https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/1338

Adera v Anti-Counterfeit Authority (Cause E025 of 2026) [2026] KEELRC 1338 (KLR) (15 May 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELRC 1338 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Employment and Labour Relations Court at Machakos Cause E025 of 2026 HS Wasilwa, J May 15, 2026 Between Johnson Otieno Adera Claimant and Anti-Counterfeit Authority Respondent Ruling 1.The Claimant/ Applicant filed a Notice of Motion dated 16th April 2026 seeking orders THAT: -a.the instant contempt application being one seeking to uphold the integrity and authority of this Court be certified urgent, directions given on compliance and be heard in limine.b.this Honourable Court be pleased to stay the respondent’s fresh interdiction letter of 15th April 2026 issued in contempt of the ruling, findings and orders of this Court of 9th April 2026 pending the hearing and determination of this contempt application.c.this Honourable Court be pleased to find the Executive Director of the Respondent and the members of the Board of Directors of the Respondent (hereinafter the contemnors respectively) in contempt of the findings and stay orders of this Court issued on 9th April 2026 in issuing the impugned fresh interdiction letter of 15th April 2026 and sentence them appropriately.d.this Honourable Court upon finding that the letter of 15th April 2026 is contemptuous of its findings and orders of 9th April 2026 does proceed to quash the same as an act in contempt of Court is always a nullity.e.costs be provided for. Claimant/Applicant’s Case 2.The Applicant avers that on 9th April 2026, in the presence of advocates for all parties, this Court delivered a ruling staying the Respondent’s interdiction of the Claimant as contained in the letter dated 10th February 2026 pending the hearing and determination of the claim herein. 3.He states that the Court specifically found at paragraph 150 of the ruling that the Respondent’s Human Resource instruments were not in force and could not therefore apply to any disciplinary process against staff members. He contends that the Court held that the Petitioner had established a prima facie case and that the Respondents could not proceed with a disciplinary process founded on a non-existent policy document. 4.The Applicant asserts that despite the said finding and order of stay, on 15th April 2026, the Respondent issued him a fresh interdiction letter founded on the same Human Resource instruments which the Court had found incapable of application in a disciplinary process. He contends that the issuance of the fresh interdiction letter amounted to a clear act of contempt of Court. 5.He avers that the interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026 contained similar allegations to those contained in the stayed letter and allegations he has challenged in these proceedings as unconstitutional and illegal which the Court is yet to pronounce itself on the legality of the said allegations. 6.The Applicant states that despite the stay orders issued by this Court, the contemnors have purported to interpret the ruling of 9th April 2026 as permitting them to continue with a disciplinary process founded on the same allegations that had been stayed by the Court. It is the Applicant’s case that once this Court issues an order of stay, the process and matters stayed remain frozen and suspended until further directions or orders of the Court. 7.It is the Applicant’s case that the contemnors are in deliberate and wilful disobedience of the orders of this Court in furtherance of a personal vendetta against him. He avers that the dignity and authority of the Court are under threat of erosion and that the application ought to be heard urgently so as to uphold the rule of law and preserve the authority and dignity of the Court. 8.The Applicant further avers that the Respondent established an opaque investigation committee which invited him to appear before it on 13th March 2026 vide a letter dated 4th March 2026. 9.He states that despite the pendency of this claim, the instant application, the constitutional and legal issues raised herein and despite the fact that he had been bereaved and was away in the village, he instructed his advocate to attend the proceedings strictly on a without prejudice basis and to raise fundamental objections regarding the legality of the proceedings before the committee. 10.He states that his Advocate raised the issue of the pendency of the claim and application and urged the committee to await the determination of this Court in line with the guidance of the Supreme Court that inferior tribunals ought to await the decision of a superior Court where a matter is pending before it. 11.The Applicant avers that his Advocate requested to be supplied with the names of persons who had given adverse evidence against him together with the proceedings to enable him prepare adequately for the proceedings. He contends that although the committee initially declined the request, it later verbally agreed to provide the same but subsequently failed and/or refused to do so, thereby violating his right to examine and cross-examine persons who had testified adversely against him. 12.He further states that his Advocate sought disclosure of documents allegedly produced before the committee by witnesses but the committee indicated that no documents had been produced before it apart from those already sent to him. The Applicant contends that the law required him to proceed based on material formally produced before the committee and that the failure to disclose the same was unlawful. 13.The Applicant asserts that his Advocate sought adequate time to prepare upon being served with the proceedings so as to effectively cross-examine witnesses, but the committee declined the request and fixed the matter for hearing on 16th March 2026 despite his Advocate having pre-scheduled matters on the same date. 14.He states that it had been agreed between the committee and his Advocate that the proceedings would proceed virtually and that this was confirmed through email correspondence dated 15th March 2026 wherein his Advocate confirmed readiness to participate virtually. However, the committee failed to respond to the said communication and instead communicated that the venue had been changed to Gelian Hotel without furnishing the virtual link requested by his Advocate despite subsequent follow-up emails. 15.The Applicant contends that the conduct of the committee demonstrates an intention to proceed unlawfully and unfairly and thereafter generate a doctored report indicating that he had declined to participate in the proceedings. 16.He avers that the committee has denied him access to proceedings to enable him know the persons who testified against him, denied him the opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses and denied him adequate time to prepare his defence. 17.He states that this Court has on several occasions held that it can intervene where an ongoing administrative process is being conducted illegally or unfairly. Therefore, the actions of the committee are intended to achieve a pre-planned outcome contrary to the law and consequently, the Court’s intervention is necessary. 18.The Applicant further avers that the investigation committee is illegally constituted as one of its members, Jane Wanjiru Ndiba, is a State Counsel/Deputy Solicitor General, therefore, a representative of the Attorney General who sits on the Board of Directors of the Respondent. He contends that under Section 69(4)(d) of the Public Service Commission Act, a person who has directly or indirectly been involved in a matter as a complainant, witness or interested party is precluded from sitting in such proceedings. 19.He states that the Attorney General, being a board member of the 2nd Respondent which made adverse recommendations and decisions against him, together with all representatives from the Attorney General’s office, are directly and indirectly involved in the matter and cannot lawfully sit as members of the investigation committee. 20.The Applicant further avers that when his Advocate raised the issue of the legality of the committee on 13th March 2026, the members of the committee, including Jane Wanjiru Ndiba, declined to properly identify themselves to enable him ascertain whether they met the legal threshold to sit on the committee. 21.It is the Applicant’s case that his participation before the committee did not amount to submission to its jurisdiction and was undertaken strictly without prejudice and under duress owing to threats allegedly issued by the committee, particularly through its letter dated 13th March 2026. Respondent’s Case 22.In opposition to the application, the Respondent filed a replying affidavit dated 22nd April 2026 and supplementary replying affidavit dated 27th April 2026 both sworn by its current Chairperson, Hon. Nelson Ributhi Gaichuhie. 23.The Respondent avers that it is established under Section 3 of the Anti-Counterfeit Act and is mandated to combat trade in counterfeit goods and enforce intellectual property rights in Kenya. The Authority plays a significant role locally and globally in combating counterfeit trade and enforcing intellectual property rights. 24.The Respondent opposes the Application and contends that the same is improperly before this Court because the interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026 raises a fresh cause of action which is distinct from the Court’s Ruling of 9th April 2026. It asserts that the Applicant ought to have filed a fresh suit challenging the interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026 instead of filing the present contempt proceedings. 25.The Respondent contends that the Application does not meet the threshold for contempt proceedings as the Applicant’s principal objective is to stay the interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026. 26.It was stated that neither the Respondent nor its Board members are in contempt of Court arising from the ruling delivered on 9th April 2026 because the interdiction letter dated 10th February 2026, was formally revoked vide a letter dated 10th April 2026 addressed to the Applicant and his advocates. Through the said letter, the Respondent expressly stated that “in compliance with the Ruling of 9th April 2026, the letter of interdiction dated 10th February 2026 is hereby revoked with immediate effect”; and confirmed that the Applicant was reinstated to office with immediate effect and informed him that all salary and benefits accrued during the interdiction period would be processed and paid within fourteen days. 27.The Respondent contends that the Applicant has deliberately failed to disclose to the Court that following the ruling, he returned to work and resumed duty and only ceased doing so after issuance of the fresh interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026. By omitting this fact, the Applicant invites the Court to determine the contempt Application on an incomplete account of events despite having accepted and acted upon the Respondent’s compliance with the Court order by returning to office. 28.The Respondent avers that vide the letter dated 10th April 2026, the Applicant was requested to report on duty with immediate effect in compliance with the Court’s ruling. The letter is itself a clear and concrete demonstration that the Respondent fully complied with the ruling and orders of the Court by revoking the interdiction letter dated 10th February 2026, reinstating the Applicant and triggering the processing and payment of withheld dues. 29.It is the Respondent’s case that it fully complied with the Ruling and Orders delivered on 9th April 2026 by revoking the interdiction letter dated 10th February 2026 and thereby bringing to an end the very decision and process which were the subject of the stay. Therefore, the allegations of contempt are factually unfounded and legally misplaced and amount to an attempt by the Applicant to shield himself from answering the allegations set out in the interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026. 30.The Respondent states that the interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026 constitutes a fresh and distinct process and is neither legally nor procedurally attached to the interdiction letter dated 10th February 2026 or the process which was the subject of the Court’s Ruling. The fresh interdiction was issued after revocation of the earlier interdiction and after reinstatement of the Applicant and that it is grounded on a different legal framework including the Public Service Commission Act, the Employment Act, the Constitution and the PSC Circular dated 6th March 2026. 31.The Respondent relied on paragraph 151 of the Court’s Ruling wherein the Court held that whilst halting the existing process, the Respondent could initiate a proper disciplinary process if need be based on proper procedures and the law. It states that the Court quashed the earlier interdiction because the Human Resource instruments relied upon had not been approved by the Public Service Commission. 32.The Respondent avers that the new interdiction letter is legally compliant because it is founded on the Public Service Commission Circular dated 6th March 2026 which approved the Respondent’s Human Resource instruments for six months from the date of the Circular. It states that at the time the Applicant was issued with the interdiction letter dated 10th February 2026 and at the time the Respondent filed its Replying Affidavit sworn on 14th March 2026, the contents of the PSC Circular had not been brought to its attention. 33.The Respondent states that although it had initially brought the PSC Circular to the attention of the Court through supplementary submissions dated 25th March 2026, the Applicant objected to its introduction through a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 30th March 2026 on grounds that it had been filed out of time. The objection related only to the mode and timing of introduction and not the authenticity or existence of the Circular. It avers that the PSC Circular has now been properly placed before Court on oath. 34.The Respondent further states that although the Court acknowledged the existence and contents of the PSC Circular in its Ruling, it did not determine the validity, constitutionality or legal effect of the Circular. The Court’s findings were confined to the status of the Respondent’s HR instruments as at 10th February 2026 and to staying the interdiction letter issued on that date. 35.The Respondent contends that the Court did not make any finding on the merits of the allegations raised against the Applicant but only addressed the legal footing of the process. The Court halted a defective procedure and did not absolve the Applicant of the allegations levelled against him. The Respondent states that the Applicant is attempting to convert a narrow procedural reprieve into permanent substantive immunity from disciplinary scrutiny. 36.The Respondent asserts that the Court did not bar it from carrying out any further disciplinary process against the Applicant but only directed that any such process be undertaken procedurally and in accordance with the law. In light of the PSC Circular dated 6th March 2026, the express terms of paragraphs 151 and 152 of the Court’s Ruling and the Respondent’s letter dated 10th April 2026 revoking the earlier interdiction, there is nothing contemptuous about the interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026. 37.The Respondent avers that the interdiction and investigation letter dated 15th April 2026 is a distinct, independent and lawfully constituted administrative action grounded on the Public Service Commission Act, the Employment Act, the Constitution and the ACA Human Resource Policies and Procedures Manual as approved by the PSC Circular. The said letter is not founded on conjecture or administrative whim but on a defined statutory and constitutional framework governing public employment discipline and institutional accountability. 38.The Respondent contends that the Applicant seeks to conflate alleged defects in the original disciplinary process under the interdiction letter dated 10th February 2026 with contempt arising from the interdiction dated 15th April 2026. 39.It states that the Applicant’s complaints regarding disclosure of witnesses, venue, timing or composition of the investigation committee related to proceedings founded on the interdiction letter dated 10th February 2026 which have since been formally terminated. 40.The Respondent avers that once the original process was halted and abandoned in obedience to the Court’s Ruling, those earlier procedural grievances ceased to have any bearing on whether the Respondent is now disobeying the Court’s orders. 41.It states that the investigative process established under the interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026 is open, ongoing and expressly rights-compliant and that the Applicant shall be invited before an independent investigations committee, furnished with particulars of the allegations, allowed to participate fully, cross-examine witnesses and present his response before any further step is contemplated. 42.The Respondent states that the interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026 sets out with clarity and specificity allegations of gross misconduct against the Applicant and expressly states that the current process is preliminary in nature and does not constitute a disciplinary hearing, a show-cause process or a determination of culpability. The process is investigative and fact-finding in nature and that any subsequent disciplinary action shall only arise upon the outcome of the investigations and where warranted in law and fact. 43.The Respondent further states that the investigative process is designed to uphold the Applicant’s constitutional and statutory rights and is intended to comply with Article 47 of the Constitution and the Fair Administrative Action Act. 44.It avers that the Applicant shall be formally invited before an independent investigations committee, furnished with sufficient particulars of the allegations, entitled to participate in the proceedings including through virtual attendance where appropriate, allowed to cross-examine witnesses and afforded a fair opportunity to respond to all allegations. 45.The Respondent contends that it is incorrect in law and fact to characterise the interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026 as a disciplinary sanction or continuation of the stayed interdiction because its design, content and legal foundation demonstrate that it is a constitutionally compliant preliminary investigative process. 46.The Respondent further avers that the Applicant is seeking to use the Court as a shield to avoid responding to the allegations contained in the interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026 rather than as a forum to ensure that those allegations are tested through a lawful process. Despite annexing the Respondent’s revocation letter dated 10th April 2026 as part of his own exhibits, the Applicant paradoxically contends that the Respondent lacked power to revoke the interdiction letter that had been stayed by the Court. 47.The Respondent contends that contempt proceedings are not designed to resolve contested constitutional and statutory questions but are intended to address clear and wilful defiance of unambiguous Court orders. By his own framing, the Applicant is using contempt proceedings as a vehicle to obtain final substantive relief on complex legal issues rather than to vindicate any genuine disobedience of the Court’s orders. 48.The Respondent avers that the Applicant has acknowledged that he is now under a fresh interdiction dated 15th April 2026 and therefore cannot simultaneously maintain that the interdiction letter dated 10th February 2026 remains operative. It states that pursuant to the revocation letter, the Respondent processed and paid the Applicant’s withheld dues including salary for April 2026 amounting to Kshs. 360,669.93. 49.The Respondent states that following the filing of pleadings and submissions, there arose a material development through the PSC Circular dated 6th March 2026 which granted interim approval for continued use of existing Human Resource instruments for six months pending formal approval by the PSC. The Circular directly addressed and cured the concern which led the Court to hold that the Respondent’s HR instruments were not in force at the time of the interdiction dated 10th February 2026. 50.The Respondent avers that following the Court’s Ruling and the PSC Circular, the Board met on 14th April 2026 and resolved to institute a fresh and procedurally compliant investigation process strictly in accordance with statute, the Constitution and the PSC framework. The interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026 expressly cited the Court’s Ruling, the PSC Circular, Section 70 of the PSC Act, the Employment Act, the Constitution and the ACA Human Resource Manual as approved by PSC. 51.The Respondent states that the interdiction letter further outlined the applicable legal framework including Articles 10, 47, 73, 75 and 232 of the Constitution, the Anti-Counterfeit Act, Sections 69 and 70 of the PSC Act, Sections 41 and 44 of the Employment Act, the Fair Administrative Action Act, the Conflict of Interest Act and the Leadership and Integrity Act. 52.The Respondent avers that the interdiction letter particularised allegations of gross misconduct against the Applicant including insubordination, refusal to obey lawful instructions, undermining of Board and Executive Director authority and possible conflict of interest arising from alleged private legal practice while serving as a public officer. 53.The Respondent contends that the legal and factual structure of the interdiction dated 15th April 2026 is qualitatively distinct from the earlier interdiction because it was issued after revocation of the earlier interdiction, is founded on the PSC Circular and is anchored on statutory provisions and constitutional obligations. 54.The Respondent states that for contempt of Court to be established, the Applicant must demonstrate existence of a clear and unambiguous Court order, knowledge of the order and deliberate disobedience of the order. 55.The Respondent asserts that the present application has failed to demonstrate any deliberate breach and that its actions demonstrate good faith and adherence to the Court’s directives. 56.The Respondent further avers that as a statutory body established under the Anti-Counterfeit Act, it is constitutionally bound under Articles 10, 73 and 232 of the Constitution to uphold integrity, accountability and high standards of professional ethics in public service. The allegations against the Applicant including abusive language, insubordination, refusal to obey lawful instructions, undermining Board authority and possible conflict of interest are serious and require investigation. 57.It is the Respondent’s case that the investigative process under the interdiction dated 15th April 2026 was instituted in order to address the allegations in a structured, transparent and rights-compliant forum where the Applicant shall have a full and fair opportunity to confront and respond to the allegations before any disciplinary determination is contemplated. 58.On the prayer for interim orders, the Respondent contends that the Applicant has failed to satisfy the principles in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358. The Applicant has failed to establish a prima facie case because the interdiction dated 15th April 2026 was undertaken pursuant to the Constitution, the Public Service Commission Act, the Employment Act, the Public Service Commission Discipline Manual and the Respondent’s Human Resource Policy and Procedures Manual. 59.The Respondent further contends that the Applicant has not demonstrated irreparable harm because interdiction is a temporary administrative measure intended to facilitate investigations and any alleged injury can be remedied through restoration of salary and benefits in the event of exoneration. 60.The Respondent asserts that the balance of convenience favours allowing the investigative process to proceed because the Applicant shall be afforded an opportunity to respond to the allegations in accordance with due process while grant of interim orders would interfere with the Respondent’s statutory mandate to investigate misconduct and maintain institutional discipline. Claimant/Applicant’s Submissions 61.The Applicant submitted that the ruling delivered on 9th April 2026 in the presence of counsel for both parties allowed the Claimant’s application dated 16th February 2026 and expressly held that he Respondent’s human resource instruments are not in force and cannot be applied against any staff member in disciplinary proceedings; that the Respondent cannot proceed with disciplinary action on a non-existent policy document; that the Court cannot allow a disciplinary process to proceed in a flawed manner; and that the Respondent’s interdiction letter dated 10th February 2026 was stayed pending hearing and determination of the claim. 62.It was submitted that despite the clear and unambiguous orders of the Court, the Respondent on 10th April 2026 purported to revoke the interdiction letter which had already been stayed by the Court and thereafter on 15th April 2026 issued a fresh interdiction letter founded on the same allegations, investigations and human resource instruments that had already been stayed and declared non-existent by the Court. The Applicant argued that the Respondent’s actions amounted to deliberate and wilful disobedience of the orders of the Court. 63.The Applicant submitted that the threshold for civil contempt as settled in Wekesa & 2 others v Munialo [2025] KECA 679 (KLR) where the Court of Appeal restated the ingredients as: clarity of the order, knowledge of the order, breach of the order, and deliberate conduct. It is submitted that the instant application meets all four elements. 64.On clarity, the Applicant submitted that the orders of 9th April 2026 were clear, unambiguous, binding on the Respondent and its officers, and expressly barred the use of the impugned human resource instruments and stayed the interdiction process. 65.On knowledge, it was submitted that the Respondent and Contemnors had full knowledge of the orders as the ruling was delivered in the presence of counsel for both parties and further because the impugned letter dated 15th April 2026 extensively referred to the ruling of the Court. He cited the Court of Appeal in Shimmers Plaza Limited v National Bank of Kenya Limited [2015] eKLR;“Would the knowledge of the judgment or order by the advocate of the alleged contemnor suffice for contempt proceedings? We hold the view that it does. This is more so in a case such as this one where the advocate was in Court representing the alleged contemnor and the orders were made in his presence……..” 66.The Applicant submitted that the Respondent’s advocate having been present in Court on 9th April 2026, the Respondent and contemnors were deemed to have had full notice and knowledge of the orders. 67.On breach, the Applicant submitted that the Contemnors acted in blatant breach of the orders of the Court by proceeding to apply the same Human Resource Policy and Procedures Manual, 2021 which the Court had declared non-existent and inapplicable. The Applicant argued that the interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026 mirrored the interdiction letter dated 10th February 2026 in all material particulars including the allegations, investigations and six-month interdiction. 68.It was submitted that an order of stay of interdiction stops an investigation was settled by the Court in Wekesa & 2 others v Munialo (Supra). Therefore, the Respondent’s impugned letter of 15th April 2026 breaches the orders of this Court of 9th April 2026 that stayed the letter of interdiction of 10th February 2026 by doing all and everything contained in the letter of 10th February 2026 that the Court stayed including investigations on the same allegations. 69.The Applicant submitted that that the letter of 15th April 2026 looked at against the letter of 10th February 2026 and the orders of this Court demonstrates obvious breach, disobedience of the clear and unambiguous terms of the orders of this Court of 9th April 2026. 70.On the Respondent’s conduct, the Applicant submitted that it is the Applicant’s submissions that the Respondent’s conduct was deliberate, including purporting to revoke the interdiction letter on 10th April 2026 without authority, convening meetings on 14th April 2026 to continue the disciplinary process, issuing a fresh interdiction on 15th April 2026 based on the same allegations, and misrepresenting that the Court had directed commencement of a fresh disciplinary process. 71.It is further submitted that the contemnors have deliberately proceeded to disobey the clear and unambiguous orders of this Court by subterfuge, a situation the Court of Appeal rejected in the Wekesa Case, when it held:“This same analysis demonstrates that their defiance was deliberate since they specifically attempted to evade the technical implications of the court order through subterfuge.” 72.It is the Applicant’s submissions that paragraph 152 of the ruling of 9th April 2026 was obiter dictum, and was made after the Court had analysed the evidence before it and made specific orders binding on the respondent. The decision of the Court did not turn on it and it was not a positive order requiring or directing the Respondent to do anything.. The Court stated:“It is also true that this court will not normally interfere with an internal disciplinary process between an employer and employee and only interferes to put the correct process on course. In the circumstances, whilst halting the existing process, the respondents can only initiate a proper disciplinary process if need be based on proper procedures and the law. Costs in the cause.” 73.The Applicant submitted that the Contemnors jumped on the obiter dictum, an act of subterfuge, to proceed with the disciplinary process, a faulty thought process that does not accord with the ruling and orders of 9th April 2026. He reiterated that nowhere at paragraph 152 of its ruling did this Court direct the respondent and the contemnors to start afresh the disciplinary process against the claimant based on the human resource instruments that the Court had declared inapplicable. 74.He submitted that obiter dictum are not binding as held by the Court of Appeal Masari Distributors Limited v UAP Provincial Insurance Company Limited [2017] eKLR:“The remarks made by the learned Judge which were obiter dictum had no effect on his main findings and we need not delve any more on the same. The remarks were made after the learned Judge had made definite findings on each issue that had been framed by the parties for his determination. Those remarks had no effect on the said findings at all.” 75.It is the Applicant’s submission that for the Respondent and the Contemnors to hide, by way of subterfuge, under the obiter dictum contained at paragraph 152 of the Court’s ruling of 9th April 2026 that was gratuitous advice that the Respondent could proceed based on proper procedures and the law when in effect it has no procedures based on the Court’s findings barring it from applying its unconstitutional human resource instruments is a clear case of deliberate disobedience of the clear and unambiguous orders of the Court and an attempt to interpret Court orders to suit a partisan and biased pattern. 76.The Applicant submitted that court orders are to be obeyed unless set aside, varied or discharged, and reliance was placed on D.T. Dobie & Company (Kenya) Limited v Joseph Mbaria Muchina & another[1980] eKLR, where it was held:“It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of, whom an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction, to obey it unless and until, that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void.” 77.It was submitted that the Contemnors were under an unqualified obligation to obey the orders of this Court and not engage in subterfuge to disobey the same even if they felt that it does not accord with their wishes. 78.The Applicant submitted that he has demonstrated that the Respondent and the Contemnors have collectively engaged in express acts whose singular effect is the disobedience of the orders of this Court of 9th April 2026 which are a nullity. 79.It is the Applicant’s submissions that the Respondent’s argument that the interdiction letter of 15th April 2026 constitutes a “new cause of action” is fallacious, as the allegations and investigations therein mirror those contained in the interdiction letter of 10th February 2026 which had been stayed. This position is consistent with Wekesa & 2 others v Munialo [2025] KECA 679 (KLR), where a subsequent disciplinary action on identical allegations was held to be contempt and not a new cause of action. 80.It was further submitted that the purported revocation of the interdiction letter was an abuse of process and an attempt to obtain a collateral advantage contrary to the stay orders of this Court, and reliance is placed on Beijing Industrial Designing & Researching Institute v Lagoon Development Limited [2015] eKLR. 81.The Applicant submitted that reliance on the Public Service Commission letter dated 6th March 2026 is misplaced as the same was considered by this Court in its ruling of 9th April 2026 and did not alter the Court’s findings that the human resource instruments were not in force. Therefore, reliance on the said letter in the impugned interdiction amounts to aggravated contempt. 82.It is the Applicant’s submissions that the threshold for contempt has been met, that the Respondent and its officers are in deliberate breach of the orders of this Court, and that the actions complained of are a nullity. The Applicant therefore urges the Court to allow the application as prayed to uphold the authority and dignity of the Court and the rule of law. Respondent’s Submissions 83.The Respondent submitted on two issues: whether the Respondent’s letter of interdiction dated 15th April 2026 was in contempt of the Court’s Ruling dated 9th April 2026; and whether the Applicant is entitled to the prayers sought. 84.On the first issue, the Respondent submitted that this Court ruling delivered on 9th April 2026 allowed the Claimant’s application and stayed the interdiction letter dated 10th February 2026 pending the hearing and determination of the claim. 85.The Respondent submitted that it relied on paragraph 152 of the said Ruling, and revoked the interdiction letter dated 10th February 2026, reinstated the Claimant and processed and paid all withheld dues including salary for the month of April 2026. 86.It was submitted that in compliance with paragraph 152 of the Court’s Ruling, the Respondent’s Board of Directors considered the Court’s decision together with the Public Service Commission Circular Ref. PSC/EMCS/27/TY (19) dated 6th March 2026 which granted approval for continued use of existing human resource instruments for six months. 87.The Respondent further submitted that the Board, in exercise of its managerial prerogative, deliberated on the matter and approved fresh investigations into the allegations against the Applicant strictly in compliance with the Court Order, the PSC approval and the law, following which the Applicant was issued with the interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026. 88.The Respondent submitted that it lawfully exercised its managerial prerogative in issuing the fresh interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026 and that the Applicant’s rights were not violated. It was therefore submitted that the Respondent complied with the Court’s Ruling and was not in disobedience thereof. It cited Manani J sentiments on managerial prerogative in Irungu v Kenya Pipeline Company Limited [2023] KEELRC 459 (KLR). 89.The Respondent further submitted that the legal and factual structure of the interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026 was qualitatively distinct from the earlier interdiction dated 10th February 2026 in that it was issued after revocation of the earlier interdiction and full compliance with the Court Order; was based on the PSC Circular dated 6th March 2026 approving use of existing HR instruments; was anchored on Section 70 of the Public Service Commission Act and other statutes and HR instruments; and faithfully responded to paragraph 152 of the Ruling by initiating a proper disciplinary process based on proper procedures and the law. 90.The Respondent submitted that the law on contempt of court was well settled. Reliance was placed on Gatharia K. Mutitika v Baharini Farm Ltd [1985] KLR 227 where the Court of Appeal held that the standard of proof in contempt proceedings is higher than proof on a balance of probabilities though not exactly beyond reasonable doubt. It further relied on Samuel M. N. Mweru & Others v National Land Commission & 2 others [2020] eKLR where the Court restated the elements necessary to establish civil contempt namely that the order must be clear and unambiguous, the contemnor must have knowledge of the order, there must be breach of the order and the breach must be deliberate and mala fide. 91.The Respondent submitted that the application failed to disclose any deliberate breach on its part and that it had acted in good faith and in compliance with the Court’s Ruling. It was therefore submitted that the application is misconceived, bad in law and an abuse of the Court process. 92.On the prayers sought, the Respondent submitted that the Applicant is challenging the interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026 which was not the subject of the Court’s Ruling delivered on 9th April 2026, therefore, the proper procedure was to institute a fresh suit in order to seek stay orders against the said interdiction letter. 93.The Respondent submitted that although the instant application was framed as contempt proceedings, it principally sought stay orders contrary to the principles governing the standard of proof in contempt proceedings. Reliance was again placed on Republic v Ahmad Abolfathi Mohammed & another [2018] eKLR where the Court of Appeal held that contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and require strict proof of willful disobedience. 94.It was submitted that the Applicant did not specify the nature of sentence sought against the Respondent’s Board members and Executive Director and that such lack of clarity offended the principles applicable in contempt proceedings. The Respondent argued that the Applicant’s failure to specify the nature of sentence while insisting on stay orders demonstrates that the Applicant is using the contempt application to obtain stay orders instead of filing a fresh suit. 95.The Respondent further submitted that in the event the Court considered the prayer for stay of the interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026, the same ought to be declined as the Applicant has failed to meet the threshold for grant of interim orders as set out in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [1973] EA 358. 96.On prima facie case, the Respondent submitted that the Applicant has failed to establish a prima facie case with a probability of success. The interdiction letter dated 15th April 2026 was issued pursuant to the Constitution, the Public Service Commission Act, the Employment Act, the Public Service Commission Discipline Manual and the Respondent’s Human Resource Policy and Procedures Manual. 97.The Respondent submitted that interdiction forms part of a lawful administrative and investigative process intended to facilitate independent investigations into allegations of gross misconduct and to safeguard the integrity of the process. Therefore, the Applicant has failed to demonstrate that the Respondent acted unlawfully, irrationally or in excess of its mandate so as to warrant intervention by the Court at the interlocutory stage. 98.On irreparable injury, the Respondent submitted that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate that he would suffer irreparable harm incapable of compensation by damages. Interdiction is a temporary administrative measure contemplated under Section 70 of the Public Service Commission Act and the Respondent’s Human Resource Manual and does not amount to a final disciplinary sanction. 99.The Respondent argued that the interdiction was merely intended to allow investigations to proceed fairly and independently and that in the event the Applicant was exonerated, the applicable framework provided for restoration of salary and benefits. It was thus submitted that any injury arising from interdiction is capable of being remedied by monetary compensation or restoration of benefits and therefore did not meet the threshold of irreparable harm contemplated in Giella v Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd. 100.On balance of convenience, the Respondent submitted that the same tilted in its favour. Granting the interim orders sought will effectively halt a lawful internal investigative process initiated in accordance with the governing disciplinary framework and in compliance with the Court’s Ruling of 9th April 2026. 101.The Respondent submitted that allowing the investigations to proceed will not prejudice the Applicant since he will be afforded an opportunity to respond to the allegations in accordance with applicable procedures and the rules of natural justice. On the other hand, granting the interim orders will unduly interfere with the Respondent’s statutory mandate to investigate allegations of misconduct and maintain discipline within the institution. 102.The Respondent therefore urged the Court to find that the balance of convenience favours allowing it to proceed with the ongoing investigations and disciplinary process in accordance with the law. 103.I have examined all averments and submissions of the parties herein. The applicants seeks an order finding the respondent guilty of contempt of this courts orders based on this court’s ruling of 9th April 2026. 104.Vide this ruling, this court found the HR instruments approved by the respondents invalid for lack of approval by the PSC and that a moratorium had been placed on the said manual by a circular from the head of public service dated 16th May 2025. 105.Due to the above finding, this court found that the respondents couldn’t initiate a disciplinary process against the applicant based on the said HR instruments. This court left room for the respondents to initiate proper disciplinary processes based on proper procedures and the law. 106.It is the applicant’s contention that in clear disregard to the court order, the respondents issued him with another interdiction letter on 15/4/26 based on the same flawed process. 107.The respondents have averred that they did not commit any contempt of court. They have alluded to the fact that vide a letter dated 6th March 2026 the PSC gave them a window of 6 months to use the existing human resource instruments pending further directions. The letter in question has been exhibited before this court by the respondents and so the fresh interdiction letter was based on this 6 window period. 108.I have confirmed the existence of the said letter and I find that indeed the respondents have the proper instruments to issue the interdiction letter and the same was not done in contempt of this court’s orders. I therefore find the application for contempt not merited and the same is dismissed accordingly. Costs in the cause. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI THIS 15TH DAY OF MAY, 2026.HELLEN WASILWAJUDGE