https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/7753

Akoth v Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Education & another (Petition 14 of 2024) [2026] KEHC 7753 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (20 May 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 7753 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Constitutional and Human Rights Petition 14 of 2024 B Mwamuye, J May 20, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 22(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010 AND IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 3, 10, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 43, 47, 50, 53, 165 AND 258 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010 AND IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC OFFICER ETHICS ACT, NO. 4 OF 2003 (REVISED 2016) AND IN THE MATTER OF THE BASIC EDUCATION ACT, NO. 14 OF 2013 (REVISED 2022) AND IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT, CAP 248 AND IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT, NO. 8 OF 2001 (REVISED 2022) Between Charles Odhiambo Akoth Petitioner and Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Education 1st Respondent Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Information, Communications, and the Digital Economy 2nd Respondent Judgment Introduction 1.This Judgment determines a Constitutional Petition filed by the Petitioner, Charles Odhiambo Akoth, acting in person. The Petitioner seeks to compel the 1st and 2nd Respondents to approve, support, and facilitate the nationwide rollout of his tele-counselling innovation in secondary schools and tertiary institutions across Kenya. The Petitioner contends that the Respondents' refusal to implement his innovation violates the constitutional rights of learners to the highest attainable standard of health, fair administrative action, equal protection of the law, and the best interests of the child, as enshrined in Articles 43, 47, 27, and 53 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 2.The Respondents oppose the Petition. Through the Office of the Attorney General, they have filed Grounds of Opposition dated 19th May 2025, a Replying Affidavit sworn by Dr. Esther Thaara Muoria, the Principal Secretary for Technical, Vocational Education and Training, on 9th June 2025, and Written Submissions dated 22nd July 2025. The Respondents argue that the Petition does not meet the threshold for a constitutional petition, that the innovation has been overtaken by events following the end of strict COVID-19 restrictions, that there was no legitimate expectation of rollout, and that granting the orders sought would improperly involve the expenditure of public funds for a private innovation. Background 3.The factual genesis of this dispute lies in the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, the Government of Kenya established a COVID-19 ICT Advisory Committee, as documented in Kenya Gazette Vol. CXXII-No. 73. The Committee's mandate was to identify and recommend ICT-based solutions to mitigate the effects of the pandemic. The Petitioner, an innovator, developed a telephone-based counselling solution intended to provide mental health support to learners. 4.On 21st January 2021, the Advisory Committee wrote a letter introducing the Petitioner and recommending his innovation for support and scaling up. Subsequently, on 26th October 2020, the then Cabinet Secretary for ICT, Innovation and Youth Affairs (now the 2nd Respondent's predecessor) wrote to the Cabinet Secretary for Education (the 1st Respondent) recommending the solution for adoption within the education system. 5.On 27th January 2023, the State Department for Technical and Vocational Education and Training within the Ministry of Education authorized the Petitioner to conduct a pilot program on condition that he first carry out a pilot study. The Petitioner conducted the pilot at the Railways Training Institute, a government institution. By a letter dated 29th June 2022, the Railways Training Institute confirmed that the pilot had been successful and called for the immediate rollout of the program within its institution. 6.The Petitioner thereafter made several written requests to the Ministry of Education seeking authorization for nationwide rollout, a list of schools and institutions, and a designated contact person for coordination. These requests are evidenced by letters dated 22nd November 2023, 29th November 2023, and 13th December 2023. 7.By a letter dated 28th February 2023, the Ministry of Education rejected the Petitioner's request. The Ministry stated that the innovation had been overtaken by events and that schools had stabilized following the resumption of in-person learning after the COVID-19 pandemic, rendering such intervention no longer required. It is this decision that the Petitioner challenges in these proceedings. The Petitioner's Case 8.The Petitioner, acting in person, filed a Notice of Motion and Petition both dated 5th November 2024. His Supporting Affidavit of even date outlines the factual matrix summarized above. He also filed Written Submissions dated 17th June 2025 and a Rejoinder dated 30th July 2025. 9.The Petitioner's case rests on several constitutional pillars. First, he argues that the 1st Respondent's decision communicated vide the letter dated 28th February 2023 violates Article 43(1)(a) of the Constitution, which guarantees every person the right to the highest attainable standard of health, including mental health. He contends that by refusing to implement his tele-counselling innovation, the 1st Respondent is infringing upon the right of learners in secondary schools and tertiary institutions to access mental health services. 10.Second, the Petitioner invokes Article 47 on fair administrative action. He argues that the 1st Respondent's decision was made without affording him a hearing, without providing written reasons that are constitutionally adequate, and without considering the overwhelming evidence of the continued mental health crisis among learners. He cites his own engagements with the Respondents on 23rd November 2020, 1st March 2023, and 21st December 2023 as evidence that his innovation was thoroughly vetted and that he had a legitimate expectation of rollout following the successful pilot. 11.Third, the Petitioner relies on Article 53(1)(c) and (2) of the Constitution, which guarantee every child the right to basic health care services, including mental health care, and mandate that the best interests of the child are of paramount importance in every matter concerning children. He argues that the Respondents' inaction disregards this paramountcy principle. 12.Fourth, the Petitioner contends that Article 27 has been violated because the Respondents have unfairly and discriminatorily denied students access to a modern innovation that would address their mental health challenges, thereby denying them equal protection and benefit of the law. 13.The Petitioner relies on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, citing Keroche Industries Ltd v Kenya Revenue Authority & 5 Others [2007] eKLR for the proposition that a public authority must not act arbitrarily or capriciously where its conduct has created a legitimate expectation in a citizen. He argues that by authorizing the pilot, recommending adoption, and engaging with him extensively, the Respondents created a clear and unambiguous promise that his innovation would be rolled out. 14.On the grant of conservatory orders, the Petitioner relies on the principles in Board of Management of Uhuru Secondary School v City County Director of Education & 2 Others [2015] eKLR, arguing that he has established a prima facie case, that irreparable harm will result if the orders are not granted, and that the public interest favours the intervention. 15.The Petitioner also heavily relies on the Report on Mental Health and Wellbeing: Towards Happiness and National Prosperity (2020) to demonstrate the severity of Kenya's mental health crisis. He cites statistics that only 25% of Kenyans can access mental health care, that suicide is the fourth leading cause of death among persons aged 15 to 29 years, that Kenya is ranked 4th in Africa for prevalence of depression, and that the budgetary allocation to mental health is less than 0.1% of the total health budget despite mental illness accounting for 13% of the disease burden. He argues that his innovation is a low-cost, high-return solution that requires no public funds, as it operates on a user-based fee structure. 16.Finally, the Petitioner urges the court to apply the doctrine of necessity, arguing that where the State is unwilling or unable to discharge its constitutional obligations, the court must intervene to protect life, dignity, and public interest. He relied on Mohammed Abdi Mohamed v Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & 2 others [2019] eKLR in support of his arguments. The Respondents' Case 17.The Respondents oppose the Petition through three main documents: the Grounds of Opposition dated 19th May 2025, the Replying Affidavit of Dr. Esther Thaara Muoria sworn on 9th June 2025, and the Respondents' Written Submissions dated 22nd July 2025, filed by Stephen Terrell, Deputy Chief State Counsel. 18.The Respondents raise a threshold objection that the Petition does not meet the test for a constitutional petition as established in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (No.1) [1979] KLR 154 and reaffirmed in Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others [2014] eKLR. They argue that the Petition cites omnibus provisions of the Constitution without providing particulars of the alleged complaints or the manner of the alleged infringements. 19.On the merits, the Respondents argue that the Petition seeks to enforce a non-existent contract or agreement for the implementation of a proposed service. They contend that there was never any written agreement or guarantee that upon completion of the pilot study, the Petitioner would be granted access to tertiary institutions or schools. 20.The Respondents take judicial notice of the fact that circa October 2020, the COVID-19 restrictions that limited in-person learning were lifted, and learners resumed normal schooling. Consequently, they argue, the learners in the Petitioner's target institutions are now able to access in-person counselling services, which is precisely what the Petitioner's innovation was meant to address the inaccessibility of mental health services owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. The innovation, therefore, has been overtaken by events. 21.Regarding the letter from the Counsellors and Psychologists Board dated 20th November 2023, the Respondents argue that the Petitioner misconstrues its contents. The Board did not provide an endorsement of the innovation; rather, it advised that the Board could not provide the endorsement the Petitioner was seeking as it was not within its jurisdiction. The Board also advised that the Petitioner must ensure that the counsellors and psychologists involved in his initiative are registered and licensed. 22.The Respondents point out that the Petitioner has not tendered evidence that he is a licensed counselling and psychology practitioner or that he has engaged licensed practitioners in the delivery of his proposed solution. In the opinion of the Counsellors and Psychologists Board, this would lend credibility to the innovation. 23.On the prayers sought in the Notice of Motion, the Respondents argue that orders b, c, and d, which seek to compel the 1st and 2nd Respondents to approve the rollout and support the program, are final in nature and can only be granted after the hearing and determination of the Petition, not at an interlocutory stage. They also argue that these orders would involve the expenditure of public funds, as the Petitioner seeks to be facilitated to actualize a private innovation, thereby putting his personal interests above the public interest. 24.The Respondents further argued that the Petitioner has not shown how the decision not to implement his innovation violates Article 25 of the Constitution. They contend that the Petitioner made a request for consideration of an innovation, and after due consideration, the 1st Respondent decided not to proceed. That, they argue, is a lawful exercise of administrative discretion, not a constitutional violation. 25.The Respondents invoked the principles of constitutional avoidance and justiciability, relying on Wanjiru Gikonyo & 2 Others v National Assembly of Kenya & 4 Others and Apollo Mboya v The Attorney General and National Employment Authority, Nairobi Constitutional Petition Number E335 of 2023 (unreported). They argue that courts should not determine hypothetical or academic issues and that this Petition presents no live controversy because the factual basis for the innovation, the COVID-19 pandemic and associated restrictions, has ceased to exist. 26.On legitimate expectation, the Respondents rely on the Supreme Court decision in Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 Others [2014] eKLR, which established that for legitimate expectation to arise, there must be an express, clear, and unambiguous promise given by a public authority; the expectation itself must be reasonable; the representation must be one which it was competent and lawful for the decision-maker to make; and there cannot be a legitimate expectation against clear provisions of the law or the Constitution. The Respondents argue that no such promise was ever made to the Petitioner. 27.Finally, the Respondents submit that the Petition and the Notice of Motion are an abuse of the court process and ought to be dismissed. Analysis And Determination 28.From the pleadings, affidavits, and submissions of the parties, the following issues arise for determination:i.Whether the Petition meets the threshold of a constitutional petitionii.Whether the Petitioner has established that the Respondents violated any of his constitutional rights or the rights of learners under Articles 27, 43, 47, 50, or 53 of the Constitution;iii.Whether the doctrine of legitimate expectation is applicable in the circumstances of this case and, if so, whether the Respondents breached any such expectation;iv.Whether the orders sought in the Petition, including the declaratory orders and the order of certiorari to quash the 1st Respondent's decision of 28th February 2023, are grantable;v.What orders should the court make, including as to costs. Whether the Petition meets the threshold of a constitutional petition 29.The first issue for determination is whether the Petition meets the threshold for a constitutional petition as established by the courts. The Respondents have strenuously argued that the Petition does not meet the test in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (supra) and Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others (supra). I must address this threshold issue before proceeding to the merits, for if the Petition is fundamentally defective in its pleading, it cannot sustain the reliefs sought. 30.The principle from Anarita Karimi Njeru is well settled. The Court held that a constitutional petition must set out with a reasonable degree of precision the provisions of the Constitution that are alleged to have been violated, the manner of the violation, and the basis upon which the court is being asked to grant a remedy. In Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others (supra), the Court of Appeal reaffirmed this principle, stating that pleadings assist in giving fair notice to the other party and that cases cannot be dealt with justly unless the parties and the court know the issues in controversy. 31.However, the Court of Appeal in Mumo Matemu (supra) also cautioned against using this principle as a mechanistic tool to strike out petitions on technical grounds. The court stated that the principle underscores the importance of defining the dispute to be decided by the court, but that it is a misconception to claim that compliance with rules of procedure is antithetical to Article 159 of the Constitution. The court emphasized that procedure is a handmaiden of just determination of cases. 32.I have carefully examined the Petition. The Petitioner has cited multiple constitutional provisions: Articles 3, 10, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 43, 47, 50, 53, 165, and 258. In paragraph 7 to 20 of the Petition, he sets out the constitutional underpinning, and in paragraphs 36 to 41, he specifically articulates how each of the cited provisions has been contravened. For Article 27, he alleges that the Respondents have denied learners equal protection and benefit of the law by blocking access to a modern innovation. For Article 43, he alleges that the denial infringes on the right to the highest attainable standard of health. For Article 47, he alleges that the 1st Respondent's decision was arbitrary, delayed, and procedurally unfair. For Article 53, he alleges that the best interests of the child have been disregarded. For Article 25, he alleges that the 1st Respondent denied him a fair hearing before making the decision. 33.While it is true that the Petition is not a model of precision and contains some omnibus citations, I am not persuaded that it is so defective as to warrant striking out at the threshold. The Petitioner is a self-represented litigant, and the court must accord him some latitude. More fundamentally, the Petition identifies a specific administrative decision, the letter dated 28th February 2023, and challenges it on constitutional grounds. The Respondents have been able to understand the Petitioner's complaint, as evidenced by their detailed Grounds of Opposition, Replying Affidavit, and Written Submissions. They have suffered no prejudice. To strike out the Petition on this ground would elevate form over substance and would be inconsistent with the court's duty under Article 159(2)(d) to administer justice without undue regard to technicalities. I therefore find and hold that the Petition meets the minimum threshold for a constitutional petition. Whether the Petitioner has established that the Respondents violated any of his constitutional rights or the rights of learners under Articles 27, 43, 47, 50, or 53 of the Constitution 34.The heart of this Petition is the claim that the 1st Respondent's decision communicated on 28th February 2023 violates the constitutional rights of learners to mental health care under Article 43(1)(a), read together with Article 53(1)(c). To resolve this issue, the court must examine the nature of the right to health under the Constitution, the evidence of mental health need among learners, the character of the 1st Respondent's decision, and whether that decision amounts to a constitutional violation. 35.Article 43(1)(a) of the Constitution provides that every person has the right to the highest attainable standard of health, which includes the right to health care services. This is a socio-economic right. Unlike civil and political rights, which are generally subject to immediate realization, socio-economic rights are subject to progressive realization within available resources. In Kanzika alias Moses Savala Keya trading as Kapco Machinery Services & Milano Investments Ltd v Governor Central Bank of Kenya & 2 others [2006] KEHC 3525 (KLR), the Court emphasized that while the fundamental rights are not absolute and are subject to resource constraints, the State cannot plead a lack of resources as a blanket excuse for inaction, particularly where vulnerable populations such as children are concerned. In arriving at the conclusion, and while adopting the decision of the court in Tanzanian case of Ndyanabo V Attorney General [2001] 2 EA 485 at page 498, Samatta C.J. stated as follows: -“Fundamental rights are not illimitable. To treat them as being absolute is to invite anarchy in society. Those rights can be limited but the limitations must not be arbitrary, unreasonable and disproportionate to any claim of state interest: see PUMBUN’S case (supra). Under the Constitution an individuals fundamental right may have to yield to the common weal of society ...” 36.However, the right to health, including mental health, is a positive right that primarily obligates the State to put in place policies, legislation, and programs to make health care services available, accessible, acceptable, and of good quality. It is not a right that automatically entitles an individual citizen to compel the State to adopt a specific private innovation. The distinction is crucial. The Constitution does not mandate the government to accept and implement every private proposal, no matter how well-intentioned or potentially beneficial. The government retains a margin of discretion in determining how best to fulfill its constitutional obligations, provided that its decisions are rational, procedurally fair, and not arbitrary. 37.In this case, the Petitioner has presented compelling evidence of a mental health crisis among Kenyan learners. The Taskforce Report on Mental Health and Wellbeing: Towards Happiness and National Prosperity (2020), a government-commissioned report, documents that at least 25% of outpatients and 40% of inpatients in health facilities suffer from mental illness, that depression is highly prevalent, and that suicide is a leading cause of death among young persons. The Suicide Prevention Strategy 2021-2026 and the WHO Global Health Estimates corroborate the seriousness of the problem. The court takes judicial notice of the fact that mental health is a significant public health concern in Kenya, one that the Government has acknowledged through the establishment of the Presidential Taskforce on Mental Health and the development of various policies and strategies. 38.The Petitioner has also demonstrated that his innovation was taken seriously by the Government. The COVID-19 ICT Advisory Committee was established precisely to source innovative ICT solutions to pandemic-related challenges, including mental health. The Committee critically acclaimed the Petitioner's innovation. The 2nd Respondent recommended it for adoption. The 1st Respondent authorized a pilot. The pilot was successful. On the surface, therefore, the Petitioner had reason to believe that his innovation was a viable candidate for broader implementation. 39.Nevertheless, the 1st Respondent's decision to reject the national rollout must be examined on its own terms. The letter of 28th February,2023 states two grounds: first, that the innovation was overtaken by events, and second, that schools had stabilized and the need for such interventions was no longer required. The Petitioner contends that this decision is arbitrary, irrational, and unsupported by evidence. 40.I have carefully considered the context in which the decision was made. The innovation was conceived during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic when schools were closed or operating under severe restrictions, and in-person counselling was largely unavailable. The Government's primary concern at that time was to find alternative means of delivering mental health services to learners who were out of school or learning remotely. By the time the Petitioner made his formal request for national rollout, the circumstances had fundamentally changed. The court takes judicial notice that from October 2020 onwards, the Government progressively lifted COVID-19 restrictions, and schools resumed normal in-person learning. This is a matter of public knowledge and is documented in the Respondents' Replying Affidavit. 41.The Petitioner argues that the mental health crisis persists and that his innovation remains relevant even outside the pandemic context. That may well be true. But the question is not whether the innovation could still be useful; the question is whether the 1st Respondent's decision not to adopt it was so unreasonable or procedurally flawed as to amount to a constitutional violation. On the evidence before me, I find that it was not. 42.The 1st Respondent is the Cabinet Secretary responsible for education policy, including the management of secondary schools and tertiary institutions. He is entitled to make policy decisions regarding which programs, including mental health interventions, are implemented within the education system. The decision that in-person counselling, which was previously disrupted by the pandemic, had been restored and was the preferred mode of service delivery is a rational policy choice. It is not for this court to second-guess that policy choice simply because another option exists. The courts must be cautious not to convert every policy disagreement into a constitutional violation. The separation of powers doctrine requires that courts respect the legitimate policymaking space of the executive branch, provided that the decisions made are lawful, rational, and procedurally fair. 43.The Petitioner also argues that the decision violated Article 47 of the Constitution because he was not afforded a hearing before the decision was made. Article 47 provides that every person has the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair. The right to be heard is a fundamental component of procedural fairness. However, the application of this right depends on the nature of the decision being made. 44.In this case, the decision was not an adjudicative decision directed at the Petitioner personally, such as a disciplinary action or a revocation of a license. It was a policy decision about whether to adopt a particular program within the education system. The Petitioner had already been given ample opportunity to present his case through multiple meetings on 23rd November 2020, 1st March 2023, and 21st December 2023, as he himself acknowledges in paragraph 14 of his Supporting Affidavit. He had presented his innovation to the Advisory Committee, to the 2nd Respondent, and to the 1st Respondent. He had been authorized to conduct a pilot, which he did. At the point of making the final decision on national rollout, the 1st Respondent was not required to invite the Petitioner for yet another hearing. The decision was based on a change in factual circumstances- the end of pandemic restrictions- not on any adverse finding about the Petitioner or his innovation. The procedural requirements of Article 47 were therefore satisfied. 45.Regarding Article 27 on equality and non-discrimination, the Petitioner has not demonstrated that the decision not to adopt his innovation treated learners or the Petitioner himself unfairly in comparison to other similarly situated persons. There is no evidence that the 1st Respondent has adopted other comparable private mental health innovations while rejecting the Petitioner's. The claim of discrimination is therefore unsubstantiated. 46.Regarding Article 53 on the best interests of the child, the Petitioner argues that the 1st Respondent's decision disregards this paramountcy principle. The best interests of the child is a powerful constitutional principle, but it is not an absolute trump card that invalidates all government decisions that affect children. In CMM (Suing as the Next Friend of and on Behalf of CWM) & 6 others v Standard Group & 4 others [2017] KEHC 8364 (KLR), the Court affirmed that the best interests of the child must be considered in all matters concerning children. However, the Court also recognized that this principle must be balanced against other legitimate considerations, and that the State has a margin of appreciation in determining what constitutes the best interests of children in specific policy contexts. The 1st Respondent's decision to prioritize in-person counselling does not, on the evidence, demonstrate a disregard for the best interests of children. It represents a different view of how best to meet their mental health needs. 47.For all these reasons, I find that the Petitioner has failed to establish that the 1st Respondent's decision violated any of his constitutional rights or the rights of learners under Articles 27, 43, 47, 50, or 53 of the Constitution. The decision was a lawful exercise of administrative discretion, made in a procedurally fair manner, and based on a rational consideration of changed circumstances. This finding alone is sufficient to dispose of the Petition. However, because the parties have extensively argued the doctrine of legitimate expectation, I will address it fully. Whether the doctrine of legitimate expectation is applicable in the circumstances of this case and, if so, whether the Respondents breached any such expectation 48.The Petitioner places significant reliance on the doctrine of legitimate expectation. He argues that by authorizing the pilot, recommending adoption, and engaging with him extensively, the Respondents created a legitimate expectation that his innovation would be rolled out nationally. The Respondents counter that no clear, unambiguous promise was ever made. 49.The doctrine of legitimate expectation is well established in Kenyan public law. In Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 others (supra), the Supreme Court articulated the essential elements. First, there must be an express, clear, and unambiguous promise given by a public authority. Second, the expectation itself must be reasonable. Third, the representation must be one which it was competent and lawful for the decision-maker to make. Fourth, there cannot be a legitimate expectation against clear provisions of the law or the Constitution. 50.Applying these elements to the facts of this case, I find that the Petitioner has not established the existence of a clear and unambiguous promise of national rollout. The letter from the 2nd Respondent to the 1st Respondent recommended that the 1st Respondent consider the solution for adoption. The word "consider" is significant. It is not a promise or a guarantee of adoption. It is an invitation to consider, which is precisely what the 1st Respondent did. The letter from the 1st Respondent authorizing a pilot was conditional on the Petitioner first carrying out a pilot. It did not state that successful completion of the pilot would automatically lead to national rollout. It authorized a pilot, nothing more. The letter from the Railways Training Institute called for immediate rollout, but the Railways Training Institute is not the decision-maker. It could not bind the Cabinet Secretary. 51.Legitimate expectation cannot arise from mere hope or aspiration; it must be founded on a clear, unambiguous, and lawful representation by a public authority. The doctrine is designed to prevent capricious or arbitrary conduct by public bodies, not to elevate every government interaction into a binding promise. 52.In the present case, all the interactions between the Petitioner and the Respondents were preliminary and exploratory. The Government was testing the efficacy of the innovation through a pilot. That is a standard practice in public policy. To hold that the Government is forever bound to adopt every innovation it pilots would paralyze public administration and discourage experimentation. The Respondents were entitled to evaluate the pilot results and make a final determination on whether to proceed. They made that determination, and they did so based on a legitimate change in circumstances. 53.Moreover, the expectation that the Petitioner claims, that his innovation would be rolled out nationally, was not reasonable in light of the conditional nature of the authorization. The pilot was authorized during the pandemic when in-person services were disrupted. Once the pandemic restrictions were lifted and schools reopened, it was entirely reasonable for the 1st Respondent to reassess the need for the innovation. The Petitioner, as an innovator dealing with the Government, must have understood that the pilot was a trial, not a guarantee of future adoption. Any expectation to the contrary was not reasonable. 54.I therefore find that the doctrine of legitimate expectation does not avail the Petitioner. No clear and unambiguous promise of national rollout was made, and the expectation the Petitioner claims was not reasonable in the circumstances. The Respondents did not breach any legitimate expectation. Whether the orders sought in the Petition, including the declaratory orders and the order of certiorari to quash the 1st Respondent's decision of 28th February 2023, are grantable 55.The Petitioner seeks several orders: a declaratory order that the 1st Respondent's decision is unreasonable and null and void; an order of certiorari to quash the decision; a declaratory order that students are entitled to benefit from modern innovations; a declaratory order that the 1st Respondent has a duty to support the Petitioner to engage with other educational institutions; and an order directing the 1st Respondent to approve and allow the Petitioner to roll out and implement the telephone counselling solution. 56.The first and second orders, the declaration that the decision is unreasonable and the order of certiorari to quash it, cannot be granted because, as I have found, the decision was lawful, rational, and procedurally fair. An order of certiorari lies only where a public body has acted without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or in breach of the rules of natural justice. None of these grounds have been established. 57.The third declaratory order, that students are entitled to benefit from modern innovations that would support their right to health, is unobjectionable in principle, but it is too broad and abstract to be the subject of a declaratory order in the context of this dispute. Declaratory orders are meant to resolve concrete legal controversies, not to issue general statements of constitutional principle divorced from a specific violation. Courts should exercise restraint in granting declaratory orders and should only do so where there is a real and present dispute that requires resolution. The general proposition that students may benefit from innovations is not disputed by the Respondents and does not require judicial declaration. 58.The fourth and fifth orders, declaring a duty on the 1st Respondent to support the Petitioner to engage with other institutions, and directing the 1st Respondent to approve the rollout, are coercive orders that would compel the 1st Respondent to take specific actions. These orders cannot be granted because they would require the court to micromanage the executive branch's policy choices. The Supreme Court in Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Kenya Airports Authority & 3others [2021] KESC 34 (KLR) emphasized that while courts can order the State to take steps to realize socio-economic rights, they must respect the separation of powers and avoid making specific policy determinations that are within the competence of the executive or legislature. Ordering the 1st Respondent to adopt a specific private innovation would cross that line. 59.The Petition is therefore devoid of merit, and all the reliefs sought are denied. Conclusion 60.In conclusion, the Petitioner has failed to establish any violation of the Constitution. The 1st Respondent's decision of 28th February 2023 was a lawful and rational exercise of administrative discretion, based on a genuine change in circumstances following the end of COVID-19 restrictions. No legitimate expectation of national rollout was created, and no constitutional rights were infringed. The Petition is therefore without merit. 61.For the reasons set out above, I make the following final orders:a.The Petition dated 5th November, 2024 is hereby dismissed in its entirety.b.Each party shall bear their own costs. Orders accordingly. File Closed Accordingly. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY THIS 20TH DAY OF MAY 2026.BAHATI MWAMUYE MBSJUDGEIn the presence of: -The Petitioner – Appearing in PersonCounsel for the Respondents – Ms. AishaCourt Assistant - Mr. Martin Mwenda and Mr. Austin