https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/10772

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT BUNGOMA** **CIVIL APPEAL NO. E052 OF 2022** **EUNICE BUNUSU ANDAKO (Suing as the Administratrix of the Estate of BYRUM NASHISAKO OWITI, deceased) ................................APPELLANT** **VERSUS** **KANG'ETHE FRANCIS..........................................................RESPONDENT** ***(Being an appeal from the judgment and decree of Hon. P. N. Gesora, Chief Magistrate, delivered on 7th June 2022 in Bungoma Chief Magistrate's Court Civil Suit No. 229 of 2010)*** **J U D G M E N T** 1. This is an appeal from the judgment delivered by Hon P.N. Gesora, CM on 7th June 2022 in **Bungoma CMCC No. 229 of 2010**, in which the trial court dismissed with costs the Appellant's claim for general and special damages arising from a fatal road traffic accident, on the ground that the Appellant had failed to prove liability against the Respondent. 2. The Appellant, Eunice Bunusu Andako, sued in her capacity as the administratrix of the estate of the late Byrum Nashisako Owiti (the deceased), pursuant to the **Law Reform Act (Cap 26) and the Fatal Accidents Act (Cap 32) of the Laws of Kenya.** 3. By a Plaint, the Appellant averred that on or about 24th December 2008, the deceased was lawfully riding his motorcycle registration number KBE 692Z along the Kakamega–Mumias road at Kisumu Ndogo, when the Respondent, by himself, his driver, servant and/or employee, so negligently and recklessly drove motor vehicle registration number KAZ 251X as to cause an accident in which the deceased was instantly killed. 4. The particulars of negligence pleaded against the Respondent included: failing to swerve, hoot or brake to avoid the accident, driving under the influence of alcohol, driving on the wrong side of the road, failing to adhere to traffic rules, and failing to maintain a roadworthy motor vehicle. The Appellant pleaded and itemised special damages totalling Kshs 66,925/=, comprising the cost of a coffin (Kshs 4,500/=), mortuary fees (Kshs 11,400/=), a limited grant (Kshs 925/=), a police abstract (Kshs 500/=) and funeral expenses (Kshs 49,600/=), in addition to a claim for general damages under the **Law Reform Act and the Fatal Accidents Act** on behalf of the deceased's dependants, namely his widow and three children. 5. The Respondent entered appearance and filed a Statement of Defence in which he denied the Appellant's allegations in their entirety, put her to strict proof thereof, and specifically denied being the owner of the motor vehicle registration number KAZ 251X, or being vicariously liable for the acts of any driver, servant or employee said to have caused the accident. He prayed that the suit be dismissed with costs. 6. At the hearing, the Appellant testified as PW1 and adopted her witness statement. PW2, a witness who had been riding pillion at the material time, testified as to the circumstances of the accident and confirmed that the deceased sustained fatal injuries after being hit by motor vehicle registration KAZ 251X, which was travelling in the same direction and swiftly encroached onto the deceased's lane before hitting him from behind. 7. PC Mandine Wambalo, the investigating officer attached to Mumias Police Station, testified as PW3. He confirmed that the accident, which was the subject matter of the proceedings, occurred and that the rider of the motorcycle sustained fatal injuries. He produced the police abstract in evidence. On cross-examination, PW3 conceded that he could not confirm the primary source from which the identity of the registered owner of motor vehicle KAZ 251X had been obtained and stated that the information indicating the Respondent as the owner had been extracted from the initial police report and other documents, none of which were produced before the trial court. 8. The Respondent testified as DW1. He denied being correctly sued as the owner of the motor vehicle in question, stated that the registration details in question were not known to him, and denied knowledge of one Ramadhan Abdi Juma, the driver alleged in the further amended defence to have caused the accident. He contended that no evidence had been adduced connecting him to ownership of the motor vehicle or to its driver, whether as employer or otherwise, and that the suit disclosed a misjoinder of parties. 9. DW2 testified on the question of ownership. He stated that he could not ascertain, from the records of the National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA) produced before the court, that the Respondent was the registered or beneficial owner of motor vehicle KAZ 251X, and that the certificate of official search produced was insufficient proof of ownership. 10. In its judgment delivered on 7th June 2022, the trial court considered but declined to strike out the suit on the ground of misjoinder, holding that no formal amendment had been sought and that the defect, in any event, was curable and not fatal to the proceedings. 11. On the substantive question of liability, the trial court found that the Respondent had denied being the driver, servant, employer or owner of motor vehicle KAZ 251X on the material day, and that no cogent evidence had been placed before it establishing either that the Respondent was the registered or beneficial owner of the offending vehicle, or that the driver of the vehicle was the Respondent's servant or employee acting in the course of his employment. 12. The trial court held that the doctrine of vicarious liability could not apply absent proof of an employment relationship and that the Appellant had, on the balance of probabilities, failed to establish liability against the Respondent. The suit was accordingly dismissed with costs to the Respondent. 13. Notwithstanding the dismissal on liability, the trial court proceeded, protectively, to assess quantum. It awarded Kshs 70,000/= for pain and suffering, Kshs 200,000/= as a conventional award for loss of expectation of life, and, applying a multiplicand of Kshs 12,000/= (being the minimum wage, in the absence of proof of the deceased's actual income), a multiplier of 25 years and a dependency ratio of two-thirds, arrived at a figure of Kshs 2,400,000/= for loss of dependency. Together with special damages of Kshs 66,925/=, the trial court found that had liability been established, the Appellant would have been entitled to a total award of Kshs 2,736,925/=, together with costs and interest. 14. Aggrieved by the dismissal of her suit, the Appellant filed a Memorandum of Appeal dated 5th July 2022 setting out the following grounds: 15. **That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in dismissing the Appellant's suit when he, in his judgment, failed to take into account relevant materials that had been placed before him, to the prejudice of the Appellant;** 16. **That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact when he found that the Appellant had not established proof of ownership of motor vehicle registration number KAZ 251X;** 17. **That the learned trial magistrate completely failed in his duty to sufficiently analyse the evidence before him as required;** 18. **That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to find liability on the part of the Respondent when the Appellant had tendered sufficient evidence to prove the same;** 19. **That the learned trial magistrate's judgment was against the weight of the evidence on record; and** 20. **That the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in dismissing the Appellant's claim, which had not been rebutted by the Respondent, thereby raising the burden of proof above the requisite standard of a balance of probabilities.** 21. The Appellant prayed that the appeal be allowed with costs, the judgment and decree of the trial court be set aside, and that this Court do re-evaluate the evidence on record and substitute its own findings on both liability and quantum in her favour. 22. The record discloses that this appeal was, in the intervening period, dismissed for want of prosecution on 26th June 2024. The Appellant subsequently moved this Court by a Notice of Motion dated 27th August 2025, brought under **Section 1A, Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 12 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Rules**, seeking orders that the dismissal order be set aside and the appeal be reinstated for hearing. This Application was opposed by Counsel for the Respondents. 23. Upon considering the application, the affidavit evidence and the record, this court exercised its discretion under **Order 12 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Rules** and the overriding objective under **Sections 1A and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act**, and reinstated the appeal, being satisfied that a litigant ought not ordinarily to be condemned unheard or shut out from ventilating a substantive appeal on account of an omission attributable to the court registry and the conduct of successive advocates, and that no prejudice incapable of remedy by an appropriate order as to costs had been demonstrated by the Respondent. **Submissions** 1. The appeal was accordingly reinstated, and directions given that the same was to be canvassed by way of written submissions which Counsel were directed to file and they both complied. **Appellant's Written Submissions** 1. Learned Counsel for the Appellant filed written submissions dated 24th March 2026, in which it was submitted that the six grounds of appeal set out in the Memorandum of Appeal dated 5th July 2022 all turn on a single paramount question, namely, liability. 2. On liability, counsel invoked **Sections 107, 108, 109 and 112 of the Evidence Act (Cap 80**) regarding the burden and standard of proof in civil cases, and relied on **Khaoya v Cleophas Nyakwana Bwana Ongaro Juma [2015] eKLR and William Kabogo Gitau v George Thuo & 2 Others [2010] 1 KLR 526** for the proposition that he who alleges must prove, and that the legal burden lies with the party who would fail if no evidence were given on either side, while the evidential burden shifts to whichever party would fail if no further evidence were adduced. 3. That the standard throughout is proof on a balance of probabilities and not proof beyond a percentage certainty. Counsel submitted that PW3, the investigating officer, testified on behalf of the Appellant and produced the police abstract, marked as an exhibit, which identified the Respondent, of P.O. Box 422, Kakamega as the registered owner of motor vehicle registration number KAZ 251X. 4. It was further submitted that the Respondent's own evidence and the documents at pages 54 to 66 of the Record of Appeal, comprising some ten documents which the Respondent himself procured and produced, were inconsistent with his denial of ownership. Counsel posed the rhetorical question: if the Respondent was not the owner of the offending motor vehicle, how did he procure and produce all ten documents relating to it contained in the record? 5. Counsel further submitted that under the provisions of Section 107(1) of the Evidence Act that they have herein cited and relied upon, when the plaintiff produced the police abstract which shows that the Respondent is is the owner of the motor vehicle in issue, the burden of proof shifted to the Respondent to rebut the police abstract and the Respondent was therefore duty bound to produce a register from KRA and/or from the NTSA to show who the owner of the motor vehicle is. That to simply deny liability generally as the Respondent had done is not enough. He cited **Khaoya v Juma (Civil Appeal E084 of 2022) [2025] KEHC(KLR)** at para 25&26 and **Mutua & Another v Moseti(Civil AppealE005 of 2024[2025] KEHC 3926(KLR) 21 (March 2025)** at paragraphs 31&32 in this regard 6. On quantum, counsel referred to the trial court's protective assessment, set out at pages 99 to 105 of the Record of Appeal, which resulted in a total award of Kshs 2,736,925/= and submitted that the Appellant was satisfied with the computation, so. The Appellant accordingly prayed that the appeal be allowed with costs, both here and in the court below. **The Respondent's Written Submissions** 1. Counsel for the Respondent filed written submissions in response, framing the appeal as raising two principal issues: proof of negligence and proof of ownership of the offending motor vehicle. 2. On proof of negligence, counsel submitted that the Appellant's plaint did not aver that the Respondent himself was driving the motor vehicle registered as KAZ 251X on the material day and that all the particulars of negligence pleaded in paragraph 3 of the Plaint were attributable to the unidentified driver of the said motor vehicle and not to the Respondent personally. Further, that in her testimony and witness statement, the Appellant did not state who was driving the vehicle, and none of the Appellant's witnesses, including PW2 and PW3, identified the driver by name or otherwise. 3. Counsel also submitted that, absent identification and joinder of the driver as a party found liable in negligence, the Respondent, who was sued only in a vicarious capacity as alleged owner, could not be held liable, since vicarious liability presupposes primary negligence established against a servant or agent and proof of the nexus of employment or agency between that servant or agent and the Respondent. Counsel posed the questions: who the driver was, whether the driver was an employee of the Respondent, and what the nexus between the driver and the Respondent was, none of which the Appellant had established. 4. On the second issue, it was submitted that the evidence adduced did not prove ownership of motor vehicle KAZ 251X on a balance of probabilities, and that the police abstract relied upon by the Appellant amounted to secondary evidence which did not fall within the exceptions under which secondary evidence may be admitted. 5. Counsel referred to **Sections 64, 66, 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act**, submitting that documents must ordinarily be proved by primary evidence save in the exceptional circumstances set out in **Section 68**, for instance, where the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power of the opposite party, or of a person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the court, none of which was pleaded or established. 6. The counsel further submitted that the police abstract is inherently a secondary document derived from primary sources such as the motor vehicle registration certificate, logbook, or insurance policy, none of which were produced in court. Additionally, PW3’s cross-examination confirmed the abstract’s inadequacy as evidence of ownership, as the witness admitted he was unaware of how the investigating officer identified the owner. 7. The witness explained that the information was obtained from an initial report and other documents, which were never produced before the court. The argument was supported by reference to **Damaris Mwende Mutua & Another v Car and General (Trading) Ltd [2025] KEHC 13059 (KLR)**. The Respondent accordingly prayed that the appeal be dismissed with costs, the judgment of the trial court being unimpeachable both on the facts and the law. **Determination** 1. This is a first appeal. the duty of the 1st Appellate Court is as was set out in the case of **Selle vs Associated Motor Boat Company Ltd [1968] E.A. 123** to the following effect; **“.... An appeal from a High Court is by way of rehearing and the Court of Appeal is a first appellate court. It is not sufficient to merely scrutinize the evidence and say whether the trial Judge was right or wrong. An appellate court is not bound to accept the trial Judge’s findings of fact if it appears either that he failed to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities or if the impression of the demeanour of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence generally.”** 1. The court shall therefore be guided by it and also **Abok James Odera t/a AJ Odera & Associates -vs- John Patrick Machira t/a Machira & Co Advocates [2013] eKLR,** wherein the holding is of a similar tenor. That said, having carefully considered the record of appeal, the judgment of the trial court, the grounds set out in the Memorandum of Appeal and the rival submissions of the parties, the court finds that the following issues arise for determination: 2. **Whether the Appellant proved, on a balance of probabilities, that the Respondent was the registered and/or beneficial owner of motor vehicle registration number KAZ 251X** 3. **Whether the Appellant proved liability, whether directly or vicariously, against the Respondent for the accident that caused the death of the deceased** 4. **Whether, in the event that liability is established, the quantum assessed by the trial court was proper; and** 5. **Who shall bear the costs of the appeal?** 6. Regarding ownership of the motor vehicle, it is the Appellant’s averment at paragraph 3) of their plaint is that at the time of the accident, the motor vehicle was being driven by the defendant or his driver servant and/or employee. The court notes that on the other hand, the Respondent from the very onset in their defence at paragraph 2) thereof stated that he is not aware of the said averments by the Appellant as laid out at paragraph 3) of the plaint and put the appellant to strict proof. 1. Thereafter in his testimony, the Respondent denied that the vehicle in question belongs to him. He also denied that he was the driver of the said motor vehicle as at the time of the accident and further denied that the driver of the same was his employee, servant and/or agent and stated that he did not know who was driving the car at the time of the accident or at all. 2. It is on this basis that the Respondent denies that he caused the accident or that he is vicariously liable for the acts of the person who caused it. Counsel for the Appellant submitted that by producing the police abstract wherein it was indicated that the Respondent was the insured, then they had satisfied the burden of proof placed upon then under **Section 107 the Evidence Act Cap 80** on a balance of probabilities and that the burden to prove otherwise had now shifted to the Respondent and which burden the Respondent had failed to discharge. 3. On this issue of who bears the burden of proof, **Section 107 of the Evidence Act (Cap 80)** places the legal burden of proving a fact upon the party who asserts it, and Section 108 places the evidential burden upon the party against whom judgment would be given if no further evidence were adduced. Section 109 places the proof of a particular fact upon a person who wishes the court to believe in its existence. All the cited provisions are now hereby reproduced as hereunder; **Section 107:** Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. **Section 108.** The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. **Section 109.** The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on the person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. 1. The standard of proof in civil matters as restated in **Maina & another v Maina & another [2026] eKLR and William Kabogo Gitau v Wachira & 2 others v Mwaniki & 2 others [2026]** requires a claimant to establish her case on a balance of probabilities, that is, that her version of events is more probable than not, though the legal and evidential burdens may, depending on the stage reached, shift between the parties. 2. Clearly, from the above provisions of the Evidence Act, the burden of proving the assertion that the motor vehicle in question belongs to the Respondent is upon the Appellant for reasons that it is the Appellant who has made the assertion, and it is the Appellant who wishes the court to believe in this assertion and desires that the court on the strength of this assertion finds that it is the Respondent who is liable for causing the accident wherein the Appellant got injured and it is the Appellant’s case that would fail if no evidence at all were given by either side. 3. Counsel has submitted that the police abstract produced by the Appellant has wholly discharged this burden. What weight then should the court place on the police abstract in light of the fact that the plaintiff failed to produce ownership record from the NTSA explicitly indicating that the Respondent is the owner of the motor vehicle. 4. On this issue, the Court of Appeal in **Wekesa & Another vs. Mwangi & Another (Suing as the administrators of the Estate of James Kanene Mwangi - Deceased) (2023) KECA 1150 (KLR)** held that in the absence of challenge, a police abstract report would be sufficient proof of ownership of a motor vehicle but that, where it (the police abstract report) is challenged, the party relying on it would need to produce certificate from the Registrar or any other proof, such as an agreement for sale of the motor vehicle, as conclusive evidence in the absence of proof to the contrary. 5. It is to be noted that in this case, the fact of the entry in the police abstract attributing ownership to the Respondent has been vehemently vigorously and rigorously denied by the Respondent as already herein summarised. The Rebuttal by the Appellant is that the burden then shifted to the Respondent to avail evidence contrary to the entry in the police abstract. 6. On this submission, the court shall be guided by the decision of the Court of Appeal in **Gitobu Imanyara & 2 Others vs. Attorney General (2016) KECA 557** wherein the court held that the burden of proof lay with the person who asserts the existence of a fact; and that the standard of proof remains on a balance of probabilities on he who asserts, and does not change even in the absence of a rebuttal by the other side. In this regard then, the burden did not at all shift to the Respondent as submitted by the Counsel for the Appellant. 7. Indeed, under the legal provisions on the burden and incidence of proof as herein reproduced, it is the Appellant who was duty bound to avail the records from the NTSA, Registrar of Motor Vehicles, et al, that he submits that the Respondent ought to have availed to rebut the police abstract entry, and more so because these are public record that are available to any and every member of the public on request upon payment of the requisite fees. Further, it was not at all alluded to by the Appellant at any point in time that these documents were in the exclusive possession of the defendant against whom they were sought to be produced. 8. Further to the above, on the specific question of ownership, this Court is guided by the well-settled evidential hierarchy under **the Evidence Act** and as submitted *in extenso* by Counsel for the Respondent. **Section 67** provides that documents must be proved by primary evidence, except in the exceptional cases set out in **Section 68**, which include, among others, circumstances where the original document is shown or appears to be in the possession of the party against whom it is to be proved, or of a person beyond the reach of the court's process, or where, from the nature of the case, the original cannot, as a matter of practicality, be produced. These exceptions have not been pleaded and/or submitted to have been pertaining in the instant case. 9. A police abstract is, by its very nature, is a document prepared by an investigating officer from other primary sources, ordinarily the motor vehicle registration certificate (logbook) and records held by the National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA); it is not itself primary proof of ownership, but at best secondary evidence of what is recorded elsewhere. This was as was held in **Car and General (Trading) Limited v Mutua & another [2025] KEHC 13059 (KLR**) where the court echoed the holding in **Wekesa & Another vs. Mwangi & Another (supra) and** stated that; **“A police abstract can prove ownership of a motor vehicle where the evidence contained therein is not rebutted.”** 1. In the present case, the record of the trial court also shows that PW3, the investigating officer, candidly conceded on cross-examination that he could not state how the identity of the registered owner had come to be ascertained, and that the entry in the police abstract had been extracted from an initial report and other underlying documents which were at no time produced before the trial court. 2. No logbook, Certificate of registration, NTSA search or Insurance document naming the Respondent as owner of motor vehicle KAZ 251X was produced. The Respondent, for his part, testified as DW1 and denied ownership, a denial reinforced by DW2's evidence that the NTSA records produced did not establish the Respondent as the registered or beneficial owner. It is further to be noted that the Appellant in the plaint did also not make a specific averment that the Respondent was the register and/or beneficial owner of the accident motor vehicle. 3. While the Appellant's submission that the Respondent's production of the ten documents at pages 54 to 66 of the Record of Appeal is difficult to reconcile with an outright denial of any connection to the motor vehicle has some persuasive force as an inference, an inference, however reasonable, cannot substitute for the primary documentary proof of ownership which the law requires, particularly where the Respondent's evidence and that of DW2 stood largely unshaken on this point. 4. Based on my above conclusion, the court, exercising its duty to re-evaluate the evidence, is therefore unable to fault the trial court's finding that the Appellant did not discharge the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that the Respondent was the registered or beneficial owner of motor vehicle KAZ 251X. 5. On liability, the issue of vicarious liability was an issue for determination. The court of appeal in **Geoffrey Chege Nuthu v M/s Anverali & Brothers Civil Appeal No. 68 of 1997** applied **Morgans v Launchbury & Others [1972] 2 ALL E R 607** in which it was stated: “**In order to fix liability on the owner of a car for the negligence of a driver, it is necessary to show either that the driver was the owner’s servant or, at the material time, the driver was acting on the owner’s behalf as his agent. To establish the existence of the agency relationship, it is necessary to show that the driver was using the car at the owner’s request, express or implied, or on his instructions, and was doing so in the performance of the task or duty, thereby delegated to him by the owner**…” 1. In the same Nuthu case(supra) the Court restated the law on vicarious liability, adopting the statement of Newbold P in **Muwonge vs A.G. of Uganda [1967] E A 17** as follows: “**The law is so long as the driver’s act is committed by him in the course of his duty, even if he is acting deliberately, wantonly, negligently, or criminally, or even if he is acting for his own benefit or even if the act is committed contrary to his general instructions, the master is liable.”** 1. In this case, as the Respondent correctly submitted, the Plaint did not aver, nor did any witness identify, the driver of motor vehicle KAZ 251X by name. The particulars of negligence pleaded in paragraph 3) of the Plaint, on their face, were directed at the unidentified driver, servant and/or employee' of the Respondent, not at the Respondent personally. 2. Neither PW1, PW2, nor PW3 gave evidence identifying who was driving the offending vehicle at the material time, nor was any nexus of employment, agency or authorisation between that driver and the Respondent established. The driver was never joined as a party to the suit, and no finding of primary negligence was, or could properly have been, made against him. 3. In the absence of proof of ownership of the offending vehicle by the Respondent, and of identification of the driver together with proof of his relationship to the Respondent, the doctrine of vicarious liability cannot therefore arise, for there is, quite simply, no proven principal wrongdoer whose conduct can be imputed to the Respondent. This Court accordingly finds, in agreement with the trial court, that the Appellant did not discharge the burden of proving liability, whether direct or vicarious, against the Respondent. 4. However, this court is mindful of the tragic circumstances of this matter, a young man of twenty-five years lost his life in a road accident, leaving behind a widow and three young children. Sympathy for a bereaved family cannot, however, substitute for the evidential proof the law requires before civil liability can be imposed on a defendant. 5. As stated in **William Kabogo Gitau v George Thuo & 2 Others [2010] 1 KLR 526**, a party who is to succeed must do so on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence. A court cannot properly enter judgment for a claimant merely because the defence, on some peripheral matters, appeared unconvincing, where the claimant has not, on the totality of the evidence, tipped the scale of probabilities in her favour. 6. As liability has not been established, the question of quantum does not strictly arise for determination. This Court nonetheless observes, for completeness and in deference to the care taken by the trial court, that the protective assessment of Kshs 2,736,925/=, comprising Kshs 70,000/= for pain and suffering, Kshs 200,000/= as a conventional award for loss of expectation of life, Kshs 2,400,000/= for loss of dependency (computed using a multiplicand of Kshs 12,000/=, a multiplier of 25 years, and a two-thirds dependency ratio), and Kshs 66,925/= in special damages, was neither impugned by the Respondent nor challenged as excessive or erroneous in principle by either party on appeal, both parties having expressly indicated satisfaction with the computation. Had liability been established, this Court would have found no basis to interfere with the said assessment. 7. For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds no merit in the appeal. The Court makes the following final orders: 8. **The appeal be and is now hereby dismissed in its entirety for want of merit** 9. **The judgment and decree of the Chief Magistrate's Court at Bungoma delivered on 7th June 2022 in Bungoma CMCC No. 229 of 2010 be and is now hereby upheld** 10. **Each party is to bear their own costs of this appeal.** **Read dated and Signed at BUNGOMA on 16th July 2026** **E. OMINDE** **JUDGE**