly within the context of informal settlement tenure, does not automatically translate into entitlement to eviction where the evidence tendered, simultaneously discloses prolonged occupation, acquiescence, competing municipal records, and unresolved questions regarding the exact identity, and extent of the disputed portions on the ground. 6. **Whether the respondents proved any lawful or equitable interest over the portion referred to as Plot No. 338B:** The respondents’ position before the trial court was that they were not occupying the appellant’s **Plot No. 338A**, but rather a separate portion identified as **Plot No. 338B** upon which their family had settled and lived since 1996. Their case was therefore not one founded upon formal registered ownership in the strict sense, but rather upon long occupation, family arrangements, local administrative recognition, and succession claims relating to their deceased mother. * 1. It is not lost to this court that the respondents did not produce any certificate of title, lease, allotment letter, or registered transfer instrument capable of conclusively establishing legal ownership under the **Land Registration Act**. Equally however, the appellant himself did not possess formal title documentation over the disputed occupied portion. The dispute is therefore within the broader context of informal and partially regularized settlement tenure where proprietary interests are frequently evidenced through municipal records, survey references, occupation history, and administrative recognition rather than formal registration instruments alone. * 1. The respondents produced before the trial court a letter from the County Government of Garissa addressed to the Directorate of Criminal Investigations concerning authentication of ownership of **Plot Nos. 338 and 338A**. The contents of that letter are significant. The County Government expressly acknowledged the existence of distinct portions and indicated that **Plot No. 338** was associated with Zeynab Mohamed Ali, while **Plot No. 338A** was associated with the appellant. The communication further referenced survey plans and measurements relating to the two parcels within the ongoing KISIP settlement programme. 2. The respondents additionally produced documents relating to succession proceedings involving their deceased mother, including an order issued by the Kadhi’s Court directing transfer of **Plot No. B338** to the 3rd respondent. While this court agrees with the appellant that such succession documents, standing alone, do not constitute instruments of title nor effect transmission in the absence of compliance with the applicable land registration framework, they nevertheless formed part of the broader evidentiary matrix demonstrating that the respondents’ occupation and claim over **Plot No. 338B** was neither fictitious nor recent. 3. More importantly, the appellant’s own testimony substantially corroborated the respondents’ historical occupation. He admitted that he allowed the respondents’ father onto the land in 1996 and further acknowledged that the respondents had continued residing thereon thereafter, even after their father’s death. The respondents’ evidence that their family had occupied and developed the land openly for decades was therefore not seriously controverted. 4. The trial court approached this evidence from the standpoint of equitable occupation and proprietary estoppel. This court is persuaded that, in the peculiar circumstances of this dispute, the learned trial magistrate cannot be faulted for doing so. The evidence disclosed prolonged occupation undertaken openly, with the appellant’s knowledge and acquiescence, and in circumstances suggesting a family arrangement whose precise terms were never formally documented. The respondents’ occupation was therefore not shown to have originated in force, secrecy, or illegality, and does not amount to trespass. 5. That said, this court must equally observe that the evidence tendered by the respondents fell short of conclusively establishing indefeasible legal ownership over **Plot No. 338B**. The respondents did not institute a counterclaim seeking declaratory ownership orders, nor did they place before the court formal title documents capable of conclusively vesting proprietary rights over the suit property in them. 6. Accordingly, the proper legal position emerging from the evidence is not that the respondents conclusively proved legal ownership of **Plot No. 338B**, but rather that they established a bona fide, long-standing equitable and possessory claim over the portion they occupied, sufficient to defeat the appellant’s claim that their occupation was purely unlawful, illegal, or amounting to trespass. The learned trial magistrate therefore properly appreciated the evidentiary and equitable realities presented before the court, and there is no basis presented to fault him. 7. ***Whether the respondents’ occupation of the disputed portion amounted to trespass:*** Having already found that the appellant did not conclusively establish exclusive proprietary entitlement over the disputed occupied portion, and further having concluded that the respondents demonstrated a bona fide, long-standing equitable and possessory claim over the portion referred to as **Plot No. 338B**, the question that follows is whether the respondents could properly be regarded as trespassers. In the court’s view, and as already stated above, the answer must be in the negative. * 1. The appellant’s own evidence was that the respondents’ father entered the land with his permission in or about the year 1996. The respondents’ occupation, therefore, did not originate in force, secrecy, or unlawful entry. Although the appellant maintained that the permission granted was limited and personal to the respondents’ deceased father, the evidence on record demonstrates that the respondents and their family remained in open occupation of the land for decades with the appellant’s knowledge and acquiescence, even after their father’s death. 2. Further, the respondents consistently maintained that they occupied the portion historically identified as **Plot No. 338B** and not the appellant’s **Plot No. 338A**, a position that found support in the documentary material produced before the trial court, including the County Government correspondence acknowledging the existence of the separate portions. In those circumstances, and absent clear and conclusive evidence demonstrating unlawful entry or occupation without any recognizable basis, this court agrees with the learned trial magistrate that the respondents’ occupation could not properly be characterized as trespass. * 1. While the learned trial magistrate made reference to the decision in ***Wambugu versus Njuguna* [1983] KLR 172**, this court notes that the respondents neither pleaded nor sought adverse possession reliefs. Nonetheless, the reference to prolonged and acquiesced occupation was relevant in evaluating whether the respondents’ continued possession of the land was unlawful in the manner alleged by the appellant. 2. Ultimately, the evidence before the trial court disclosed a long-standing occupation arising from family arrangements and continuing openly for nearly three decades. In the circumstances, the appellant failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the respondents were trespassers or that he was entitled to the eviction and injunctive orders sought. 3. ***Whether the learned trial magistrate properly evaluated the evidence and arrived at a legally sustainable determination:*** Having reconsidered and re-evaluated the entirety of the evidence on record, this court is satisfied that the learned trial magistrate properly appreciated the nature of the dispute before him, and correctly identified that the matter extended beyond a straightforward claim of formal ownership. The evidence disclosed competing claims grounded on informal tenure documentation, longstanding occupation, family arrangements, and local administrative recognition, all of which the trial court duly considered. * 1. The learned trial magistrate carefully evaluated the documentary evidence produced by both parties, including the appellant’s municipal records and rates payment receipts as well as the respondents’ succession-related documents, and the correspondence from the County Government of Garissa acknowledging the existence of **Plot Nos. 338 and 338A**. The trial court further took into account the appellant’s own admission that the respondents’ father had entered the land with his permission in 1996, and that the respondents’ family had remained in occupation thereafter. * 1. In the circumstances, this court finds no basis for interfering with the trial court’s ultimate finding that the appellant had failed to prove unlawful occupation or trespass so as to justify the grant of eviction and permanent injunctive orders against the respondents. 2. However, this court notes that the respondents did not file a counterclaim seeking declaratory or possessory relief in respect of **Plot No. 338B**. The issue before the trial court was therefore, limited to whether the appellant had proved his claim for eviction, injunction, and damages. While the evidence justified dismissal of the suit, the learned trial magistrate went a step further and directed that the respondents *“shall remain in occupation of the portion historically known as* ***Plot No. 338B****.”* In the absence of a counterclaim or substantive pleadings seeking such relief, that order effectively granted affirmative relief in favour of the respondents beyond the scope of the pleadings before court. It is settled that parties are bound by their pleadings and that a court should not grant reliefs which have neither been sought nor prayed for. * 1. Accordingly, while this court finds no merit in the appeal against the dismissal of the appellant’s suit, it finds merit in interfering with *order (b)* of the judgment solely to the extent that it granted substantive occupation rights to the respondents in the absence of a corresponding counterclaim. 2. Consequently, the appeal partially succeeds only to the extent that *order (b)* of the judgment directing that the respondents shall remain in occupation of the portion historically known as **Plot No. 338B** is hereby set aside. The dismissal of the appellant’s suit is otherwise upheld. 3. Given the family relationship between the parties herein, and the nature of the dispute, each party shall bear their own costs of the appeal notwithstanding the provision of **Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act, Chapter 21 of Laws of Kenya**. 1. Flowing from the above determinations in this appeal, the court finds and orders as follows: 1. **That the appeal partially succeeds only to the extent of setting aside order (b) of the judgment delivered on 14th May 2025, directing that the respondents “shall remain in occupation of the portion historically known as Plot No. 338B”.** 2. **That the rest of the appeal is dismissed, and the learned trial magistrate’s judgement delivered on 14th May 2025 is hereby affirmed.** 3. **That each party to bear their own costs in this appeal.** Orders accordingly. **DATED, SIGNED AND VIRTUALLY DELIVERED ON THIS 21ST DAY OF MAY 2026.** **S. M. Kibunja** **ELC JUDGE** **In the presence of:** Appellant – Mr. Chacha Respondents – Mr. Bosire Mohamed - Court Assistants **S. M. Kibunja** **ELC JUDGE**