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Amrit & another v Wachira (Civil Appeal E071 of 2022) [2026] KEHC 7998 (KLR) (2 June 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 7998 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Murang'a Civil Appeal E071 of 2022 SC Chirchir, J June 2, 2026 Between Jasper Kaur Amrit 1st Appellant Travinder Singh 2nd Appellant and Gloria Muthoni Wachira Respondent (Being an Appeal against the Judgment of Hon. P.N. Maina (-CM) delivered on 27th October, 2022 in Muranga’s CMCC No. 303 of 2017) Judgment 1.The Respondent herein commenced proceedings against the Appellants in the Chief Magistrate’s Court at Murang'a seeking damages for injuries and incidental loss suffered as a result of a road traffic accident which occurred on or about 3rd April 2010. At the material time, the 1st Appellant was the registered owner of motor vehicle registration number KAM 359R which was being driven by the 2nd Appellant. The Respondent was a passenger in motor vehicle registration number KAU 657Q. The accident resulted from the collision of the two vehicles. 2.Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court delivered judgment in which it found the Appellants fully liable for the accident awarded the Respondent damages as follows:a).General damages for pain and suffering -Kshs. 4,000,000,b).Loss of earning capacity - Kshs. 3,000,000c).cost of minder -Kshs. 2,520,000d).Specific sums for future medical treatment in Kenya and India.e)Special damages -Kshs. 1,499,180.89. Memorandum of Appeal 3.Aggrieved by the findings on both liability and quantum, the Appellants proffered this appeal. He has listed the following grounds:1.The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding the Respondent stated awards which were not proved at trial, leading to a miscarriage of justice.2.The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding the Respondent an award of special damages of Kshs. 1,499,180.89 when no evidence was tendered in court at the trial of the suit thereby arriving at an erroneous decision which has occasioned great miscarriage of justice.3.The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in making award on loss of earning capacity, cost of minder, and future medical expenses both in Kenya and India when the same were not proved as per the law as no evidence was led on the same arriving at manifestly high award which has occasioned great miscarriage of justice.4.The Learned Trial Magistrate misdirected himself by totally failing to consider the Appellants' submissions and cited authorities on record as well as failing to apply precedents and tenets of the law applicable thereby arriving at awards which are manifestly excessive.5.The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact by holding the Appellants wholly liable when there was evidence on record by the Respondent contrary to such decision thereby reaching to an erroneous decision which has occasioned great miscarriage of justice.6.The Learned Trial Magistrate failed to adequately evaluate the evidence and exhibits on record at the trial thereby arriving at decisions unsustainable in law. 4.The Appeal was heard by way of written submissions. Appellants’ Submissions 5.The Appellants herein contend that the trial court’s findings on both liability and quantum was wrong. They aver that the Learned Magistrate reached a conclusion from a point of deficiency specifically their failure to enjoin a third party rather than evaluating the existing evidence. 6.They argue that the trial court ignored vital viva voce evidence, particularly the Respondent’s own admission during cross-examination that her driver should have given way at the time of the collision. 7.The Appellants further impugn the evidence of the Investigating Officer (PW3), stating that he was not the initial officer at the scene and his testimony was based on police abstract that lacked a supporting investigation report. Relying on the finding in the case of Kayjay Packaging Limited & Another v Njuguna (2025)KEHC 7122 (KLR), they submit that a police abstract alone, without a tested investigation, lacks sound basis to conclusively ascribe blame. They buttress this by citing Sections 107, 108, and 109 of the Evidence Act and the case of Evans Otieno Nyakwana v Cleophas Bwana Ongaro(2015) KEHC 8440 (KLR), asserting that the legal burden of proof remained with the Respondent to prove her case, a duty they submit , she failed to discharge. 8.The Appellants argue that the awards were manifestly excessive. Regarding general damages, they propose a reduction to Kshs. 1,200,000, citing the principles from the court of Appeal on interference of the court awards as established in Kemfro Africa Limited t/a Meru Express Services (1976) & Another v Lubia & Another (No. 2)(1985) eKLR. They further rely on Songok & Another v Baraka (2025)KEHC 5672 (KLR) to argue that the injuries sustained did not warrant the high award. 9.The Appellants contend that the trial court’s rejection of the multiplier approach when assessing loss of earning capacity was contradictory, as the final award surpassed what the multiplier approach would have yielded. They propose a sum of Kshs. 2,700,000. 10.On special damages, they have relied on the decision in Capital Fish Kenya Limited v The Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited(2016) KECA 56 (KLR), in support of contention that these must be strictly proved. They challenge the medical receipts from India, noting the Respondent failed to indicate the exchange rates used for foreign currencies or the specific dates those rates were effective, proposing instead a total of Kshs. 385,169.39 under this head of damages. 11.Finally, the Appellants contest the award for future medical expenses in India. They point to the Respondent's testimony that she had refused to go back to India hospitals after recurring infections and argue that since the specific treatment she sought in India was available in Kenya, she is not entitled to travel or treatment costs for India. They propose a cumulative award of Kshs. 200,000 for future medical treatment. Respondent’s Submissions 12.. On liability, the Respondent maintains that the finding of 100% blame against the Appellants was correct. It is argued that the respondent’s evidence that the Appellants’ vehicle went directly to the path of the vehicle she was in remained uncontroverted. She argues that the Appellants’ failure to prosecute a third-party notice was a central issue and that they cannot now seek to apportion liability to a party not joined in the suit. 13.In support of the trial court’s evaluation of evidence, the Respondent cites Mursal & Another v Manese (Suing As The Legal Administrator of Dalphine Kanini Manesa) Civil Appeal E20 of 2021 KEHC 282 (KLR) to buttress their submissions. 14.On the quantum of damages, the Respondent argues that the award of Kshs. 4,000,000 for general damages was fair, given her near -fatal injuries, multiple surgeries, and 70% permanent disability. She has relied on the decisions in the case of David Chege Ndungu v Robert Macharia & 2 others (2014)eKLR and Martin Kidake v Wilson Simiyu Siambi (2014)eKLR as sound precedents for such awards. She distinguishes the Appellants' reliance on the Songok case, noting the disability in that instance was only 5%, compared to her own disability at 70%. 15.The Respondent asserts that all claims were specifically pleaded and proved, through documentary evidence. She maintains the trial Magistrate was well aware of the foreign currency receipts and correctly applied exchange rates to arrive at the justified sum of Kshs. 1,499,180.89. 16.The Respondent submits that her travel to India was established as a necessity rather than a preference. She supports the trial court’s awards for treatment in Kenya (Kshs. 700,000), India (Kshs. 892,887.16), 17.the award of Kshs. 4,000,000 for general and travel expenses (Kshs. 72,894.39. Summary of Evidence at the Trial Court 18.PW1, was the respondent herein. She testified that on 3rd April 2010, she was traveling from Nairobi to Nyeri when she was involved in a head-on collision. She stated that she saw the Appellants' vehicle, registration number KAM 359R, cross into the path Motor vehicle registration No. KAU 657Q at high speed, while overtaking another vehicle. The two vehicles collided. As a result of the accident, she sustained severe injuries, consisting of comminuted segmental fractures of the right tibia, fibula, and femur, resulting in a 70% permanent disability. She was admitted to AIC Kijabe Mission Hospital for over five months and later sought specialized treatment in India. On cross-examination, she admitted her driver should have given way but maintained that the Appellants' vehicle crossed into her lane. 19.PW2, was the Respondent's father. He told the court that he pays the minder Kshs. 7,000 per month to assist his daughter. 20.PW3, was the Investigating Officer from Makuyu Police Station He produced the police abstract and referred to the Occurrence Book (OB) entries made immediately after the accident. He testified that the Appellants' vehicle, registration number KAM 359R, was to blame for the accident as it overtook when it was unsafe to do so, leading to the head-on collision with the other vehicle. Under cross-examination, he clarified he was not the initial investigating officer but confirmed the OB indicated the Appellant’s vehicle was moving at an excessive speed. 21.DW1, was the driver of the Appellants’ vehicle. He testified that he was part of the Safari Rally service crew stationed at Makuyu. He stated that while exiting the club station, vehicle registration number KAU 657Q came onto his lane while overtaking another matatu, leading to the collision. He maintained that he did not cause the accident and that the matatu driver was to blame. Analysis and determination 22.It is trite law that an Appeal to the High Court from Magistrate’s Court is by way of a re-trial. Consequently, this Court has the duty to review the evidence, do its independent analysis and arrive at its own findings. However due allowance must be made for the fact that the trial Court had the benefit of hearing and observing the witnesses first-hand. In the case of Gitobu Imanyara & 2 others v Attorney General [2016] eKLR the court of Appeal held:This being a first appeal, it is trite law, that this Court is not bound necessarily to accept the findings of fact by the court below and that an appeal to this Court from a trial by the High Court is by way of retrial and the principles upon which this Court acts in such an appeal are well settled. Briefly put, they are that this court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowances in this respect. See Selle and Another v Associated Motor Boat Company Limited and others [1968] EA 123 and Williamson Diamonds Ltd. V. Brown [1970] E.A.L.” 23.I have considered the trial record, the grounds of Appeal and the Submissions of the parties, and I have identified the following issues for determination:a).The question of liability.b).Whether the award on general damages and earning capacity were excessive.c).What should be the award on future costs of treatment.d).Whether the award on special damages was erroneous. Liability 24.There is no dispute on the fact that the Respondent was a passenger in Motor Vehicle Reg. No. KAU 657Q and that the said vehicle collided with the Appellants’ Motor Vehicle No. KAM 359R.In her pleadings and testimony the respondent accused the Appellants for negligence for the manner in which the vehicle was driven. The Appellants denied blame, and shifted it to the driver of KAU 657Q. However, the Appellants did not take out 3rd party proceedings to have the owner or driver of KAU 657Q admitted to the suit to defend themselves. 25.The trial court reasoned that the Appellant then ought to have taken out 3rd party proceedings if they were blaming a 3rd party.The Appellants has faulted this approach. They fault it for focusing on what they are calling “a point of deficiency” as opposed to the “existing evidence” . I understand the Appellants argument to be that the deficiency did not absolve the plaintiff of the burden of proof. To this extent I agree. 26.The respondent told the court that it is the Appellant’s vehicle which was overtaking, while the Appellant’s asserted that it was the other vehicle, which was driving on an unlawful lane. It is not correct therefore to assert as the Appellant did, that the respondent did not prove her case. She stated that there was a collision and the Appellants were the cause of that collision 27.What happened instead was that the court was presented with two different versions of how the accident occurred. On the face of it there was nothing to suggest that either witness was lying. However, the common ground was that there was a collision and the respondent was a passenger. 28.Am therefore satisfied that that to the extent that the respondent put blame on the Appellants, then on the balance of probabilities she proved her case against the Appellant. 29.Under paragraph 5 of the plaint she pleaded the principle of Res ipsa Lquitor. The doctrine once pleaded shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. In this case it shifted the burden to the drivers of both vehicles. In David Onchangu Orioki (Suing as personal representative of Anthony Nyabondo Onchangu (Deceased) v Ismael Nyasimi & Charles Michieka Nyoungo [2019] KECA 434 (KLR) the court of Appeal held: “ When a collision occurs between two vehicles, as between them, the issue of contributory negligence and apportionment may arise. However, as between a passenger and the owners/drivers of the two vehicles involved in the accident, liability on the part of the owners is 100% joint and several and no question of apportionment arises unless it is proved the passenger was negligent.” 30.Further in the case of David Onchangu Orioki (Suing as personal representative of Anthony Nyabondo Onchangu (Deceased) v Ismael Nyasimi & Charles Michieka Nyoungo [2019] KECA 434 (KLR) the same court held: “Although the defendant denied the accident but pleaded in the alternative that the accident was as a result of negligence on the part of the deceased, the defendant chose to call no evidence whatsoever, and that being the case the particulars of negligence on the part of the deceased were not proved and are mere allegations. The plaintiff, on the other hand pleaded the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor and produced documents including police abstract showing the date and place of the accident although no eye witness to the accident was called. However, since the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor was pleaded, the burden of proof was shifted to the defendant to disprove the particulars of negligence attributed to him.” 31.In their defence, the Appellants, I believe in appreciation of the above settled precedent did not apportion blame to the respondent but shifted blame on the driver of the opposite driver. 32.This takes me to the question of “deficiency “that the Appellant has referred to. The Appellants pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the opposite vehicle, as aforesaid. consequently, on the basis of David Onchangu’s case(supra) , they ought to have proved their case against the other vehicle. 33.Order 1 rule 15 of the Civil procedure Rules (CPR) provides for an elaborate procedure to be followed by a defendant claiming against a person not already a party to the suit. It provides as follows:“ 15.(1)Where a defendant claims as against any other person not already a party to the suit (hereinafter called the third party)— (a)that he is entitled to contribution or indemnity; or(b)that he is entitled to any relief or remedy relating to or connected with the original subject-matter of the suit and substantially the same as some relief or remedy claimed by the plaintiff; or(c)that any question or issue relating to or connected with the said subject-matter is substantially the same question or issue arising between the plaintiff and the defendant and should properly be determined not only as between the plaintiff and the defendant but as between the plaintiff and defendant and the third party or between any or either of them,he shall apply to the court within fourteen days after the close of pleadings for leave of the court to issue a notice(hereinafter called a third party notice) to that effect, and such leave shall be applied for by summons in chambers ex parte supported by affidavit." 34.The deficiency is the Appellant’s failure to comply with the above stated provisions of the civil procedure Rules, and against the background on this court’s finding on the whether the respondent had proved her case, then this deficiency makes them fully liable for the accident. In other words, had the Appellant complied with order 1 rule 15 of the CPR, the court will have had the mandate to decide on which of the drivers was to blame. It was the duty of the Appellants to bring in the third party whom they blamed for the accident. The court could not make an order against a person or entity who was not a party to the suit, as that would constitute an infringement of Article 50 of the constitution on the right to be heard. What the Appellants have called a point of deficiency, is founded on law. 35.Further I have perused the Appellants’ defence and I did not see any statement assigning or apportioning blame to the Respondent herein. This was instructive as the Respondent was a passenger and had no control of any of the vehicles. Therefore, she did not play any role in the causation of the accident. 36.The court therefore has no hesitation in finding that, in the circumstances, the Appellant fully carries the blame for the occurrence of the accident. DIVISION - General Damages. 37.There is no dispute on the nature and extent of injuries suffered by the Respondent. She sustained Multiple fractures, described as comminuted segmental fracture of the shaft of the right tibia and fibula, comminuted fracture of the proximal part of right femur. Fracture of the midshaft of the right, fracture of the shaft of the left tibia, right basal neck fracture of the Right tibia Gustillo 111 B; permanent loss of upper incisor tooth, shortening of the right leg and permanent disability of 70%. The trial Court assessed general damages for pain and suffering at Ksh, 4,000,000. 38.The Appellant argues that the amount was excessive and Ksh. 1,200,000 would have been reasonable. 39.It is trite law that assessment of damages is at the discretion of a trial Court and an appellate Court can only interfere with the aforesaid discretion, if it is based on wrong principles or if it is too high or too low so as to represent an erroneous estimate of the injury or loss suffered. Further it is now firmly established through numerous past decisions of the courts that comparable injury or loss should attract comparable awards, with inflationary trends being a further consideration. (see:) Odinga Jacktone Ouma vs Muareen Achieng O dera(2016) e KLR. This ensures that there is consistency and predictability in judicial decisions 40.I have compared the above injuries with those sustained by the claimant in the case of Tijan Kisilu vs. Bonfide clearing anfd forwarding Co. Ltd &2 others (2018) e KLR. The plaintiff had sustained rib fractures, bilateral femur fractures, profuse bleeding Pere partition avulsion of the mandible; comminuted compound fracture of the mandible plus extensive lacerations. The High Court awarded Ksh. 5,000,000 in 2018. In Catholic Diocese of Kisumu vs. Tele [2004] eKLR The plaintiff sustained multiple fractures albeit fracture with 30% disability. The court awarded Ksh 4,000,000. 41.In the present case, apart from the multiple fractures, the Respondent suffered resultant disability of 70%. she was hospitalized for 4 months, and part of that period was spent in the intensive care unit; there were subsequent further hospital admissions one of which was outside the country. During the same period, she underwent general surgeries. 42.In view of the aforegoing the award of Ksh, 4,000,000 cannot be said to have been too excessive to warrant any interference by this court. Loss of earning capacity 43.The Appellants have faulted the trial Court for adopting a global approach in assessing loss of earning capacity and that by so doing, the award went higher than if the multiplier approached had been adopted. 44.In assessing loss of earning capacity, it is now well established that the global and the multiplier approach are valid methods of assessing the damages, with consideration being made for whether the claimant had proof of income or not. It is awarded to the plaintiff whether or not one was in any gainful work at the time of injury. The trial Court cannot be therefore be faulted for taking a global approach, particularly when in this case, there was no proof of the alleged earnings. There was therefore no error in principle in the mode of assessment of this head of damages. 45.In any event, Contrary to the Appellant’s Submissions, the multiplier approach would have resulted in a higher award. That is to say, considering that the Court had adopted a multiplier of 30 years, then the multiplier approach would have worked out as follows: -(15,000/=X30X12) = 5,400,000.Thus, the award of Ksh. 3,000,00 was much less than what the Court would have arrived at,had the multiplier approach been adopted. 46.However, I have noticed that the Appellants, in their submissions had proposed that the amount be discounted by ½, basing their proposal in the finding of the court in the case of Brenda Nyaboke vs. German International Co-operation GIZ [2017]KEHC 452(KLR) .The cited decision is a High Court decision, and whereas it may be persuasive to this court , it is not binding on it. I have further perused a number of decisions of the superior courts established that dependency ratio is not a factor when assessing loss of earning capacity. I am satisfied that considering the age of the Respondent, the global figure of Ksh. 3,000,000 was reasonable. The cost of future treatment 47.The Appellant has submitted that the cost of future treatment in india is no longer applicable as the Respondent informed the Court that she has opted to be treated in Kenya; that the only relevant costs is Ksh. 200,000 as per the testimony of the Respondent. 48.I have read through the various medical records that have been submitted in Evidence. I am of the view that had Dr. Muleshe been called to testify, he would have shed light on some of the grey areas, particularly in relation to some of the medical procedures that have so far been carried out and what was remaining, as at the time he examined Respondent on 02/5/2014. There is no doubt that the plaintiff had suffered severe injuries, had undergone extensive medical procedures and from the evidence, further procedures will need to be carried out. The manner in which the respondent prosecuted her case was rather lazy, in the circumstances 49.Nevertheless, this is what I have deciphered from the many medical records in regard to future treatment:a)When Dr. Muleshe examined the Respondent on 4/5/2011 X-ray review showed that there was a total of four (4) metal implants located on the lower tibia shaft, right femur shaft, proximal femur (apparently the left) and left femur shaft (Pg. 16 of the record of the Appeal). Then while concluding his report he recorded: “The metal implants on her lower limbs will require to be removed at the estimated costs of Ksh. 500,000”b).Then from the Respondent’s testimony, and Dr. Muleshe’s report of 02/5/2014, the right femur didn’t heal, occasioning many other visits to hospitals, including spine clinic in India. There was also a Malunion of the right tibial /fibula bone. Following the treatment in India, Dr. Shah in his report stated: - “that the Respondent will require removal of implants on the right tibia and fibula, and for the removal the said implants , he estimated the costs at 890 U.S dollars”.c).On 02/05/2014 on her second visit to Dr. Muleshe the Doctor observed that the left femur and left tibia had healed with “IM nail in situ” Then concludes by stating that the 2 nails in the left femur and fibula will be removed at an estimated cost of Ksh. 200,000.He also observed that the right femur and right tibia were still problematic. 50.What I have understood therefore is that when Dr. Muleshe gave an estimate of Ksh. 500,000 in 2021, he was referring to all the implants. In 2014, he noted that the fractures on the left leg had healed but the other on the right were still problematic. He thus concludes that the removal of the two nails on the left leg will require Ksh. 200,000. 51.However, the Respondent had to go to India because of the chronic osteomyelitis of the right femur and non-union of the right tibia, which Dr. Muleshe had observed were still problematic as aforesaid. And in India these two fractures were what were attended to (pg. 211 of the record) Dr. Shah concluded by stating that the removal of the plates from the right tibia and femur will be approximately 8900 dollars (Pg 212 of the record). 52.It is evident therefore that Dr Muleshe’s estimated cost of ksh. 200,000 referred to the removal of the implants on the left leg , while Dr. Shah ‘s estimate of 890 U.S dollars was referring to the removal of the ones on the right leg. 53.It then follows that Dr. Muleshe’s estimate of ksh. 500,000 for the four or five implants had been overtaken by events. Thus, the lumping of Ksh. 500,000 and Ksh. 200,000 to arrive at a total cost of ksh. 700,000 was erroneous. Thus the only treatment costs that was proved and due to be incurred in Kenya is Ksh. 200,000. 54.For the treatment in India, I have observed that the Appellants are not disputing the particulars of this claim. Their submission is that the Respondent has sought treatment in Kenya and has not gone to India. 55.The respondent told the court that she suffered some infection and she opted to be treated locally instead of going to india. I have carefully read her testimony and I established that at no instance did she tell the court that she was not going to India for the removal of the metal implants. Indeed in her evidence in chief (given by way of a written statement) she stated that she will need to travel to India for the removal of the implants . The trial Magistrate observed, and correctly so, that previously she sought treatment in India because the right leg had not healed despite repeated treatments. The record shows that the treatments being referred to had taken place in Kenyatta National Hospital, PCEA Kikuyu and Consolata hospital in Njeri without relief. The intention to get further treatment in India for purposes of remaining the two plates is not therefore without basis. The trial Magistrate observation and finding was therefore based on Evidence. 56.In her second further Amended Plaint the Respondent pleaded Ksh 892, 887.16 as the cost of future treatment in India. This was based on the invoice of US dollars 890 issued by Dr. Patel, in the month of May 2018. A search at Central Bank of Kenya website shows that 1 US dollar was equivalent to ksh. 100 . The estimate of Ksh, 892, 887 was therefore correct . The extra 180, 583.92 was for travel and incidental costs. Am therefore satisfied that the Appellant proved, both the need for further treatment in India and actual costs thereof. Special Damages 57.The Appellant’s Complaint in respect to this head of damages is that the award was lacking in particulars; that the receipts were in foreign currencies and the exchanged rate for Indian rupees against the Kenyan shillings was no indicated. The Appellant have proposed Ksh. 385, 169 39 instead. 58.The Respondent pleaded Ksh. 1,112,011.50 as the amount that was spent in India. I agree with the Appellant that the currency of payment is not indicated. The Respondent in her pleadings and submissions made no effort to state the currency rate of change, of how they arrived at the figure of 1,112,011.50 in Kenya shillings. However, on cross- examination, the respondent stated that it was in US dollars, but there was no consolidated figure given in the alleged dollars for the court to ascertain that the correct prevailing conversion rate was used. Further a keen look at the many receipts submitted in evidence show that the currency of payments are not indicated. Thus even if the court was to take the trouble to do the conversion, there were insufficiency of materials particulars. This was a case of throwing documents at the Court and hoping that the Court will figure out what the plaintiff was seeking for. It is another evidence of laziness earlier referred to, on the part of Respondent. 59.I have observed that the trial magistrate, while returning a positive verdict on this head of damages has referred to “exchange rate” at the time without specifying what currency he had in mind and at what rate the referred currency was exchanging against the Kenyan shilling at the time. The law on special damages is well established;- It is not enough to specifically plead , they must also be strictly proved. This part of the treatment costs was not proved. Special damages is hereby discounted by Ksh. 1,112,011.50 attributed to the treatment in India , leaving a balance of 387, 169.39. 60.On the allegation that the documents presented were invoices, however, that observation is not correct. The documents are described as either “Retail invoices” of counter-sale. Such documents normally operate as invoices and evidence of sale. 61.In view of all the aforegoing , these are the final orders:a.The Appeal on liability is hereby dismissed.b.The Lower Court award on general damages is upheld.c.The Lower Court award on loss of earning capacity is upheld.d.The cost of future treatment in Kenya for Ksh. 700,000 is hereby set aside, and substituted with Ksh. 200,000.e.The Lower Court award on future treatment in India as well as the cost of the Air ticket is upheld.f.Special damages of 1,499, 180.89 is hereby set aside and substituted with Ksh. 387, 169.39.g.The awards will attract interest from the date of Judgment at the trial Court.h.Each party to meet their own costs in this Appeal. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT ISIOLO, THIS 2ND DAY OF JUNE, 2026S. CHIRCHIRJUDGEIn the presence of:-Roba Katelo-Court Assistant