https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/4043

Allibhai (Suing as administrators of the Estate of Kurbanali Allibhai Noor Mohamed) v Rivatex East Africa Ltd (Environment and Land Case E086 of 2025) [2026] KEELC 4043 (KLR) (2 July 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 4043 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Eldoret Environment and Land Case E086 of 2025 CK Yano, J July 2, 2026 Between Mohamed Iqbal Kurbanali Allibhai (Suing as administrators of the Estate of Kurbanali Allibhai Noor Mohamed) Plaintiff and Rivatex East Africa Limited Defendant Ruling 1.This ruling is with respect to the Plaintiff/Applicant’s Notice of Motion Application dated 12th September, 2025 seeking the following orders:-1.Spent.2.Spent.3.Spent.4.That temporary injunction do issue restraining the Defendant/Applicant, its agents, servants and or employees by whatever name called from further proceeding with the tender process of leasing the Defendant/Respondent to third parties pending hearing and determination of the main suit herein.5.That in the alternative, temporary injunction do issue restraining the Defendant/ Applicant, its agents, servants and or employees by whatever name called from leasing out the Defendant/ Respondent’s property known as Eldoret Municipality Block 12/164 which has encroached onto the Plaintiff/Applicant’s property known as Eldoret Municipality Block 12/160 to third parties pending hearing and determination.6.That this Honorable court do order a joint survey to be conducted by the surveyors to be appointed by the Plaintiff/Applicant and surveyors to be conducted by the Defendant/ Respondent for purposes of establishing the boundaries of the Plaintiff/Applicant’s property known as Eldoret Municipality Block 12/160 and the Defendant/Respondent’s property known as Eldoret Municipality Block 12/164.7.That cost of this application be provided for. 2.The application is premised on the grounds set out on the Motion as well as the Plaintiff/Applicant’s Supporting Affidavit sworn on 12th September, 2025. The Plaintiff states that he is the son of the late Kurbanali Allibhai Noor Mohamed (now deceased) and executor of his estate. He deponed that in 1975, his late father purchased the property known as L.R. No. 777/2, which was then registered as an indenture. That the property was transferred to the deceased on 2nd January, 1975, but the title was converted and given a new title number, being Eldoret Municipality Block 12/155 (the suit property herein). 3.The Plaintiff avers that the Commissioner of Lands issued notices to compulsorily acquire 56.5 acres of the suit property under the Land Acquisition Act 1968, vide gazette notices No. 3055, 3056 and 3057 of 15th September, 1975 to set up a textile mill and future industrial area. The Plaintiff avers that on completing the process of compulsory acquisition, only 10 out of the 56.5 acres were actually compulsorily acquired, and the deceased was only paid for the 10 acres which were curved out of the suit property. That the Defendant/Respondent was then incorporated to run the textile industry set up and title to the curved property, known as Eldoret Municipality Block 12/164 issued to it. 4.The Plaintiff deponed that in the year 1979, the deceased caused subdivision of the remainder of the suit property into four Parcels known as Eldoret Municipality Block 12/160, 161, 162 and 163. The Plaintiff avers that in administering the estate, he instructed surveyors to establish the boundaries of the deceased’s estate. That he discovered from the report submitted that the Defendant herein now occupies 16 acres instead of the 10 acres compulsorily acquired, and had encroached into parcel no. Eldoret Municipality Block 12/160 by 6 acres. The Plaintiff claims that all attempts at an amicable settlement and administrative intervention have been unsuccessful, hence this application and the suit herein. The Plaintiff claims that he has learnt the Defendant has floated a tender to lease out the said property for 21 years including the portion of the property belonging to the estate which the Defendant has encroached onto. 5.The Plaintiff expressed apprehension that if the lease is left to go on as is, he will lose the portion that is encroached by the Defendant. He urged that the encroachment on their portion is unjustified since only 10 acres were acquired, yet the Defendant has and continues to unfairly gain from occupying the portion of land encroached. The Plaintiff averred that the application raises triable issues with high chances of success and lays the basis for a prima facie case. That if the Defendant is not restrained the threat that it may lease his property is imminent and he will suffer irreparable loss. That in the circumstances, it is just and equitable that the orders herein be granted to afford the Plaintiffs justice. He claimed that no prejudice shall be visited upon the Defendant if the application herein is allowed. 6.The Defendant/Respondent opposed the Application through a Replying Affidavit sworn by its Company Secretary, Tecla Tum, on 19th January, 2026. She deponed that the Defendant is the registered proprietor of Eldoret Municipality/Block 12/164, which was lawfully acquired without dispute or encumbrance and the title has never been challenged. She deponed that the government acquired 56.5 Acres excised from L.R. No. 777/15. That it allocated 17.18 Acres (Plot No. 12/164) to the Defendant, 3.636 acres and 3.694 Acres (Plot Nos. 12/299 and 12/391) to Kerio Valley Development Authority. 7.Ms. Tum deponed that in 2008-2009, Moi University purchased Rift Valley Textiles, including the Parcel No. 12/164 from a liquidator, upon which it incorporated Rivatex East Africa Ltd, whose name changed in 2025 to Rivatex East Africa SEZ Limited, to manage the business. She deponed that the Plaintiff had demonstrated no lawful basis or finding by any lawful authority to support the alleged encroachment. That in 2025, the Government of Kenya resolved to lease the Defendant’s property, plant & equipment, and did in fact enter a lease with a non-equity partner legally and procedurally vide a competitive procurement process for 21 years. 8.Ms. Tum explained that possession of the leased property has since been lawfully handed over to the said partner and denied the alleged encroachment of Parcel No. 12/160. She claimed that the suit is not only statute barred, but was meant to frustrate a lawful government-backed transaction already undertaken and substantially implemented. She deponed that the Plaintiff had not established a prima facie case or irreparable loss incapable of compensation by damages. She claimed that the balance of convenience tilts in the Defendant’s favour. 9.She averred that granting the injunction would prejudice the Defendant, the Government and innocent third parties, as well as disrupt a strategic investment of national importance. She pointed out that the dispute can be resolved through proper boundary verification by the relevant land and survey authorities, and does not warrant injunctive relief. She asserted that its title and occupation of Parcel No. 12/164 is lawful and indefeasible, and intimated that the Defendant was willing to comply with any lawful directive by the court regarding boundary verification. That it is thus fair and in the interest of justice that the application be dismissed with costs. 10.The Plaintiff reacted to the Defendant’s response through a Further Affidavit sworn on 26th February, 2026 reiterating the contents of the Application, the Supporting Affidavit and the annexures thereto. The Plaintiff admitted that the Respondent is the registered owner of Parcel No. 12/164, but that the same constitutes a section of his land which was illegally/fraudulently acquired and or curved out of the deceased’s property without his knowledge or consent. He reiterated that while the Government intended to compulsorily acquire approximately 56.5 acres of the suit property, per the gazette notice, it actually acquired only 10 acres thereof. 11.The Plaintiff averred that despite acquiring only 10 acres, the deceased decided to curve out 56.6 acres to avoid inconvenience in case the government decided to act on its intentions to acquire the remainder of the said acres. That this led to two subdivisions namely LR NO. 777/2/15/1 and LR No. 777/2R. That the said LR No. 777/2R was number given to the said 56.5 acres after subdivision, which was later given LR No. 777/3 and converted to Eldoret Municipality Block 12/158. He explained that LR No. 777/2/15/1 remained with the deceased and was converted to Eldoret Municipality Block 12/155, and in 1979 was subdivided into parcel nos. 160, 161, 162 and 163. 12.The Plaintiff accused the Defendant of amalgamating the deceased’s parcel no. 12/160 with parcel no. 12/150 to create parcel no. 12/164 without any colour of right or justification. The Plaintiff explained that Eldoret Municipality Block 12/159 was curved out from Eldoret Municipality Block 12/158. He further accused the Defendant of processing the title as a new grant instead of maintaining the history of the amalgamations, with the intention of clearing any traces of the Defendant’s property being linked to the deceased’s property. 13.The Plaintiff asserted that Block 12/160 is approx. 16 acres and 12/159 is also approx. 16 acres, thus the total acreage Eldoret Municipality Block 12/164 is 32 acres. That as it stands, the Defendant is illegally occupying 22 Acres, being 6 acres under Block 12/159, and the entire Block 12/160 that was fraudulently amalgamated with the Block 12/159 to create Block 12/164. He averred that the Defendant’s title, having been obtained fraudulently is impeachable under Section 26 of the Land Registration Act. 14.The Plaintiff deponed that there is no record that the 46.5 acres were ever acquired procedurally or at all. That in the survey report he obtained from the survey of Kenya, the government entities are not sitting on the 56.6 acres, but they illegally grabbed parts of the deceased’s remaining property after curving out the 56.6 acres. He averred that the Respondent had not only encroached on the suit property but had illegally acquired the same. The Plaintiff deponed that no evidence has been exhibited to prove that the Defendant had been leased out as insinuated. 15.The Plaintiff averred that the suit is not statute barred as it was brought once the Plaintiff discovered the encroachment and upon obtaining the Surveyor’s report in May 2025 and as well as a report obtained from the Survey of Kenya. The Plaintiff insists that he has demonstrated a case with probability of success, and asked the court to allow the application as prayed. Submissions: 16.The Application was canvassed by way of written submissions, with the Plaintiff filing submissions dated 6th March, 2026 in support of the Motion. The Defendant on the other hand filed its submissions dated 25th April, 2026 opposing the Motion. Analysis and Determination: 17.I have considered the application, the affidavits filed in support, the replying affidavit as well as the submissions filed by the parties herein and do find that the issues that lend themselves for determination are:-i.Whether the court should issue the injunction sought to restrain the Defendants from proceeding with the process of leasing the property to third parties and/or from encroaching into the suit land;ii.Whether the court should order for a joint survey to establish the boundaries of parcel Nos. Eldoret Municipality Block 12/160 and 164; a. Whether the court should issue the injunction sought to restrain the Defendants from proceeding with the process of leasing the property to third parties and/or from encroaching into the suit land; 18.In the present application, the Plaintiff/Applicant seeks two temporary injunctions. The first is to stop the Defendants from leasing out the business of the textile mill registered in and operated under the name of the Defendant to a third party pending hearing and determination of the suit. The second injunction is to restrain the Defendant from leasing out the Defendant’s property known as Eldoret Municipality Block 12/164 alleged to encroach into the Plaintiff’s Eldoret Municipality Block 12/160 to third parties pending hearing and determination. Being that the consideration for grant of an injunction are the same, it is only prudent that the same be dealt with together. 19.The power of a court to issue temporary injunctions is donated under Order 40 Rule (1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, which states as follows:- 1.Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted [Order 40, rule 1]Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise—(a)that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged, or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree; or(b)that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property in circumstances affording reasonable probability that the plaintiff will or may be obstructed or delayed in the execution of any decree that may be passed against the defendant in the suit,the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal, or disposition of the property as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. 20.A Court however has discretion whether or not to grant the injunction sought, which discretion is to be exercised reasonably, judiciously and on sound legal principles. Before granting a temporary injunction, the court must consider the principles articulated in the well-known case of Giella vs Cassman Brown & Company Limited (1973) EA 358, where the Court of Appeal held that:-“The conditions for the grant of an interlocutory injunction are now, I think, well settled in East Africa. First, an applicant must show a prima facie case with a probability of success. Secondly, an interlocutory injunction will not normally be granted unless the applicant might otherwise suffer irreparable injury which would not adequately be compensated by damages; and if the court is in doubt, then it can decide the application on a balance of convenience.” 21.The first limb for consideration is whether the Applicant has established a prima facie case with a probability of success. A prima facie case is defined in Mrao Ltd vs First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others (2003) KLR 125, where the Court of Appeal explained that:“ 17.I would say that in civil cases it is a case in which on the material presented to the Court a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.” 22.Courts have held that it is not sufficient to claim that they have a prima facie case. The evidence must show an infringement or threatened infringement of a right, and the probability of success of the applicant’s case upon trial. Thus, the test as to whether or not a prima facie case had been made out is satisfied if the applicant is able to show the existence of an arguable case. 23.In a nutshell, the Plaintiff’s case is that the Defendant is occupying a portion of his land without consent, and is in the process of leasing the same to a third party. The Plaintiff claims that the Government compulsorily acquired part of his father’s land measuring 56.5 Acres. That the Government, however, only took possession of and fully compensated for 10 Acres to operate the mill that the Defendant now runs on the land. The Plaintiff avers that despite this, the Defendant currently occupies 22 Acres in excess of the land so acquired. 24.I have taken time to look at Gazette Notice No. 3055 dated 19th September, 1975. It was a notice issued by the then Commissioner of Lands expressing the intention to acquire LR No. 777/3 (Old LR No. 777/2/R measuring 56.5 Acres. It was followed by Gazette Notice No. 3056 of the same date for a Notice of Inquiry to be held on 17th October, 1975 by the Land Registry in Eldoret. The Commissioner of Lands also issued Gazette Notice No. 3057 being a Notice of Intention to Take Possession of only 10 Acres out of the 56.5 Acres so acquired. 25.The Defendant has also annexed the same three Gazette Notices in its Replying Affidavit. There is no evidence that any other notice was issued regarding the taking of possession of the portion measuring 46.5 Acres being the remainder of the land that was to be acquired. The Plaintiff however claims that the Defendant is now occupying more land than it compulsorily acquired. He thus avers that the Defendant is illegally occupying 22 Acres of his land in excess of the compulsorily acquired land. This, the Plaintiff explained is contained in the 6 acres under Block 12/159, and the entire Block 12/160 that was fraudulently amalgamated with the Block 12/159 to create Block 12/164. 26.In the Plaintiff’s Further Affidavit, he annexed a Ground Status Report on L.R. No. 777/2/15/1 and L.R. No. 777/3 from the Survey of Kenya dated 10th February, 2026. The said report acknowledges that L.R. No. parcel no. 777/2/15/1 was subdivided into Eldoret Municipality Block 12/160, 161, 162 and 163 and registered in the name of Kurnabali Allibhai Noor Mohamed. The report further notes that L.R. No. 777/3 was also Eldoret Block 12/158 which was surrendered to the government of Kenya vide Gazette Notices No. 3055 and 3057 of 19th September, 1975. 27.This report confirms the averments in the Plaintiff’s Further Affidavit, where he has explained that his late father purchased LR No. Eldoret Municipality Blcok 12/155 (formerly LR. No. 777/2) in 1975, and subdivided it into LR No. 777/2/15/1 and LR No. 777/2R. It is this LR No. 777/2R that comprised of the 56.5 Acres acquired vide Gazette Notice No. 3055 of 19th September, 1975. The same LR No. 777/2R was later given number LR No. 777/3 and later converted into Eldoret Municipality Block 12/158. 28.The Ground Status Report found that L.R. No. 777/3 measuring approx. 22.87 Ha originated from L.R. No. 777/2/R, borders Block 12/155 and is occupied by Government Institutions as well as private companies. Further, that the Defendant, Kenya Power and Lighting Company Ltd and an entity known as Wareng Ndovu Precast are in possession of both LR. No. 777/2/15/1 (Block 12/155) and LR No. 777/3. The said report also indicates that parcel no. 164 is an amalgamation of parcel nos. 159 and 160, which as stated herein, belonged to the Plaintiff’s deceased father. 29.The Ground Status Report therefore also tallies with the Plaintiff’s allegations that parcel no. Block 12/164 was an amalgamation of Eldoret Municipality Block 12/159 and the Plaintiff’s land known as Eldoret Municipality Block 12/160. The said amalgamation resulted in the parcel of land known as Eldoret Municipality Block 12/164. 30.The Defendant has claimed that there is no evidence from the relevant authorities on the allegations set out by the Plaintiff. However, the Ground Status Report was prepared by the Survey of Kenya which is the relevant government agency with the mandate over boundaries. In addition, the said Ground Status report was prepared after the team of surveyors visited the relevant parcels on 29th January, 2026 accompanied by the local administration officers and representatives of the registered owner. Thus, the Ground Status Report is from the requisite authority to issue information of the facts on the ground as regards boundaries and occupation. 31.The Defendants have also submitted that the claim is barred by Section 7 of the Limitation of Actions Act, since the Plaintiff seeks to reverse an acquisition that was perfected 50 years ago. However, this argument is not substantiated, since in effect, the Plaintiff is not seeking to reverse the acquisition. The Plaintiff seeks only to recover the excess land occupied by the Defendant over and above the land that was properly acquired and compensated for. 32.Bearing the above facts in mind, I am convinced that without delving into the further merits of this case, and based on the material placed before this court at this interlocutory stage, that the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case. 33.I now turn to the requirement that the party seeking the injunction must demonstrate that they stand to suffer irreparable loss that cannot be compensated by way of damages. In Pius Kipchirchir Kogo vs Frank Kimeli Tenai (2018) KEELC 2424 (KLR), the court explained the concept of irreparable harm as follows:-“Irreparable injury means that the injury must be one that cannot be adequately compensated for in damages and that the existence of a prima facie case is not itself sufficient. The applicant should further show that irreparable injury will occur to him if the injunction is not granted and there is no other remedy open to him by which he will protect himself from the consequences of the apprehended injury. The defendant has been collecting rent since the year 2005 and therefore the issue of irreparable harm if injunction is not granted should not arise so long as the matter is fast-tracked for hearing.” 34.On irreparable harm, the Plaintiff claims that he has demonstrated that the Defendant has taken more land than that which it was intended under the compulsory acquisition. The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant’s title to the property, which it is illegally occupying, is impeachable in light of Section 26 of the Land Registration Act. The Plaintiff claims that if the Defendant is left to make good the threat to lease out the property, then the Plaintiff stands to lose irreparably. 35.The Plaintiff submitted that in the likely event that this court allows his case, he will have to incur cost and trouble commencing eviction proceedings against the person to whom the Defendant has leased the land to. That it will be worse if the said person has developed the portions of land that have been encroached. The Plaintiff urged that he has demonstrated he is bound to suffer irreparable loss as he will be deprived of his right to property. 36.The Defendant’s Company Secretary deponed that the Plaintiff had not established a prima facie case or irreparable loss incapable of compensation by damages. She claimed that the balance of convenience tilts in the Defendant’s favour. The Defendant also contends that it will be prejudiced by the granting the injunction, alongside the Government and innocent third parties, as it will disrupt a strategic investment of national importance. 37.If the Defendant is to be believed, the lease to be entered with the purported strategic partner is for a period of 21 years. This strategic partner has not been revealed to this court and neither are they a party to this present suit. Notably, as the Plaintiff has submitted, the Defendant in their Replying Affidavit did not attach any evidence in terms of either the signed lease or change of name to prove that the textile mill operation being run on the suit land and the land itself have been leased out as insinuated. The Plaintiff therefore argues that having failed to attach any evidence, the allegations relating to the purported lease have not been proven to the required standard. 38.Evidently, in the event that a lease is indeed entered for the said 21 years, this will constitute significant and/or irreparable harm to the Plaintiff. There is also no doubt that should the Plaintiff succeed in his suit, he will have to incur further expenses and time to secure the eviction of the third party to whom the land would be leased to. Furthermore, the Lease will have introduced a party into the land in dispute who is not a party to this suit, who will now have acquired rights and/or interests over the land, with no clear indication whether the dispute herein has been disclosed to them. In the circumstances, I am convinced that the Plaintiff has shown that he stands to suffer irreparable harm if the land is leased out to a third party to warrant the grant of the injunction sought. 39.However as regards the textile mill business itself, the Plaintiff has no interest on the business of the textile mill to result into any irreparable injury to him. The Plaintiff is in any event not claiming any share of the business, save only for the land on which it stands. While this Court agrees that leasing of the land itself would greatly prejudice the Plaintiff, there is no evidence that the Defendant’s intended leasing of the textile mill business operated by the Defendant will affect his rights in any way. For this reason, prayer (4) of the Notice of Motion cannot issue at this point. 40.The Defendant claims that the dispute can be resolved through proper boundary verification by the relevant land and survey authorities, and does not warrant injunctive relief. However, this alone cannot in the circumstances disentitle the Plaintiff to the injunction sought herein once all the requirements have been met. In addition, while the issue of the boundaries of the properties can be resolved through a boundary verification, the issue of the Defendant’s entitlement arising out of the compulsory acquisition of 1975 cannot be dealt with solely by the survey office. Moreover, there is the issue of the intended lease of the land to a third party, which can only be dealt with by this court. 41.As to the issue of whether damages are sufficient to compensate the Plaintiff for his loss, Courts have repeatedly held that the fact that damages are payable are also not reason enough to disallow an injunction when there is an evident violation or threatened violation of a right. The Plaintiff cited Waki J. (as he then was) in Mohamed vs Commissioner of Lands and 4 others KLR (E&L) 1 219, where it was held that:-“It is no answer to the prayer sought that the applicant maybe compensated in damages. No amount of money can compensate the infringement of such right or atone for transgressions against the law, if this turns out to have been the case. These considerations alone will entitle the applicant to the grant of the orders sought.” 42.I will also add the finding by Warsame J. (as he then was) in Joseph Siro Mosioma vs Housing Finance Company of Kenya Limited & 3 Others (2008) eKLR, where he held as follows:-“On my part let me restate that damages is not automatic remedy when deciding whether to grant an injunction or not. Damages is not and cannot be a substitute for the loss, which is occasioned by a clear breach of the law. In any case the financial strength of a party is not always a factor to refuse an injunction. More so a party cannot be condemned to take damages in lieu of his crystallized right which can be protected by an order of injunction.” 43.The third limb is that if the Court is in doubt, then it ought to determine the matter on the balance of convenience. However, the court is convinced that the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case. The Court is also convinced that the Plaintiff further stands to suffer irreparably if the injunction is not issued. That being the case, the Court is not in doubt at all as regards to the issuance of the injunction. b. Whether the court should order for a joint survey to establish the boundaries of parcel Nos. Eldoret Municipality Block 12/160 and 164; 44.The Plaintiff has asked the court to order a joint survey to be conducted by the surveyors to be appointed by the Plaintiff and the Defendant for purposes of establishing the boundaries of Eldoret Municipality Block 12/160 and Eldoret Municipality Block 12/164. 45.The Defendant claims that the dispute can be resolved through proper boundary verification by the relevant land and survey authorities. Notably though, as the Court has explained earlier, that will only deal with one aspect of the dispute. The cause of action herein as pleaded by the Plaintiff is that the Defendant is currently occupying more land that the government actually acquired from his late father. 46.It is clear from the Ground Status Report that a group of surveyors visited the land with the Plaintiff and the local administration. However, the Defendant appears to not have been included during this visit. The Plaintiff did not inform this court the auspices under which the surveyors visited the suit parcels of land and the ground status report prepared. 47.The survey plan will no doubt shed light on the sizes of the two parcels and assist this court to decide conclusively if the Defendant is indeed encroaching on a portion of the Plaintiff’s property. I note however that as per the provisions of Section 19(2) of the Land Registration Act, the Land Registrar is mandated to deal with issues of boundaries. Under the said Section 19(2), the Land Registrar is required to notify all the affected parties. By virtue of the fact that the Defendant is the registered owner of one of the properties sought to be surveyed, it is an affected person in this dispute. However, there is no evidence that notices were issued to the Defendant when the team of surveyors visited parcels of land to prepare the Ground Status Report. 48.Nevertheless, conducting the survey will no doubt clear the issue of how much land is currently occupied by the Defendant. Consequently, since the parties are yet to take pre-trial directions and the matter has not been set down for hearing yet, I see no prejudice in issuing the order directing that a survey be conducted. Orders:- 49.In the end, the Plaintiff/Applicant’s Notice of Motion dated 12th September, 2025 partially succeeds in the following terms:-a.A temporary injunction do hereby issue restraining the Defendant/Respondent, its agents, servants and/or employees by whatever name called from leasing out the Defendant/ Respondent’s property known as Eldoret Municipality Block 12/164 which has encroached onto the Plaintiff/Applicant’s property known as Eldoret Municipality Block 12/160 to third parties pending hearing and determination of this suit.b.The court do hereby order that a joint survey to be conducted by the surveyors to be appointed by the Plaintiff/Applicant and the Defendant/Respondent for purposes of establishing the boundaries of the Plaintiff/Applicant’s property known as Eldoret Municipality Block 12/160 and the Defendant/Respondent’s property known as Eldoret Municipality Block 12/164.c.The costs of this application shall abide the outcome of the suit. 50.Orders accordingly. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT ELDORET ON THIS 2ND DAY OF JULY, 2026 VIDE MICROSOFT TEAMS.HON. C. K. YANOELC, JUDGEIn the virtual presence of;Mr. Mogambi for the Plaintiff.Mr. Kwame for the DefendantCourt Assistant - Laban.